

22 April 1994

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia  
18 April 1994

1. The meeting, chaired by National Security Advisor Lake, was called to assess five options for expanded UN/NATO military activity in Bosnia aimed at avoiding further Serb gains against Gorazde and other safe areas. In addition to the DCI, other attendees included Secretary Christopher, Secretary Perry, UN Ambassador Albright, JCS Chairman Shalikashvili, Deputy National Security Advisor Berger, and Leon Fuerth. Vice President Gore sat in for a few minutes.

2. The DCI briefed participants on the continued fighting around Gorazde, the defiant Serb reaction to the recent NATO air-strikes, Muslim disgust with the UN, and the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gorazde. He distributed copies of the latest Gorazde areas of control map and a paper detailing Bosnian Serb air defense assets in the Gorazde area. The DCI also addressed an inquiry on whether the Intelligence Community had evidence that the Muslims had provoked the Serb advance into the Gorazde enclave. Participants expressed concern that the situation around Sarajevo could rapidly deteriorate.

3. Several issues were raised at the outset of the meeting. Some participants sought clarification of the US position on sanctions against Serbia, making it clear that they thought the time was not right to even hint at any weakening of the sanctions regime. There was also concern that the US was overly reliant on the UN and Lt. General Rose for information about the situation in Bosnia. Finally, some participants expressed concern about recent CIA and DIA analyses which they thought had said that the Serbs would not make a significant advance into the Gorazde pocket.

4. The subsequent discussion of military options was inconclusive, but agreement emerged on several issues and principles:

- The US needed to take some action in response to the Serb advance on Gorazde, which was viewed as a direct threat to the credibility of NATO and the UN.

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- Current European and Russian outrage over Serb behavior has created an opening to win support for tougher international action.
  - The US has approached the limits of what it can credibly propose in terms of military action without committing US ground troops.
  - UNPROFOR is having trouble raising new troops, so any new proposals should not require additional forces.
  - Whatever action was decided on, NATO should not make any threats that it is not prepared to carry out.
  - The setback in Gorazde was a tactical defeat for the US/NATO; the wrong reaction could turn it into a strategic defeat.
5. Lake recommended further action in two areas:
- The NSC was to prepare a more detailed assessment of two military options for presentation to the President the next day: 1) Establishment of exclusion zones around safe areas in which any heavy weapons found would be subject to airstrikes. 2) Option #1 with some provisions to respond to any attacks on safe areas by heavy weapons or infantry with airstrikes.
  - Leon Fuerth was to seek interagency agreement on a package of measures to strengthen sanctions against Serbia.
6. The two-plus hour meeting resulted in several taskings for the Agency:
- Lake requested an assessment of recent violations of the Sarajevo cease-fire and exclusion zone, as well as prospects for a more serious confrontation in that area. (Delivered 18 April)

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- Lake requested Agency assistance in preparing an unclassified summary of how living conditions in some areas of Bosnia and Croatia had been improved by recent UN/NATO actions. (Delivered 18 April)
- The DCI requested an analysis of CIA's reporting on Serb objectives around Gorazde for presentation to Vice President Gore. (Delivered 19 April)

A. Norman Schindler  
Chief, Balkan Task Force

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