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27 November 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

SUBJECT:

Principals' Committee Meeting on Bosnia

28 November 1994

- 1. Monday's Principals' Committee meeting, like the last meeting on 18 November, will focus on the deteriorating situation around Bihac and possible initiatives to deal with it. You will be asked to lead off the meeting with a situation assessment.
  - -- In preparation, <u>I suggest that you read the MILITARY UPDATE TAB--which includes a paper the NSC requested that we circulate prior to the meeting--and the HUMANITARIAN UPDATE TAB.</u>
  - -- During our pre-brief in the car, I will provide you with specific talking points based on these two papers and any late-breaking developments.
  - -- You will also have updated page-size maps of the Bihac area and Serb air defenses to distribute at the meeting in support of your briefing.
- 2. At the last Principals' Committee meeting, <u>Admiral Studeman briefed that the Bosnian Serbs' primary objective</u> was to destroy the ability of the Bosnian Government's V Corps to launch another offensive out of the Bihac pocket. We assessed that the Serbs did not want to enter Bihac city, and did not need to in order to achieve their military objective. The Serbs also want to reinstall rebel Muslim leader Abdic as leader of at least part of the enclave.
  - Nothing that has happened since is inconsistent with this view. The Serbs have moved into the "safe area" and outskirts of Bihac city, are close to cutting off the city to the north, appear ready to accept a cease-fire on their terms, and have suggested that government forces can surrender to Abdic.
  - -- Bihac city is most likely to "fall" if government forces cease to defend it; there were rumors on Friday--which proved untrue--that government troops had decided to abandon the city.
- 3. The situation in Bosnia--as well as US-Allied/Russian relations and UN-NATO relations--have become more tense since the last meeting, in part because of the

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NATO airstrikes against Udbina airfield and Serb air defense assets, and differences over the merits of additional airstrikes. We're in another one of those periods, such as the Gorazde crisis in April, when events seem to be spinning out of control and the international community is increasingly frustrated.

- -- Predictably, the Serbs have responded to the airstrikes with threats and by taking about 200 UNPROFOR troops and UN Military Observers hostage. Serbs also have fired on NATO aircraft repeatedly during the last several days.
- -- Some UNPROFOR participants--including the Canadians, British, and Russians--have again begun to talk about pulling their troops out of Bosnia.
- -- Both the Serbs and Muslims increasingly view UNPROFOR as the enemy; this weekend, Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic termed UNPROFOR Bosnia Commander Rose an "accomplice" in deaths occuring in Bihac.
- -- Both Saturday and today, the UN frustrated NATO plans to engage in airstrikes in response to the continuing Serb advance on Bihac.

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4. State and OSD/JCS will be asked to discuss options for dealing with the Bihac crisis, as well as the status of US military planning for assisting an UNPROFOR withdrawal and protecting US personnel in the region. None of the papers that have been tasked in connection with these discussions have arrived, even in draft.

over Bosnia.

5. There will also be another discussion of Nunn-Mitchell implementation, with State, OSD, and JCS taking the lead. The NUNN-MITCHELL TAB includes a summary of the minimal impact implementation of the amendment has had on intelligence sharing. Our limited discussions on Capitol Hill to date have not repeat not revealed any concern that the Intelligence Community is not doing enough to meet the requirements of the amendment.

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- -- The focus of the PC discussion is likely to be on other aspects of Nunn-Mitchell implementation, including reporting requirements on how we plan to train the Muslims outside Bosnia and eventual options for arming them.
- -- The NSC--reflecting negative feedback from Congressional staffers following the first interagency briefing effort two weeks ago--sent JCS back to the drawing board in reformulating its plans.
- The NSC still plans to look to us to brief key members and staffers on the broader implications of "lift." The Balkan Task Force is completing a comprehensive briefing. The ARMS EMBARGO LIFT TAB includes the Special Estimate requested by Principals at their meeting on 7 November.
- 6. Leon Fuerth will brief the Principals on the status of inter-Serbian sanctions. The INTER-SERBIAN SANCTIONS TAB includes the second monthly assessment that the Balkan Task Force prepared in support of his efforts. The SANCTIONS MATRIX TAB includes a matrix that we prepared at Leon's request--which he repeatedly has praised--to help synthesize the voluminous data on this issue. In addition, we continue to produce daily and weekly assessments, as well as special reports

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notetaker.	-						+ 5		
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A. Norman Schindler

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