

Approved for Release CIA Historical
Collections Division AR 70-14
1OCT2013





Intelligence Report

Office of European Analysis

3 November 1994

Implication of Lifting the UN Arms Embargo Against Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia

Lifting the UN arms embargo against Croatia, Slovenia, or Macedonia--in addition to Bosnia--would increase the chances for a broader conflict in the region. Zagreb--whose cooperation is vital in shipping arms to Bosnia--will insist on inclusion or, as is now occurring, on receiving a sizeable cut of arms flows to Bosnia. Lifting the arms embargo against Croatia, however, probably would hasten a decision by Zagreb to retake portions of the Krajina by force and possibly increase the scale of an offensive. Macedonia probably would not insist on inclusion in lift if it would threaten UNPROFOR's continued presence in Macedonia. An inflow of arms to Macedonia would damage its already difficult relations with Greece and Serbia and could add to Greek-Turkish tensions. Slovenia may hedge its support for lift at this time to avoid a resolution that includes Croatia and that could re-ignite Croatian-Serbian conflict over the Krajina.



Secret

Discussion

Lifting the UN arms embargo against Croatia, Slovenia, or Macedonia--in addition to Bosnia--would have the clear benefit of allowing the US and other Western governments to counter the political and economic influence of Islamic nations such as Iran who are currently providing covert military assistance to Bosnia and Croatia. On balance, however, we assess that including these three former Yugoslav republics in a lift resolution would increase the chances for a broader regional conflict. [redacted]


Croatia

Zagreb is ambivalent about whether arming the Bosnian federation will help end the Bosnian conflict. For this reason, it probably could live with an international decision to back off from overt, legal lift for Bosnia and Croatia, as long as covert flows of arms to Croatia and Bosnia continue.

- Both Defense Minister Susak and Foreign Minister Granic have expressed concern that lifting the embargo would lead UNPROFOR to withdraw from Bosnia, increase the level of fighting in Bosnia, and spread the conflict to Croatia.
- President Tudjman in September expressed concern [redacted] that the Bosnian Muslims could use their strengthened position to dominate the Bosnian Croats and try to create an Islamic state following the war.
- [redacted] Zagreb might prefer continued covert flows of arms to a formal lifting of the embargo against Bosnia and Croatia in an effort to avoid a preemptive Serb attack in Bosnia, [redacted]

If the Croatian Government is not included in the UN resolution to lift the arms embargo, it will insist at least on continuing to receive a cut of the weapons flowing across Croatian-controlled territory to the Bosnian Muslims. Zagreb could also tie its continued political support for the Bosnian federation to this issue as well.

This report was prepared by analysts from the DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force as requested by Ambassador Charles Thomas. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force, [redacted]



-Secret-

~~Secret~~

- Exclusion would increase opposition party criticism of President Tudjman for failing to gain US and international support for key Croatian interests, including resolving the Krajina issue and strengthening the country's defense posture. Tudjman probably would survive the challenge, however.

It would be extremely difficult to implement a lift resolution for Bosnia without Croatian cooperation. The most practical way to send heavy weapons to Bosnia would be by way of Croatian ports. Airdrops could not supply the federation forces with sufficient numbers of tanks and heavy artillery to make a difference on the battlefield and, in any event, would have to transit Croatian airspace.


Zagreb would see lifting the arms embargo on Croatia as tacit international approval to retake by force the Krajina if the negotiating process does not bear results.

- President Tudjman and other senior leaders have forewarned US and German officials in recent months that they are considering force if lift for Croatia occurs.
- With lift, Zagreb probably would be less patient with the negotiating process before taking military action. Depending on Zagreb's success in acquiring and integrating tanks, heavy artillery, and air defense assets, it might feel emboldened to undertake more ambitious offensives in the Krajina.
- If the UN withdrew from Croatia as well as Bosnia, this would remove the buffer between Croatian and Krajina Serb forces and further increase the risk of a Croatian attack and incidental confrontations that could escalate into serious fighting.

Macedonia

Macedonia will join Croatia and Slovenia in seeking inclusion in a UN resolution to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian federation. Skopje, which has little to spend on arms--probably would try to acquire aircraft, air defense systems, heavy artillery, and anti-tank weapons. If Macedonia were the only country excluded from a lift resolution, Skopje would view this as a lack of US commitment to its sovereignty.

- Skopje probably would increase its black-market efforts to purchase arms. It is negotiating with various Russian firms and has received three Russian Mi-8 transport helicopters since July, according to defense attache information.

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

Skopje sees the UN presence as integral to its legitimacy and essential to its security. It would be concerned if a lift scenario could threaten UNPROFOR's continued presence in Macedonia.

- In the event UNPROFOR withdrew, Skopje almost certainly would call on the US--among others--to provide an increased buffer force out of concern that heavier fighting in Bosnia would spark a wider conflict.

An inflow of arms to Macedonia would further undermine regional stability.


- Macedonian efforts to equip its army better would re-ignite Greek sensitivities about perceived Macedonian territorial ambitions and thwart progress on a comprehensive bilateral settlement.
- While Macedonia's large ethnic Albanian community would support efforts to better arm the country against Serbia, it could be concerned that Skopje also might use any new weapons to maintain internal control.
- Ankara, which already has a limited military exchange with Skopje, would immediately send arms to Macedonia, further exacerbating tensions with Greece.
- Belgrade would view influx of arms into Macedonia with great suspicion, fearing that the international community's intent was to sandwich Serbia between the modernized armies of its neighbors. It almost certainly would try to intimidate Skopje into sponsoring arms smuggling through the leaky Macedonian-Serbian border. Skopje would find it hard to ignore such pressure from its most powerful neighbor.

Slovenia

Slovenia repeatedly has sought exemption from the UN arms embargo, citing its distance from the Bosnian conflict as well as its desire and financial ability to buy US and Western equipment.

- Ljubljana's primary foreign policy goal is to join Western security and economic institutions, including NATO, according to its senior leadership. It views inclusion in the arms embargo as an unfair hindrance to Slovenia's efforts to escape imprisonment in the Yugoslav "problem."
- Slovenia's most pressing needs are for aircraft, air defense systems, and artillery.

Ljubljana nonetheless may hedge its support for lift at this time to avoid a resolution including Croatia.

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

- Ljubljana almost certainly is concerned that Zagreb would use lift to attack the Krajina Serbs--a conflict that could widen to involve Serbia and prompt large refugee flows to Slovenia.

Lifting the arms embargo against Slovenia would have the fewest consequences for regional stability.

- It could, however, increase the role of Slovenia as a route for arms going to former Yugoslav republics still under the embargo.
- Zagreb would be concerned if the embargo was lifted against Slovenia and not Croatia. It could temper its support for the Bosnian Croat-Muslim federation and turn up the heat on Ljubljana related to a border dispute in the Gulf of Piran and other bilateral issues.


Russian and Allied Views

Russia will remain strongly opposed to lifting the arms embargo, regardless of whether lift applies solely to Bosnia or includes Croatia, Slovenia, or Macedonia.

- Russian officials have repeatedly argued that any lift will only inflame the conflict and increase legislative pressures in Russia to assist the Serbs.
- Foreign Minister Kozyrev has publicly said that lifting the embargo should only be undertaken if the international community is willing to completely write off the peace process.

The West Europeans almost certainly will argue against ending the arms embargoes against Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia, employing the same arguments they have used to oppose lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian federation.

- The Europeans probably would argue that dropping sanctions against the republics bordering Bosnia, by improving the logistics for transporting arms to federation forces, would accelerate the flow of arms into Bosnia to all sides and fuel the conflict even more.
- French and British officials have told US diplomats that they want to avoid placing themselves in open opposition to the United States and that they would abstain on a vote in the UN Security Council on any resolution lifting the embargo against Bosnia, probably hoping Russia will veto it. They probably will stick with this course even if other former Yugoslav republics are included in the resolution.

~~Secret~~