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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting, 26 July 1993

1. The meeting was called to address four issues: a UN request for an American officer to serve as Chief of Staff of UNPROFOR forces; whether or not to support UNPROFOR proposals to reopen Tuzla airport for humanitarian deliveries; possible steps to improve Macedonian sanctions enforcement and elevate the level of US diplomatic representation; and sanctions against Croatia because of its actions in Bosnia. The meeting was chaired by Deputy National Security Advisor Berger. It also was attended by Lt. General Ryan (JCS), Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Slocombe (OSD), Undersecretary Tarnoff (State), Ambassador Bartholomew, National Security Advisor to the Vice President Fuerth, David Scheffer (for Ambassador Inderfurth), Jenonne Walker (NSC) and DDI Doug MacEachin.

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2. There were strong reservations about the proposal to name a US chief of staff for UNPROFOR. The general feeling around the table was that this would enmesh the US in the problem to an unacceptable degree.

3. The consensus was that there was no pressing need to open Tuzla airport, although the humanitarian situation there was likely to worsen and the issue to emerge again. One suggestion put on the table was that the US take the lead in making the facility useable and then turn it over to UNPROFOR, but this was not followed up. There was some disagreement between about the extent of the severity of the humanitarian problem in Tuzla, and Berger tasked the DDI with preparing an assessment of the humanitarian and military situation around Tuzla. (This was faxed to Berger and the other participants in the meeting on 28 July and disseminated internally).

4. There was an extended discussion of the Macedonian role in sanctions violations. There was considerable sentiment for using UNPROFOR and US forces to support sanctions monitoring, although some felt that this would make them a target of Macedonian resentment. There was considerable reluctance to take the lead in pushing this

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idea, but strong interest in getting behind a Swedish proposal to which would have UNPROFOR do just that. Leon Fuerth's Sanctions group was tasked with planning a strategy. It also was agreed that 10 additional US monitors should be added to the SAM force as soon as possible. The Greek role in sanctions violations came up, but there was no inclination at the table to take on Athens over this issue--the decision was to wait until the efficacy of new Greek procedures designed to make more difficult the diversion of oil and other goods to Serbia had been tested.

5. There was general agreement that it was in our interest to elevate the US level of representation in Macedonia, but not to a point which would be unacceptable to the Greeks. The sense of the group was that we should move to the "highest feasible" level of representation.

6. The issue of imposing sanctions against Croatia as a way of forcing it to cooperate with the Muslims and cease collaboration with the Serbs in central Bosnia was the most significant issue treated, but was discussed relatively briefly. Sentiment at the table was divided, with some pushing strongly for the quick imposition of multilateral sanctions, and others questioning the effect. The DDI expressed reservations about the impact on Muslim refugees in Croatia, and pointed out that sanctions might impede apparent progress toward a settlement in Geneva. These concerns were acknowledged, but the advocates of sanctions carried the day. The decision was to move immediately to significant economic sanctions (Phase II) and for State to draft a demarche to Zagreb. The Sanctions Group was directed to examine means for applying sanctions.

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Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

