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HR70-14



APPROVED FOR
RELEASE -
HISTORICAL
COLLECTION
DIVISION DATE:
06-18-2012

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1999



Military Reliability of the
Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact Allies

National Intelligence Estimate

~~Top Secret~~

~~NE 1271-83~~
~~SC 00440-83~~
28 June 1983

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MILITARY RELIABILITY OF THE
SOVIET UNION'S WARSAW PACT ALLIES

Information available as of 28 June 1983
was used in the preparation of this Estimate.

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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.

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PREFACE

The crisis in Poland has again focused Intelligence Community attention on the issue of Warsaw Pact reliability. Two main developments prompt this inquiry. Over the past three decades, Soviet [] increasing reliance on their Warsaw Pact Allies in a war with NATO. Opposition to Soviet dominance has repeatedly found indirect popular and, in some cases, political expression in Eastern Europe. In several instances East European unrest was suppressed only by armed Soviet intervention. An important factor for NATO planning is an assessment of the Soviets' confidence that their Allies would comply with orders and the identification of possible exploitable vulnerabilities in Pact cohesion. Although this subject has been examined in open literature, no Community study has been issued since 1966.

This Estimate examines the military reliability of the USSR's Warsaw Pact Allies in the event of major external crisis or war with NATO. It considers the roles of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) armed forces in Soviet plans for war and assesses the various elements that could undermine or strengthen reliability of the NSWP forces. Annexes provide details on specific Soviet control measures, the importance of the NSWP Allies in a European war, implications for Western planners including a selected list of NSWP vulnerabilities, and, finally, intelligence gaps.

This Estimate is hampered by a shortage of data regarding Soviet perceptions and intentions. []

[] little information about the Soviets' views of the reliability of their Allies in a crisis. For the most part the perceptions of Soviet leaders described in the study are our judgments of their probable views, buttressed by observations of their precautionary actions. Other judgments pertain to our own estimates of probable NSWP force behavior under various circumstances. Available evidence reveals certain steps the Soviets have taken that would be used to control their Allies in time of war and may permit assessment of the probable effectiveness of these steps. This Estimate focuses on a period of crisis leading up to and including the outbreak of hostilities.

While political, economic, social, and situational factors all play important parts in determining the overall reliability of NSWP armed forces, this study focuses primarily on the military aspects of the question.

We believe the conclusions of this Estimate are valid for the next several years. Our confidence in this view reflects our assessment that NSWP military reliability is a product of factors that tend to be resistant to change. However, potentially destabilizing factors include changes within the leadership and the deepening economic problems of many East European countries and their sociological consequences.

Military Reliability

This Estimate uses the concept of "reliability" in two contexts. One is our assessment of whether the NSWP armed forces would carry out Pact directives in the period before or during a conflict with NATO. The other is the Soviet perception of that reliability. We have tried to make clear in which context the word is being used.

Historically, reliability has been a key variable in the performance of a wide range of armies—both Communist and non-Communist. It is the product of such factors as morale, discipline, training, equipment, and performance on the battlefield. When one or more of these factors prove inadequate to the test, varying degrees of noncompliance with orders, or "unreliability," could result. An extreme example would be those countries that have halted cooperation with their allies or actually changed sides in a war. Unreliability has taken many forms: passive resistance (that is, failure to obey orders or giving only a semblance of obedience); individual or mass defection to the enemy; and active resistance to former allies and countrymen (including sabotage and guerrilla warfare).

KEY JUDGMENTS

We believe that Soviet orders to go to war would be successfully transmitted from the Soviet General Staff to non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) line units that would, in the main, obey these orders at least during the initial stages of a conflict with NATO. However, we also believe that NSWP military reliability could be degraded by a static front, and substantially degraded by Warsaw Pact reverses. The Soviet Union is concerned about the military reliability of its Warsaw Pact Allies in the event of a conflict with NATO and is apprehensive about initiatives NATO has already undertaken and might undertake in a crisis or war.

Soviet dependence on its Allies, especially in Central Europe, is so great as to make their participation crucial to Soviet success. The Soviet Union has taken a number of actions, both political and military, to try to ensure the cooperation of its Allies, but the effectiveness of these actions is likely to depend on developments that the Soviets cannot entirely control. These include the circumstances of outbreak of the conflict, possible NATO actions to try to induce East European defections, and the outcomes of initial engagements.

Prior to a final decision to go to war, East European leaders, whose countries have the most to lose in a war with NATO, are likely to use whatever influence they have to attempt to moderate Soviet decisions. However, Soviet willingness to do whatever is necessary to ensure compliance—including the use of force against other Pact members—is an accepted fact. Once the Soviets decide to go to war, East European leaders are likely to tailor their actions with this in mind. The general outlook and political dependency of NSWP leadership groups on the Soviets would also probably result in most members of those elites assessing their interests during crises as congruent with the Soviets in most respects. However, this might not be true of all members of these elites, and the behavior of lower levels of the military and populaces in general would be less predictable. Their response would be dependent on their perceptions of the nature and cause of the crisis, the perceived consequences for their countries, and considerations affecting their personal interests.

Soviet control over the East European forces—and Soviet confidence in such control—would be at its highest at the beginning of a war while East European forces are being mobilized and deployed or advancing. In a conflict, particularly if there were Pact military setbacks, Soviet control over the East Europeans could erode substantially. Although we do not have direct evidence of the extent to which concern about East European reliability weighs in the Soviets' planning, we judge that they see this factor as important.

Among the major factors affecting the military reliability of NSWP forces in time of crisis, or the initial phases of a war with NATO, are the established Pact control mechanisms and the caliber of training and discipline. These factors are likely to ensure the reliable response of most Pact forces to initial orders of an alerting and mobilizing nature during a crisis and through the initial stages of a conflict. Subsequently, military reliability could be degraded as hostilities progressed; this is especially likely in the event of significant Pact failures on the battlefield and appropriate Western measures aimed at disrupting Pact unity.

The Soviets have continued to introduce more extensive control measures such as the recently introduced Warsaw Pact Wartime Command Statute, which legally centralizes military command and control in Soviet hands. Although we do not regard it as given that all the senior NSWP political and military authorities would willingly comply with a Soviet effort to take their forces to war, Soviet control measures would serve to limit the capability of NSWP forces to ignore or countermand Pact alerting, mobilization, and deployment orders.

We believe that four principal situational factors could affect NSWP reliability:

- **Circumstances of outbreak:** especially the degree to which the war could be portrayed as defensive.
- **Personal motivations and opportunities:** individuals differ in attitudes and units in control and discipline; and opportunities to shirk or defect would vary greatly.
- **NATO initiatives:** these might include declarations of support for abstaining East European countries, targeting policies, and battlefield tactics aimed at inducing neutrality or help to NATO.

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— Fortunes of war: early successes on the battlefield would probably be the most critical factor.


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The Soviets probably perceive the military forces of the NSWP countries as reliable during initial hostilities, albeit in differing degrees and circumstances:

- They probably regard Bulgaria as their most reliable Ally.
- The East German regime is probably regarded as the next most reliable by the Soviets. Soviet confidence is certainly reinforced by the presence of 19 Soviet divisions in the country.
- Czechoslovakia is probably a source of concern for the Soviets. Nevertheless, its population appears resigned to a continued Soviet presence, and the regime remains politically reliable.
- Hungary's reliability is more open to question, despite the presence of four Soviet divisions. Hungary's geographic and strategic position might allow its leaders to minimize direct engagement with NATO forces.
- Poland has been a perennial problem for the USSR. Its key role in military operations and its location probably result in a great deal of concern by the Soviets. Because of widespread social unrest, disorganization of the Polish Communist Party, and severe economic problems, there was an erosion of Soviet confidence in the near-term reliability of the Polish armed forces. While the extent of current Soviet confidence is in question, and the memory of recent strains will linger, precedent indicates that confidence would be restored over time. Community opinion diverges on precisely when this would occur. Most agencies believe that Soviet confidence in Poland's ability to carry out its Warsaw Pact obligations is slowly improving and that the Polish armed forces would carry out initial Pact wartime orders. An alternative view holds that Soviet confidence in the Polish armed forces will not be restored until the party regains preeminence and Solidarity is no longer a major factor in Polish society.¹
- Romania is probably perceived by the Soviets as their least reliable ally, in part because it has eschewed formal integration of its forces into the Pact command and control systems.

¹ The holder of this view is the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army.

Without reasonable assurance of participation by most Pact forces, we believe Moscow is unlikely to initiate hostilities against NATO. Actions that might be taken by NATO to encourage East European noncompliance with Soviet orders in a war could increase Soviet misgivings about NSWP reliability.

Figure 1
Session of the Council of Ministers of the
Warsaw Treaty Member States, December 1981



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DISCUSSION

Evolution of the Warsaw Pact

1. The relationship of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries with the USSR is forced, and their relationships among themselves at times are competitive and exploitative rather than cooperative. These countries have historical territorial claims against one or more of their East European neighbors as well as histories of discriminating against ethnic minorities.

Origins

2. Immediately after the formation of the Communist governments of Eastern Europe in the mid- and late-1940s, the USSR signed bilateral defense treaties with each of them. No multilateral treaty linked them until after the West German armed forces joined NATO. In 1955, Albania, * Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the USSR signed the Warsaw Treaty. [

]until the early 1960s [] the NSWP forces played no important part in Soviet military plans. During those years the Pact primarily served political purposes, both as an international bargaining chip against NATO and a means of institutionalizing Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe through its central policymaking body, the Political Consultative Committee. The Staff of the Combined Armed Forces, invariably headed by a Soviet Marshal, was established in Moscow, but in practice the NSWP forces remained under national control. Over the past three decades Moscow has attempted to make the national NSWP armed forces more responsive to orders from the Soviet General Staff through the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces.

3. In all the NSWP countries except Bulgaria there have been acts of resistance to Soviet dictates, although at varying times and in radically different ways. Only Romania has successfully opposed Moscow's foreign policy line in some, but far from all, respects. How-

* Albania ceased participating in Pact activities after 1961 and renounced its membership in 1969.

ever, although opposition to the Soviets is widespread, it is not universal. [

]The ruling elites, however, have vested interests in maintaining the status quo. Most military leaders and many of the party elite have been trained in and screened by the USSR and owe their positions to continued Soviet approval.

4. Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and, to a lesser extent, East Germany tend to be more submissive to Soviet direction in economic, political, and social spheres than the other Warsaw Pact nations, although for very different reasons. Czechoslovakia's submissiveness derives from the repressive measures implemented following the 1968 crisis and the subsequent dependency of the Czechoslovak Government on the Soviets. Bulgarian national interests have usually coincided with those of Russia for many centuries. On the whole Bulgaria has profited from the association, and many Bulgarians (particularly the elite) still tend to recognize Moscow as a protector of their interests. Recently, however, even some Bulgarians have shown signs of chafing at Soviet direction. No ethnic or cultural ties bind East Germany to Moscow. On the contrary, East German leaders depend on the Soviets because of East Germany's rivalry with West Germany and the appeal of the West to many East Germans.

5. Poland, Hungary, and Romania are less submissive to Moscow and have demonstrated this in different ways. Poland's size, history, and internal political dynamics have prevented Moscow from completely imposing its will. Hungary has been able to trade submissiveness in following Moscow's lead in foreign policy matters for greater domestic economic and social freedom. There are recent indications, however, that Budapest is emphasizing its status as a small European state that can serve as a bridge between East and West. Despite a round of Soviet-Romanian media polemics in the spring of 1983, Bucharest has muted some of its differences with Moscow and suggested a willingness to move closer on certain issues. In the past, Moscow has tolerated a measure of Romanian foreign

policy independence, in part because of Bucharest's domestic orthodoxy. These recent polemics, differences with the Soviets over the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and Romania's continued limited participation in Pact exercises indicate the differences that remain.

6. Ostensibly created as a counterweight to NATO, the Warsaw Pact also has served to legitimize Soviet interference in the affairs of its Allies and its military presence on their soil. The fact that Soviet armed might or the threat of it has been required to quell internal disorders undoubtedly contributes to their concern when assessing the overall reliability of their Allies. The reactions of NSWP military forces to internal Pact crises provide some evidence—albeit indirect—of their military reliability or unreliability. These crises have given the Soviets the opportunity both to evaluate the loyalty of the forces to the regimes—and therefore indirectly to Moscow—and to try to correct perceived deficiencies in Moscow's ability to control its Allies.

The Hungarian Crisis

7. The Hungarian revolution in 1956 was the first internal crisis to test intra-Pact military reliability. The Hungarian People's Army (HPA) was not a significant factor in the crisis. Many soldiers turned their weapons over to civilians, and a few units actively resisted the Soviets. Most units stayed in their garrisons. At the same time, a newly constituted "Hungarian Officer Corps" assisted the Soviets in reestablishing control. Realizing that the restoration of order in Hungary would be a long-term process and that more control was desirable, in the early 1960s the Soviets took measures to improve military reliability, which included:

- The promotion to key positions of Hungarian officers who had proved their pro-Soviet sympathies in 1956.
- A greater role for the Hungarian Communist Party in shaping and controlling the new HPA.
- Designation of specified Soviet officers throughout the Warsaw Pact as representatives of the Commander in Chief of Warsaw Pact Forces.

— Concessions to national pride throughout the Pact, such as the reinstatement of distinctive uniforms and military traditions.

— Concessions to national sovereignty, such as institution of procedures for notifying NSWP states about the movement of Soviet troops in their countries.

8. In the 1960s, the Soviets took a number of other steps to improve NSWP combat capabilities and enhance their control measures. In 1961 the Warsaw Pact established direct communications between the Soviet and NSWP General Staffs and held the first multinational exercises involving Soviet and NSWP troops. At the same time a major modernization of both the Soviet and NSWP military establishments also began. Better and more standardized equipment—some built in Eastern Europe—came into the NSWP inventory to improve combat capability and logistic support. It may have had the additional effect of instilling a sense of cohesiveness within the Pact. Such measures signaled a new Soviet emphasis on the employment of NSWP forces in the event of war with NATO, relying most heavily on East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

9. In the 1960s, changes in Soviet military doctrine gave increased emphasis to the NSWP forces. Soviet planners began to describe [war in Europe that might begin with a conventional phase, which increased the importance of East European forces. This further adjustment of relying on forces in place in Eastern Europe potentially reduced the warning time given NATO by reinforcement from the western USSR and also increased the share of NSWP forces committed to the initial offensive against NATO]

The Czechoslovak Crisis

10. The Czechoslovak crisis in 1968 tested NSWP responsiveness, and the outcome gave the Soviets reason for guarded optimism regarding NSWP military reliability for intra-Pact purposes. On the one hand, there was the experience of Czechoslovak popular resistance to Pact intervention together with the fact that part of Czechoslovakia's officer corps participated in the reform movement in the late 1960s. On


Figure 2
Crises in the Warsaw Pact



East Berliners throw rocks at Soviet tanks in workers' revolt in 1953.



Soviet tank attempts to clear road barricade in Budapest, 1956.



Czechoslovaks carry their national flag past burning Soviet tank in Prague, 1968

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the other hand, the national governments (except for Romania) ordered their troops (albeit in minor roles) to accompany the Soviet intervention force. The Czechoslovak People's Army (CPA) followed its leaders' orders not to resist. Afterward, the Soviets instituted severe limitations on Czechoslovak command and control:

- Soviet officers were assigned control and supervisory positions in all departments of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Defense and in parts of the political apparatus.
- Both Czechoslovak Military District headquarters were placed under the control of Soviet officers.
- Soviet officers sat in on all important meetings of the Czechoslovak Defense Council and other top military bodies.

Additionally, the Czechoslovak Central Committee's Department for Military Affairs was reestablished in February 1969 to ensure close party control of the military establishment. The military counterintelligence service, which was subordinate to the Interior Ministry and not the Defense Ministry, also played a key role. Widespread purges of those Czechoslovak officers who had not already resigned their commissions were carried out between 1969 and 1975. About 11,000 officers and 3,000 noncommissioned officers were removed. Many more left voluntarily. Nevertheless, five years after the invasion the new chief of the party apparatus in the military claimed that direct supervision of the CPA by the party had been fully restored. As a direct result of the 1968 crisis, five Soviet divisions were stationed in Czechoslovakia, where none had been before. Although this action might not contribute substantially to the reliability of Czechoslovak forces in a NATO war, it does ensure a strong element of direct control over that country's stability.

The Wartime Statute

11. Since the late 1950s, the Warsaw Pact, under Soviet aegis, has evolved into an increasingly integrated military alliance. In the late 1970s the Pact, except for Romania, implemented a Statute for Wartime Command of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact (see annex A). This directive and subsequent protocols, in effect, give the Soviet General Staff

a legal basis for alerting, mobilizing, and organizing NSWP units down to the regiment level for combat.

The Polish Crisis


12. The next major test of Soviet control over Eastern Europe began in Poland in 1980.

13. The Soviets probably draw mixed lessons from the experience of the past several years in Poland. On one hand, large elements of the Polish nation made clear their rejection of the policies of the regime. The survival of that regime rests to a large extent on Moscow's power and the implicit threat of a Soviet invasion. The Soviets had grave concerns about resistance from the Polish Army if such an invasion had occurred. On the other hand, the Polish military performed as expected by its commanders and when and as required by its government. Soviet military planners can draw some satisfaction from that performance, because at one point soon after the establishment of martial law some regular army forces reportedly assisted Ministry of Internal Affairs troops in breaking strikes. The rank and file of the Polish Army, however, was not used in direct confrontation with rioters.


Implications

14. These experiences bear only *indirectly* on the response of the Pact as a whole to a real or supposed

Figure 3
The Polish Crisis



Polish tank patrols Solidarity monument, in Gdansk, December 1981.



Polish armored vehicles seize Lenin shipyard in Gdansk, December 1981.

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external threat, but, on balance, it would appear the Soviets learned significant lessons from all three crises. In the case of Hungary, the Soviets moved in quickly with a small contingent of troops that proved inadequate. They subsequently had to resort to massive forces. In the Czechoslovak and, in particular, the Polish crises the Soviets took more time for political maneuvering, and in the Polish case they clearly viewed Pact armed intervention as a last resort. The three crises evolved from different circumstances, although the implicit threat to the Pact was evident in each case.

15. The history of repeated popular rebellion, including the participation of elements of the NSWP military establishments in several of these events, probably raises doubts in the Soviet leadership about Pact behavior in a war with NATO. The Soviets have instituted a progressively more elaborate set of statutory and military command and control procedures. Such measures have the additional benefit of minimizing the potential for East European military unreliability.

The Warsaw Pact as an Alliance

Peacetime

16. In peacetime, the central policymaking body of the Warsaw Pact is the Political Consultative Committee (PCC). Delegates to PCC meetings have included party First Secretaries, heads of governments, Foreign Ministers, Ministers of Defense, and General Staff Chiefs. Resolutions of the PCC form the political and legal basis for the activity of the working organizations of the Pact. These organizations include the Committee of Foreign Ministers, the Committee of Defense Ministers, the Military Council, a Technical Committee, and the Combined Armed Forces Staff (CAF).

17. The Committee of Defense Ministers is the highest military organ of the Alliance and is responsible for proposals and recommendations on Pact military matters. The Warsaw Pact Commander in Chief and the Chief of Staff are members of this committee, as well as the Defense Ministers of the member countries. The Military Council, permanently chaired by the Pact Commander in Chief, includes East European deputy commanders and the Pact Chief of

Staff. The Staff of the CAF reportedly includes East European Deputy Chiefs of Staff and other officials. Reportedly, the CAF headquarters staff works on measures to prepare the Pact Armed Forces for war. It plans training programs and exercises, stages meetings and conferences, and makes recommendations about organizational and technical matters concerning the CAF. In wartime, as the control organ of the Supreme High Command of the CAF, the Soviet General Staff performs planning for actual employment of Pact forces.

Transition to War

18. A Soviet decision to move toward war with NATO would be made by the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, probably on the recommendation of the Chairman of the Defense Council (the party General Secretary). Soviet Minister of Defense Ustinov is a member of the Politburo, but other Soviet military leaders, including at least the Chief of the General Staff and the Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact CAF probably would also participate in the deliberations that would precede the Politburo's decision. The readiness and reliability of the Warsaw Pact Allies would almost certainly be among the matters the Soviet Politburo would discuss at this time.

19. The point in the decisionmaking process at which the Soviets would begin discussions with their Pact Allies would depend largely on the circumstances of war initiation.

the Soviets assume a NATO attack. This scenario would allow the least possible time for intra-Pact coordination, consultation, and mobilization.

the Soviets presume some finite "threatening period" preceding the initiation of hostilities. Consultations would have to occur between the Soviets and their Allies during this period, given the degree to which Soviet planning appears to depend on their Allies' combat, mobilization, and economic support.

20. the Soviets express doubts about the possibility of a bolt

Figure 4
The Warsaw Pact Alliance



Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party and Chief of State of the USSR, at the May 1980 meeting of the PCC.

Military representatives to the May 1980 Warsaw meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact. Among those shown are Warsaw Pact Commander in Chief Kulikov (second left), Chief of the Soviet General Staff Ogarkov (right), and Polish General of Arms Urbanowicz (center).

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from the blue" attack by either side. They claim that the most likely circumstance for war initiation is the escalation of some regional crisis. During this period, Moscow might hope to achieve its political objectives without a war and, we believe, would strive as long as possible to hold NATO responsible for the threat of war. In any event, we know that the standard Pact scenario is generally a military worst-case situation,

intended by commanders to test their organizations under the worst possible situation. It may not, therefore, fully reflect actual Soviet or Pact perceptions of war initiation. (S NF)

21. have reported that NSWP officers do not believe that NATO has the intention or capability to initiate an attack at this time. We believe the Soviet leadership

shares this view, although we have no hard information on the perceptions of the Soviet leadership in this regard. Whatever the circumstances, the Soviets' dependence on East European support would be a critical factor. Therefore, although the Soviets might withhold from their Allies certain aspects of their own deliberations and perceptions of the crisis, actions and decisions affecting the general operational preparation of the whole CAF of the Pact could not be withheld without seriously upsetting what we assume to be standing war plans. The Soviets, however, would also seek to ensure the tactical surprise and integrity of their attack by maintaining tight security over certain operational aspects of their plans.

22. [

the Romanians rejected the Wartime Statute and the Polish General Staff expressed misgivings that the Statute would infringe on Polish sovereignty. The mechanism represented by the Wartime Statute certainly provides for virtually automatic military response by NSWP units to orders initiated in Moscow. [

political consultations [almost certainly would have to take place prior to the implementation of the statutory mechanisms. We assume the Soviets would be the driving force in such discussions [

Significance of NSWP Forces for Pact Planning

23. NSWP forces make up a large proportion of the forces—especially opposite NATO's Central Region. Nearly one-third of the active Warsaw Pact divisions opposing NATO are from NSWP countries.³ Also, certain NSWP units undergo training to employ nuclear weapons, and, according to [

the Soviets have procedures to transfer nuclear weapons in wartime. The details of these procedures [may indicate a degree

³ See annex B for a more complete description of NSWP force contributions to the Warsaw Pact.

of Soviet confidence in the reliability of at least these receiving units.

24. Czechoslovak, East German, and Polish armed forces compose more than one-third of the Pact ground divisions available for use in the Western Theater of Military Operations (TVD), and, depending on the scenario, could provide about 50 percent of the first echelon. [East German, and sometimes Soviet, forces help form a Polish Front. Other East German divisions typically join the Group of Soviet Forces Germany and the Soviet Northern Group of Forces to form a Soviet-East German Front. Czechoslovakia's forces join the Soviet Central Group of Forces stationed in that country to form the Czechoslovak-Soviet Front. Although Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania are clearly less crucial for a NATO war than their Allies in the north, [

form important elements for ground operations in the Southwestern TVD against the Turkish straits area, Greece, Austria, and Italy. Hungarian forces combine with the Soviet Southern Group of Forces to form the Soviet-Hungarian Front. Operations against the Turkish straits are headed by Soviet forces from the Odessa and possibly Kiev Fronts with some Bulgarian forces. To secure their western flank, the remaining Bulgarian forces form a Balkan Front. Romanian forces, if used at all, might form part of the Balkan Front or might constitute a national front in the second echelon of the TVD.

25. [raised questions about the Soviet view of Czechoslovakia's reliability in the aftermath of the 1968 crisis and about the Poles' reliability in the 1980s. [

26. The Soviets continue to urge their Allies to modernize their military forces. Most NSWP countries have been reluctant to accede to these Soviet demands, primarily for economic reasons, and have lagged behind the Soviets in modernization. This slower paced upgrading of NSWP forces could hamper their ability to operate with Soviet forces. This difference further indicates a divergence of priorities between most NSWP leaderships and the Soviets.

27. Of nearly equal importance to successful conduct of military operations against NATO are the lines of communications (LOCs) and much of the Pact logistic support structure within NSWP countries. Even though the Soviets would no doubt commit some of their own forces, such as the Railroad Troops or Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) troops, to protect these LOCs, without NSWP cooperation they would find continued logistic support increasingly difficult.

Soviet Control Measures in the Warsaw Pact

28. The behavior of Moscow's Warsaw Pact Allies will be influenced by a variety of factors ranging from the vested interests of the political and military elites of the East European countries to the attitudes and loyalties of the noncommissioned officers and middle grade officers, to the motivation and control of the armed forces, and to the attitudes and behavior of other groups in these nations. Both NSWP leaders and the Soviets are highly sensitive to these factors and have taken measures that affect their control.

29. Concern about NATO actions is another consideration underlying Soviet control measures. Soviet writings reflect considerable apprehension about initiatives NATO has already undertaken and might undertake in a crisis or war. One reflection of Moscow's attitude is the jamming of Western radio broadcasts to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Opposition by the Soviets to the use of Western language on jamming in the final document of the Madrid meetings on CSCE highlights their continued concern for the harmful effects of such broadcasts. The Soviets clearly perceived Western broadcasts during the Polish crisis as playing on a potentially significant Pact vulnerability.

Political Leadership

30. In spite of the increasing tendency on the part of some East European governments to assert a degree of independence, their foreign policies still are not provocative vis-a-vis Moscow (with the partial exception of Romania). Their elites generally benefit from heeding Moscow's wishes. The Warsaw Pact's collective defense arrangements give the East Europeans a considerable measure of security. For nations whose history has been replete with wars, Soviet dominance offers a peaceful, albeit oppressed, respite. Perhaps more important, the Pact, under Soviet leadership, is a guarantor of the continuance of Communist regimes within each of the Pact countries. Thus, on balance, Soviet hegemony helps protect the ruling elites of Eastern Europe against both foreign and domestic enemies.

NSWP Military Leadership

31. The Party leaderships regularly co-opt leading members of the military high command into their ranks, thereby acquiring their military expertise and giving them access to the policymaking process. Defector reports confirm that military leaders selected for such positions are the most politically reliable and committed to regime policies, and, like the political elite, have a vested interest in maintaining their privileged status. Any who are assigned to critical positions in command, control, and communications are screened by Moscow—usually in Soviet command and staff schools—and are monitored by the Soviets to ensure their continued reliability.

The Political Control Apparatus in the Military

32. Under normal noncrisis conditions, NSWP political control organs generally achieve a high degree of conformity and obedience within their armed forces. Pact media do sometimes reveal flagrant examples of poor training, corruption, lack of discipline, and improper ideological orientation—but always in the spirit of exposing the offenders and correcting the problems. The regularity of such discussions, combined with reports from defectors and other intelligence sources, leads us to believe that Pact military commanders are well aware of the potential for unreliability. The control system is structured so that

their troops will at least get assembled to go into combat if ordered.

33. The Warsaw Pact political control apparatus consists of the main political administrations (MPA) of the armed forces. The chiefs of these MPAs hold military rank and are part of the military command structure; however, their organizations are also directly subordinate to the Communist Party and report through party channels. These separate reporting channels provide the party an alternate source of information for assessing the status of the armed forces. The MPA structure, in most cases, parallels the military chain of command, with deputy commanders for political affairs assigned down to the company level. Although these "political officers" are responsible primarily for troop indoctrination, they share responsibility with the military commander for any decline in the overall combat readiness of the unit. In fact, by their influence over discipline, control over indoctrination, authority in assignment matters (they can recommend replacement of any personnel including the commanding officer), and their direct and separate chain of command, they have in most cases a disproportionately powerful position in the military structure. Although organizationally subordinate to the commander, they are rated by the next higher political officer, not by the commander. Therefore, while the political officer and the unit commander have a common interest that supports the control system within Pact military units, the political officer in most forces enjoys a high degree of autonomy from the regular chain of command. Nevertheless, in combat, as well as peacetime, the dual military and political control system has elements of ineradicable tension, which sometimes disrupt an otherwise cooperative relationship.]

has pointed to the political officer as a potential cause of military unreliability under especially adverse circumstances. More recently in Poland, however, the political officers have been reported as taking hardline positions during the course of the crisis.

34. *Troop Education.* Military-patriotic education at the troop level consumes several hours each week of the troop training schedule. Political education often bores the average conscript, and the Pact military

press regularly cites examples of ineffective political officers. Even so, military-patriotic education complements and builds on the previous political training that all citizens of Pact states receive in school and at work.

35. Political reliability is critical to advancement in the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact. The enterprising conscript seeks membership in the Young Communist organization if he wants to advance in rank, and a party membership card is a virtual necessity for the officer who wants to get ahead. For example, it is estimated that slightly more than 75 percent of the officer corps of the Hungarian Army are members of the Communist Party. The role of the party collective within each military unit is not well understood, but mandated participation in political work and supervision through the party chain of command probably reinforce tendencies toward reliability within the officer corps. Pact troops are evaluated partly on the basis of their "party mindedness." Anyone deviating from the party line or displaying a lack of commitment to party work in the military runs a grave risk of jeopardizing both his military and subsequent civilian career.

The Security Police Apparatus

36. A crucial element of control is contributed by security police officers who, although technically bearing military rank and uniforms are, in most cases, representatives of the state security apparatus. Their purview extends to ferreting out "ideological diversions," a crime that is interpreted very broadly in the Communist lexicon. Given their limited representation, such officers would probably not be able to ensure control of a unit as much as they could serve to identify and eliminate unreliable individuals.

37. *Paramilitary Internal Security Troops.* In addition to military police, the civilian ministries of internal affairs maintain relatively large troop bodies tasked with providing internal security against both domestic and external enemies.]

]they are part of the "palace guard" of the Communist regime, would play a key role in the event of domestic unrest, and would conduct rear-area security missions. As in the case of Poland, these forces, rather than regular army troops, would be

primarily relied on to put down domestic disturbances. This spares the regular armed forces from becoming directly involved in domestic crises, which might lead to a decline in the morale and political reliability of the regular army. These forces help ensure that regular military forces are available to perform their combat role, despite domestic unrest within the country. Further, a large number of Soviet security forces could be deployed to NSWP countries in time of war.

Military Factors

38. *Soviet Military Presence in the Warsaw Pact Nations.* The Soviets have stationed 30 maneuver divisions in NSWP countries, plus air and other forces, totaling more than half a million troops. In addition, they maintain senior military officers in each NSWP capital accredited as representatives of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact to the NSWP ministries of defense. In some NSWP armies, these officers oversee the activities of the Soviet advisers who are present at lower echelons of the national force. Where they are present, these advisers are tasked with reporting on the political reliability as well as combat readiness of the national forces to which they are assigned.

39. *Elite Units.* Contrasting with the normal conscript divisions of the Pact, all these countries have available a limited number of small elite units. They are trained for special missions behind NATO lines to conduct reconnaissance and surprise attacks on high-value targets. Thorough screening of personnel, high morale, and esprit de corps would tend to make them among the most reliable of NSWP forces. In addition, other segments of some East European forces consider themselves highly trained, cohesive, and capable. These segments largely comprise such specially trained personnel as airborne troops, naval infantry, and fighter pilots.

40. *Warsaw Pact Exercises and Doctrine.* The Warsaw Pact annually conducts a series of command post and set piece field exercises designed to test combined command procedures. These exercises condition the NSWP staffs for working and fighting with their Soviet "brothers-in-arms." These staffs become used to Soviet organization, doctrine, and warfighting

strategies, which require relatively rigid adherence to prearranged procedures and orders. The exercises also serve to reinforce perceptions of the Pact defending against potential Western aggression. Finally, these exercises demonstrate Soviet military power, thereby reminding the NSWP Allies of the limits of their autonomy.

Command and Control of Warsaw Pact Forces

41. Command and control of Warsaw Pact forces is maintained with great rigor by the Soviets. Although some effort has been made to erect a facade of coequal command authority by such devices as placing East European leaders in charge of some combined exercises, the Pact's Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff have always been Soviet officers, and the Soviet General Staff would serve as the planning and coordinating center for the Pact forces in wartime. In fact, Hungarian leader Kadar recently told the American Ambassador that there is overwhelming Soviet involvement in East European defense matters. He all but admitted that there are no national command authorities in NSWP capitals that could interpose themselves in times of crisis between the Soviet General Staff and the individual national staffs. Kadar said "the Warsaw Alliance is a single army." As noted previously, the Soviets have tightened their control over their NSWP Allies (except Romania) under the Wartime Statute (see annex A) and its alerting network. []


Situational Factors in NSWP Military Reliability

42. In the event of crisis or war, a number of major situational factors would probably have some influence on the military reliability of NSWP countries. All of these factors are variable within the context of the presumed situation. The following discussion of their individual and collective contributions to Pact reliability is therefore speculative and scenario dependent.

National Considerations

43. The degree to which the Soviets could count on NSWP support in a specific situation varies among these countries. A major influence would be the view of the potential gains or losses resulting from cooperating in Soviet military actions as perceived by leader-

Figure 5
Warsaw Pact Exercises



Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov, Commander in Chief of Warsaw Pact forces, at joint maneuvers in East Germany in 1980.



Czechoslovak, East German, and Soviet Army officers in joint exercise.



Bulgarian and East German soldiers at joint command post exercise "Brotherhood-in-Arms."



Soviet and Hungarian troops launch bridge in river-crossing exercise.

Unclassified

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ship groups in each country. The possible consequences of losing would be a prime factor for consideration by NSWP leaderships. Another important consideration would be the amount of damage likely to be inflicted by NATO forces during the conflict. Given their geographic location, however, damage expectations would probably be high no matter what their choice.

44. In a conflict with NATO, Soviet and NSWP leaders would claim to be defending themselves against aggression. Thus, the Polish and Czechoslovak people would be urged to defend themselves against West Germans and might find that argument convincing. The Hungarians might share such a view, but to a lesser extent. Also, the Bulgarians could take satisfaction in the possible opportunity to recover lost territory from the Greeks and Turks. East German susceptibility to such propaganda is open to question because some sources have doubted the vigor with which East Germans could be expected to fight West Germans. There are also national considerations that could act to reduce the desire of NSWP forces to engage in combat with NATO countries. Historical affinities might make Poles, Czechoslovaks, or Hungarians unwilling to fight Americans, the British, or the French, particularly if Western appeals in this regard were effectively transmitted.

45. The Soviets have reason to feel differently about the potential reliability of each of their NSWP Allies. They probably recognize the Bulgarian regime as their most reliable Ally. Bulgarian leaders have consistently supported Soviet policy and historically have had the closest ties with the Soviet Union. Defector and emigre reporting places the East German regime as the next most reliable in Soviet eyes—both politically and militarily. Soviet confidence is certainly reinforced by the presence of 19 Soviet divisions in the country. Considering its history, Czechoslovakia must be a source of concern for the Soviets. Nevertheless, the regime was politically reliable under Antonin Novotny and remains so under Gustav Husak. The Czechoslovak populace appears to be resigned to continued Soviet domination, reflected by the presence of five Soviet divisions. Despite the presence of four Soviet divisions in Hungary, its reliability is more open to question. Hungary's geographic and strategic position might allow its leaders to

minimize direct engagement with NATO forces. Romania is probably perceived by the Soviets as militarily the least reliable ally. In addition to Soviet concern about Romanian foreign policy, Bucharest has failed to participate fully in Pact exercises, other than with small staff elements, and has rejected any formal integration of its forces into the Pact command and control systems.

46. Regardless of two Soviet divisions in the country, Poland has been a perennial problem for the USSR, and its political eruptions, sparked by economic problems over the years, have had a strong undercurrent of anti-Soviet sentiments. Poland's key role in military operations and its location on the main lines of communication to the West must, therefore, result in a great deal of concern by the Soviets. Perhaps assuaging some of this concern, however, is the fact that the Polish armed forces as a whole—though not directly assigned to a confrontational role—have performed their duties in a reliable manner during the Solidarity crisis. In part, the Polish military can be said to have acted to restore domestic order to prevent an overt Soviet intervention. The extent to which the Polish situation can be used to measure NSWP, or even Polish, reliability is open to question. Because of widespread social unrest, disorganization of the Polish Communist Party, and severe economic problems, there was an erosion of Soviet confidence in the near-term reliability of the Polish armed forces. While the extent of current Soviet confidence is in question, and the memory of recent strains will linger, precedent indicates that confidence would be restored over time. Community opinion diverges on precisely when this would occur. Most agencies believe that Soviet confidence in Poland's ability to carry out its Warsaw Pact obligation is slowly improving and that the Polish armed forces would carry out initial Pact wartime orders. An alternative view holds that Soviet confidence in the Polish armed forces will not be restored until the party regains preeminence and Solidarity is no longer a major factor in Polish society.*

Personal Motivation

47. Given the political dependence of these regimes on the Soviets, many leaders are likely to assess their

*The holder of this view is the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army.

interests as congruent with the Soviets' in most respects. Their convictions as lifelong Communists and their personal status, indeed survival, are likely to lead most of them to comply with Soviet directives. However, some might attempt to influence or interpret these directives according to their perception of their national interests. Also influencing East European perceptions is the constant threat posed by proximity to the USSR.

48. The Soviet concept of fast-moving offensive operations could constitute a strong lever for ensuring the personal participation of individual East Europeans in a war with NATO. It would be to the Soviets' advantage to minimize time for reflection or exposure to anti-Soviet nationalistic sentiments amplified by Western psychological warfare. It would, however, be difficult to eliminate such exposure completely.

49. Unit cohesion and the respect of troops and junior officers for their battlefield commanders are important factors that the Soviet forces, like all other armies, have recognized. Pact training and doctrine emphasize unquestioning obedience to orders and severe punishment for noncompliance. Rapid, victorious movement to the west would confirm all that NSWP troops have been taught to expect, and thus bolster their reliability. Stalemate or retreat could raise fears about the superiority of Western weaponry, erode unit cohesion and cooperation, and exacerbate tensions within the Pact's high command.

Circumstances of War Initiation

50. East European leaders know that their countries stand to suffer greatly during a war through the destruction of much of their populations and economic infrastructures. These concerns and possible differing views on how to resolve the crisis could drive some leaders to offer alternative solutions or attempt to moderate Soviet positions through party, government, and personal channels. Their likely goal in these efforts would be to influence Moscow to reconsider its options short of war.

51. It seems unlikely that a central European war would begin with a "bolt from the blue" attack, without some degree of political warning and prewar mobilization on both sides. Soviet military strategists state explicitly that such a contingency is improbable,

although they emphasize the continuing possibility of a NATO surprise attack as the basis for high Pact readiness. Nonetheless, the Soviets evidently believe that a general war would most likely result from the expansion of a local crisis, preceded by rising tensions that could last several weeks or longer. Such a condition, which the Soviets call the "threatening period," would allow the Soviets time to appraise and influence popular attitudes, as well as those of NSWP leaders, before implementing any decision to initiate hostilities.

52. A short period of crisis before hostilities begin would provide little time for political factors undermining NSWP reliability to show any effect. It would require the Soviets to implement Pact war plans and commit forces on short notice. In such a situation the Soviets would also have little time to mobilize their reserve forces deep within the Soviet Union, and they would thus have to rely primarily on forces (including NSWP forces) already stationed in Eastern Europe for the prosecution of initial phases of the war. If the Soviets judged that a regional crisis had a high potential for escalating to major war, they would attempt to initiate at least partial Pact mobilization, perhaps by covert phases. [

] Under this scenario, many NSWP units and individuals would probably be uncertain, for at least a short period, as to the actual Soviet intentions—whether the Pact was merely exercising, mobilizing to deter NATO from interference in a regional crisis, or actually girding for war. Contrasting with the secrecy the Soviets might obtain by utilizing such covert procedures is the high potential for confusion and disorganization caused by issuing last minute instructions for combat to already fielded units.

53. Should the crisis be prolonged, anti-Soviet views and their impact on military personnel—especially the conscripts—could gain importance. Extensive propaganda campaigns by both the Soviets and the NSWP countries would seek to suppress any anti-Soviet, antiwar sentiments by depicting NATO as an aggressor whose bellicose intentions would be construed as an outrage to the national interests of all Pact members. The many historical, cultural, and political differences among the NSWP countries could potentially weaken

military reliability, and their influence could grow throughout the prewar crisis. The Soviets are aware of these attitudes and would look to the ruling elites of Eastern Europe for support.

54. If the Soviets decided to initiate hostilities, they would probably conduct a multifaceted program of propaganda and "active measures" both to bolster the East Europeans' confidence and to distract the West. (The invasion of Afghanistan incorporated active measures, including a "request" for assistance, to legitimize the Soviet invasion.) Should the Soviet-inspired measures prove ineffective and the NSWP populations perceive that there was inadequate justification for war, opposition to conflict could be widespread. Such opposition, however, would have to develop early to have a major influence on mobilization. Depending on the circumstances, some NSWP leaders, groups, and individuals might work to limit their countries' involvement in the war and to play as passive a role as possible. Other, and probably smaller, groups might engage in active resistance to Soviet forces. However, we would expect that the large number of Soviet troops moving through Eastern Europe toward the front would have an inhibiting effect on local populations. In any event, to the extent that Moscow exercises control over NSWP forces through the Warsaw Pact in this scenario, NSWP leaders could find that large elements of their own armed forces were already alerted under combined Pact command. Attempts to subvert the system devised by the Soviets probably would not be effective.

55. Continued NSWP civil unrest has probably led Soviet military planners to consider eventualities that include massive defections within the Pact. Prudent military planning would require setting up contingency plans to deal with such worst-case situations, but we have not observed exercises of such contingencies.

56. The circumstances of war initiation would affect NSWP reliability insofar as the relative length of the preceding period of crisis allows for countervailing forces to gather momentum. A short prehostilities crisis would tend to afford the Soviets the best chance for applying the controls inherent in their statutory agreements with their allies. Even in a "longer threat" scenario, the Soviets could still withhold some infor-

mation from their Allies in the interest of secrecy and security. Both of these scenarios, however, deny the Soviets the fullest degree of political preparedness and military and economic mobilization, the absence of which could seriously degrade operations. We believe, therefore, that in general the Soviets' dependence on their Allies for a full, coordinated attack will temper the degree of secrecy. The factors influencing the Soviets in this choice will undoubtedly be strongly dependent on the unfolding situation.

East European Expectations of Actions by the USSR

57. Reporting [

] sheds considerable light on how some East Europeans interpret Soviet thinking about the NSWP forces. They reportedly believe that transition to war would follow one of the following courses:


— The Warsaw Pact Supreme High Command (SHC) of the CAF could call a meeting of the national leaders and instruct them that a threat existed and that they must act in accordance with the threat. There was speculation that this option would only be used if the entry into war arose out of a steadily growing crisis, where time was not a critical factor.

— Another option, [] would be for the essentially Soviet SHC simply to notify the member states that a threat to the Warsaw Pact existed and alert the CAF to the nature of the threat.

58. [] argues that the Pact's Wartime Statute and its associated protocols and directives had been accepted by the member states in peacetime. At that time, there was ample opportunity to organize bureaucratic resistance to Soviet demands and follow the example of the Romanians, who rejected Soviet control concepts. Romanian concerns over infringement of national sovereignty, implicit in their reaction, parallel similar concerns held elsewhere in the Pact but never brought to the table. Given the location of most NSWP countries on the Soviet lines of communication in a war with NATO, it is unlikely the Soviets would countenance failure to cooperate by any NSWP country. The Soviets have repeatedly demonstrated

their resolve to achieve compliance by whatever means necessary—including the use of force against other Pact members. The NSWP leaders are fully aware of this and would most likely tailor their actions accordingly.

59. The Statute, as set up by the Soviets, makes what some East European military officials regarded as wholly inadequate provisions for the active participation of the consultative organs of the Warsaw Pact organization in wartime. [] believes that decisions normally taken by these organs in peacetime will be taken by the SHC in wartime. Thus, the Statute creates a centralized command for the CAF that appears to these officials as, in reality, a Soviet command.



61. [] stated that Pact norms call for CAF units to attain full combat readiness from their normal peacetime readiness in about 6 to 8 hours. First-echelon units are expected to be ready to initiate combat from their wartime assembly areas within 54 hours of the initial signal to implement war plans (assuming the units start at the normal peacetime readiness state). We note that these norms have not been achieved in practice by these forces. According to Pact doctrine, when a signal to raise readiness status is received, particularly at the lower levels of readiness, CAF actions may be taken under the guise of exercise activity without an overt combat alert.

62. It is the conclusion of [] that the Soviet-controlled Pact SHC, if it desired, could mobilize the NSWP member states and propel them into a war without the active, independent participation of the NSWP political leaders. Further, [] no clear statement in Pact directives to prevent such activation as the result of an alleged attack on the USSR from outside the European context. [] the Soviet leadership might not notify the NSWP political leaders of its intention to initiate hostilities until after a signal to implement war plans had been transmitted, so as not to compromise the security of the initial stages of mobilization.

63. []

[] The Statute reportedly refers to the authority exercised by the Pact's SHC and to the authority exercised by the High Commands in the Theaters of Military Operations as having been derived from the decisions of the states according to some process not defined in the Statute.

[] The control system as described in this Estimate is considered pervasive in the Pact and certainly affords Moscow a high degree of control over a chain of command that is virtually all-Soviet by definition. Given the political and military control measures within the NSWP and the general alignment of the NSWP leadership, we believe that the strong Soviet-imposed control measures are likely to be effective at least initially.

Fortunes of War

64. As in all wars, the degree of success on the battlefield, is likely to be the most critical factor to the reliability of the armed forces engaged. Defeat or even stalemate could impair the reliability of many of the East European military forces. Although this judgment cannot be supported by specific evidence, there are historical precedents for allies changing sides when the tides of war turn, including in Eastern Europe in World War II. The penalties the Soviets could exact in an age of nuclear warfare, however, would be very high. Prolonged combat, particularly with a static front, would raise the question among all segments of

the NSWP forces and populace about the wisdom of participation in a drawn-out war of attrition, increasingly damaging to their countries. Such a sentiment might not be Pact-wide, nor would it necessarily apply to all the forces of one particular country. However, it would have a direct effect on the combat effectiveness of some Pact units and could, over time, spread to other Pact forces.

65. Escalation of the war to include NATO nuclear strikes against NSWP targets might have drastic effects on NSWP military reliability, but this would depend on the combat situation. If NATO were to direct its nuclear fire so as to spare East European populations and combat units not cooperating with the Soviets—or were to announce such an intent—then the incentives of NSWP countries to be neutral could increase. However, if NSWP leaders saw themselves as being on the winning side, the use of nuclear weapons—especially against their homelands—could simply increase their determination to take revenge against NATO. In any event, there is no historical precedent or evidence for any projections of military or civilian reactions to nuclear warfare in Europe.

66. In the event that the general Pact offensive collapsed and East European forces had to make major withdrawals, we believe Soviet control measures could be hard pressed to ensure NSWP reliability. Such an

eventuality would undermine any NSWP perception of the Soviets as invincible, probably disrupt Soviet command links, and present opportunities for non-compliance with orders and defection. Alternatively, NSWP armed forces would fight more enthusiastically if they perceived the battle as a struggle to defend their homelands. Soviets plans for a rapid and overwhelming offensive no doubt are based, at least in part, on the fear that a stagnant front or retreat could have crucial debilitating effects on NSWP troops and perhaps their own as well. NSWP soldiers will respond to the same stimuli that have affected soldiers throughout history. Given sufficient cohesion to initiate combat operations, continued reliability will be tied largely to the relative success of the forces involved.

67. In conclusion, we believe that the Soviets' need for support by the NSWP forces is such that they would not initiate a war against NATO until they were reasonably sure of the participation of most Pact forces. The primary factors affecting the Pact's military reliability during initial hostilities are its established control mechanisms and the status of its training and discipline. We believe these are likely to favor the reliability of the Pact in the early stages of the conflict. Reliability thereafter could be progressively degraded by Pact failure on the battlefield and appropriate NATO initiatives.

ANNEX A

THE STATUTE FOR THE WARTIME COMMAND OF THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES OF THE WARSAW PACT AND ITS UNIFIED WARTIME COMMAND SYSTEM

Origins

1. The Statute for the Wartime Command of the Combined Armed Forces (CAF) of the Warsaw Pact was drafted in accordance with a November 1978 resolution of the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) of the Warsaw Pact. The draft was approved by the Committee of Defense Ministers (CDM) of the Warsaw Pact on 4 December 1979. It was formally ratified in the name of the Warsaw Pact member states in early 1980 by the signatures of the First Secretaries of the Communist Parties and the Prime Ministers of the member states. We have reason to believe that it has never been presented at a formal meeting of the PCC. Based on the 1978 PCC resolution, a set of unified readiness and alert procedures was presented to the Warsaw Pact member states in a directive of the Commander in Chief (CinC) of the CAF in the fall of 1979. The Statute with its associated protocols and directives established the military technical systems for the centralized command and control of the military, economic, political, and scientific resources of the Warsaw Pact member states in wartime. Romania has been reported to be the only member state to steadfastly refuse to sign any PCC resolutions or CDM resolutions since November 1978 that have dealt with the Statute.

Description

2. According to the terms of the Wartime Command Statute, the Supreme High Command (SHC) of the CAF will exercise total operational command and control, through the Soviet General Staff as its control organ, over all the armed forces and state resources of the Warsaw Pact member states that have been allocated to the CAF through the appropriate protocols. Also, the SHC is delegated the authority when required to assume effective control over all the national

forces and resources not specifically allocated to the CAF in the theaters of military operations. A representative of each Warsaw Pact member state with his respective working group would be attached to the SHC.

3. The Statute reportedly states that the naming of the Supreme Commander in Chief of the CAF is determined by a decision of the Warsaw Pact member states. This action was, in fact, accomplished by means of an associated protocol. Leonid Brezhnev was named Supreme Commander in Chief. Andropov probably has succeeded him in this position []

Implementation

4. The Statute provides that on a signal from the SHC, the Staff of the CAF will be dissolved and replaced with two theater-level commands: the High Command of the CAF in the Western Theater of Military Operations, and the High Command of the CAF in the Southwestern Theater of Military Operations.

5. [] there are three basic conditions under which the provisions of the Statute can be activated:

- First, the wartime command organs could be brought into being and the other terms of the Statute activated on a decision of the Warsaw Pact member states.
- Second, a member state could notify the CAF CinC that it is threatened with aggression and has alerted its armed forces. At this point the CAF CinC will notify the SHC and then the CAF members that the Unified Wartime Command System is being implemented.

— Third, the SHC could simply notify the member states that a threat to the Warsaw Pact exists and alert the CAF according to the nature of the threat.

6. According to the provisions of the Statute, the SHC, through the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, can raise the CAF to full combat readiness, which includes mobilization of the forces of the Warsaw Pact member states designated for commitment to the CAF.

7. On receiving the signal from the SHC to raise readiness levels, the high commands in the theaters will be created. At the same time the national forces and resources allocated to the CAF in the Theaters of Military Operations will be transferred to the high commands. The military and defense-related leaders in the NSWP member states are regularly drilled in these procedures.

Significant Provisions

8. The Wartime Command Statute authorizes the CinC of the high command in the theater access to the political leadership organs of the member states. Preamble documents attached to the Statute are said to state that control over the military, political, economic, and scientific resources of the member states necessary to the prosecution of combat operations in each theater will reside solely in the high command of that theater. Furthermore, the purpose of the Statute is to create the means for the centralized control of the combined forces of the member states to defend their national existence and the gains of socialism. In the event of the activation of the Wartime Command System, the SHC and the high commands in the theaters would therefore take effective control of the forces and assets of all the member states.

ANNEX B

SIGNIFICANCE OF NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT FORCES FOR PACT PLANNING

Quantitative Contribution of NSWP Armed Forces

1. Warsaw Pact forces for operations against NATO can best be described in terms of major groupings:

- Ground, tactical air, and air defense forces in Eastern Europe, the military districts of the USSR opposite NATO,¹ and, possibly, in the Moscow, Volga, and Ural Military Districts.
- Naval forces of the Soviet Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleets and the NSWP countries.
- Most medium- and intermediate-range and some inter-continental ballistic missiles of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces.

2. Pact forces opposite NATO are predominantly Soviet, but NSWP forces—especially those of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia—are critical to execution of Soviet strategy for conflict in Europe. Of the 163 active Warsaw Pact divisions opposing NATO, 55 are from NSWP countries. In addition to these active divisions, the NSWP armies have mobilization divisions that can be activated in the event of hostilities. The NSWP-Allies also have about 2,300 fixed-wing combat aircraft in tactical air units and some 500 tactical helicopters. In all, they constitute some 45 percent of Warsaw Pact combat aircraft in Eastern Europe. NSWP naval forces, particularly in the Baltic area, would also enhance Pact naval operations.

3. The East European Pact countries also contribute to Warsaw Pact nuclear delivery capabilities, including some 140 fighter-bomber and 300 missile launchers. There are about 20 known major munitions storage sites at Soviet installations in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Some

of these are believed to contain nuclear weapons. Certain army and air force units in these countries undergo training to employ nuclear weapons. [

]the Soviets have procedures for transfer of nuclear weapons to these units in wartime.

4. We believe the wartime roles of the Warsaw Pact armies and fronts would be highly dependent on the specific situation that developed before the forces were committed.* [

]capability and willingness to resubordinate divisions and armies to other formations depending on the situation. Nevertheless, geographic constraints, the peacetime disposition of both Pact and NATO forces, and strategic trends [

] give a good indication of the most likely manner in which Pact forces would be employed.


The Northern Tier Nations of the Warsaw Pact

5. The Czechoslovak, East German, and Polish armed forces constitute the most important NSWP contribution to Pact forces that would be committed to battle in event of war with NATO. They make up more than one-third of the Pact ground divisions available for use in the Western Theater of Military Operations (TVD). Of the 57 active Pact divisions in place in the Northern Tier, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland provide 31. These countries also provide a large share of the combat aircraft available for use in the TVD and a smaller but still sizable share of the general purpose naval forces.

6. In the event of war, our understanding of Soviet military plans depicts these forces being used in offensive operations. Pact planning for the Western

* For a full discussion of Soviet plans and capabilities for going to war, refer to NIE 11-14-81, *Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO*, and IIM: *Employment of Warsaw Pact Forces Against NATO*.

Figure B-1
Illustrative Warsaw Pact Ground Force Campaign in the Western TVD



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TVD envisions offensives along three-to-five main axes of advance in Central Europe. (See figure B-1.) To carry out these offensives, the Pact probably would seek, at least initially, to organize its first-echelon forces into three fronts—the Soviet-East German, the Polish, and the Czechoslovak-Soviet—although a smaller force might be employed in extreme circumstances.

7. [] Polish forces (possibly augmented by some East German and more recently some Soviet forces) would form a Polish Front of about 15 divisions. [

] however, Polish armies have been used as exploitation forces in the central part of West Germany. This [] forces] does not give us a clear picture of current Soviet plans. In any case, the Polish Front command structure is still believed to be in Warsaw Pact plans.

8. East Germany's two armies typically join Soviet forces from the Group of Soviet Forces Germany and the Northern Group of Forces to form a Soviet-East German Front of about 27 divisions. [

] Czechoslovakia's 10 divisions would join the five divisions of the Soviet Central Group of Forces stationed in that country to form the Czechoslovak-Soviet Front. [

The Southern Tier Nations of the Warsaw Pact

9. Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania—the Southern Tier members of the Warsaw Pact—have in the past played less crucial roles in Soviet plans for war in Europe than their Allies in the north, and their capabilities have been correspondingly smaller. Their lesser status has reflected historically differing Soviet priorities in this region. More recently, however, the Soviets, while improving their own forces in the region, have also pressed their Southern Tier Allies to upgrade their military capabilities and assume more important roles in war plans. In the event of a war

with NATO, the Warsaw Pact probably would concentrate its initial ground operations in the Southwestern TVD on the Turkish straits and Austria, with eastern Turkey as the next most likely area of attack. Six Hungarian divisions would combine with the four Soviet divisions of the Southern Group of Forces to form the Soviet-Hungarian Front and invade Austria to secure the southern flank of the Western TVD and possibly to invade Italy or West Germany. Operations against the Turkish straits would be headed by Soviet forces from the Odessa and possibly Kiev Fronts with some Bulgarian forces. To secure their western flank, the remaining Bulgarian forces would form a Balkan Front. Romanian forces might be included in the Balkan Front, or they might constitute a national Front in the TVD's second echelon. (See figure B-2.)

Lines of Communications and Logistic Support

10. Besides the importance of the NSWP countries in the conduct of military operations against NATO, they also have a critical role in managing and protecting the lines of communications (LOCs) and much of the Pact logistic support structure within their countries. Major railroads and marshaling yards are on Polish and East German territory, and logistic facilities in Czechoslovakia would also be essential for Pact military reinforcement and supply. In addition, oil pipelines for resupply of Soviet forces run through these territories. In time of crisis or combat, the Soviets undoubtedly would commit some of their own forces, such as the Railroad Troops or Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) special troops, to protect their LOCs. Even so, without NSWP cooperation (such as indigenous railroad workers) the Soviets would find continued logistic support increasingly difficult. If significant local opposition were to occur, Soviet management of a quick, successful campaign would be severely inhibited, if not impossible.

11. For logistic reasons, as well as the scale of their planned commitment to combat, the failure of one or more NSWP countries to participate in a Pact military operation involving their territory would also seriously impair or limit its scope. We believe, therefore, that the Soviets plan on the use of NSWP forces and secure LOCs through these territories to wage a successful war against NATO.

Figure B-2
Illustrative Warsaw Pact Operations in the Southwestern TVD*



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ANNEX C

MILITARY RELIABILITY IMPLICATIONS

1. The nature of Pact reliability as shown in this Estimate raises important implications. Though not exhaustive, the following is representative of such implications.

2. This Estimate's assessment of Pact forces as initially reliable refers to our belief that they would perform their initial combat missions as ordered. This does not imply that all these forces maintain equal levels of combat effectiveness. Combat effectiveness would vary depending on many factors, of which only one would be reliability.

3. Penchants for secrecy and security might lead the Soviets to withhold certain information from their Allies concerning their plans for combat. Nevertheless, in nearly every scenario, the Soviets would necessarily be forced to alert, mobilize, and position large bodies of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact troops to ensure the most militarily effective operation. In addition, despite the possibility that the Soviets would attempt to mobilize covertly to keep their intentions unknown in the West and unclear among their Allies, some actions would have to be taken that would clearly differentiate the process from a simple exercise. [

] These preparations would include, of course, Soviet as well as NSWP units. Without these preparations, or with only Soviet units alert and ready for combat, the Soviets face the prospect of initiating hostilities with a good part of Pact forces at best confused and at worst so seriously disorganized as to be unable to perform its missions.

4. Overall reliability is dependent largely on the fortunes of war once hostilities begin. Warsaw Pact forces, including the Soviets, could be susceptible to a wide range of NATO initiatives, including psychological operations. For these initiatives to be effective,

however, they would have to be accompanied by NATO success on the battlefield. Without such success, these initiatives would have impact on some individuals and perhaps small units, but probably would not seriously affect overall reliability.

5. Because of the traditional historical differences among the nations that compose the Warsaw Pact, they should not be treated as a homogeneous military entity. Under some circumstances, properly differentiated plans and programs could exploit already present tensions among Pact members.

6. The following list is representative of specific vulnerabilities that could affect the military reliability of NSWP forces:


- Cultural, ethnic, religious, and nationalistic tensions within and among the Pact countries.
- Loss of national self-determination.
- Resentment of Soviet domination.
- Overall economic hardship.
- Desire for greater material benefits.
- Fear of superior Western weaponry.
- Desire for more "democratic" freedoms.
- Absence of free media.
- Mendacity of Communist system.
- Unofficial peace movements.
- Conflicting loyalty of political officers.
- Tensions within the armed forces, resulting, for example, from harsh treatment of new conscripts and dislike of political officers.
- Frustrations of lifestyle under totalitarian systems.

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ANNEX D

KEY INTELLIGENCE GAPS ON NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT RELIABILITY



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