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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

28 March 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: Some Conclusions from
the Experience of Conducting the SHIELD-76
Operational-Tactical Exercise

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on articles from a SECRET Soviet publication called Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This article examines the Shield-76 combined operational-tactical exercise of the Combined Armed Forces, first outlining the exercise theme and the play-out of its stages, and then proceeding to a rather lengthy discussion of the conclusions drawn on the basis of the experience of the exercise. This journal is published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This article appeared in Issue No. 13, which was published in 1977.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned the [redacted] Codeword [redacted].

John N. McMahon

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Intelligence Information Special Report

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SUBJECT

WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: Some Conclusions from the Experience
of Conducting the SHIELD-76 Operational-Tactical Exercise

SOURCE Documentary
Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article from a SECRET Soviet publication called Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This journal is published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This article, written by General of Arms F. Siwicki, examines the Shield-76 combined operational-tactical exercise of the Combined Armed Forces, first outlining the exercise theme and the play-out of its stages, and then proceeding to a rather lengthy discussion of the conclusions drawn from the exercise experience. In this the areas treated include the conduct of a border engagement, the use of aviation and landing forces, engineer support, air defense, troop control, the organization of cooperation, reconnaissance, and radioelectronic warfare. This article appeared in Issue No. 13, which was published in 1977.

End of Summary

Comment:

In 1977 General of Arms Florian Siwicki was identified as a Vice Chairman of the Polish Council for Higher Military Education and also as a member of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party.

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Some Conclusions from the Experience of Conducting
the SHIELD-76 Operational-Tactical Exercise

by

General of Arms F. SIWICKI

Deputy Minister of National Defense of the Polish People's
Republic/Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces

In September 1976 a combined operational-tactical exercise of the Combined Armed Forces, codenamed SHCHIT-76 (SHIELD-76), was conducted under the direction of the Minister of National Defense of the Polish People's Republic with the participation of the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces. Other participants in the exercise were staffs and troops of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic, the Polish Armed Forces, the Soviet Army and the Czechoslovak People's Army. The exercise was one of the major combined undertakings of the Combined Armed Forces in 1976.

It was organized with reference to the actual conditions of the current international situation. Its theme, objectives, and operational-strategic orientation reflected the peaceful intentions of our countries and met the requirements for further strengthening the security of the Warsaw Pact member states.

1. A brief description of the SHIELD-76 exercise and
special features of the play-out of its stages

The theme of the exercise was "Repel an attack, go over to offensive actions, and develop a front operation under conditions of the assault crossing of water obstacles and the employment of airborne landing forces, and also the repelling of powerful counterthrusts and encirclement of a large grouping of enemy troops."

In working out the theme it was planned to continue to improve the operational-tactical ability of the commands, staffs and troops in organizing and conducting combat actions, to deepen cooperation among the troops of the allied armies under conditions of the employment of conventional and nuclear means of combat in the initial period of a war, and also to further

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develop friendship and brotherhood in arms among the soldiers of the allied armies.

Special attention was devoted in the exercise to enhancing skills in the organization of a front offensive operation with the simultaneous deployment of attack groupings; to repelling air strikes and attacks of enemy armored and mechanized large units; to organizing the transition of the front troops to an offensive operation and developing the operation in a complex radioelectronic situation; and to improving ways of organizing the changeover to actions with the employment of nuclear weapons, the repelling of powerful counterthrusts, and the development of an offensive operation with a simultaneous encirclement of a large grouping of enemy troops.

During the exercise a number of episodes were played out. These had to do with the organization and conduct of defensive actions by the ground forces, air forces and air defense forces of the country; the negotiation of a cover zone and breakthrough of previously prepared and hastily organized enemy defensive lines; the repelling of counterattacks, the commitment to battle of second echelons and reserves; the assault crossing of water obstacles in cooperation with helicopter-borne landing forces; the conduct of meeting battles, including under night conditions; the employment of airborne landing forces; the neutralization of enemy airfields; the conduct of radioelectronic warfare; the elimination of the aftereffects of nuclear strikes; and a number of others.

The concepts of the sides amounted to the following. West, having decided to unleash an armed conflict against East, planned to suddenly go over to offensive actions without the employment of nuclear weapons and deliver the main attack with the adjacent flanks of the Northern and Central army groups, using the forces of four army corps. As a result, it intended in the course of seven or eight days to rout the troops of East's first strategic echelon and take certain designated lines.

In the event of a threat that the operation would be disrupted and it would be unable to achieve its objectives with conventional means, West planned to employ weapons of mass destruction.

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East prepared to resolutely ward off West's attack and go over to offensive actions. It planned to smash West's main forces in the course of seven or eight days by using the forces of a separate army and the Northern and Central fronts in cooperation with long range aviation and the allied navies. East planned subsequently to rout [West's] approaching reserves by committing the second echelons of the fronts to the engagement and, on the 12th or 14th day of the operation, to arrive at the intended line.

During the operation East maintained its forces and means in readiness to deliver the initial nuclear strike and planned to conduct combat actions under conditions of the employment of weapons of mass destruction.

The exercise, which was preceded by a preparatory period, was conducted in three stages.

In the preparatory period the troops regrouped to training grounds and engaged in regular combat training. The commands and staffs worked on matters pertaining to the deployment of the field control system and the organization of cooperation.

In the first stage of the exercise, East did the organization of a front offensive operation and the operational deployment of attack groupings, and repelled the enemy attacks.

In the initial phase of this stage, West, on the pretext of exercises, deployed troops along its eastern border, having formed from the corps of the first operational echelon of the Northern Army Group an attack grouping of 11 divisions against the ten divisions of the Northern Front. West established the greatest superiority on the axis of the main attack, where against four incomplete divisions of East it concentrated six divisions, four of them tank divisions, in the first echelon.

In addition, West planned to commit another three divisions on this axis, thereby establishing a nearly twofold superiority in tanks, artillery, and antitank means.

Immediately as East introduced a state of full combat readiness, the troops of the Northern Front began organizing

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cover of the state border, using the divisions of the first-echelon armies. The rest of the front's forces and means, including the troops of the second echelon, continued regrouping to departure areas.

The large units and units of the air army dispersed to alternate airfields, field airstrips, and prepared stretches of roads, maintaining a high level of combat readiness which later allowed them to participate effectively in the air operation in the theater of military operations.

The timely receipt of data on West's readiness to initiate combat actions allowed the front commander to make a well-grounded decision, the gist of which was to defend with part of the front forces on the left flank, and at the same time regroup to the right flank the amount of forces and means necessary to allow them to go over to an offensive operation. As a result of this almost 1.5 to one superiority in divisions and two to one superiority in tanks and artillery was achieved on the axis of the main attack.

In the second phase of this stage the start of West's combat actions with the employment of conventional means of destruction was played through. Here West intended to contribute to the success of gaining air supremacy by carrying out a 30-minute massive radioelectronic operation and simultaneously neutralizing the army radio nets.

In the wake of massed air strikes against the troops, staffs, air defense system, airfields, depots and other East installations, West went over to offensive actions on axes planned in advance. By the end of the first day of the war, having overcome the strong resistance of the troops on the left flank of the Northern Front, the attack grouping of the Northern Army Group had penetrated East's territory to a depth of 20 to 25 kilometers. On other axes West was conducting containing actions.

The troops of the Northern Front, using the forces on its left flank, repelled the attack of the superior enemy forces, and, in the center of its operational disposition and on its right flank, conducted offensive actions as attack groupings were formed.

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The air army, within the framework of an air operation in a theater of military operations, destroyed enemy air defense means and aircraft, first of all those equipped with means of delivering nuclear weapons, on the flight routes of bomber aviation.

During this stage an episode was played out in which the attack of an enemy tank grouping was repelled by a mechanized division supported from the air. Here there arose the very difficult problem of maintaining the cooperation of front aviation, the air defense forces of the country and the air defense of the defending troops while performing various different tasks at the same time.

Then began the second stage of the exercise, which lasted two and a half days. Its main content was the going over by the Northern Front's main forces to the offensive and the development of the operation in a complex radioelectronic situation. Accordingly, both sides conducted offensive and defensive actions for the purpose of gaining superiority, seizing the initiative, and developing the offensive on axes planned in advance.

Thus West, by committing the second echelons of its corps on the axis of the main attack, by the end of the third day of the war had penetrated 50 to 70 kilometers into East's territory. On other axes West was not able to achieve success and was forced to conduct a difficult defensive engagement. As the result of East's successful offensive actions of the axes of the main attacks of the Northern and Central fronts, conditions were established for breaking out to the rear and encircling the main attack grouping of West.

In view of the impossibility of achieving the objective of the operation with conventional means of destruction, West decided to employ nuclear weapons and commit to the engagement the second operational echelons of the army groups.

The Northern Front, after committing new divisions to battle, was able to take the operational initiative. Using the forces of two armies on the axis of the main attack, it developed an offensive and penetrated 80 to 100 kilometers into West's territory. It became possible to increase the rate of advance and, in cooperation with troops of the Central Front, to get to

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the rear of the main grouping of West's troops.

In this situation the front commander decided to switch the attack from the main axis to a southern axis and commit the second echelon to battle sooner than planned, while continuing to hold off the onslaught of the enemy on his left flank.

At this time the front received the order to prepare for the initial massed nuclear strike.

At this stage of the exercise the following were played out: the negotiation of a cover zone by a tank division and the breakthrough of the enemy's forward defense line; the commitment of an army's second echelon to the engagement to break through an intermediate line, and then the repelling of a counterattack under night conditions. In addition, a strike by allocated aviation forces against an enemy airfield was realistically carried out.

In the third and last stage of the exercise they did a changeover to actions with the employment of nuclear weapons, the development of an offensive operation, the assault crossing of water obstacles with the employment of airborne landing forces, the repelling of powerful enemy counterthrusts, and the encirclement of his grouping in cooperation with adjacent forces.

The characteristic feature of the playing out of the stages of the exercise was the saturation with a large number of practical episodes, especially with field firing and bombing. In the dynamics of the play-out extensive use was made of modern range facilities, which made it possible to present a picture of a modern battle with maximum realism. The use of remotely controlled T-34 tanks as targets was a substantial addition to audio-visual battlefield simulation methods.

The exercise, conducted on such a large operational scale with the involvement of significant numbers of forces and various technical means, abounded in the use of the more sophisticated methods of troop actions and staff work in a modern battle. In addition, it made it possible to exchange views and experience, and to accumulate interesting material which can be used by the allied armies for further theoretical and practical analysis as well as to work out definite conclusions on operational-tactical

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matters and training methods,

2. Some conclusions from the experience of the exercise

1. The results of a border engagement depend to some extent on the level of training of the armed forces and on depriving the enemy of the opportunity to mount a surprise attack. As is known, the NATO forces are characterized by a high level of manning and of combat and mobilization readiness. They are intensively saturated with modern combat equipment and weapons, their combat capabilities are increasing, and their system of control is improving. The disposition of the troops favors the formation of strong attack groupings on selected operational axes. All this under certain conditions allows them to initiate combat actions without undertaking large-scale preparatory measures.

In unleashing aggression, the enemy will strive for extensive employment of the latest weapons and combat equipment in order to increase the operational surprise.

Taking these factors into account, it is necessary to devote special attention to the rapid attainment of full combat readiness by our large units and formations, especially by the air defense and air forces, and to improve the mechanism for operationally deploying the armed forces and setting up the system of control. All these measures must be carried out with high vigilance, in the shortest possible time, and with all-round operational and combat support. An important factor under these conditions is to ensure a rapid exchange of available information on the enemy.

2. The exercise confirmed the special significance to the successful conduct of a border engagement of seizure of the operational initiative, which ensures freedom of action and the use of one's own forces on the appropriate axes. It is essential that the thought of fulfilling this task, which determines the further course of a border engagement, permeate all levels of control. Of course, in a struggle to seize the initiative one may encounter various difficulties, which can be overcome more effectively the better the staffs are trained to conduct engagements in the initial period of a war. In turn, the troops must know how to combine the mobility and might of all their fire

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means, and also must have excellent physical and psychological training.

3. Extensive use was made of aviation in the exercise. It delivered strikes against the enemy's airfields, his nuclear, missile, and antiaircraft means, and covered and supported the attacking troops by carrying out various tasks on the battlefield. The pilots of the allied armies exhibited excellent tactical flying skills, fully exploited the combat characteristics of the aircraft, operated at various, particularly low and very low, altitudes, and employed a variety of methods of maneuvering and of attacking and destroying targets.

The experience of the exercise confirmed that successful utilization of aviation in the initial period of a war requires high efficiency on the part of staffs and strict organization of the control system, which ensures the fulfilment of two complex tasks: participation in an air operation in a theater of military operations and support of the actions of the ground forces.

4. During the exercise a great deal of attention was devoted to the use of helicopters. They were employed for control, for battlefield surveillance, artillery fire spotting, mobile minelaying, reconnaissance of zones of contamination, supply, and evacuation of the wounded.

Fire support helicopters found particularly broad application. They carried out close support of tank and mechanized subunits and tactical landing forces, and acted as antitank reserves. Some of them also were used as platforms for antitank guided missiles.

Excellent combat characteristics were demonstrated by the Soviet MI-24 fire support helicopters. The exercise confirmed their great combat capabilities and effectiveness in joint actions with subunits of tanks, infantry in combat vehicles, and tactical landing forces. The tactical-combat characteristics of fire support helicopters lend a maneuvering nature to the conduct of battle by these subunits, and increase their fire and striking capabilities. The further technical sophistication of helicopters and their capability of being used everywhere require

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good coordination of their actions with the tank and mechanized subunits. The tactical and firing training of helicopter crews, as well as the development of reliable ways of controlling them, are becoming an important task. Under the conditions of a modern battle a definite importance is attached to the tactics of raiding actions by helicopters in cooperation with tanks, chiefly to destroy the missile means of the enemy.

5. Another important feature of the exercise was the extensive employment of landing forces. Almost every decision connected with the assault crossing of a water obstacle envisioned the use of a tactical landing force. Let me just mention that the tactical landing forces demonstrated excellent combat capabilities in the exercise, and in some cases the tasks they performed were of decisive importance to the successful development of the battle.

6. To the effectiveness of the employment of aviation, helicopters, and tactical landing forces is related the problem of overcoming the enemy's air defense. The exercise showed that this is becoming an ever more difficult task.

After the acceptance into service of new generations of missiles and antiaircraft guns the NATO forces strengthened their air defense. The fire of these means is supplemented to some extent by portable missile systems such as the Red Eye and by aircraft weapons and small arms. A good many of these means are equipped with homing heads and are controlled with the use of radars. The field air defense is closely tied in with the NADGE automated ground air defense system and with the actions of fighter aviation. This is a deep, multilayered fire barrier that is difficult to overcome.

It is known that the main burden of combating enemy air defense means, especially in the depth of his defense, up to the present time has been carried chiefly by aviation. However, today the strength and effectiveness of such defense often exceeds the capabilities of aviation, and in view of this fact, combating it acquires a combined-arms character. This levies on staffs the additional tasks of organizing the neutralization of the air defense system with all the forces and means they have access to. We believe that staffs cannot regard the task of destroying air defense means as a byproduct of neutralizing the

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enemy defense as a whole. In our view, in organizing combat with air defense, staffs have to select the targets, allocate them, assign the appropriate forces and means to neutralize them, and also coordinate the actions of the forces and means whose mission it is to make their respective types of passages or corridors in this system. Along with the tasks connected with working out ways of breaching the air defense system, it also is necessary to work out the tactics for aviation to use in penetrating through these breaches into the depth of the enemy grouping. Also becoming an important problem in training practice is the need to acquire the skills of coordinated employment in combat with enemy air defense of all fire means, raiding actions of special tank-mechanized groups, tactical landing forces and reconnaissance-sabotage subunits, and also to develop in the pilots excellent physical and psychological endurance.

7. In the exercise the troops were forced to repeatedly break through the enemy defense, which will probably be a typical occurrence under present-day conditions. The defense of our potential enemy is characterized by great firepower, particularly antitank and anti-aircraft firepower, by deep echeloning, high maneuverability, as well as by engineer preparation and considerable saturation with various types of obstacles. The basic defense is the system of antitank fire, particularly the fire of antitank guided missiles, the number of which is constantly increasing.

The present antitank defense of the NATO forces, as well as the future quantitative and qualitative development of the means of combat are a significant fire obstacle to armies possessing a large amount of armor. We assume that the striking potential of divisions, especially tank divisions, can be fully exploited only when the antitank barrier in their path is destroyed. This requires neutralizing in the breakthrough sector a considerable number of antitank means, including armored, sheltered, and mobile ones. The command and staffs devoted a great deal of attention to solving this problem in the exercise.

8. Related to the breakthrough of an enemy defense is the use of such basic elements of tactics as fire and assault. Of 13 practical episodes in the exercise, eight were conducted with field firing and air strikes. They demonstrated a high level of firing training of the troops of the fraternal armies, as well as

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good skills in control on the part of the commanders. The growing role of combined-arms commanders and staffs as the main coordinators of the fire of all combat means was confirmed. We believe that in training practice their role in this regard should be elevated even further, especially in matters of improving fire control methods.

A characteristic feature of the exercise was the great concentration of forces on the axes of the main attacks, which reached 50 tanks and 100 guns per kilometer of frontage, as well as extensive employment of infantry combat vehicles. The exercise confirmed the great tactical capabilities of infantry combat vehicles. Their use in conjunction with tanks significantly enhanced the effectiveness of attack and increased the power of assault, thereby increasing the combat capabilities of the units and large units. The employment of infantry combat vehicles in the exercise and the experience acquired, in our opinion, should become the subject of thorough analysis for the purposes of developing more sophisticated ways of using them in modern battle, especially in cooperation with tanks.

9. The actions of troops in the exercise were distinguished by great dynamism, which made considerably increased demands on engineer support. Its main task was to lay paths for the tank troops, especially when it was necessary to negotiate mixed minefields and make assault crossings of water obstacles.

In practical actions the troops exhibited good technical and organizational-tactical training for negotiating any kind of obstacle by various methods using different kinds of means. However, the solution of these problems presented considerable difficulty, first of all because of the rapid qualitative development of the mines and explosives themselves, and also the methods of emplacing them. Surface minelaying carried out by the methods of "scattering mines" with the use of LARS or, in the future, MARS launchers, as well as helicopters and high-performance motor vehicles, can unexpectedly create obstacles on the paths of troop movement and block elements of the combat grouping. This behooves us to more actively seek the technical means and tactical methods that will enable us to quickly eliminate this type of obstacle. Therefore, one of the major problems will be to provide combined-arms units and subunits, especially tank units, complete independence in

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negotiating obstacles without long halts awaiting the assistance of special units.

A great deal of attention also was devoted in the exercise to the conduct of combat actions involving the assault crossing of water obstacles. It is known that the Western Theater of Military Operations is characterized by a large number of water lines of operational and tactical importance. Among them are many navigable canals which are particularly difficult to cross.

The commands and staffs in the course of the exercise successfully solved the problems of negotiating water obstacles. In their actions we saw a striving to prevent the enemy from consolidating on the other side of a river, to have the forward detachments and tactical landing forces quickly capture a bridgehead, and also to have the main forces make a rapid assault crossing of the river and develop a decisive offensive on the opposite bank. In so doing, attention was focused on proper coordination of the actions of the troops with the fire support and strikes of aircraft and combat helicopters. The troops showed excellent skill in the assault crossing, decisiveness and high speed, able use of crossing equipment, and complete synchronization of actions.

The exercise, however, also confirmed the complexity of actions in crossing water obstacles and the importance of organizational-technical support of the crossing of some water lines located not far from each other. Such an event may often occur in actions in the Western and other theaters on both a tactical and an operational scale. Because of this it appears necessary to direct our efforts toward providing greater independence to large units in negotiating water obstacles. It obviously will be an important training and organizational-tactical task to improve the activity of staffs in utilizing the available inventory of crossing equipment.

10. It is known that the mobility, and by the same token the momentum, of troop actions depend to a significant extent on the nature of the terrain and the ability to exploit its features. The exercise was held on terrain that was generally flat, partly swampy, and covered with large tracts of forest and with lakes and rivers.

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The open terrain with a well developed road network facilitated the efficient regrouping of troops, maneuvering and the organization of supply. However, in the event nuclear weapons were employed it could create the danger of the outbreak of fires over a large territory and of wide zones of contamination that would remain in the woods for a long time. As a result of the distortion of the terrain following nuclear strikes there could be changes in the course of rivers and widespread flooding. All this could considerably hamper the movement of troops and slow the momentum of their actions.

Tying the troops down to strictly defined routes and training fields in the exercise did not allow them to fully play out combat in densely populated areas, which are so typical of many theaters of military operations. However, the operational decisions took into account the whole range of factors having a negative influence on the rate of troop actions: the nature of the environment, the military and economic infrastructure, the possibility of the distortion of terrain as a result of nuclear strikes, and so on. This made it possible to create a number of realistic situations which gave the staffs and troops a great deal of practice in assessing and exploiting all the terrain features. This specifically contributed to maintaining a high and at the same time realistic operational momentum, which averaged 50 kilometers per day. The exercise also showed that the staffs and troops must in the future improve their skills in comprehensive assessment of terrain features and in knowing how to exploit them to maximum operational-tactical advantage.

The need to maintain a high rate of advance forces the troops to conduct combat actions around the clock. Consequently, night actions will be a common occurrence, requiring, indeed, that staffs carry out the appropriate organizational and tactical-technical measures, and that troops have a good knowledge of how to orient themselves and utilize their combat equipment, and possess physical toughness and psychological endurance. The night offensive of a tank division in the exercise demonstrated that under these conditions it is possible to obtain the kind of results that in turn will be decisive to the development of subsequent daytime actions.

11. The exercise brought out the ever-increasing importance of air defense in all types of combat actions. This stems from

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both the number and the quality of means of air attack. In the tactical aviation of NATO the process of modernizing and updating its military equipment is continuing. In the last five years 20 percent of the aviation inventory was replaced, which made it possible to increase the yield of a conventional fire salvo in the Western Theater of Military Operations by 30 percent, and that of a nuclear salvo by 23 percent. Plans for the second half of the 1970's provide for new, more sophisticated aircraft to enter service, as a result of which the striking power of tactical aviation will increase by 35 percent. Along with the amount, i.e., the size, of the salvo of conventional means of destruction, its effectiveness increases as well.

The growing threat of air attack substantially increases the importance of field air defense. It must be emphasized that in recent years, due to their equipping with missiles, a rapid qualitative growth in air defense capabilities has been noted in all the allied armies. The exercise showed that the staffs and troops have become fully proficient in operating and servicing this modern equipment. In many instances the staffs demonstrated original and innovative methods of employing it. This found expression in the organization of temporary antiaircraft barrage detachments formed to perform specific tasks, and also in the establishment at the front and army levels of mobile reserves of missiles airlifted on helicopters, which made it possible to quickly shift the main efforts of air defense without regrouping the missile hardware. We think the experience gained in this field should be given broad application in the process of training staffs and troops.

12. The system of troop control was put to a severe practical test in the exercise. It must be noted that the staffs of the fraternal armies demonstrated their combat maturity. They displayed good operational-tactical training and the ability to employ the most sophisticated methods of staff work in controlling troops in the complex and dynamic situation of a modern war. The decisions adopted were courageous and based on realistic predictions of the probable development of combat actions. Fully recognizing the importance of the struggle to gain time, the staffs strove to preempt the enemy and impose their will upon him.

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The system of control posts and communications adopted in the armed forces also proved itself. At the tactical level the basic element of the command post were the armored command vehicles which were distinguished by their high mobility and resistance to the effects of fire, as well as their capability of providing continuous communications on the main nets and links. At the present time the equipping of this system with secure communications has considerably increased the effectiveness and cohesiveness of control in the units and large units. At the operational level the control posts are based on mobile, and for the most part armored, technical means.

Some of the staffs in the exercise displayed many interesting technical innovations as well as ways of organizing control posts. An integral part of these at both the operational and tactical levels are the ever more boldly employed airborne elements of control. The sphere of employment of helicopters as airborne command posts was broadened; these in particular turned out to be very useful in controlling the battle of the first-echelon regiments of divisions.

Greater efforts also were made to combine former staff working methods with elements of the automated control system. The practical application of these solutions and the conclusions obtained will unquestionably speed up the creation of a field automated system.

In the course of staff work in the exercise there appeared many organizational-methodological, technical, and training problems, the solution of which will aid in increasing the efficiency of staffs. This may be achieved, in our view, through further simplifying staff work and mating traditional methods with the use of automated and technical devices, the employment of airborne elements of control and mobile armored means, and the standardization of the field equipment of staffs.

13. In the exercise the all-around cooperation of the troops of the allied armies was much in evidence. Their large units carried out combined combat tasks within the framework of an operational formation -- the front. The commands and staffs demonstrated much ability to foresee the development of the operation and battle, which was a realistic basis for organizing cooperation among the branch arms and services, elements of the

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combat grouping and adjacent units. This was possible because of the unity of operational art, tactics, and methods of staff work and troop training. The commands and staffs of the fraternal armies understood each other perfectly both from the language standpoint and from the standpoint of military terms and concepts, which was the basis for the smooth coordination of the coalition efforts in achieving the objectives and fulfilling the combat tasks. We think that in the process of further training the staffs and troops we must develop and strengthen all forms and methods of coalition cooperation.

14. Much attention was devoted to reconnaissance in the exercise, although not much practical use was made of some types of reconnaissance. I may mention with satisfaction that the organizational and training measures taken, as well as the ever more extensive equipping of reconnaissance units with modern technical equipment produce tangible results. In the exercise the entire system of reconnaissance was deployed at the operational and tactical levels, including radioelectronic reconnaissance. Thus, extensive opportunities were created for the collection of various data on the enemy, which made it possible to determine his forces and intentions quite accurately, which in turn aided in the adoption of correct decisions. The exercise indicated the expanding role of reconnaissance stemming from the employment by the enemy of subtle methods of camouflage, deception, radioelectronic countermeasures and rapid changes in the situation. It should be emphasized with satisfaction that the ability of staffs to evaluate and exploit the data received has increased considerably. The staffs are gradually getting away from examining incoming data from the standpoint of very simple comparison alone. They are much more frequently examining quantitative relationships as they interconnect with time and quantitative factors and only on the basis of such a broad analysis are they predicting the actions of the enemy. This makes it possible to take the appropriate steps so as to act before the enemy does and utilize surprise forms of counteraction.

The dissimilarity, fragmentary nature, and great volume of incoming reconnaissance data to a considerable extent increase the importance of collating and evaluating them. Therefore we believe that staffs must henceforth improve their skills and facility in thoroughly correlating and studying the data received

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from the various sources.

The exercise confirmed that reconnaissance organs are faced with a number of organizational-technical and training tasks. From among these, obviously, one has to single out the need to increase the depth and effectiveness of reconnaissance at the operational and tactical levels by equipping these organs with modern technical means. This will also be promoted by increasing and improving the overall harmony, efficiency, and accuracy of the actions of all types of reconnaissance, and also the ability to correlate, evaluate, and efficiently exploit the data received.

15. It is known that under modern conditions there has been a significant increase in the importance of radioelectronic warfare, which has become an important element of the operational and combat support of combat actions. As one of the possible variants in the exercise we demonstrated a 30-minute massive enemy "radioelectronic assault", delivered by him together with the first air attack. The basis of this was powerful jamming which disrupted the operation of the radioelectronic systems of the front. All decisions related to radioelectronic warfare showed generally good theoretical preparation of the respective staff levels and their ability to assess the situation and act with confidence. Another positive aspect was that they tried to have the conduct of all radioelectronic warfare measures follow the concept and objectives of the operation and to unify the performance of these tasks with the destruction of selected enemy targets.

16. The broad participation in the exercise of soldiers of four fraternal armies brought about an atmosphere and conditions that were conducive to party political work. The interallied political organ was able to properly and skilfully link the measures undertaken with the troops with the organization of numerous propaganda and political indoctrination measures. Party political work to a considerable extent contributed to the formation of a high state of morale and political consciousness, and strengthened military discipline and motivated the men toward aggressive combat actions. Party work and printed propaganda were permeated with the idea of the friendship of the peoples of the socialist commonwealth, the brotherhood in arms of the allied armies, and the concept of internationalism. The soldiers'

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meetings and encounters with the population, youth and local party and government organs helped to strengthen the friendship among our peoples.

17. The large scope and dynamic nature of the exercise, as well as the participation in it of considerable amounts of troops and combat equipment clearly demonstrated the importance of the rear services and the size and complexity of the problems of materiel-technical support of a modern battle.

The exercise produced good results in the area of planning and carrying out the materiel-technical support of troops, including multinational formations and large units. A great help in this regard were the experience and conclusions obtained in earlier coalition rear services exercises we have held, such as VISLA-ELBA (VISTULA-ELBE) and BARYER-73 (BARRIER-73).

The experience confirms the need for further development and improvement of the forms and methods of materiel-technical support of allied troops, for enhancing proficiency in the cooperation of the rear staffs and combined-arms staffs, and also for the development of effective ways of protecting and defending rear services organs.


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On the whole the exercise was an important phase of the improvement of the operational-tactical training of staffs and troops. Conducted on a large scale, with great dynamism, and in a complex and intense operational situation replete with surprise events, it became an examination of the political and combat maturity of the command-staff organs and military bodies. I should mention with satisfaction that they passed this examination.

In addition to the rich operational-tactical experience the exercise provided, it also was very important for political indoctrination, and it promoted the reinforcement of brotherhood in arms among the men of our armies and the strengthening of the international ties among our fraternal peoples. It demonstrated once again that the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states are an effective instrument in guaranteeing the



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security of the Warsaw Pact countries, and that they serve the cause of peace throughout the world,



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