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## Intelligence Information Report

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REPORT NO

DATE DISTR. 0 5 APR 1982

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
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REPORT CLASS		<u> </u>			
COUNTRY	Poland/USSR				*
SUBJECT	Status of the in Poland (DOI: 1981)	Soviet Northern Group	of	Forces	
SOURCE					

- 1. Officially the Soviet Northern Group of Forces (NGF) in Poland is composed of two tank divisions, an air army, and tens of signal units, including a high frequency secure communications signal regiment which has been stationed at the Rembertow army barracks outside Warsaw for 15 years.
- 2. There are two lines of contact between the NGF and the Polish authorities. The first leads to the Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Polish Government for the Stationing of Soviet Armed Forces in Poland. The head of this office is Division General Michal ((Stryga)). This office deals with quartermaster support to the NGF, including the supervision of Polish resources temporarily turned over to the Soviet forces (such as barracks and training areas), and legal aspects of the Soviet presence, including the handling of damage claims from Polish citizens against the NGF. Although subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense (MON), this office is on the table of organization of the Council of Ministers and is the liaison between the Polish government and the NGF.

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- 3. The second line of contact between the NGF and the Polish authorities leads to the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces (PAF). This should be, in theory, an active command liaison channel dealing with all operational matters between the NGF and the PAF. In practice, however, it is used primarily for notification of the Polish General Staff of Soviet military training activities outside the Soviet garrison areas and the permanent military training areas.
- There is no tradition of regular relations between the NGF and the Polish General Staff. In fact, the NGF appears to follow a policy of by-passing the General Staff of the PAF whenever it can. This fact led General Wojciech Jaruzelski, after he became Minister of National Defense, to promulgate an order that all contact between the Soviet military and the Polish governmental authorities should pass through the Polish General Staff. Nonetheless, the NGF appears to honor this instruction in the breach, rather than in the observance. Source stated that although the NGF Commander-in-Unier (CinC) is legally required to notify the Polish General Staff of changes in the strength or disposition of NGF forces, he never heard of such a formal notification in all his years on the General Staff.) Thus, the Polish General Staff does not have reliable knowledge on the size and disposition of the NGF.
- 5. NGF headquarters and staff personnel, however, do not ignore the Office of the Chief of the Polish General Staff, General Florian ((Siwicki)). NGF staff officers, including lieutenant colonels and colonels, in violation of all norms of military protocol and the chain of command make continuous unannounced visits to Siwicki's office. They approach him regularly on all manner of trivia, while refusing to deal with the regular Polish General Staff offices. This is in contrast to the fact that the NGF CinC, Gen. ((Zarudin)), rarely visits the headquarters of the Polish General Staff.
- 6. NGF relations with the Polish military districts (MD) (especially the Pomeranian MD and the Silesian MD) stand in sharp contrast to its relations with the Polish General Staff. A close working relationship has developed over the years between the NGF and these MDs. The Poles have accepted this situation, despite the fact that it contradicts Jaruzelski's order that all such relations should pass through the General Staff.

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7. The NGF and the Polish MD commands coordinate their use of joint training areas and joint exercises (though the 1stter are included in the General Staff's annual exercise plan). Each year one of the Soviet divisions exercises with two Polish divisions from one of the above two MDs, and the other Soviet division follows suit with Polish divisions from the other MD. The following year, the Soviet divisions alternate the MDs with which they train, so that each Soviet division never exercises with the same MD in two successive years. The command of these exercises alternates between the NGF CinC and the Polish MD commanders. On occasion, the NGF air army has exercised with the Polish MDs, but this is not a normal event. Also, the NGF does not normally exercise with forces from the Warsaw MD.

8. Although the Poles have participated in the above exercises for years, as well as Warsaw Pact joint forces exercises, they have no real idea as to the purpose of the NGF. Its structure is a monstrosity, and does not accord with any known table of organization in the Warsaw Pact. It normally exercises as a front, yet it is not structured as a front. The Poles speculate that some forces from GSFG may be intended for assignment to the NGF in wartime to swell it to a front, but this is only speculation.

Comment: Source stated that he knew of no such plan.) Poles have also speculated that the NGF may be intended to assist the Polish internal front during wartime, but this does not concur with its structure either. The most popular idea among the Poles is that the NGF is intended to form a "Reserve Army of the Western Theater of Military Operations."

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