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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

25 November 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : [redacted] Report


1. Enclosed is a [redacted] report. For convenience of reference by NFIB agencies, the codeword [redacted] has been assigned to the product of certain extremely sensitive agent sources of CIA's Directorate of Operations. The word [redacted] is classified [redacted] and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

2. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this report in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

[redacted]
William W. Wells

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Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY USSR, Poland, GDR

DATE OF INFO. September 1977

DATE 25 November 1977

SUBJECT

Polish Response to Criticism of Polish Participation in Exercise "FALA [WAVE]-77" by Soviet Marshal KULIKOV

SOURCE Documentary

SUMMARY:

This report is a translation of a Polish document classified SECRET entitled Memorandum on the Report of Marshal KULIKOV on Exercise "FALA-77" prepared by the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces. The memorandum replies to criticisms of Polish preparations, organization, and conduct of the exercise and indicates disagreements with the critique or measures taken to remedy valid inadequacies, such as the support and command of naval and assault landing operations, ship-to-shore coordination and communications problems, and deficiencies in radioelectronic warfare equipment. The need for improvement in the coordination of Soviet, Polish, and German naval actions is discussed.

END OF SUMMARY

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THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces
Warsaw, 1977

THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,
Citizen General of the Army
Wojciech JARUZELSKI

MEMORANDUM

Regarding Marshal KULIKOV's Report
on Exercise "FALA [WAVE]-77"


In response to the problems discussed by Marshal KULIKOV (letter 7/0833 dated 10 August 1977), the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces submits the following evaluation and proposals: (x)

1. The method used by the staff of the Combined Armed Forces to prepare the exercise directing body and the umpires for exercises, which consists of rehearsing with them the more important elements of the dynamics (page 2, para 4), can be adopted by the Polish Armed Forces. Until now, we have been using various methods of preparation, depending on the time available; the level of preparation of the personnel comprising the exercise directing body and the umpire apparatus; and the scale, nature and importance of the undertakings. Usually, group training lasting one to two days is conducted, primarily in the area where the exercises (deployment of staffs) will take place, and it is devoted to thorough

(x) Recommendations on this matter will be presented in the summary of tasks and proposals generated by exercises "ZACHOD [WEST]-77" and "FALA-77." This document will be prepared by 15 September 1977.

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
familiarization of the exercise directing body, the umpires, the gaming apparatus, and the game players with the concept of the exercise and the course of its dynamics. Until now, during the preparatory period for the exercises, gaming with the umpire apparatus has not been conducted (reporting by the senior umpires with the commanders and by umpires-specialists on permissible decisions and possible solutions consistent with the objectives and tasks of a given phase of the exercise). The method adopted by the staff of the Combined Armed Forces allows for expansion of objectives and problems planned for the exercise and, it follows also, the more efficient conduct of it. In addition, this method creates better conditions for operational-tactical improvement of officers comprising the exercise directing body and the umpire apparatus. There are, however, negative aspects, the foremost of which are time consumption (in reality, it is necessary to prepare and conduct two exercises, a preliminary one with the exercise directing apparatus, and the exercise itself) and the possibility of premature disclosure of the intentions of the exercise directing body.

2. All practical episodes (combat and fire missions) performed during the exercise (page 2, para 5) are conducted in the Polish Armed Forces exclusively against the background of the operational-tactical situation. We are emphasizing and giving priority attention to two-sided exercises, both within and between the branches of the armed forces (e.g., exercise "ZIMA [WINTER]-75" with the air forces and the National Air Defense Forces), played out on the basis of decisions made by the participants.

3. The problems of supplying ships at sea (page 3, para 1, last sentence) are being properly resolved in the Polish Navy. The forces and means in existence (5 tender ships, 5 supply ships, 7 fuel tankers, 3 oil barges without propulsion, 31 transport barges, 6 transport cutters, and the group of the 35th POL Depot for delivering fuel from an

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unarmed shore) have the capability of resupplying combat ships with fuel, missiles, ammunition, and so forth both at dispersed basing points and at sea. In all exercises with naval forces, appropriate rear services units are always deployed to the necessary extent and their supply capabilities are tested. For example, during exercise "WIOSNA [SPRING]-76", the organization for supplying various classes of ships at sea by a surface ship supply unit called up on an emergency basis from the bases of the GDYNIA and HEL naval port headquarters was tested in practice. A mobile basing point for missile and torpedo cutters was deployed at WLADYSLAWOWO.

4. In the field of organizing joint party-political undertakings (page 3, para 2) our political institutions have much experience and many achievements. For example, during exercise "TARCZA [SHIELD]-76," like in many other joint exercises, party-political and propaganda work was conducted by a unified political organ, composed of forces and means assigned from all the participating armies. The performance of this organ was highly regarded.

5. In operational-tactical training, exceptionally much attention is devoted to the problem of organizing the repulsion of an enemy attack on the national territory from the air and sea (page 3, para 5-7). In addition to continuous improvement of national air defense, much effort has been invested during recent years in resolving the problems related to defense of the sea coast. Resolution No. 02/75 of the National Defense Committee, dated 17 April 1975 on Protection of the Polish Maritime Border and Sea Coast, and Directive of the Minister of National Defense No. 004/OPS dated 30 April 1975, on Planning and Preparation of Defense of the Polish Sea Coast have been prepared and published. Provisions contained in those documents are being verified and improved in repeated exercises of the "WYBRZEZE" ["COAST"] type. Considering the geographic location of our country, the problems of organizing the occupation and preparation of jump-off areas for the purpose of repulsing an enemy attack in a border battle are rehearsed on a relatively smaller scale because the national border designated by mutual agreement limits this capability.

6. In order to ensure efficient command and control and fuller coordination in assault landing operations, we are studying the need to establish an authorized position for a Deputy Commander of the Navy who in time of war would be the commander of the assault landing forces, and to appoint his staff in advance (page 4, para 3). From a preliminary evaluation, it appears that appointment of the staff of the assault landing forces commander during peacetime would be unnecessary (another solution is being sought, e.g., assignment of the above mentioned staff from the command and staff of the navy during a period of increased combat readiness).

7. Improvement of the effectiveness of antiaircraft defense for the assault landing forces (page 4, para 4, last sentence) will be possible at this stage by attaining better organization of combat operations and coordination of forces and means of the National Air Defense Forces, Air Forces, and the Navy. In the future (succeeding 5-year plans), the strengthening of assault landing air defense will be possible by the successive replacement of aircraft in the 7th Fighter-Assault Aviation Regiment, which is armed with LIM-5 (6) aircraft. (x)


8. Formation of a Unified Baltic Fleet, and the related appointment of a unified command (page 4, para 6) requires a separate study.

9. Improvement of the antimine defense system at sea (page 5, para 1 and 2) is among the priority tasks of the Polish Navy. The antimine defense now consists of two divisions each of: minesweeping ships, minesweeping cutters, mine observation craft and cutters, and of frogmen-minelayer groups which are components of the minesweeping cutter divisions. Within the 5-year plan for developing the Polish Armed Forces, introduction into the line of three low-magnetic,

(x) Undertaking the domestic production of SU-25 aircraft may hasten the solution of the problem.

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
inshore, project 207 minesweepers is envisaged. Delay of the work, however, does not ensure fulfilment of this task on time (if the present rate of construction is maintained, it is feared that, by the end of 1980, only one prototype of this class of ship will be put into service). In addition, at the shipyards of the Polish Navy, studies of the concept of ships capable of breaking through mine barriers have been undertaken, and at the GDANSK Polytechnic design work is in progress on an assault landing-air cushion craft with a great capacity for overcoming antilanding defenses. (xx) At this stage, adapting our naval helicopters to minesweeping tasks is not feasible. There is a lack of data on the tactical-technical capabilities of Soviet naval helicopters to perform minesweeping tasks. Consultations are planned.

10. Implementation of recommendations of the VI Session of the Committee of Defense Ministers regarding the creation of unified communications systems for the allied fleets in the Baltic Sea (page 5, para 3), is progressing in Poland in accordance with the plan. Thus far, a double-cable line has been constructed along the sea coast. Junction of wire communications systems with communications systems of the allied fleets has been ensured by constructing and multiplexing the long distance cable in the GDYNIA-BALTYSK link, and constructing a cable link in the SWINOUJSCIE-western state border link. Protected (secure) telephone and telegraph communications are planned for the links: Navy headquarters - flotillas and Command Post of the Polish Navy - Navy Command Posts of the USSR and the German Democratic Republic. In order to increase the security of command and control communications, employment of high-speed telegraphy is envisaged in ship-shore links (so far, radio receiving centers have been installed on four ships and on the shore

(xx) A prototype of this unit is planned to be constructed by the end of 1981. Activation of serial production of the hovercraft is planned for the period 1983-84 (if an executor can be found).

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at GDYNIA and SWINOUJSCIE; plans have been made to equip an additional six ships with appropriate apparatus by 1982. In addition, in order to ensure protected (secure) ultra shortwave communications with ships at sea, ships are being successively equipped with protective (secure) "SYRENA" type apparatus, while command points (of the navy and flotillas), and the relay points are being adapted to function with the ships in this functional system. The possibility of adapting airborne automatic relay apparatus for this purpose is also under study.

Communications centers existing at naval command points can be used even now (on a limited scale) to direct joint combat operations of the allied fleets in the Baltic Sea. Full support of needs in this field will be possible after the staff of the Combined Armed Forces precisely defines operational communications requirements and principles for financing investment undertakings.

Acceleration of implementation of recommendations of the Committee of Defense Ministers is dependent on:

-- Connecting wire communications systems--this requires laying a cable from the western border of the PPR through the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to the command post of the GDR Navy;

-- Utilizing rapid telegraphy--this requires earlier deliveries from the USSR of special communications equipment for outfitting the ships (moving up deliveries from 1982 to 1980).

Projects related to the construction and introduction of a sea-borne automated control system are being conducted in the Polish Armed Forces according to plan. By the end of 1980, conclusion of research and preparatory-introductory work on adaptation of mobile electronic computer assemblies in containers is envisaged. One coastal minesweeper has been assigned for research purposes, which--together with a command ship and designated shore units--will form a so called experimental link.

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11. Radioelectronic warfare problems are being resolved within a limited sphere, primarily, by forces and means of the 6th Radioelectronic Unit. As a rule, there are no radioelectronic warfare means on naval ships, aircraft, and helicopters (page 5, para 4), except on the destroyer "WARSZAWA, which has projectiles with jamming devices for the 130-mm guns. During the current 5-year period, it is planned to outfit type 205 missile cutters with 80-mm antiradar missiles. In addition, work on our own radioelectronic warfare launchers and projectiles (which have been successfully tested) is being conducted at the Military Technical Institute for Armaments.

At the meetings of the working group of specialists of the armies of the Warsaw Pact in June 1976 and of the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces in April 1977, policies for the development of radioelectronic warfare means to meet the needs of the allied fleets were defined. However, a specific plan for outfitting the units has not been established, and assignment of tasks for producing appropriate devices has not been made. Neither has there been any information on possibilities of purchasing new radioelectronic warfare equipment useful for naval units. These matters should be discussed with the staff and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces.

General Staff of the
Polish Armed Forces

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