

Approved for Release CIA Historical
Collections Division AR 70-14 1OCT2013

~~SECRET~~

13 April 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia,
10 April 1994

1. The DCI and DDCI attended a PC called on short notice following the first NATO air-strikes against Bosnian Serb ground targets around Gorazde. President Clinton attended part of the meeting before leaving to deliver a press statement on the attack. National Security Advisor Lake chaired and other attendees included Deputy National Security Advisor Berger, Secretary Christopher, Secretary Perry, UN Ambassador Albright, JCS Chairman Shalikashvili, and Leon Fuerth. The meeting, which lasted almost two and one-half hours, also dealt briefly with the situation in Rwanda, following word that the last Americans had been evacuated successfully from that country. [redacted]

2. The meeting began with a briefing by General Shali on the chain of events leading to the attacks by two US F-16s. Participants were satisfied with the speed with which permission was granted for the attack and UNPROFOR Bosnia Commander Rose's subsequent statement that airpower "would be turned on again" if Serb attacks continued; the delay in actual execution of the attack was due to poor weather, which made it difficult to pinpoint the targets. The DDCI distributed a map of the Gorazde area and briefed participants on Serb military gains during the recent offensive and the balance of forces in the area. The DCI interjected at a later point that, [redacted], the UN believes the Muslims initiated the recent fighting in the Gorazde area. [redacted]

3. There was a lengthy--ultimately inconclusive--discussion of what to do next to prevent a further deterioration of the Gorazde situation. Participants were divided on whether to seek a Sarajevo-type exclusion zone around the city, or a more limited demand for a Serb withdrawal from recent gains combined with a threat to attack any forces firing on Gorazde. Participants decided to await the results of planned discussions the next day between UNPROFOR and the Bosnian Serbs (they did not take

[redacted]
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia,
10 April 1994

place) before taking the issue up again. Peter Tarnoff relayed information from Ambassador Redman in Sarajevo that the UN intended to insist in those talks that the Serbs stop shelling Gorazde and withdraw from recent gains.

4. A few other substantive notes of interest emerged from the discussion:

- Tarnoff relayed other information from Redman that UNPROFOR Commander DeLapresle was less inclined than Rose to approve additional air-strikes against Serb forces. Indeed, DeLapresle seemed to be staking out a position that could lead the Serbs to conclude that they can get away with anything as long as UN personnel are not targeted.
- Rose, who earlier had hoped to deploy some French forces to Gorazde, now was leaning toward deployment of a "less threatening" force comprised of Ukrainians, Egyptians, and Jordanians. The French were cooling toward participation in risky military operations, in part because of Prime Minister Balladur's declining political position at home.
- Redman talked to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Churkin in Belgrade, who had not been aware of the attack. Churkin reacted in a tense manner, claimed that the Serb offensive was due in part to Muslim provocations, and suggested that there should also be some Bosnian withdrawals if the Serbs are ordered to retreat from their recent gains.

5. Lake did not indicate when the next meeting on Bosnia would be held and there was no new tasking for the Agency.

A. Norman Schindler
Chief, Balkan Task Force

SECRET