

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED~~

4152

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

HR70-14

31 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSONS :
"The Conduct of the Air Engagement and
Delivery of the Initial Massed Strike
in the Air Operation."

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on a collection of 29 lessons, classified TOP SECRET, prepared in 1977 for use in the Soviet General Staff Academy. The lessons are broken down into two parts: the first 19 lessons deal with the staff preparation of a front offensive operation with conventional and nuclear weapons; the remaining 10 lessons deal with the conduct of an offensive employing conventional weapons at first with a transition to the use of nuclear weapons. This report is a translation of the lesson dealing with an air army's defensive and offensive tasks using conventional ordnance following preemptive NATO air strikes in East Germany.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

John N. McMahon

FIRDB-312/01861-80

TS #808158
Copy # 5

~~ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



FIRDB-312/01861-80

Distribution:

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force

Director, National Security Agency

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center

Director of Strategic Research

Director of Scientific and Weapons Research

Page 2 of 9 Pages

TS #808158

Copy # 5

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED~~



Intelligence Information Special Report

Page 3 of 9 Pages

COUNTRY USSR

FIRDB - 312/01861-80

DATE OF
INFO. 1977

DATE
31 July 1980

SUBJECT

GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSON No. 20a : "The Conduct of the Air Engagement and Delivery of the Initial Massed Strike in the Air Operation."

SOURCE Documentary


Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of a lesson, classified TOP SECRET, prepared for use at the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the USSR. This lesson is for the instruction of students acting as air army commanders in the transition to the offensive using conventional ordnance following preemptive NATO air strikes in East Germany. The scenario specifies the target areas struck by NATO: front air defense means and airfields; and the main targets to be hit by the air army: NATO's missile/nuclear means, airfields, and Hawk battalions. The lesson cites the specific East German airfields used by the air army and also gives a detailed listing of the model air army's squadrons, regiments, groups, and divisions of fighter, fighter-bomber, bomber, reconnaissance, and electronic countermeasures aircraft. Also discussed are control measures, time scheduling, holding zones and the distance from them to selected NATO airfields, and support for the overflight of a Long Range Aviation bomber corps.

End of Summary

TS #808158
Copy # 5

~~TOP SECRET~~



LESSON No. 20a

I. Lesson subject: "The conduct of the air engagement and delivery of the initial massed strike in the air operation."

II. Training objective: to investigate with the students the work method of the commander and staff of the 1st Air Army in controlling the combat actions of air large units and units in the air engagement and in the initial massed strike of the air operation.

III. Method and time for conducting the lesson:

- individual study by students -- 2 hours;
- group exercise with elements of a command-staff exercise -- 2 hours.

IV. Methodological recommendations on the students' preparation for the lesson

At the start of individual study as desired by the students in the group, the instructor will hold a short briefing, in which he will recommend to the students that they:

- estimate the situation at 0710 hours 8 September, elaborate a decision for the commander of the 1st Air Army, enter the decision in the chart (appendix No. 4), and prepare to report on the lesson;
- perform the necessary calculations and prepare to control the combat actions of air large units and units in the air engagement and the initial massed strike of the air operation.

V. Procedure for conducting the lesson

First training topic

Decision-making by the commander of the 1st Air Army

TS #808158
Copy # 5

~~TOP SECRET~~

FIRDB-312/01861-80

Page 5 of 9 Pages

according to the situation at 0710 hours 8 September -- 30 minutes.

The instructor announces that the operational time is 0710 hours 8 September.

In the role of the commander of the 1st Air Army, the students are to report the conclusions from the estimate of the situation and the decision on the delivery of the initial massed strike under conditions of a preemptive raid by enemy aviation.

Decision of the commander of the 1st Air Army according to the situation at 0710 hours 8 September

(variant)

In the period from 0702 to 0710 hours, enemy aircraft delivered strikes against front air defense means in the areas of WISMAR, GADEBUSCH, and SCHWERIN; WITTENBERGE, GARDELEGEN, and STENDAL; fighter groups of from four to six aircraft each are blockading the airfields at GUSTROW, SCHWERIN, STENDAL, and BURG (Nos. 230, 239, 257, and 263); the runways on the airfields at PARCHIM, PUTLITZ, and RATHENOW (Nos. 242, 245, and 258) were put out of operation.

The main forces of the 1st Air Army have taken off; the 3rd, 6th, and 9th fighter regiments are conducting an air battle to destroy the aircraft of the enemy's first echelon in cooperation with the front air defense troops, and they are lifting the blockade of airfields Nos. 230, 239, 257, and 263.

He decided:

Three fighter regiments (the 4th, 7th, and 10th fighter regiments -- groups 46, 47, and 48) are to be sent to intercept and destroy the aircraft of the enemy's second echelon in an air engagement over his territory.

Fighter-bomber groups (Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, and 31) of the 8th, 2nd, and 4th fighter-bomber divisions and reconnaissance aircraft of the 20th Reconnaissance Air Regiment and the 21st Tactical Reconnaissance Air Regiment (Nos. 21 and 22) are to perform their previously assigned tasks.

TS #808158
Copy # 5

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FIRDB-312/01861-80

Page 6 of 9 Pages

Part of the forces of the bomber aviation and fighter-bomber aviation (groups 29, 32, 35, 36, 37, and 40) are to destroy the on-alert launchers for Lance, Sergeant, and Pershing guided missiles.

The main forces of the 8th, 2nd, and 4th fighter-bomber divisions and the 6th Bomber Division (groups 30, 33, 34, 38, 39, 42, and 43) are to go to holding zones for the subsequent destruction of enemy aircraft on airfields after they have landed.

In the period from 0725 to 0735 hours part of the forces of these groups (from eight to ten aircraft each) as well as group No. 41 are to destroy the runways and mine the airfields at HUSUM, WITTMUND, KLOPPENBURG, BERGER, HAREN, HOPSTEN, and GUTERSLOH (Nos. 7, 24, 33, 31, 39, 37, and 43).

Control of the combat actions of the large units and units during conduct of the air engagement and delivery of the massed strike is to be exercised from the air army's command post, the air army's fighter aviation combat control center, the airborne control post, the air army's combat control center, and the guidance and target designation post, that are located together with the command post of the surface-to-air missile /abbreviation unclear -- probably troops/.

Second training topic

Decision-making by the commander of the 1st Air Army according to the situation at 0740 hours 8 September and the control of combat actions -- 50 minutes.

The instructor announces that operational time is 0740 hours 8 September and communicates hypothetical situation No. 2 to the students.

Hypothetical situation No. 2

In the period from 0702 to 0736 hours the enemy delivered strikes against the air defense means of the front and the country, the air army's airfields, and the rocket troops.

TS #808158
Copy # 5

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FIRDB-312/01861-80

Page 7 of 9 Pages

At 0740 hours the main forces of the enemy's aviation are located in the areas of: ROSTOCK, SCHWERIN, and GUSTROW; WITTENBERGE, KALBE, and STENDAL; MAGDEBURG, QUEDLINBURG, and SCHONEBECK, and are flying in a westerly direction.

With its main forces the air army's fighter aviation continues to destroy enemy aircraft in air combat. Three on-alert fighter squadrons of the 1st, 3rd, and 5th fighter divisions, under the command of the air army's fighter aviation combat control center, are scrambling.

The air army tactical groups, which have delivered strikes against air defense means, on-alert missile/nuclear means, and airfields, have fulfilled their assigned tasks and are returning to the airfields. According to the group commanders' reports, the 39th, 35th and 5th Hawk battalions have been neutralized, and the runways on the airfields at LECK, HUSUM, WITTMUND, KLOPPENBURG, BERGER, HAREN, HOPSTEN, and GUTERSLOH (Nos. 3, 7, 24, 33, 31, 39, 37, and 43) have been put out of operation.

The strike groups of the 8th, 2nd, and 4th fighter-bomber divisions and the 6th Bomber Division (Nos. 30, 33, 34, 38, 39, 42, and 43) are airborne in the holding zones in the vicinity of the airbases.

The air army commander knows that in the period from 0730 to 0738 hours small groups of enemy aircraft (of four to six aircraft each) have landed on the airfields at BURG, VAREL, OLDENBURG, BREMEN, HANNOVER, DIEPHOLZ, and DETMOLD (Nos. 12, 26, 22, 29, 21, 34, and 46).

According to the reports of the air large unit commanders, the runways on the airfield at PARCHIM, PUTLITZ, WAHREN, ORANIENBURG, EBERSWALDE, and RATHENOW (Nos. 242, 245, 238, 217, 218, and 258) have been put out of operation.

The commander of the 1st Air Army has received a report from the front staff that the 3rd OTBAK DA /Separate Heavy Bomber Air Corps of Long-Range Aviation/ has taken off. The flight over the State's borders by the foremost subunits of the corps is expected between 0910 and 0915 hours.

TS #808158
Copy # 5

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FIRDB-312/01861-80

Page 8 of 9 Pages

In the role of the commander of the 1st Air Army, the students are to:

- perform calculations according to the chart on the feasibility of delivering strikes from the holding zones against the landing fields of the enemy aircraft;
- make the decision on the delivery of strikes;
- assign tasks to the air large units and units;
- issue instructions on the landing of the aircraft groups returning from a combat mission;
- report to the front commander the decisions made.

The instructor will allow the students 20 minutes to perform the calculations and make a decision regarding the situation at 0740 hours 8 September, and during the following 30 minutes he will hear their reports.

1. The results of the calculations on the delivery of strikes against the landing fields from the holding zones:

a) -- Group No. 30 of the 8th Fighter-Bomber Division; Nos. 33 and 34 of the 2nd Fighter-Bomber Division; Nos. 38 and 39 of the 4th Fighter-Bomber Division; and Nos. 42 and 43 of the 6th Bomber Division, are to be in the holding zones for 30 to 35 minutes following the scramble.

b) -- the distances from the holding zones to the discovered landing fields of the enemy's aircraft will be: from the 8th Fighter-Bomber Division to the airfield at BURG -- 215 km; from the 2nd Fighter-Bomber Division to the airfields at VAREL (No. 26) and OLDENBURG (No. 22) -- 250 km; from the 4th Fighter-Bomber Division to the airfields at BREMEN (No. 29) and DIEPHOLZ (No. 34) -- 250 to 275 km; from the 6th Bomber Division to the airfields at HANNOVER (No. 21) and DETMOLD (No. 46) -- 300 to 350 km.

c) -- the tactical radius of the aircraft of the 8th, 2nd, and 4th fighter-bomber divisions and the 6th Bomber Division at 0740 hours will ensure that strikes are delivered against the planned airfields from the airborne alert zones.

2. The decision of the commander of the 1st Air Army regarding the situation at 0740 hours 8 September (variant)..

TS #808158
Copy # 5

~~TOP SECRET~~



He decided:

In the period from 0800 to 0810 hours to destroy the enemy's aircraft and put the runways out of operation on the airfields at BURG, VAREL, OLDENBURG, BREMEN, HANNOVER, DIEPHOLZ, and DETMOLD (Nos. 12, 26, 22, 29, 21, 34, and 46).

To support the combat actions of the strike forces with three fighter squadrons of the 1st, 3rd, and 5th fighter divisions, that are to have taken off at 0740 hours, and one squadron of the 23rd Separate Electronic Countermeasures Air Regiment.

To have the aircraft of the 14th and 15th regiments of the 2nd Fighter-Bomber Division, of the 17th and 18th regiments of the 4th Fighter-Bomber Division, and of the 30th Regiment of the 6th Bomber Division make landings on alternate airfields by decision of the commanders of these divisions.

To have by 0900 hours one air squadron each from the 8th and 2nd fighter-bomber divisions and the 1st and 3rd fighter divisions in Readiness No. 1 in order to support the flight of the 3rd Separate Heavy Bomber Air Corps of Long-Range Aviation over the front zone.

Critique of the lesson

10 minutes

The instructor rates the quality of the students' preparation for the lesson, to what extent the training objectives have been achieved, and points out the positive and negative aspects of the students' decisions, focusing their attention on the necessity for a careful preparation of the air army for combat actions under conditions of a preemptive raid by enemy aviation.

TS #808158
Copy # 5