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**Bosnia and Croatia: The Next Six Months**

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**Bosnia: Alternative Scenarios****I. Scenario: Achievement of a Political Settlement**

- **Likelihood.** Very low. Neither side currently wants a political settlement. The current Contact Group map is totally unacceptable to the Serbs. The Muslims would reject any changes that would make the map more palatable to the Serbs.
- **Conditions.** If the current map is the basis for a settlement, it probably would require a change in the top Bosnian Serb leadership, combined with international pressure on the Muslims to settle, including carrots (international guarantees and implementation force) and sticks (cut-off of current weapons flow). The current Bosnian Serb leadership might accept a modified map and arrangement permitting confederation with Serbia, but achievement of this settlement would require the same carrots and sticks with the Muslims.
- **Implications.** Violence is reduced to relatively low level. Implementation force including US troops would be required.

**II. Scenario: Continuation of the Status Quo--Battlefield Stalemate, Periodic Offensives and Counteroffensives, UNPROFOR Remains Deployed**

- **Likelihood.** High (60 percent).
- **Conditions.** No specific date is set for lifting the arms embargo. Flow of weapons to the Muslims does not increase much beyond current rate. Serbs do not launch preemptive strike. Muslims are relatively restrained in launching offensives against the Serbs.
- **Implications.** Large-scale humanitarian crisis averted. Islamic influence in Bosnia increases as more Middle Eastern/Islamic contingents deploy. Growing Islamic influence, perceived US abandonment of lift weakens Bosnian Government interest in the federation and strengthens Serb hardliners in Bosnia and Serbia. Bosnian Government grows increasingly vocal in its criticism of US failure to lift arms embargo. European war-

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weariness grows. Other Contact Group members increasingly will want to explore other options for a political settlement, including efforts to develop a new map, but will continue to resist lifting the arms embargo. Sanctions regime against Serbia gradually erodes.

### III. Scenario: Overall Increase in the Violence

- Likelihood. Moderate (40 percent).
  - Conditions. Arms embargo is lifted or Serbs conclude that lifting the arms embargo is inevitable in the spring and launch a preemptive attack. The flow of weapons to the Bosnian Muslims and Croatia increases. The Muslims increase offensive actions against the Serbs. UNPROFOR begins to retrench, withdrawing from the eastern enclaves.
  - Implications. Possibility of serious humanitarian crisis as Serbs attack eastern enclaves, tighten the supply and utility situation around Sarajevo, and take a very restrictive approach to aid deliveries. Serbian-Bosnian Serb border becomes more porous. Bosnian Government expects NATO military action to slow the Serbs. UNPROFOR comes under greater attack from Serbs. Pressure for UNPROFOR withdrawal goes up. US forces possibly called on to help extricate UNPROFOR. Croat enthusiasm for renewed war in the Krajina grows as Croatia's military machine absorbs the larger weapons flow.
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## Croatia: Alternative Scenarios

### I. Scenario: Continuation of the Status Quo—Stagnation

- Likelihood. Less than 50-50 chance.
- Conditions. Negotiations continue aimed at achieving a political settlement with some progress on economic issues and confidence-building measures. The Muslim-Croat federation in Bosnia remains shaky so that the Croats must worry about the situation there, or fighting resumes between Croats and Muslims. Fighting between Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia remains limited. Croats have doubts about their ability to score military gains with a minimum of casualties. International community maintains pressure on Croatia not to launch a military attack.
- Implications. Serbs continue to establish control over areas they control, but the spread of the conflict is averted.

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**II. Scenario: Renewal of Fighting--Limited Croatian Attack**

- Likelihood. More than 50-50 chance.
- Conditions. No progress is being made in negotiations. The international community is perceived by the Croats as not actively engaged. Croats are confident of military capabilities in some areas, but remain convinced that a broad attack will fail. Milosevic continues to maintain a blockade against the Krajina and Bosnian Serbs. The Croat-Muslim federation continues to plod along or some steps are made to strengthen it. Muslim-Serb fighting in Bosnia is on an upswing, with the Krajina Serbs providing some assistance to the Bosnian Serbs.
- Implications. UNPROFOR forces in Croatia could be placed in danger. Serbs could launch missiles against population centers as a weapon of terror. Both sides could employ air power. Fighting initiated by Croats could embolden nationalists in Serbia opposed to Milosevic's cut-off of aid to the Krajina and Bosnian Serbs.

**III. Scenario: Renewal of Fighting--Major Croatian Attack**

- Likelihood. About 20 percent chance.
- Conditions. No progress is made in negotiations between the Croats and Krajina Serbs. Zagreb perceives that the international community is not interested in the Krajina problem. Weakened arms embargo provides steady flow of weapons for Zagreb. Croats are confident--even overconfident--of their military capabilities. Bosnian Serbs are on the defensive against the Muslims in Bosnia, thereby less able to assist the Krajina Serbs. Milosevic's embargo continues to be felt strongly in the Krajina, particularly in terms of fuel shortages.
- Implications. Sharp increase in fighting, with the possibility that UNPROFOR forces may need to be extricated. Serbs will attack Croatian population centers. The Yugoslav Army will intervene if the Krajina Serbs begin to lose significant ground. A military stalemate is likely to develop.

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