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## Soviet Strategy To Derail US INF Deployment

An Intelligence Assessment

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NOCONTRACT (NC)  
PROPIN (PR)  
ORCON (OC)

REL.  
FGI  
WN

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## Soviet Strategy To Derail US INF Deployment

### Key Judgments

*Information available  
as of 24 February 1983  
was used in this report.*

In attempting to forestall US deployments of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe, scheduled to begin late this year, the Soviets will continue a complex strategy of inducements and threats designed to influence NATO governments, particularly West Germany before its March elections. With time growing short, their near-term objective evidently is to pressure NATO to delay the deployments and to move from its zero option proposal.

Moscow has begun an intensive effort to brief West European governments on the new Soviet proposal for a subceiling on missile launchers in Europe. The subceiling would result in substantial reductions in the number of Soviet medium-range ballistic missile launchers opposite NATO but would be linked to the number of French and British ballistic missile launchers and would preclude the deployment in Europe of US INF missiles. The Soviets have argued that their new proposal demonstrates "flexibility," in sharp contrast to US "intractability" in adhering to its zero option proposal. They also have hinted in vague terms to West European governments of certain "concessions" they might adopt at the INF negotiations in return for greater US flexibility.

At the same time, Moscow has warned NATO of the serious consequences should the US position remain unchanged in Geneva and the United States proceed with its deployments. Such consequences probably include: the lifting of their unilateral SS-20 moratorium, deployment of additional SS-20s in Europe, and the development of new cruise and ballistic missiles for deployment opposite NATO. Thus Moscow is trying to persuade the Europeans that their security would be better served by its proposal for a missile subceiling than by US INF deployments offset by corresponding Soviet counterdeployments.

Along with these diplomatic moves, the Soviets have actively promoted the European "peace movement" through aggressive propaganda and covert activities. They have focused their efforts primarily on those countries scheduled to base the new NATO missiles, with the chief emphasis on West Germany. Their campaign covers a whole spectrum of activities--from overt efforts to create a fear of nuclear war to covert measures, including forgeries and disinformation, to put NATO governments in the worst possible light.

Should US deployments begin without "acceptable" progress in the talks, the Soviets probably would continue to negotiate, but on a different basis—the Soviet side then would offer to trade off its "new" systems in exchange for US INF systems. Nevertheless the Soviets probably hope that the situation will not deteriorate to the point where they would find it necessary to counter NATO's deployments with hundreds of their own missiles. Having acknowledged in Geneva that they expect NATO to proceed with its plans, they must have seriously contemplated a negotiated outcome in which NATO is allowed some level of deployment. Given their particular concern over the Pershing II, the Soviets might continue to call for a ban on it, while grudgingly accepting some level of GLCM deployment—albeit sharply reduced from the planned 464 launchers. In return, they probably would merely reiterate their missile subceiling proposal. In fact, they could insist that any US GLCM deployment (augmenting the French and British missile launchers) be offset by deployments of additional Soviet missile launchers.

By late 1983 Moscow should be able to assess whether an INF agreement is possible. If it sees little prospect for one and is convinced that the NATO deployments will begin as scheduled in December 1983, it probably will begin implementing the military countermeasures foreshadowed last March by Brezhnev and more recently by Andropov. In his 21 December address, the new General Secretary pledged to deploy a new long-range cruise missile if Washington proceeds with cruise missile deployment. This response could be in the form of sea-launched cruise missile deployment off US shores as well as ground-launched cruise missile deployment opposite NATO. The Soviets also could choose to develop a new IRBM more capable than the SS-20 for deployment against Western Europe.

Moscow almost certainly would accompany such military moves with a sharply increased effort in covert activities in the five INF-basing countries. It probably would feel less constrained than before in promoting demonstrations and supporting radical peace groups, including some which might engage in sabotage against NATO facilities. Moscow also will use propaganda, disinformation, and support to Communist party and front groups to increase the political pain of the governments in the INF-basing countries. It will hope that this, in turn, will cause those countries to bring pressure on the United States to accede to an agreement that caps NATO deployment at a low level and minimizes reductions in Soviet forces.

Nevertheless, the Soviets realize that their overt "peace" campaign in Western Europe has been their most effective tactic. They also recognize that the peace movement there has indigenous roots and has acquired a momentum of its own. They will do what they can to nurture it without appearing too heavyhanded.

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## Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Key Judgments	iii
I. Moscow's View of NATO Deployment Plans	1
II. Soviet Negotiating and Overt Political Strategy Until Now	1
Negotiating Strategy	2
Overt Political Strategy	3
III. Soviet "Active Measures" Against INF: The Covert Campaign	4
Use of Communist Parties and Front Organizations	4
Financial Support	5
Propaganda Guidelines	6
Direct Involvement in Peace Groups	6
Influence Through Foreign Media and Disinformation	6
Effectiveness of Soviet Efforts	7
IV. Soviet Negotiating Options in Mid-to-Late 1983	7
Trade-off	7
Suspension	8
Walkout	8
Merger	8
Broader Context	9
V. Future Soviet Political Moves	9
VI. What Type of Agreement Might Moscow Accept?	9
VII. Possible Soviet Plans if Negotiations and Political Moves Fail	10
Military Options	10
Covert Measures	11
Appendix	
Significant INF-Related Events	13
Table	
The Missile Balance in Europe	3

## Soviet Strategy To Derail US INF Deployment

A key goal in Moscow's security policy since 1979 has been to derail NATO's plans to deploy the Pershing II medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) and the ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM). By blocking these deployments, scheduled to begin in late 1983, the USSR would retain its current predominance in intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) as well as further its long-term objective of weakening NATO and dividing Western Europe from the United States.

### I. Moscow's View of NATO Deployment Plans

The Soviets see US deployment of the Pershing II and GLCM not only as an effort to upset the theater nuclear balance, but as an attempt to skew the global nuclear balance in favor of the United States. In their view, the deployment of these systems—with the range and accuracy to strike hardened targets deep in the USSR—would change the linkage between theater and intercontinental war to the advantage of the United States. Without resorting to use of its central systems, the United States would be able to threaten the Soviet homeland, including a portion of the USSR's strategic forces and its command, control, and communications network (see map).

The Soviets see the new US systems as an effective counter to their SS-20 IRBM force and may believe that the scale of NATO's deployments would nullify the advantage in escalation control that they had planned to secure with that force. For example, Moscow would have to consider that NATO, if confronted with a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact, would be tempted to use its new INF systems before they were destroyed. If the Soviets believed NATO would use these systems, they might feel even more compelled to launch a theater-wide preemptive strike.

The Soviets probably would expect that Pershing IIs and GLCMs would be used concurrently and in conjunction with air- and sea-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs and SLCMs) and strikes by tactical and strategic aircraft in a full-scale nuclear attack. They

see the Pershing II as particularly dangerous because its short flight time and accuracy would make it a threat to major elements of their command structure and some of their strategic forces, which would not have adequate warning time to react. In December

[ ] that Moscow perceives the Pershing II as the most serious threat to its security, even more than the Minuteman III ICBM, because of the flight time factor.

The Soviets probably regard the GLCM as an effective complement to the Pershing II in that it could be used against strategic and tactical targets that are not time urgent and, when used with sea-launched and air-launched cruise missiles, would severely complicate Soviet air defense strategy. The deployment of both the Pershing II and the GLCM would seriously strain Soviet capabilities to locate and attack NATO's nuclear means in Europe early in a war. From a Soviet targeting standpoint, the GLCM would pose the greater problem because it would be dispersed among five countries, four of them deep in NATO's rear and behind NATO's air defense belt.

### II. Soviet Negotiating and Overt Political Strategy Until Now

The Soviets have employed a multifaceted strategy to achieve their INF arms control objectives. They clearly view the West European governments as the key to blocking US INF deployments. While negotiating with the United States in Geneva, they have carried out a propaganda and covert action offensive—primarily focused on the peace movement in Western Europe—similar to the one they waged in 1977-78 to stop NATO from deploying enhanced radiation weapons. In this campaign they have tried both overt and covert means, inducements as well as threats, to exploit anti-INF sentiment in West European governments. Perhaps the most heavyhanded threat intended

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for these governments was contained in an interview Brezhnev had with *Der Spiegel* in November 1981. He said that "in order to neutralize [NATO's] mobile missiles it would be necessary [for Moscow] to deal retaliatory strikes of great yield at the supposed areas of their deployment

Later that same month President Reagan announced his zero option proposal, which to the Soviets' dismay was eagerly embraced by Western Europe. The tenacity with which Washington adhered to this proposal during the last negotiating round probably convinced Moscow that a new Soviet initiative was needed to bring further pressure on the United States and NATO. Previous initiatives—for example, the unilateral moratorium on SS-20 deployment in the western USSR and the threat to put the United States and Western Europe in an "analogous" position if NATO deploys new INF systems—have not yielded measurable results in the negotiations or in West European capitals


One of Moscow's recent threats was a warning that NATO's INF deployment would necessitate the adoption of a Soviet launch-on-warning policy. This was implied in a statement issued by the Novosti press agency on 30 November that apparently was aimed at intimidating the West Europeans. This threat, like the others, probably was counterproductive because many West European governments saw it as a rather crude and clumsy attempt to pressure them to forgo INF deployment. □

*Negotiating Strategy.* Although Brezhnev had hinted in an address last October that the SS-20 deployment moratorium might be lifted soon, Defense Minister Ustinov, in a 6 December interview, implied that it was still in effect. Whatever the fate of the moratorium, Moscow has other diplomatic options to explore, particularly with the West Europeans, in the hope that they will exert pressure on the United States to change its bargaining position. □

In an address on 21 December, General Secretary Andropov officially announced the missile subceiling proposal and emphasized the reductions that would be made, including "tens of the latest missiles, known in the West as SS-20s." The Soviets could reduce their missile launchers to 162 by retiring 250 SS-4s and SS-5s and 81 SS-20s (see table). This cutback in SS-20s would amount to one-third of the force in the European USSR. Although the Soviets have the option, under their proposal, of either dismantling their excess SS-20 launchers or removing them to the eastern USSR, they have hinted □ □ willingness to destroy at least some of them

The Missile Balance in Europe

	Present		Andropov's Subciling Offer		US Zero Option Proposal	
	Missiles	Warheads	Missiles	Warheads	Missiles	Warheads
Soviet	493	979	162	486	0	0
SS-20 IRBM	243	729	162	486	0	0
SS-4 MRBM and SS-5 IRBM	250	250	0	0	0	0
NATO	162	162	162	162	162	162
Pershing II MRBM (US)	0	0	0	0	0	0
GLCM (US)	0	0	0	0	0	0
SS-3 IRBM (France)	18	18	18	18	18	18
M-20 SLBM (France)	80	80	80	80	80	80
A-3 SLBM (UK)	64	64	64	64	64	64



[ The Soviets have sent briefing memoranda on their view of the INF negotiations to most of the major West European capitals. They probably believe they will have their best shot at influencing Allied positions if they appear to be flexible in the negotiations ]



[ that a postponement of NATO's INF deployment would satisfy Moscow for the present. This goal became more evident in early November, when Brezhnev sent a letter to West German Chancellor Kohl requesting that such deployment not proceed automatically because more time was needed to achieve results at the INF negotiations. After the Brezhnev funeral, Andropov made a similar request in a meeting with West German President Carstens. ]

*Overt Political Strategy.* The Soviets have begun a campaign to highlight their new INF initiative and are intensifying their efforts to undermine the NATO deployment plan as the West German national elections approach in March.

The Soviets are directing their efforts primarily toward public diplomacy—to avoid risking the adverse public reaction that would result if covert operations were exposed. They are emphasizing the carrot of Moscow's negotiating flexibility rather than the stick of threatening retaliation to NATO deployments. As Gromyko's recent visit to Bonn demonstrates, Moscow is seeking to present an image of caution and reason, presumably to leave the door open for future cooperation with the Christian Democrats if they win the elections, and to avoid discrediting the Social Democratic Party's attempts to broker an agreement on INF between the United States and the USSR.

### III. Soviet "Active Measures" Against INF: The Covert Campaign

In the past three years, in support of its direct diplomatic efforts to block deployment of US INF on West European soil, Moscow has conducted an ambitious campaign to infiltrate, manipulate, and exploit the European peace movement. To conduct such a campaign, the Soviets rely on a full range of so-called "active measures"—a term they use to refer to activities worldwide that are intended to promote Soviet foreign policy goals but which go beyond traditional diplomatic, propaganda, and military means. Many of the active measures currently being employed in the anti-INF campaign are adaptations of those that proved effective in the 1977-78 campaign against the "neutron bomb." The scope and intensity of the USSR's public and covert campaigns can be expected to grow as scheduled deployment dates approach. It has already surpassed the scale of the anti-neutron bomb campaign

*Use of Communist Parties and Front Organizations.* Moscow has instructed West European Communists and the leaders of pro-Soviet international organizations to make the anti-INF campaign their foremost concern and has provided funding and political guidance for their peace movement activity.

The Soviets have directed West European Communist parties specifically to assume a leading role in organizing antinuclear demonstrations and meetings and to coordinate their efforts with non-Communist peace activities. Moscow has been most active with regard to the INF-basing countries, particularly West Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium. For example:

• [ the West German Communist Party (DKP), which takes direction from Moscow and East Berlin, was instrumental in organizing the blockage of the NATO weapons arsenal in Baden-Wuerttemberg on 1-8 August 1982 and some subsequent demonstrations in West Germany.

• [ the West Berlin Communist Party (SEW) functions under the close supervision of the East Germans. The party has long contributed an organizational support network for local peace activity that apparently was accepted even by groups that are opposed to the party ideologically.

• The Dutch Communist Party (CPN) maintains frequent contact with Moscow and East Berlin and, [ receives regular and detailed guidance from the Soviets and East Germans regarding anti-INF activity.

• [ the head of the Belgian National Action Committee for Peace and Development (CNAPD) and three other peace activists visited East Berlin in late September 1981 at the invitation of the Helsinki-based World Peace

Council (WPC), the major Soviet-controlled international organization. The CNAPD head later discussed plans for the 25 October anti-INF demonstration in Brussels with officials of the East German Embassy.

[ ] reported that PCI officials visiting Moscow in [ ] 1981 were subjected to heavy pressure to raise strong opposition to INF and subsequently ordered regional party secretaries to step up anti-INF propaganda and initiate demonstrations and marches.

The Soviets also are using their international front organizations to initiate and direct some of the anti-nuclear activities in Western Europe and to try to attract non-Communist participants to lend credibility to Soviet objectives:

- The WPC is particularly active in planning and trying to coordinate and control antinuclear activity in the West. The WPC's draft "action program" for 1981 provides for several international conferences—some specifically suggested by the Soviets. The highlight will be the "World Peace Assembly" planned for 15-19 June in Prague; this can be expected to feature the anti-INF theme.
- The Soviet-backed International Union of Students (IUS) was working in early October 1981 to attract mass participation in IUS-sponsored peace movement activities.

• As early as 1978, [ ] [ ] the Soviets were even exploring the possibility of using the United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as an unwitting front organization to promote peace and disarmament themes.

[ ] access to broadcast services, the availability of funding for publications, and the other opportunities available to Soviet personnel who could be placed on the staff of the UNESCO Information Service

**Financial Support.** The USSR and its East European allies contribute considerable financial and material support covertly to the West European peace movement through Communist parties and front organizations:

• The West German Government publicly charged in December that the East Germans secretly provide more than \$2 million a month to the West German Communist Party (DKP). [ ]

• In October 1981 the Danish Government expelled KGB officer Vladimir Merkulov, a second secretary in the Soviet Embassy in Copenhagen for, among other things, using a Danish journalist agent to manipulate and fund the Danish peace movement.

• The World Peace Council was given an estimated \$63 million by Moscow in 1980 and also received contributions from other Communist parties, particularly in Eastern Europe.

• Italian Communist Party officials believe that an independent member of Parliament who has organized a "Group for World Peace" and publishes a magazine, *Struggle for Peace*, receives instructions and financial aid from the Soviet

The Soviets also fund the peace movement openly:

• In an interview last May in the Austrian press, Soviet Central Committee official Vadim Zagladin provided details about the "Soviet Peace Fund" and its support to Western peace groups, including the WPC and its affiliates in various West European countries.

- A former Soviet Peace Fund chairman asserted in an article in the English-language *Moscow News* in the spring of 1981 that his clients included "leaders of the international democratic organizations working for peace" and cooperated with another ostensibly "public" Soviet organization, the Committee for the Defense of Peace (SCDP) to "render financial aid to organizations, movements, and personalities."

**Propaganda Guidelines.** The Soviets have sought to direct the focus of the West European peace movement by providing Communist parties and front organizations with propaganda themes keyed to local concerns and to US and NATO policies.

The Soviet Peace Committee reportedly tried to aggravate existing concerns that the United States would force Western Europe to accept more Pershing II missiles than originally agreed.

Soviet propaganda guidance also has reflected concern about the growing tendency among West European peace activists to blame the USSR as well as the United States for the arms race:

- The Soviets told Finnish Communist Party officials last autumn that the CPSU Central Committee has issued a directive to its departments and embassies to collect information on "anti-Soviet phenomena" in West European countries for use in the propaganda battle over INF.
- The Soviets reportedly told leaders of the WPC in [redacted] to try to limit the effectiveness of a peace group that had criticized Soviet policies.

**Direct Involvement in Peace Groups.** Because of the urgency of their anti-INF campaign, the Soviets have risked discrediting some West European peace groups by directing diplomats and other Soviet officials abroad to undertake covert involvement in those groups' activities. For example:

- On 19 November the Dutch press reported that representatives of the Soviet Embassy and trade

mission in the Netherlands had violated diplomatic rules by getting directly involved in the peace movement.



**Influence Through Foreign Media and Disinformation.** The Soviets routinely try to exploit the Western press to advance the USSR's peace movement objectives:

- The left-leaning West German magazine *Der Spiegel*, for example, is a leader in publishing interviews with the Soviets, particularly on arms control issues.
- The KGB, usually through front organizations, provides funding for West European media sympathetic to Soviet interests. For example, late last year it provided, via a Luxembourg-based East German front organization, the funding to finance the new printing installations of the pro-Soviet Greek Communist Party.
- The press organs of pro-Soviet European Communist parties, although they have limited circulation, provide sympathetic coverage of the USSR's policies and activities regarding antinuclear issues. This prevails even on the lowest level, as in the case of the local Communist party newspaper that reported daily on a Soviet peace delegation touring Denmark last November.

Disinformation and forgeries are other "active measures" the Soviets and their allies are using in the campaign against INF basing:

- In May 1982 a forged letter, purportedly from former Secretary of State Haig to NATO Secretary General Luns regarding nuclear arms issues, was

circulated in Belgium and Luxembourg. It distorted NATO nuclear strategy and played on the fear of NATO use of nuclear weapons in a limited war.

- The West German Communist Party may have been involved in fabricating or disseminating a purportedly official notice that was posted in several areas of Bonn in mid-November alerting citizens to measures concerning the transport of nuclear and conventional weapons through the city. The forgery clearly was intended to increase public concern about a recent accident involving a Pershing I transporter and had no basis in fact.

*Effectiveness of Soviet Efforts.* It is difficult to evaluate the real effect of Soviet active measures in the West European peace movement. Clearly, not all opposition to NATO nuclear forces modernization is Soviet inspired. There is good evidence, however, that the Soviets have sought to exploit and manipulate the movement and that their covert support has enabled it to grow beyond its own capabilities. The most successful tactic employed by the Soviets to date, however, probably is the incessant emphasis in public and private meetings with West Europeans on the USSR's ostensible commitment to detente and arms control in contrast to the United States' alleged drive toward "military supremacy." This type of "political influence operation" is difficult to counter, because many West Europeans meet with Soviet officials and local Communists often, considering this to be a legitimate means of obtaining information.

There has, however, been a perceptible change recently in the attitude of some non-Communist peace groups toward Soviet and other Communist support:

- In the past six to eight months the Dutch Inter-church Peace Council (IKV) has distanced itself from the Soviet position and called more strongly for mutual disarmament by East and West.
- In June 1982 the West German "Greens" broke with the Communist Party over the issues of the need for disarmament by both superpowers, support for the peace movement in East Germany, and criticism of Soviet actions in Poland and Afghanistan.

- The British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) reportedly will not support the WPC's "World Peace Assembly" scheduled to be held in Prague this June.

*IV. Soviet Negotiating Options in Mid-to-Late 1983*  
Moscow will continue to assess NATO's deployment plans and the US stance in the current round of negotiations, which will probably last until late March. Although site preparation has been under way for some time, the first deliveries of INF equipment are scheduled to arrive in West Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy between April and October. If by that time the Soviets conclude there has been insufficient movement in the NATO negotiating position and they are convinced that the INF equipment deliveries will be made, they probably will announce an end to the SS-20 moratorium

During the summer round of the INF talks several options would be open to the Soviets. They could:

- Shift their tactics at the INF talks by expressing a willingness to trade off cruise and ballistic missiles currently under development against the GLCM and Pershing II.
- Call for a long suspension of the talks, blaming the United States for the stalemate.
- Walk out of the talks indefinitely, with no date set for resumption.
- Call for merging the INF talks with START.
- Propose to the West Europeans that they join the talks or suggest another venue for the talks, such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

*Trade-off.* Probably the Soviets' most likely option (and one that they have suggested) is a proposal to trade off their future cruise and ballistic missiles against NATO's new systems. They currently have a number of such programs in development, some of which could be ready for deployment by late

1983. In his address on 21 December, Andropov stated that the USSR was testing a long-range cruise missile and would deploy it if the United States proceeded with plans for cruise missile deployment.

By matching their new systems against NATO's, the Soviets might seek to change the whole focus of the negotiations, so that the emphasis would be on limiting the new systems of both sides—while protecting their substantially deployed SS-20 force. That tactical shift could keep on the table their missile subceiling proposal, with its enticement of substantial reductions in the SS-20 force. They might argue then to NATO governments that European security would be better served by the missile subceiling proposal than by US INF deployments matched by Soviet counterdeployments.

The threat of such Soviet deployments, however, would not be well received in European capitals and might even increase Allied support for INF deployments. INF proponents would characterize the threat as a Soviet effort to divide Western Europe from the United States and would urge their governments to follow through with deployments. At the same time, however, the West European governments would urge the United States to persevere at the INF talks so that a deal might still be negotiated.

*Suspension.* Of the above options, the second seems least likely, because the Soviets probably would feel that it would not be "tough" enough. With time running out before NATO deployment, they almost certainly would believe that more definitive measures were required to impress NATO with the gravity of the situation.

*Walkout.* If they chose to walk out, the Soviets might argue in justification that until the United States is interested in "bargaining seriously," there is no need to continue INF talks. In November they indicated

What the next round of negotiations (currently in session) would be a watershed. They also seemed to be laying the groundwork for an eventual public accounting of their "flexibility" throughout the negotiations, in contrast to US "intractability." At various times last fall Soviet INF delegates and party officials hinted at a walkout if the US position remained

unchanged and Washington began INF deployments; but at the same time. They indicated that they would continue negotiations even after the United States began such deployments.

Leaving the talks clearly would be risky to the Soviets: Western public opinion might blame them for the collapse of the negotiations. If they feared this possibility, they could stress their willingness to continue to negotiate at START but make it clear that no progress would be possible in that forum until INF questions were resolved.

*Merger.* The idea of negotiating INF in the START framework might be an option open to the Soviets, as Colonel General Chervov of the General Staff recently indicated in an interview with a West German newspaper. At present, Chervov opposes the idea because of the need to reach an INF settlement quickly and the likelihood that combining INF talks with START would delay an INF solution for many years. Nevertheless, the Soviets might consider this approach if they believed that it had West European support and could delay NATO's deployment plans.

Moscow would be in a good position if the talks were merged, because it has already linked the two in its negotiating approach. Its reduction proposal in START is contingent on no US deployment of new INF systems. The call to ban long-range cruise missiles and air-to-surface ballistic missiles is found in both its INF and its START proposals. Its objection to US proposals in both the INF talks and START is that Washington is not looking at the whole panoply of weapon systems comprehensively, but is interested in selectively limiting only Moscow's strengths, such as ICBMs and the SS-20.

The Soviets might well see an advantage if all systems with a "strategic" mission—including US "forward-based" systems and British and French nuclear forces—were on the negotiating table. In their view this could open up opportunities for horse trading, such as occurred during SALT II, and could make more credible the Soviet argument that there is

overall strategic parity between East and West. If by late 1983 Moscow saw NATO deployment as a certainty and was still interested in a negotiated outcome, it might believe that this advantage would outweigh any disadvantage there might be in losing a separate forum for INF. (The separate forum has been useful in exerting leverage on the West Europeans, particularly the Germans.)



*Broader Context.* Another option open to the Soviets would be to invite the West Europeans to join the INF talks or propose that the talks take place within a broader European framework, such as the CSCE. They could argue that the negotiations are of paramount importance to Europe and that all major powers should be involved. There is no evidence to suggest such a move, but it would be consistent with the long-term Soviet strategy of capitalizing on differences of view among NATO countries. The Soviets would clearly recognize, however, the low likelihood of acceptance by the West Europeans, particularly the French and British, for the reason cited above.

#### V. Future Soviet Political Moves

The Soviets will continue vigorous efforts to influence the West German position, regardless of whether the elections result in a CDU victory or return the SPD to power. They may be more willing after the elections to offer specific inducements, such as eased emigration for ethnic Germans in the East, since they will no longer be constrained by reluctance to help the CDU in its campaign. At the same time, they may resort more openly to intimidation, particularly if the CDU is victorious. They might stress that West Germany would be more exposed than other West European countries to Soviet retaliation in the event of a nuclear exchange, because only West Germany would base Pershing IIs

Throughout Western Europe the Soviets will intensify their public campaign against US INF deployment. These efforts are likely to include:

- Stepping up contact with a broad spectrum of European politicians, media representatives, church leaders, and student groups, with the intention of purveying as widely as possible an image of Soviet reasonableness and a commitment to a negotiated INF solution.
- Employing propaganda to arouse public alarm over alleged US intentions of making Europe the "nuclear battlefield" of a US-Soviet conflict.
- Introducing new "peace" initiatives, such as their latest proposal for a tactical nuclear-free zone in Central Europe.

#### VI. What Type of Agreement Might Moscow Accept?

Throughout the negotiations the Soviets have insisted that the United States forgo deployment of its new systems in an INF agreement. Privately, however, they have indicated that they expect Washington to proceed with deployment. While they have not provided any clues as to what level of NATO deployment they might ultimately accept.

Clearly the Soviets would like NATO's plan to fall through on its own, but they cannot be confident that this will happen. They probably would not welcome a situation in which NATO fully deployed its systems and they found it necessary to respond with hundreds of their own missiles. Between these extreme outcomes, they must have given considerable thought to an agreement in which NATO is permitted some level of deployment. Given their particular concern over the Pershing II, they might continue to call for a ban on it, while grudgingly accepting some level of GLCM deployment—albeit sharply reduced from the planned 464 launchers. In return, the Soviets probably would merely reiterate their missile subceiling proposal. In



fact, they could insist that any US GLCM deployment (augmenting the French and British missile launchers) be offset by deployments of additional Soviet missile launchers.

Moscow would view a negotiating outcome that killed the Pershing II program as a favorable initial step, but it still would be greatly concerned about limiting the US cruise missile threat. It could propose additional arms control measures that would severely limit air- and sea-launched cruise missiles. It might demand that ALCMs be quantitatively limited on heavy bombers (as they were in SALT II) and might call for a continuation of the ban on SLCM deployment that was negotiated in the now-expired SALT II Protocol. To get Washington more interested in such measures, Moscow might want to heighten the visibility of its own cruise missile systems (as Andropov did in his 21 December address)—particularly as those systems approach operational capability, perhaps as early as late this year. The Soviets probably would be willing to use either the INF talks or START to negotiate these measures:

#### VII. Possible Soviet Plans if Negotiations and Political Moves Fail

By late 1983 Moscow probably will be able to judge whether an agreement is possible and whether any of the negotiating options and political moves outlined above would be effective in postponing or derailing NATO's deployment plans. If the Soviets are convinced that the initial deployment will occur as scheduled in December, they almost certainly will take steps—for internal as well as foreign policy reasons—to implement whatever military response they have planned to make once NATO's deployment actually begins. This response was foreshadowed in Andropov's 21 December address and in March 1982, when Brezhnev threatened retaliatory measures that would put the United States and its allies "in an analogous position" if NATO deployed its new INF systems.

#### Military Options

the Soviets could, inter alia  
• field new cruise missiles and short-range ballistic missiles opposite Europe and deploy a larger SS-20 force.


- Station submarines with sea-launched cruise missiles near US coasts.
- Install nuclear-capable offensive weapon systems in Cuba, either overtly or covertly.

Last fall the Soviets hinted at the INF talks that they might respond with deployment of a long-range cruise missile or a new ballistic missile, or both. In his 21 December speech, Andropov highlighted the Soviet long-range cruise missile program as a counter to NATO's INF deployments, probably because the system is already at the flight test stage. The Soviets recently have modified a Y-class submarine and a number of Bear bombers, apparently to serve as platforms for a long-range cruise missile, which could be targeted against US territory. If they choose to develop a new IRBM for deployment opposite Europe, it probably will be a system more capable than the SS-20 in terms of payload and accuracy. Another Soviet option could be deployment of the SS-20 in the northeastern USSR, where it could target the northwestern United States. A Foreign Ministry official mentioned this possibility last August, and a Soviet official discussed it in October.

The above options seem more plausible than the emplacement of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Moscow no doubt understands that such an action could bring the superpowers to the brink of a nuclear confrontation. It probably would calculate that the political costs in Europe and the potential risk of military confrontation with the US administration—which has made initiatives in the Caribbean Basin a major element of its foreign policy—are not worth whatever increase in military or political leverage they think such a move might provide. Moscow probably also would believe that such an action would result in the collapse not only of the INF negotiations, but of START as well.

Nonetheless, the threat of missile emplacement in Cuba has been hinted at. This probably is part of an overall Soviet strategy to bring as much pressure as possible to bear on the United States and Europe to move off the zero option position.

*Covert Measures.* If the Soviets' current strategy fails, they probably will shift the focus of their active measures campaign. They will attempt to use covert means to complement military, diplomatic, and political moves, in an effort to slow the pace of deployment and to keep it at the lowest possible level. With the East-West atmosphere probably souring by that time, they might feel even less constraint against pursuing riskier measures—such as encouraging demonstrations and supporting radical peace groups, some of which might engage in sabotage at NATO facilities.



The Soviets also will use propaganda, disinformation, and support to Communist Party and front groups to increase the political costs to the governments of the basing countries. They will hope that this, in turn, will cause those countries to urge the United States to accede to an agreement that caps NATO deployments at a low level and minimizes reductions in Soviet forces.

In the Netherlands, the Soviets can be expected to intensify their active measures with the Communist Party and its fronts in the period leading up to a Dutch decision (scheduled for late 1983) on INF deployment. Soviet pressure on the Italian Communist Party to intensify support of the peace movement undoubtedly will increase as the initial GLCM equipment deliveries to Italy in October draw near. The Soviets are currently operating under a liability in Italy, however, since their public image there has suffered badly as a result of allegations of Soviet involvement in the attempted assassination of the Pope.

The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has been gaining political clout in the United Kingdom. The Soviets' ability to influence it appears to be extremely limited, but they will do what they can to support it, particularly as the projected GLCM deployment date (December) approaches. The Soviets can also be expected to attempt to persuade leftist groups to throw their support behind the CND.

The Soviets probably will be careful, however, not to go too far with their active measures campaign. They are aware that strong antinuclear movements exist in all the INF-basing countries (except Italy), even without Soviet or Communist involvement. They also realize that, by treading carefully, they can profit from these movements, which have been aroused by heightened East-West tensions and greater public awareness of nuclear weapons programs affecting West European countries. For these reasons the Soviets probably will continue to rely more on overt political measures, which have proved to be their most effective activities.

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Appendix

Significant INF-Related Events Scheduled for 1983

27 January	INF (Round IV) resumes
30 January-10 February	Vice President Bush's European trip begins in Bonn; includes a visit to INF and START negotiations
1 February	Session of the UN Committee on Disarmament begins in Geneva
14 February	Meeting of NATO's Special Consultative Group (SCG)
6 March	Elections in West Germany
March	NATO Nuclear Planning Group ministerial meeting in Portugal
March	Williamsburg summit
Late March	INF (Round IV) ends
March-April	CPSU Central Committee meets
April (?)	Votes on INF infrastructure funding to be held in Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands
April	First GLCM equipment arrives in United Kingdom
9-10 June	NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting in Paris
June	INF (Round V) resumes
June	First Pershing II equipment arrives in West Germany
August	INF (Round V) ends
October	First GLCM equipment arrives in Italy
November	NATO Nuclear Planning Group ministerial meeting in Canada
4 December	SPD party congress in West Germany
December	NATO ministerial meetings
December	Scheduled initial operational capability for Pershing II in West Germany and GLCM in the United Kingdom