


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HR70-14



31 MAY 1979

MEMORANDUM

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
The Warsaw Pact Unification and Standardization
Program: Implications for the Ground Forces

1. The enclosed memorandum is based on a series of classified Warsaw Pact documents which contain Soviet proposals for modernizing and standardizing the organization and weaponry of the Pact's Combined Armed Forces. The memorandum summarizes the Soviet proposals, assesses the likelihood of their implementation, and discusses the potential impact of the plans on Warsaw Pact ground forces and weapons development and procurement. [redacted]

2. Because the sources used in this memorandum are extremely sensitive, the report should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis. [redacted]

3. Comments and queries regarding this memorandum are welcome. They may be directed to [redacted]
[redacted] Office of Strategic Research [redacted]

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The Warsaw Pact Unification and Standardization
Program: Implications for the Ground Forces

Summary

Over the past several years, the Soviets have initiated a broad program to accelerate the "unification and standardization" of the Warsaw Pact's Combined Armed Forces. The purpose of this Program appears to be to complete the standardization of Pact forces by the mid to late 1980s and to eliminate the gaps in their capabilities brought about by the slower pace of organizational development and modernization in non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) forces. [REDACTED]

The Soviet program is multi-faceted. They have proposed the reorganization and expansion of NSWP ground forces on the Soviet model to achieve a unified force structure and commonly organized and equipped divisions, armies, and Front-level units. They also appear to be encouraging accelerated weapons modernization in the NSWP ground forces, based on centralized and integrated weapons development, production, and procurement. This latter aspect is of particular significance in that:

- it includes NSWP acquisition of latest model Soviet ground force weapons some of which have only recently been observed with Soviet forces or are still under development;
- it suggests an expanding role for East European defense industries in the licensed production of sophisticated Soviet weapons for Pact-wide introduction; and
- it reflects increasing specialization in weapons development among the Pact allies based on common specifications and integrated planning.

Soviet motivations behind the program appear to be three-fold:

- to increase their control over NSWP force modernization and expansion;
- to hold down the overall cost of Pact weapons development through centralized program management and to discourage duplication of effort in East European defense industries; and

- to mitigate East European resistance to expensive force improvements by offering a weapons development and procurement scheme that is, perhaps, more viable economically than direct weapons purchases from the USSR. [redacted]

We do not know whether the East Europeans have accepted the Soviet proposals, even in principle, nor are there any indications of NSWP plans for more rapid force modernization. The Soviet weapons modernization program could impose considerable economic burdens on some Pact allies, particularly on Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. Similarly, demographic trends in most NSWP countries probably will constrain the proposed expansion of East European ground forces. Although some key weapons programs appear close to implementation and some further NSWP force expansion can be anticipated, it is highly unlikely that the Soviet goal of complete Pact ground force unification and standardization will be realized before the end of the next decade. [redacted]

Over the long term, ground force weapons development and production in Eastern Europe will become increasingly important factors in the assessment of Pact ground force capabilities and potential. If the organizational proposals are fully implemented, the capability of the Pact to generate an early war fighting capability against NATO, using forces in place in Central Europe in peacetime, will be substantially enhanced, as will the capability of Pact ground forces to engage in combined multinational operations. [redacted]

Background

Over the past decade, Soviet military writings have stressed the need to improve Warsaw Pact capabilities against improving NATO conventional forces. Since the mid-1960s, Soviet ground forces have been expanded and modernized, with emphasis on improved mobility and conventional firepower, as new families of tanks, artillery, antitank weapons, and tactical air defense systems have entered the inventory. At the same time, the number of weapons in Soviet divisions and non-divisional support elements--particularly artillery, antitank, and air defense systems--has increased. [redacted]

During this period, the East European ground forces have been given an expanded role in Soviet planning for operations against NATO. The NSWP forces--with Soviet forces in Central Europe--are now expected to stop any NATO attack and go over to the offensive. They provide about half of the forces available for early operations, and Polish and Czech forces would form independent fronts which would tie down considerable NATO forces on the flanks of Central Europe, allowing

the concentration of Soviet forces in the critical center sector. [REDACTED]

Despite the larger role of the NSWP armies, the expansion and modernization of their forces have not kept pace with improvements in the Soviet forces. NSWP divisions and non-divisional support forces are currently organized differently and equipped at lower levels than those of the USSR, and they lack many of the newer weapon systems now in the Soviet inventory. The Soviets have long pressured the East Europeans to increase the readiness and modernity of their forces, and a program developed and managed at the Warsaw Pact command headquarters level to unify and standardize the organization and weaponry of all Pact ground forces has been formalized since at least 1975. The management structure and decision-making process for this program are discussed in Annex A. [REDACTED]

The Unification and Standardization Program

The unification and standardization effort is intended to increase the ability of Pact forces to engage in multinational operations and reduce the time and cost of military research and development. Unification is a comprehensive effort to achieve commonality in both force organization and weapon development and procurement. The weapons' unification program involves:

- Modernization of existing weapons and equipment to achieve commonality with newer, like systems.
- Replacement of obsolete weapons with newer, commonly developed and procured systems. The new weapons would be developed by joint or independent efforts according to common specifications, or by licensed production.

Standardization involves the development of:

- Common standards for components, spare parts, and ancillary equipment in order to insure interchangeability of weapons and equipment.
- Common documentation for technical specifications, designs, weights and measures, operational instructions, and repair.

- Common terms, markings, and sizes.
- A common system for classifying and codifying military products. [REDACTED]

Organizational Proposals: 1981-1985. Soviet proposals for the organizational development of the Pact Combined Armed Forces during 1981-1985--presumably reviewed at the 11th Session of the Committee of Defense Ministers in December 1978--provide for substantial restructuring and reequipping of Pact ground forces to achieve a unified force structure. Under the proposed plan, all Pact ground forces would be converted to a standard table of organization and equipment which would entail increases in T-72 tanks, BMP infantry combat vehicles, FROG-7 rockets, self-propelled (SP) artillery, antitank systems, and air defense systems, as well as additional, more modern engineer and chemical equipment and advanced command and control systems. [REDACTED]

Each "constant readiness"* *motorized rifle division (MRD)* would have three motorized regiments (one equipped with BMPs and two equipped with wheeled APCs), a tank regiment, a 54-gun artillery regiment, an air defense regiment equipped with SA-6 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), a mixed antitank battalion equipped with towed antitank guns and vehicle-mounted antitank guided missiles (ATGM), and a separate battalion of 18 multiple rocket launchers. [REDACTED]

"Constant readiness" *tank divisions (TD)* would have three tank regiments equipped with the T-72, a BMP regiment, a 54-gun artillery regiment (including 36 M-1974 122-mm SP howitzers), an SA-6 regiment, and a separate multiple rocket launcher battalion. [REDACTED]

Motorized rifle and tank *regiments* in the MRD and TD would have an air defense battery equipped with improved versions of the SA-7 and SA-9 SAMs (the latter, mounted on an MTLB tracked chassis, has only recently been seen in Soviet units) and the ZSU-23-4 SP antiaircraft gun. Although not mentioned in the Soviet proposals for 1981-85, it is likely that each motorized rifle and tank regiment in the MRD would also have organic towed or SP 122-mm howitzers. [REDACTED]

* "Constant readiness" divisions probably include all active divisions except cadre-strength units. Reserve and mobilization divisions most likely would be excluded. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Artillery support at army and front levels would be reorganized and increased. Each Pact front would have an artillery division with 360 guns, including the new Soviet 240-mm SP mortar which is nuclear capable. At army level, a 96-gun artillery brigade and separate regiment with 54 multiple rocket launchers would be standard.

[REDACTED]

The proposals also call for the creation of separate army and front tank destroyer units: a brigade at front-level and a regiment at army-level. Each would be equipped with both towed antitank guns and ATGMs. Army- and front-level air defenses also would be improved by establishing additional SA-4 brigades and SA-6 units.

[REDACTED]

Engineer troops would be expanded to the standard Soviet brigade and regimental organizations, and chemical defense troops would convert to the standard Soviet brigade and battalion organization at front- and army-level respectively. The plans also envision an overall increase in mobility in the rear services and an increase in wartime material reserves for all Pact armies up to a three-month requirement.* The overall cargo capacity of supply transport assets also would be increased.

[REDACTED]

It is quite probable that the 1981-1985 proposals, or at least their general drift, have been included in some form in previous five-year Pact development plans, including the 1976-1980 plan. Although the general drift of the 1981-1985 proposals may not be altogether new, the plan is significant for several reasons.

- It appears to reflect a move to formalize and legitimize Soviet control over and management of Pact force development and the military planning process in the NSWP countries.
 - It will require a substantial acceleration in the force improvement efforts of the NSWP armies if the stated goals are to be reached by 1986.
 - It will probably impose a considerable economic burden on the NSWP countries--particularly those southern tier allies whose ground forces are still quite outdated.
- [REDACTED]

* The current shortfall is unknown.

Weapons Unification: 1981-1985

Successful implementation of the Soviet organizational proposals will largely depend upon the extent to which the modernization and standardization of NSWP ground force weapons can be accelerated. Although the full plan for the introduction and new weapons and/or the modernization of old systems during 1981-1985 is not known, recent intelligence has provided some details on Soviet proposals.* This fragmentary evidence suggests that accelerated weapons modernization in the NSWP ground forces is to be based on centralized and integrated weapons development, production, and procurement. The Soviets evidently intend to provide some of their latest ground force weapons to the East Europeans relatively early in the production cycle and are offering to license production in Eastern Europe of many of the new weapons being proposed for Pact-wide deployment. [redacted]

Soviet motives behind the weapons proposals probably are two fold: (1) to hold down the overall cost of Pact ground force weapons development through centralized management and to discourage duplication of effort in burgeoning East European defense industries (especially in Czechoslovakia and Poland); and (2) to mitigate East European resistance to expensive Pact-wide force improvements by offering a scheme that is, perhaps, more viable economically than direct purchases from the USSR. The possibility of increased Third World sales by NSWP countries may also make the program more attractive. [redacted]

The new weapon systems developed and produced by the USSR, that are being proposed for Pact-wide introduction include:

- the T-72 medium tank which is to be produced under license by Poland and Czechoslovakia;
- the new Soviet 240-mm self-propelled (SP) heavy mortar (the Soviets have developed nuclear rounds for this piece); the M-1974 122-mm SP howitzer (already being delivered to East Europe) and, most likely, the M-1973 152-mm SP gun;
- a new 122-mm multiple rocket launcher only recently observed in the USSR and a new family of 82-mm and 120-mm mortars for which production licenses are being offered;

* Annex B summarizes and describes major new weapons known to have been offered for possible Pact-wide service.

- a new family of manportable and vehicle-mounted antitank guided missile (ATGM) systems and a new antitank gun, most of which would be produced under Soviet license;
- two new tactical SAM systems, for licensed production, to replace the SA-7 and SA-9 systems, and a new 30-mm SP antiaircraft gun for direct purchase from the USSR; and
- the latest Soviet infantry weapons, to be produced under license, including a new assault rifle and light machine gun and improved versions of the RPG-7 antitank grenade launcher and SPG-9 antitank gun. [redacted]

Recent evidence also indicates an expanding role for East European defense industries in the development and production of major weapon systems for the Pact. Full details are not known, but information regarding the Czechoslovak and Romanian programs (see Annex B) suggests that these and probably other NSWP countries are engaged in independent development of advanced weapon systems. The new Czech and Romanian weapons being offered for Pact-wide service fall into two categories:

- those which are equivalent to current or older Soviet weapons and have probably been developed for indigenous use, thus alleviating the requirement to purchase new or replacement systems from the USSR (e.g., most of the Romanian weapons) and;
- those which have no known Soviet counterpart and may have been developed according to agreed specifications for introduction throughout the Pact, including Soviet forces. [redacted]

Implications


Whatever success the Soviets may achieve in selling the 1981-1985 unification and standardization program to the East Europeans, NSWP ground force weapons development and production will become an increasingly important factor in the assessment of Pact ground force capabilities and potential. Similarly, if the organizational plans are fully implemented, the ability of the Pact to generate an early war fighting capability against NATO using forces in place in Central

Europe in peacetime will be substantailly enhanced, as will the capability of Pact ground forces to engage in combined arms operations on a multinational basis.


Although unification and standardization probably have been key elements of Warsaw Pact force planning for some time, it appears the Soviets are now attempting to overcome East European sluggishness by obtaining agreement to ambitious goals for the mid 1980s. East European acceptance of the Soviet proposals would set in motion a substantial acceleration in the force improvement and modernization efforts of the NSWP armies. It also would impose considerable economic burdens on some Pact allies, particularly on Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria whose ground forces are still quite outdated. The increases in defense spending necessary to implement expanded programs in these countries would likely be at the expense of nonmilitary expenditures. Thus, even with the opportunity for greater indigenous weapon production programs and the possibility of increased arms sales to the Third World, a sizable increase in weapons procurement over the short term is doubtful.

Similarly, demographic trends in most NSWP countries probably will constrain the proposed expansion of East European ground forces. The Czechs especially, but also the East Germans and Poles, face strained manpower resources. In addition to military manpower needs, NSWP state planners must accommodate competitive demands for manpower from the civilian sector. The reduced manning levels of most NSWP active forces suggest that these demands already have taken their toll on the military. Under these circumstances, the expansion of combat forces would require either the allocation of a greater share of the dwindling labor pool to the military or a reduction in rear area support forces, which are already manned at low levels.

The Soviet proposals appear to recognize these constraints and include the provision that the overall manpower strength of the combined Armed Forces is not to increase beyond the level projected in Current plans for 1980. Rather, any manpower increase in the combat forces is to be accomplished either from savings resulting from organizational changes or by a reduction in the strength of support and service units. Changes in organizational structure and equipment modernization could result in some manpower savings--for example, introduction of the T-72 will result in a one-man reduction in the size of a tank crew. Nonetheless, further reductions in support forces would appear to be the most likely course to accommodate the bulk of any increase in the combat forces.



We do not know whether the East Europeans have accepted the Soviet proposals, even in principle, nor are there any indications of NSWP plans for more rapid force modernization. Some key programs --such as NSWP production and procurement of the T-72--appear close to implementation, some force expansion is underway, and some acceleration in NSWP efforts may be achieved over the next few years. Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that the goal of complete Pact ground force unification and standardization--even to present Soviet norms--will be realized before the end of the next decade.



ANNEX A

Unification and Standardization Program
Management and Decision-making

Program Management

Although ultimate authority is retained by the political leadership of the Pact's member nations, centralized Pact decision-making for military programs is vested in the Committee of Defense Ministers and Military Council. The day-to-day management of the unification and standardization program is centered in the Combined Armed Forces Staff and its Technical Committee.* This committee is responsible for planning and implementing the development and integration of new weapons and equipment into the Pact inventory as well as for recommending organizational measures which contribute to the overall integration of Pact forces. [redacted]

* The *Committee of Defense Ministers* is comprised of the member states' Ministers of Defense, the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Armed Forces (Soviet Marshal V. Kulikov), and the Chief of Staff, Combined Armed Forces (Soviet General A. Gribkov). It meets about once a year to discuss long-range Pact plans and to advise Pact political leaders on matters requiring multinational approval.

The *Military Council*, a subordinate body of the Committee of Defense Ministers, was established in 1969 and is comprised of the CINC, Combined Armed Forces, and a Deputy CINC from each member state. It meets at least once, and usually twice, a year on routine matters related to training, force structure, readiness, doctrine, force integration, and coordination, etc.

The *Technical Committee* of the Combined Armed Forces Staff is a permanent organization subordinate to the CINC, Combined Armed Forces. It was established in 1969 to coordinate Pact military research and development and equipment procurement. It is made up of representatives from all member states. [redacted]

In late 1977, the Technical Committee was reorganized and expanded with the establishment of two new directorates specifically concerned with unification and standardization:

- A *Ground Forces Armament and Equipment Directorate*, which has centralized control over a number of departments responsible for ground force weapons and equipment development.
- A *Unification and Standardization Directorate*, which appears to be responsible for planning and overseeing the entire effort. [redacted]

Under its new structure, the Technical Committee has a wide range of force development responsibilities. These include:

- studying the status of, and potential for, unification and standardization and recommending specific projects to the CINC, Combined Armed Forces;
- working with Pact member nation armies toward the inclusion of unification and standardization measures in national defense plans;
- acting as a coordinating mechanism, in the field of unification and standardization, between the armies of the member nations and the Permanent Commission on Defense Industry of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA);
- reviewing the implementation of adopted standards by the armies of the member nations and by CEMA; and
- reviewing the fulfillment of unification and standardization programs and measures by the Combined Armed Forces. [redacted]

The Planning Process

Although little information is available on planning over the past few years, planning for the 1981-1985 period probably began by 1976. Weapons and equipment unification and standardization--as well as organizational measures--have been critical ingredients in the planning for this five year plan period. [redacted]

Over the past two years, the planning process has involved:

- preparation by the Technical Committee, in conjunction with the Ministries of Defense, of general proposals for the development of the Combined Armed Forces during 1981-1985, including the identification of equipment to remain in service during that period, new weapons to be put into service first, and weapons and equipment to be modernized or replaced;
- submission of lists of weapons and equipment developed by Warsaw Pact member states and proposed for Pact-wide deployment during 1981-1985;
- identification by the Technical Committee of levels of weapons and equipment unification to be achieved by the end of 1985; and
- preparation by the Technical Committee, in conjunction with Ministries of Defense, of a draft weapons and equipment standardization program for 1981-1985.

During the second half of 1978, the Combined Armed Forces staff was to complete the weapons and equipment proposals for 1981-1985 and submit these to the allied armies for comment. In late 1978, the Pact Military Council was to review these proposals. The completed plan for the development of the Combined Armed Forces and proposals for equipping them during 1981-1985 were to be reviewed and approved by the Committee of Defense Ministers at its 11th session in December 1978. During 1979-1980, bilateral protocols on the development of the Combined Armed Forces will be prepared and approved.

ANNEX B

The table below summarizes the major ground force weapon systems being offered by the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Romania to the Pact (with the timing of initial deliveries and/or the transfer of production licenses) for possible Pact-wide deployment. Discussions of each major system and of NSWP weapon development and production potential follow the table.

Major Ground Force Weapons Proposed for Pact-Wide
Deployment During 1981-1985*

<u>Weapon System</u>	<u>Developed By</u>	<u>Initial Series Production</u>	<u>Available for Export Within the Pact</u>	<u>Transfer of License</u>
T-72 Medium Tank	USSR	1973-74	1982-83	On-Going
BMP	USSR	1967	On-Going	Completed
TAB-77 APC	Romania	1978	1980	1981
TYULPAN 240-mm SP Mortar	USSR	1975-76	Unknown	Unknown
AKATSIYA 152-mm SP Gun	USSR	1971-72	Unknown	Unknown
DANA 152-mm SP Gun	CSSR	1978(?)	Unknown	Unknown
GRAD-1 122-mm MRL (36-tube)	USSR	1975-76	1980	None
122-mm MRL (40 tube)	Romania	1980	1981	1982
PRAM 120-mm SP Mortar	CSSR	1985	Unknown	Unknown
120-mm Modernized Mortar	Romania	1981	1981	1983
SANI 120-mm Mortar	USSR	Unknown	1984	1980
VASILEK 82-mm Auto Mortar	USSR	1970	None(?)	Unknown
PODNOS 82-mm Light Mortar	USSR	Unknown	1984	1983
82-mm Modernized Light Mortar	Romania	1979	1980	1980
82-mm APC-Mounted Light Mortar	Romania	1980	1981	1981
TAR Tracked Artillery Tractor	Romania	1977	1980	1980
MALYUTKA-P1 ATGM	USSR	1971(?)	On-Going(?)	1983


<u>Weapon System</u>	<u>Developed By</u>	<u>Initial Series Production</u>	<u>Available for Export Within the Pact</u>	<u>Transfer of License</u>
FAGOT ATGM	USSR	1972(?)	On-Going	None
KONKURS ATGM	USSR	Unknown	None	1983
FLEYTA ATGM	USSR	Unknown	None	1980
METIS ATGM	USSR	Mid-70s	1984	1985
SHALO-B 85-mm Antitank Gun	USSR	Unknown	1985	1986
100-mm Towed Antitank Gun	Romania	1977	1980	1980
STRELA-3 SAM	USSR	Unknown	None	1982
STRELA-10SV SAM (Vehicle-Mounted)	USSR	Unknown	1980	1980
TUNGUSKA SP Antiaircraft Gun (30-mm)	USSR	Unknown	1984	None
Twin-barrel 30-mm Antiaircraft Gun	Romania	1980	1983	1984

T-72 Medium Tank. A few T-72 tanks are to be delivered by the USSR to its Pact allies for demonstration and training. However, equipping of NSWP forces will be accomplished from licensed production. Negotiations between the USSR and Poland and Czechoslovakia for production licenses have been underway for some time. According to the most recent intelligence, Czech production is to begin by 1981, with delivery to other Pact allies beginning in 1982-83. Polish production probably will begin about the same time. The Czech and Polish versions will be standardized on the Soviet model.


A few T-72s have already been delivered to NSWP units. Six T-72s have been observed with Hungary's only tank division, and Romania appears to have received some T-72s. In both cases the tanks probably have been supplied for familiarization and training. There also have been reports of Soviet-Yugoslav negotiations for T-72 production licensing.

Armored Vehicles: Both the Soviets and the Romanians have proposed East European production of armored vehicles for Pact-wide use:

- *BMP:* Already being provided to NSWP forces and produced by the Czechs under license for their own forces and for Soviet forces. A




command and control version of the standard BMP infantry combat vehicle has also been proposed by the Soviets for licensed NSWP production.




- *TAB-77 APC*: A dual-engine, wheeled amphibious vehicle which may be a Romanian version of the Soviet BTR-70 (an upgraded BTR-60PB). It has been in production since last year, and apparently is being offered as an alternative to Soviet wheeled APCs.

Artillery Systems. The organizational proposals for 1981-1985 envision both expansion and modernization of divisional and non-divisional artillery. The new weapon systems proposed for Pact-wide deployment include:



- *GRAD-1 Multiple Rocket Launcher*: A 36-tube, 122-mm system mounted on either a ZIL-131 truck or MILB tracked vehicle. It probably is an improvement-- particularly in mobility--over the widely deployed BM-21 MRL. A new MRL, similar in appearance to the BM-21 but mounted on a ZIL-131 truck, has been seen with a number of motorized rifle regiments in the USSR over the past year or so and may be that version.



[REDACTED]

of the GRAD-1. The Soviets rate the overall capabilities of the GRAD-1 slightly higher than the BM-21 probably because of its improved mobility. [REDACTED]

- *40-tube 122-mm MRL*: A truck-mounted system developed for Romanian divisions. It fires a standard 122-mm rocket and apparently is a Romanian version of the BM-21. It probably is being offered as an alternative to the BM-21. [REDACTED]
- *PRAM 120-mm SP Mortar*: Being developed independently by Czechoslovakia for possible Pact-wide deployment. The PRAM system is comprised of a standard 120-mm mortar mounted on a lengthened BMP vehicle and is intended for deployment with motorized rifle battalions. The Czech draft technical specifications for the PRAM were discussed with the Soviets in 1972, and initial deliveries from series production are scheduled to begin in 1985. [REDACTED]
- *120-mm Portable Mortars*: Both the Soviets and the Romanians have developed modernized 120-mm mortars for possible Pact-wide use. The Soviets have recommended that NSWP armies establish special units for advanced cadre training on the SANI system. The Romanian model is designed for light infantry and airborne troops and fires standard mortar rounds. [REDACTED]
- *82-mm Mortars*: Four 82-mm mortar systems have been developed for possible Pact-wide use--two by the Soviets and two by the Romanians. The Soviet systems include the VASILEK, an automatic mortar--mounted on a GAZ-66 truck--which has been deployed with Soviet motorized rifle troops in East Germany (and presumably elsewhere) for several years. The VASILEK has a maximum range of 4,200 meters and a maximum rate of fire of 100-120 rounds per minute. The Soviets are proposing Hungarian licensed production for NSWP armies. The second Soviet system, the PODNOS, is a light, portable mortar for battalion-level use. [REDACTED]

The Romanians have developed a modernized 82-mm mortar in two versions: one, a portable version for light infantry and airborne troops, the other mounted on an amphibious armored personnel carrier for employment with mechanized (motorized) infantry regiments. Both fire standard Pact mortar rounds. [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
- *TAR Tracked Artillery Prime Mover*: Designed as a replacement for the 1950s-vintage Soviet ATL light artillery tractor. No other details are known.
- [REDACTED]

Antitank Systems. Five new Soviet ATGM systems and two antitank guns (one of them produced by Romania) have been proposed for Pact-wide service. Two of the ATGM systems have been seen in Soviet forces only recently, and one may not yet be in series production.

[REDACTED]


- *MALYUTKA-P1 ATGM*: An upgraded Sagger AT-3 with semi-automatic guidance. It has been in production in the USSR for some time and is scheduled for licensed production in Czechoslovakia in 1983. The Czechs will produce the missile and will mount it on a vehicle (probably a BRDM wheeled APC) to be supplied by the USSR. The Czech version will be exported within the Pact.
- *FAGOT ATGM*: Designated the AT-4 SPIGOT by NATO. This man-portable, tube-launched ATGM has been introduced into some Soviet and East German mortarized rifle battalions along with the SPG-9 recoilless antitank gun. The Soviets apparently do not anticipate offering licensed production of the FAGOT.
- *KONKURS ATGM*: A wire-guided, semi-automatic ATGM system mounted on a BRDM-2 armored vehicle. It fires two types of missile, one of which may be identical to the FAGOT missile. Apparently, the KONKURS is to complement the 100-mm antitank gun in division tank destroyer battalions. It is rated by the Soviets as roughly equal to the US TOW ATGM system in overall capabilities.
- *FLEYTA ATGM*: A radio-guided, semiautomatic system that probably is an upgraded AT-2 SWATTER. It is mounted on a BRDM-2 vehicle, is designed to be deployed at division level with the 100-mm antitank gun, and is rated equal in capability to the KONKURS.


A new tube-launched ATGM system, mounted on a BRDM-2 vehicle, was seen in the November 1977 Moscow military parade and may have been the KONKURS or FLEYTA. The Moscow ATGM system has been seen in a few Soviet units in East Germany.


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
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
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


- *SHALO-B 85-mm Antitank Gun:* To be deployed at battalion level in conjunction with the METIS ATGM system. The SHALO-B fires fragmentation, armor-piercing (AP), and high explosive antitank (HEAT) rounds. It has a maximum range against tanks of 1,700 meters with the AP round and 1,050 meters with the HEAT round. The Soviets have proposed that the NSWP armies establish special units equipped with the METIS and SHALO-B systems for advance training of cadres. 

- *100-mm Antitank Gun:* Developed independently for the Romanian army as a replacement for 85-mm and 57-mm antitank guns. This gun is currently in production in Romania and fires standard Pact ammunition. 

Tactical Air Defense Weapons. In addition to further proliferation of the SA-6 (GAINFUL) SAM system with NSWP division air defense regiments, the Soviets have proposed the introduction of a new family of tactical air defense weapons for Pact motorized rifle and tank regiments. The Romanians also are developing a new anti-aircraft gun for their own forces and have offered it to their Pact allies. 

- *STRELA-3 SAM:* Apparently an upgraded man-portable SA-7 (GRAIL) SAM system, with an overall capability that is rated by the Soviets as slightly higher than the existing SA-7. 



- *TUNGUSKA:* A 30-mm SP anti-aircraft gun mounted on an unidentified 32-ton tracked chassis and intended for



[REDACTED]

employment in motorized rifle and tank regiments with the STRELA-10SV SAM system. Its 4,000 to 5,000 round-per-minute rate of fire suggests a multi-barrel system similar to the ZSU-23-4 four-barrel 23-mm gun which it may replace. This system has not yet been observed with Soviet units. The Soviets have proposed, however, that NSWP armies establish special units equipped with both the TUNGUSKA and STRELA-10SV SAM for advance cadre training. [REDACTED]

- *Twin-barrel 30-mm Antiaircraft Gun:* Developed for the Romanian army, this system is intended to replace the old Soviet M-1973 37-mm antiaircraft gun. It is a low-altitude, towed weapon with a maximum rate of fire of 1,000 rounds-per-minute and a maximum range of 4,000 meters. [REDACTED]
- *Infantry Weapons:* The Soviets also have proposed Pact-wide deployment--through NSWP licensed production--of a new family of infantry small arms. All of these weapons include models equipped with "NSPU" night sights. They include the AK-74 5.45-mm light machine gun (now in series production in the USSR and being fielded with Soviet units), a modernized 7.62-mm AKM assault rifle and machine gun, and improved RPG-7 antitank grenade launchers and SPG-9 recoilless guns. The Czechs also are reported to have developed an improved version of the RPG-7, known as the RPG-75 "KOBLYKA." [REDACTED]

NSWP Weapons Development and Production Potential. Poland and Czechoslovakia have the most fully developed and active land arms industries within the NSWP. Not only will these two countries probably continue as the leading non-Soviet arms producers, but they also will likely be the focal point of growth in NSWP production capacity and activity over the near term. [REDACTED]

Romanian capabilities have expanded somewhat in recent years, but, due to Romania's increasingly independent stance, it is difficult to predict the extent to which it will participate in integrated, cooperative efforts with the Soviets. East Germany, Bulgaria, and Hungary have lesser capabilities--Germany due more to Soviet constraints rather than the lack of the requisite technological base. The Bulgarians currently produce only small arms ammunition, have a limited technological base, and are

likely to continue to depend upon their Pact allies for major weapon systems. The Hungarians currently produce wheeled APCs, antiaircraft guns, small arms, ammunition and other equipment items and have some potential for expansion into other fields. [REDACTED]

Tanks. Historically, Czechoslovakia's Martin Tank Plant and Poland's Labedy plant have operated at about 30 percent of capacity, producing about 1,000 tanks each per year. If T-72 production reached these levels by 1983, and if none of this production went to the USSR or to non-Pact countries, all 15 active NSWP tank divisions could be reequipped with T-72s by the end of 1985, in accordance with the Soviet proposals. It is more likely, however, that production for NSWP forces will be stretched out over a longer period and that some T-72s produced in Poland and Czechoslovakia will be exported to the USSR and other countries. Except for Romania, there is no evidence that the other NSWP countries will develop tank production facilities. [REDACTED]

Romania began to develop a tank production capability in the early 1970s, and has produced a number of prototypes of a modernized T-55 medium tank of Romanian design. Although the Romanians apparently have received some T-72s from the USSR, there are no indications that Romania intends to become involved in the T-72 production program. [REDACTED]

Armored Vehicles. Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and Hungary produce wheeled amphibious armored personnel carriers. Only the Czechs, however, produce the BMP and they would be the logical candidate for licensed production of the BMP command variant. Nonetheless, the Poles, Hungarians, or Romanians probably could take on such a project. Over the long term, indigenous armored vehicle programs probably will continue in all four countries. [REDACTED]

Artillery. Only the Czechs are known to have been involved in the development or production of self-propelled artillery. Poland, Hungary, and Romania, however, have the capability to produce towed artillery as well as multiple rocket launchers and antitank guns. It is difficult to predict whether any of these countries will become involved in future self-propelled artillery programs. Production of major artillery weapons in East Germany or Bulgaria is less likely, although the Germans would have the technological capability. [REDACTED]

Antitank Missiles. Again, only the Czechs are known to produce complete ATGM systems: they currently produce the SAGGER AT-3 system and are to produce the upgraded SAGGER--MALYUTKA-P1--under Soviet license. The Poles may also produce the SAGGER, and other Pact countries, including East Germany, may engage in component production. Any of these could become involved in licensed production of the new Soviet missile systems: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Air Defense Weapons. Both Poland and Czechoslovakia produce the SA-7 SAM system and would be likely candidates for both the STRELA-3 and STRELA-10SV systems. Bulgaria assembles the SA-7 from components supplied by the USSR. Germany, Hungary, and Romania could be involved in SAM component production. [REDACTED]

The Soviets apparently will not offer licensed production of the TUNGUSKA 30-mm SP anti-aircraft gun system, however, the Czechs, Poles, Romanians, and Hungarians have produced anti-aircraft artillery in the past and could become involved in either independent or cooperative development and production programs for towed or self-propelled systems. [REDACTED]

Infantry Weapons. All six NSWP countries have active infantry weapons production programs which include grenade launchers, recoilless guns, and small arms. It is likely that indigenous arms plants will produce the new Soviet assault rifles and machine guns as well as modernized RPG-7 grenade launchers and SPG-9 recoilless guns. [REDACTED]