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16 December 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: Acting Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

SUBJECT: Deputies' Committee Meeting on Bosnia
19 December, 11:00-12:30

1. The Principals at their December 12 meeting agreed-- apparently at Strobe Talbott's suggestion--to reengage the Deputies in the policy discussions on Bosnia. This will be the first follow-up to that suggestion. There is some confusion at the working level about the goals the Principals wanted the Deputies to accomplish. Norm Schindler will accompany you to the meeting.

2. The purpose of the meeting is to consider the next steps in the development of Bosnia policy. You have not been tasked to lead on any topic, but may be asked to give an intelligence update, especially regarding Bosnian Serb compliance on Karadzic's promises to Carter, and any reactions to the ongoing Carter mission. Talking points for an intelligence update will be provided Monday morning at the pre-brief. Only one of the four papers scheduled for the meeting has been provided, an OSD paper on build-down. We will add others on Monday if they arrive.

Strategy to Deflect Unilateral Lift

3. If he is able to attend, Ambassador Thomas will report to the meeting on the results of this week's Contact Group meeting. However, it seems unlikely because his secretary mentioned that Thomas was planning to go back out with the Carter mission Saturday. The book includes a tab updating you on the status of negotiations in the Contact Group and the impact of the Carter mission on negotiations.

4. OSD will lead on discussions of how to make UNPROFOR more effective. The Principals have decided in previous meetings that we must keep UNPROFOR in Bosnia at all costs and tasked OSD with coming up with options how to make UNPROFOR more effective. This would counter arguments by Dole and others that UNPROFOR should be withdrawn--and then we lift the arms embargo. Another OSD proposal is a possible build-down strategy by which they would seek to level the playing field by destroying. We have provided several pieces of analysis on UNPROFOR:

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- A paper requested by the J2 concerning the likely reactions of the warring parties to measures to strengthen UNPROFOR and make it more aggressive;
- An analysis of the likely response by the warring parties to a UNPROFOR withdrawal;
- An analysis that judges UNPROFOR is likely to remain at least through the spring;
- An analysis that demonstrates that a UNPROFOR withdrawal is likely to lead to more intense fighting and a deterioration of the humanitarian situation;
- and the final version of the Special Estimate on the Prospects of UNPROFOR Withdrawal.

5. State will also lead on the Congressional/Public Strategy, which is mainly a strategy for dealing with probable Congressional pressure to impose unilateral lift. One probable item left over from the last Principals' Committee is whether to send briefers to the Congressional districts over the Christmas break. Also, there may be further discussion of the advisability of vetoing legislation including unilateral lift language.

Sanctions: Preparing for January 13th Decision

6. The Deputies will discuss strategy as the 100-day period of partial sanctions suspension ends on 13 January. At the last PC, the Principals agreed to make this decision based solely on the facts, but if an extension seemed to be in the works, the US would seek another 100-day suspension rather than for an indefinite period. We have included a summary of our assessment on the efficacy of inter-Serbian sanctions. As you know, the BTF has been leading the analytical effort on this issue.


Gaining Congressional Support for US Participation in NATO Operations to Withdraw UNPROFOR

7. At the last meeting, the Principals discussed whether to seek Congressional authorization for committing US ground troops to help evacuate UNPROFOR. This commitment was offered to the Allies to help repair the rift in NATO and also as a means to encourage UNPROFOR to stay. Some expressed concern that consulting with Congress might undermine Congressional prerogatives. OSD and State Congressional Affairs people were to do a head count of Congressional views on helping UNPROFOR withdraw.

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Strategy Post-withdrawal

8. The final item answers the question: what happens after a UNPROFOR withdrawal? Do we lift and strike? Do we pursue the build-down strategy? Congressional staffers have already indicated that Congress will want to know what the Administration plans to do as UNPROFOR is being withdrawn. State is slated to circulate a paper on next steps with the Allies and Russians. JCS will report on the state of military planning for the evacuation of UNPROFOR. The Principals wanted to complete this planning within a week, so the actual US commitment could be identified.



Ray Converse