

22 March 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Results of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia
and Macedonia, 8 March 1994

1. Sandy Berger chaired the meeting. Attendees included the DCI, Defense Secretary Perry, JCS Chairman Shalikashvili, Leon Fuerth, Deputy Secretary of State Talbott, and Rick Inderfurth. []

2. At the outset of the meeting, with all but Berger present, the DCI presented a four-minute video showing highlights of the 6 March 1994 [] mission in the Mostar area. Scenes showing moving people and vehicles provoked the greatest reaction, and several attendees commented at the end that the footage was "impressive."
[]

3. The meeting itself focused on issues related to augmenting the UN presence in Bosnia, which now stands at 13,000 troops. The DCI presented attendees with a matrix summarizing current troop deployments in Bosnia and the status of additional troop commitments.

- There was general agreement to recommend deployment of up to 500 additional US troops to Macedonia in the hope that Nordic troops currently there might be redeployed to Bosnia. Participants were aware that at least some of the Nordics might not agree to such a redeployment. Participants also wanted to avoid a situation in which only US troops were present in Macedonia, or US forces totally dominated the UNPROFOR component in Macedonia.
- There was general agreement that the US should provide air lift support to help other contributors augment their presence in Bosnia, charging only the "incremental cost" involved in using US equipment and personnel.
- There appeared to be a consensus--although discussion at the table was brief--that the East Europeans should be pressed for "more than symbolic" troop contributions to give meaning to their participation in the Partnership for Peace program. No one seemed to think, however, that they would make significant contributions.

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-- There was considerable agreement that use of Turkish troops in the former Yugoslavia would cause problems. Italian participation, by contrast, was viewed by some participants as a possibility if Italian domestic constraints could be overcome.

4. The meeting ended with a discussion of US relations with Greece and Turkey and how decisions on Macedonia and Bosnia would impact on both. There was a consensus to emphasize the need to examine all issues together--more US troops to Macedonia, providing KC-135 tankers for Turkey, denying the Turks an opportunity to play in Bosnia--and how this would impact on our relations with Greece and the upcoming Turkish elections. In response to a question, the DCI indicated CIA concern about rising Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey, but opined that Prime Minister Ciller's primary problems were economic and that there was little the US could do to help on that score. In setting policy priorities, no participant challenged the assertion that priority should be given to managing the crisis in the former Yugoslavia--including Macedonia--and that resultant problems with the Greeks would just have to be managed.

5. Berger did not indicate when the next PC or DC would occur and there was no new tasking for the Intelligence Community.

A. Norman Schindler
Chief, Balkan Task Force

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