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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

Acting Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, January 11

SUBJECT:

FROM:

1. The meeting today centers on two key topics:

What do we do now on the Contact Group negotiations?

What should be done to get the Croatians not to end the UN mandate?

## Next Steps on Negotiations on Bosnia

Assistant Secretary Holbrooke will brief about his 2. recent trip to Europe and on the next steps to advance the negotiations in the short window before Congress attempts to lift unilaterally the arms embargo on Bosnia. Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic had a public disagreement with Holbrooke this week, complaining about being pressured to accept the Bosnian Serb offer to accept the plan as the basic form tiations. [FYI, Dole's staffer -said after a briefing on Monay we were giving congressional staffers that Holbrooke was beginning to sound like Bosnian Serb General Mladic.] We have included an update of diplomatic developments since the last DC.

have included an update on the current status of the cessation of hostilities agreement.

## The Situation in Croatia

3. Last weekend,

the Croatians had accraca to end the UN mandate when it expires at the end of March. (There is an unconfirmed press report that UNPROFOR would be asked to leave by the end of January, but we doubt the accuracy of this report.) Tudjman has been under heavy domestic pressure to show more progress on the Krajina, and the recent action could be an attempt to pressure the international community--especially the US--and the Krajina Serbs to make some progress on this issue. The Croats have sent a delegation, including Tudjman's son, to the US to explain their position and plan to inform Boutroe Chaling this decision tomorrow, State thinks it unlikely that Christopher will agree to meet with the delegation.

4. You have been tasked with the lead on what Tudjman's motives and strategy are likely to be and what are the near and long-term implications of the UN withdrawing from <u>Croatia</u>. We have included talking points on this for your use,

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think it is possible yet for Zagreb to be bought off again; last time around it was bought off by a meeting with the President, but his price has risen since the last mandate renewal.

We


5. Should UNPROFOR attempt to withdraw from Croatia, the Krajina Serbs might try to impede it. Also, a withdrawal raises the chances of fighting in Croatia, which could adversely impact humanitarian deliveries in Bosnia. Some of the UNPROFOR troops withdrawn from Croatia could possibly be redeployed to Bosnia, but it could also become a pretext to withdraw from Bosnia, too. DOD will comment on the practicality of having UNPROFOR in Bosnia and not in Croatia.

## Other issues

6. Sandy Berger is expected to identify for discussion at a future deputies meeting an apparent disconnect in US policy. On the one hand, the Administration favors keeping UNPROFOR in the Balkans and the looming budget gap for peacekeeping.

7. There will be a progress report on how the current Congressional briefings are going on unilateral lift. Apparently the public affairs people have decided to delay the press campaign against Dole's bill until later.

8. Leon Fuerth or State might voice concern about reopening of trade between the Krajina and Croatia. We have included a short paper on sanctions developments in Croatia for your background. Also, we have a Secret-level version of the inter-Serbian sanctions matrix for you to circulate if you choose. While such a development is positive for peace in Croatia, there is concern this will open the back door for both Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs. The deputies may consider asking the UN forces in Croatia to monitor the border, but the UN has always refused to help enforce sanctions and the issue could become irrelevant if UNPROFOR withdraws.



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