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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

28 OCT 1977

HR70-14

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : Report

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
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Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY USSR/Warsaw Pact

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DATE OF INFO. 1975-1976

DATE 28 OCT 1977

SUBJECT

Lectures and Exercises of the General Staff Academy
of the Armed Forces of the USSR




SUMMARY:

This report is a translation of the notebook of an officer who attended a course at the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the USSR (Voroshilov Academy). Although the notebook is not formally organized into chapters, the translation breaks down into the following substantive areas:

- Strategic Operations in a Theater of Military Operations pages 5-15
- The Artillery of a Front pages 16-22
- TO&E of Air Defense Units of a Front pages 23-29 ✓
- Forces and Means of the Rear of a Front pages 30-35
- Chemical Defense Troops of a Front pages 36-40
- Ground Forces, Air Forces and Nuclear Warheads of the 1st Western Front pages 41-52
- Air Defense Forces of the 1st Western Front pages 53-60 ✓

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Forces and Operations of the Baltic Fleet in
Cooperation with the 1st Western Front pages 61-68

Premise of War Exercises pages 69-71


Defensive Operations of an Army pages 72-87 ✓

Source Comment: The lectures on forces and means of a front probably reflect approximately the true wartime strength of Soviet forward units, but the paper exercises involving the hypothetical "First Western Front" should not be taken as accurate reflections of Soviet order of battle. In discussing nuclear warfare, the commander of the academy expounded the official Warsaw Pact doctrine of no first strike, but stressed that any use of nuclear weapons by the West, regardless of scale or range, would be met with "total global riposte" by all possible means.

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(Strategic Operations in a Theater of Military Operations)

A. A strategic operation in a continental theater of military operations as one of the main forms of strategic actions of our armed forces:

I. Special features:

- 1) The capabilities of strategic forces permit destruction of groupings of armed forces and destruction of military-economic installations in the entire depth.
- 2) Short periods of time.
- 3) For destruction of the enemy all branches of the armed forces are needed.

II. A strategic operation may include:

- strikes by the rocket troops;
- aerial operations of long-range aviation;
- (illegible)
- naval operations of the fleet;
- aerial operations to destroy the air enemy;
- airborne assault operations;
- combat operations of formations and large units in air defense.

III. In nuclear war:

The decisive act of a strategic operation is the delivery of the first nuclear strike by the strategic rocket forces, long-range aviation, missile submarines and nuclear means of the front.

In a war begun with conventional weapons it is most important to destroy groupings of troops, aviation, and nuclear means. Destruction will be achieved sequentially according to the depth of the enemy and the time required for destruction of groupings of his troops.

B. The definition, concept, tasks and possible scope of a strategic operation are:

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Goal: complete destruction of groupings of enemy forces in the theater of military operations;

disruption of military-economic bases of the enemy coalition;

taking out of the war all forces of particular enemy states.

Achieving the goal of a strategic operation requires accomplishing a number of large-scale strategic tasks:

- destruction of groupings of enemy forces in the theater of military operations;
- repulsion by air defense forces of enemy strikes;
- destruction or capture of military-economic installations;
- ~~disruption of mobilization;~~
- disorganization of control;
- capture of vitally important areas.

C. Planning for the use of troops of fronts in a strategic operation of a continental theater of military operations:

The planning is carried out by the General Staff. The plan of a strategic operation is worked out as a unified whole for conditions at the onset of combat operations both with and without the use of nuclear weapons. The plan is made up of:


- the decision for the strategic operation;
- a plan for the use of nuclear weapons;
- a plan of operations and combat operations of formations and large units and of branches of the armed forces;
- a support plan.

The disposition of a grouping of front formations is set up in accordance with the concept of the strategic operation. It must ensure:

- constant readiness of troops for the rapid conduct of offensive operations;
- readiness for repulsing sudden strikes of the enemy;

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- concentration of forces and means on axes of main strikes;
- capability of intensifying the efforts of formations;
- effecting a maneuver along the front and from the depth;
- readiness to deliver nuclear strikes against the enemy by operational-tactical means independently or in cooperation with strategic nuclear forces.

Stemming from these requirements, the disposition of a grouping of troops of fronts in a strategic operation in a theater of military operation may include:


- fronts of the first echelon set up from groups of Forces and border military districts in peacetime;
- fronts or armies of the second echelon set up by drawing on troops of the border or internal military districts;
- reserves for various purposes.

Operational and Special Support

The most important factor in achieving success of an operation is to have well thought out and timely organized support of combat operations of troops. Types of support are:

- reconnaissance;
- operational camouflage;
- protection of troops and rear installations against weapons of mass destruction;
- engineer support;
- radioelectronic warfare;
- chemical support;
- hydro-meteorological support;
- topogeodetic support;
- rear support.

Support of an offensive operation of a front (army) is organized on the basis of a decision of the commander and on his orders. Support measures are worked out directly under the leadership of the chief of staff of the front (army).



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The following measures are worked out by the staff of the front (army):

- reconnaissance;
- protection of troops and installations of the rear from weapons of mass destruction;
- operational camouflage;
- radioelectronic warfare;
- hydro-meteorological support;
- topogeodetic support.

Other types of support are organized and carried out by the corresponding chiefs of special troops and services. Plans are worked out for each type of support and orders are given to the troops via combat instructions undersigned by the chief-of-staff.


Camouflage

Operational camouflage must be directed at concealing preparations and achieving surprise in an operation of troops of the front. The most important tasks of operational camouflage are:

- concealment from the enemy of the true location of the main grouping of troops, aviation and rocket troops;
- concealing a maneuver and regrouping of troops;
- display of dummy targets, especially dummy locations of missile/nuclear means.

Operational camouflage in the initial period of war is organized first of all in support of actions by rocket troops, aviation and air defense forces and means which are taking part in the delivery of the first mass nuclear strike and in repulsing an enemy attack. At the same time, considerable attention should be given to implementing measures to camouflage troops of the front during movement and deployment for entry into an offensive and also in the course of an operation.

During the organization and implementation of measures in operational camouflage it is necessary to achieve a situation whereby, in case of a surprise enemy attack, his nuclear



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strikes will be delivered against dummy targets and empty areas, and whereby the combat effectiveness of our troops and the protection of the most important installations of the rear of the front are preserved.

In organizing operational camouflage it is also possible to develop measures for the deception of the enemy, to prepare radio and radiotechnical means for operational camouflage, and to set up in the necessary quantities and in specific areas reserves of materiel for implementing various types of camouflage.

Commitment of the Second Echelon

A decisive method of intensifying efforts is the commitment of the second echelon of the front (army). The army of the second echelon of the front may be committed to battle to accelerate fulfillment of the immediate task or at the onset of the subsequent task of the front. This, of course, does not preclude the use of this army in the first days of an operation, depending on the specific situation which is forming during the development of the offensive. The army of the second echelon of a front, as a rule, is designated for fulfilling tasks on the main axis. It is also possible to use this army for the development of the offensive on new (other) axes in support of a rapid achievement of the goal of the operation. At the time of its commitment to battle it is advantageous to effect, somewhere on the line, the accelerated fulfillment of the immediate task of the front. In all cases, the commitment to battle of this army should be carried out in an organized fashion, taking into account destruction of the opposing enemy by strikes of rocket troops and aviation which make possible a swift penetration to a significant depth, to go to the flank and rear of the main grouping. Commitment to battle may be effected in a sector of one or two armies.

Composition of a Front

- three to four armies (including a tank army);
- three to five reserve divisions;
- an air army with two to three fighter air divisions, one to two fighter-bomber air divisions and one bomber



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- air division;
- two front missile brigades;
- one to two artillery divisions;
- one to two tank-destroyer artillery brigades;
- four to five surface-to-air (antiaircraft artillery) regiments;
- ✓ -- an airborne assault brigade;
- front large units and units of special troops;
- in a number of cases, based on the order of the Supreme Command, an airborne landing division may be allotted for operations as an airborne landing force.

In all the front will have:


22 to 25 divisions, including 8 to 10 tank divisions;
130 to 160 operational-tactical and tactical missile launchers;
3700 to 4100 field artillery pieces and mortars;
6200 to 7100 tanks;
more than 2000 antitank artillery and antitank guided missiles;
6200 to 7000 armored personnel carriers and combat infantry vehicles;
600 to 800 combat aircraft including 400 to 500 nuclear weapons delivery aircraft.

For delivery of the first nuclear strike the front can draw on 250 to 330 individual delivery means, including 100 to 130 operational-tactical missile launchers and 150 to 200 missile delivery aircraft.

Regarding artillery, a front has the capability on selected sectors for strikes (breakthrough) on an overall width of 27 to 30 kilometers to set up a density of 90 to 100 guns and mortars per kilometer of front.

Regarding tanks, a front in sectors of strikes (break-through) for a combined-arms army can have up to 40 to 50 tanks per kilometer, and for a tank army can have up to 60 to 70 tanks per kilometer.

Air defense means of a front permit the dependable



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accomplishment of all tasks connected with the repulsion of attacks of the enemy at all altitudes.

Composition of an Army

- five to six divisions, including one to two tank divisions;
- an army missile brigade;
- artillery, surface-to-air missile and antiaircraft artillery large units and units;
- units (sub-units) of special troops.


In all, an army may have:

- 29-33 missile launchers (of these, ? for operational-tactical missiles);
- up to 1260 tanks;
- about 740 guns, rocket launchers and mortars;
- about 480 antitank means.

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THE INTERNATIONAL DUTY AND LIBERATION MISSION OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES WILL OFTEN BE INFLUENTIAL IN SHAPING THE GOALS OF FRONT AND ARMY OPERATIONS.

Scope	<u>Front</u>	Army
Immediate task	250-300 kilometers	100-150 kilometers
Subsequent task	350-500 kilometers	150-200 kilometers
Depth of operation	600-800 kilometers	250-350 kilometers
Speed of advance		40-60 kilometers per day
When breaking through prepared defense		25-30 kilometers per day
In the depth		60-70 kilometers per day



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Duration	12-15 days	6-9 days
Width of zone	300-400 kilometers	60-80 kilometers and more

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Methods of Operating with Nuclear and Conventional Weapons

Methods of conducting an operation and destroying enemy groupings will depend on:

- the weapons being used (nuclear or conventional);
- groupings and nature of operations of the enemy;
- composition of the front;
- nature of the terrain.

I. When nuclear weapons are the basic means of conducting the operation, it will consist of delivering decisive destruction by nuclear weapons, and advancing rapidly with tanks, motorized rifle and airborne troops to destroy the enemy and seize the most important areas of his territory in a short period of time.

- 1) The most efficient method will be the delivery of decisive destruction against the enemy in the first and subsequent nuclear strikes and the rapid advance of troops in cooperation with airborne landing forces ALONG THE SHORTEST AXES toward the areas in order to achieve the goals of the operation and the dispersal of the main enemy groupings and their piecemeal destruction.
- 2) Methods of conducting an operation can also be used whereby after the first nuclear strike the troop advance is planned ALONG CONVERGING AXES FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENCIRCLING AND DESTROYING the main enemy forces with forces of the armies of the front or in cooperation with an adjacent front, SIMULTANEOUSLY

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DEVELOPING AN ADVANCE IN DEPTH toward areas in order to achieve the goal of the operation.

- 3) The delivery of decisive destruction against the enemy with nuclear strikes and the rapid advance of armies (divisions) along the SHORTEST AXES INTO THE DEPTH OF HIS DISPOSITION WITH A SIMULTANEOUS ENVELOPING STRIKE TOWARD THE FLANK AND REAR of an enemy grouping for the purpose of pressing it toward a large barrier and its subsequent destruction.

It is possible to use other methods of conducting an operation, including various combinations of them.


II. Without the use of nuclear weapons, a basic method of conducting an offensive will be THE SEQUENTIAL DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY ALONG THE FRONT AND DEPTH:

- 1) Destroying the enemy with the massive employment of artillery and aviation, the delivery of frontal strikes on one or two axes, the dispersal and subsequent destruction of enemy groupings piecemeal with simultaneous development of an offensive/advance into the depth and to the flanks.
- 2) Delivery by troops of strikes along converging axes for the purposes of encircling and destroying the opposing enemy with simultaneous development of an advance into the depth.
- 3) On a maritime axis - a strike from the front and along the seacoast.

The main strike must always be carried out by the main forces of nuclear weapons and troops, inasmuch as they are the most maneuverable of the formations and large units (tank armies and tank divisions), for the purpose of destroying the nuclear strike means and main grouping of the enemy and of seizing his important areas and installations in the theater of combat operations. Other strikes of the front are carried out by the remaining forces and means of the front for the destruction of other groupings and also for seizing areas,

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supporting the fulfillment of the main tasks in an operation.

Selection of Axes

For the successful destruction of the enemy and achieving the goals in a short time it is necessary to have a correct selection of axes for the advance of the troops. There may be two or three such axes in the sector of advance of the front.

One of these axes is selected as the main one on which are concentrated the main efforts of the operational-tactical missile troops and of aviation of the front and powerful strike groupings from combined-arms and tank troops for the destruction of the main enemy groupings and the seizure of his important areas in the theater of combat operations. In so doing, it is necessary to maintain a CONSTANT ADVANTAGE in forces and means on the axis of the main strike.

The axis of the main strike is defined for the depth of the immediate tasks and sometimes for the entire depth of the front operation. The axis of the main strike must bring the troops of the front toward the flank and into the rear of the main enemy groupings, and also in the shortest possible way into the interior of his territory toward important areas, the capture of which achieves the goals of the operation. It must ensure that the maximum use of the capabilities of maneuver of the advancing troops, and travel along the enemy's weakest area - flanks, breaks between the boundaries of his troops, sectors and axes covered by troops who are unimportant or unstable in combat or political-morale sense.


The axis of the main strike may also pass through strong sectors of enemy operational disposition, especially in cases:

- when the nature of the terrain on various axes (five words missing);
- when on these axes (word missing) nuclear weapons (four words missing).

When selecting the axis of the main strike it is necessary to

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
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study the nature of the terrain and (portion illegible).

Under these conditions it might be feasible to advance on those axes where there are already groupings of troops and where little time is required for their commitment to battle.

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(The Use of Artillery)

Depending on conditions of the transition of troops of the front to the offensive, including the situation when the enemy is invading, different methods will be applied for the destruction of enemy groupings.

For disrupting an advance of enemy ground forces, it goes without saying that the most effective way is to deliver an anticipatory strike against his troops while they are moving for the offensive. (Portion illegible) Artillery, because of its limited range of fire, can hardly deliver effective destruction against the enemy who is preparing for an advance and who is not directly on the state border but some distance away. For practical purposes, only long-range (gun) artillery can take part in such a strike, moved up and deployed for this purpose in firing positions ahead of departure areas of the troops for the offensive.

If the enemy anticipates the troops of the front when they deploy and go over to the offensive, and if his chosen axes give him a significant advantage in forces and means, then the disruption of his offensive will be carried out by defensive operations of the forces of the front.

Fire against the enemy during his movement toward and across a state border will be conducted by artillery which is supporting combat-support units, and also by artillery of the main forces occupying firing positions ahead of the departure areas of our troops. In the case of further penetration by the enemy, fire will be opened by artillery located in firing positions of the departure areas of our troops.

THE SYSTEM OF FIRE IN CASE OF AN ENEMY INVASION IS PREPARED AHEAD OF TIME. After determination of the axes of the offensive by the main enemy troop grouping, A MANEUVER IS CARRIED OUT by the artillery to these axes. With its own fire, artillery destroys enemy troops and equipment and does not allow his wedge deep into our territory, changing to our advantage the balance of forces and means and ensuring the establishment of conditions for transition of troops of the



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front to the offensive.

For the defeat of the enemy when switching troops of the front to the offensive, fire means are first used, and then the strike force of the troops. The destruction of the enemy depends on the place from which the troops of the front are departing, its distance from the line of combat contact, and the nature of enemy operations. The transition of our troops to the offensive may be carried out:

- from a departure position in direct contact with the enemy;
- from a departure area located (several words missing) from the state border;
- or from a combat alert concentration (area?).


The use of artillery should be initiated based on the actual situation.

Switching our troops to the offensive from direct contact with the enemy occupying a defense with significant forces is usually begun with the implementation of an ARTILLERY PREPARATION FOR THE ATTACK. For this, the necessary quantity of artillery is concentrated which will neutralize (destroy) tactical nuclear means, artillery and mortar batteries, tanks, antitank means, personnel and fire means in strong points, control posts and radiotechnical means.

If only the forces of enemy covering units oppose our troops, then their destruction may be carried out by forward detachments sent from divisions of the first echelon. Each forward detachment operating on the main axis should be reinforced by two to three artillery battalions. This artillery should occupy prepared fire positions ahead of time and conduct, if needed, a SHORT ARTILLERY PREPARATION (in certain cases, one artillery strike is enough) up to the moment when sub-units of the forward detachment reach the state border. Artillery support of an advance of forward detachments is carried out based on the decisions of their commanders.

The deployment of artillery attached to forward detachments should not lead to its lagging behind. Having fulfilled

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the fire tasks, it should be rapidly moved from the positions occupied, in order to follow directly behind the forward detachments. In order that artillery attached to the forward detachments not lag behind, it is sometimes advisable not to deploy it for an artillery strike against enemy covering units, but to conduct the latter with forces of division and army groups from firing positions occupied by them in our covering sector.

Artillery deployed in the covering sector can assist in the successful advance of the main forces of first echelon divisions, including the division artillery.

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
After crossing the state border, sub-units of ground artillery reconnaissance of divisional and army subordination must follow directly after the artillery of the first detachments and advance guards. Artillery groups of regiments of the first echelon should usually be at the heads of columns of their own regiments. At the level of regiments of the first echelon, it is necessary for divisional artillery groups and divisional antitank reserves to travel along independent routes. Army artillery groups should move at the level of the main forces of the first echelon divisions which are operating on the main axes of the army. Antitank reserves of the army should follow behind large units of the first echelon on axes where enemy armored counterattacks are expected.

(Portion illegible)

In destroying the main forces of the enemy in a meeting engagement, the chief factor is to deny the enemy the ability to deliver artillery strikes against the main forces advancing and deploying against his troops and, thus, to gain fire superiority. Artillery preparation in a meeting engagement, as a rule, will not last long (15 to 25 minutes) as the enemy is moving or even stopped but has not yet succeeded in conducting engineer preparation of the terrain and in setting up a system of fire. In the course of artillery preparation on the axis of operations of our troops, it is necessary to neutralize the enemy's control posts, artillery, antitank

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guided missile combat vehicles, antitank guns, tanks and personnel.

During the conduct of a meeting engagement, initiative plays a great role, especially in destroying the enemy's tactical nuclear strike means and artillery.

An army artillery brigade consists of a staff, two battalions (three batteries each) of 130mm guns, two battalions (three batteries each) of 152mm howitzers, and an artillery reconnaissance battalion which includes a sound-ranging reconnaissance battery, a radiotechnical reconnaissance battery and a topogeodetic reconnaissance battery. Altogether in the brigade there are 72 guns.

An army tank-destroyer artillery regiment consists of a staff and three battalions. In each battalion there are two batteries of 100mm antitank guns (12 weapons) and one battery of antitank guided missiles (9 combat vehicles). Altogether in the regiment there are 36 T-12 antitank guns and 27 antitank guided missile combat vehicles.


An army rocket-artillery regiment (word missing) 56 BM-21 combat vehicles (several words missing) BM-24.

An army artillery reconnaissance regiment consists of the regimental staff and two reconnaissance battalions of the same type, each of which includes a sound-ranging battery, a radiotechnical battery and a visual reconnaissance battery. In addition there are separate batteries for topogeodetic, photogrammetric and meteorological reconnaissance and sub-units for combat support and servicing.

An army corps consists of a corps artillery regiment, a reconnaissance artillery battalion of the same composition as in an army artillery brigade, one battalion of 152mm gun-howitzers, two battalions of 130mm guns (altogether 54 weapons) and a corps tank-destroyer battalion having three six-weapon batteries with 100mm T-12 antitank guns and one antitank guided missile battery with nine combat vehicles.

< A tank army has no army artillery. >

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In a motorized rifle division there is an artillery regiment (two battalions of 122mm howitzers and one battalion of 152mm howitzers totalling 54 weapons), a separate rocket-artillery battalion (18 BM-21 combat vehicles) and a separate tank-destroyer artillery battalion (18 100mm T-12 guns).

A motorized rifle regiment has a battalion or battery of 122mm howitzers (18) and a battery of antitank guided missiles (nine MALYUTKA units mounted on combat reconnaissance vehicles).

A motorized rifle battalion has a mortar battery of 120mm mortars and an antitank platoon (four MALYUTKA antitank guided missiles which are portable and two SPG-9 heavy antitank grenade launchers).

The artillery of a motorized rifle division includes 180 guns, mortars and rocket artillery combat vehicles for firing from covered fire positions. (If in the motorized rifle regiments there are artillery batteries and not artillery battalions then this total is 144.) In addition there are 81 antitank artillery weapons and antitank guided missile launchers. Altogether there are 261 (or 225) weapons.


A tank division has an artillery regiment (54 122mm howitzers) and a separate rocket-artillery battalion with 18 BM-21 or BM-24 combat vehicles. The artillery of a motorized rifle regiment is the same as in a regiment of a motorized rifle division. In all a tank division has 108 (96) guns, mortars and rocket-artillery combat vehicles and 21 antitank guided missile launchers.

At the present time the 152mm howitzers of battalions of artillery regiments of motorized rifle divisions are gradually being replaced by AKATSIYA 152mm self-propelled howitzers and the 122mm howitzers of artillery battalions of motorized rifle and tank divisions are being replaced by GVOZDIKA 122mm self-propelled howitzers.

A front does not have organic artillery, and for reinforcement receives artillery divisions and tank-destroyer artillery brigades of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command. An artillery division of the Reserve of the Supreme High

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Command consists of a staff, one gun artillery regiment (54 130mm guns), two heavy howitzer artillery regiments (72 152mm gun-howitzers each) and one rocket-artillery/mortar regiment (36 BM-21's or BM-24's and 12 240mm mortars). In all 6 regiments of the division there are 246 guns, mortars and rocket artillery combat vehicles. In each regiment there is an artillery reconnaissance battery. A tank-destroyer artillery brigade has four battalions, each having three batteries of T-12 100mm guns and one antitank guided missile battery (9 combat vehicles). A brigade has 72 antitank guns and 36 anti-tank guided missile combat vehicles in its complement.

Artillery divisions of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command are distributed among armies of the first echelon of the front. Tank-destroyer artillery brigades of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command are distributed among armies and also go to establish the antitank reserve of the front.


//
The Reserve of the Supreme High Command:

-- two heavy howitzer artillery brigades, each with 4 battalions of 18 152mm gun-howitzers	72 times 2 =	144
-- a gun artillery brigade with 4 battalions of 18 130mm guns	18 times 4 =	72
-- a howitzer artillery brigade with 4 battalions of 18 122mm howitzers	18 times 4 =	72
-- a rocket-artillery/mortar regiment with 3 battalions of 18 BM-21's or BM-24's	18 times 3 =	54
	TOTAL:	342

Tank-destroyer artillery brigade:

-- 4 separate battalions, each with 18 100mm guns		72
-- 2 separate battalions, each with 18 antitank guided missiles		36
	TOTAL:	108

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Weapons of mass destruction

radiation exposure

crews

radiation reconnaissance

factors:

q - yield y - coordinates

(two words missing)

time after burst

J - warhead and direction of average wind

H - ground

$$H \leq 3.5 \sqrt[3]{q}$$

50% (word missing)

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Air Defense Units of a Front

The combat composition of the air defense troops of a front may be varied. It depends on the tasks facing the front (army) in the offensive operation and the role of the front in a strategic operation. Allowing for the entry into service of new models of antiaircraft weapons, the air defense large units and units might be the following:

1) Front large units and units: ✓

one to two KRUG-A surface-to-air missile brigades;
one to two S-75 surface-to-air missile regiments;
one to two S-125 surface-to-air missile regiments;
one antiaircraft artillery division;
one air defense radiotechnical regiment.

2) Army large units and units:

one KRUG-A surface-to-air missile brigade;
one S-75 surface-to-air missile regiment or S-60 antiair- ✓
craft artillery regiment;
one separate air defense radiotechnical battalion.

3) Units of an army corps:

one S-75 surface-to-air missile regiment or one S-60 anti- ✓
aircraft artillery regiment.


The composition of air defense units and sub-units in divisions, regiments and battalions is conditioned by their organic structure. In the Western Theater of Military Operations, a front composed of three combined-arms armies and one tank army might have the following:

six KRUG-A surface-to-air missile brigades;
five S-75 surface-to-air missile regiments;
up to 20 KUB surface-to-air missile regiments;
eight S-60 antiaircraft artillery regiments;
two KS-19 antiaircraft artillery regiments.

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KRUG-A (SA-4 GANEF) Missile Brigade


The KRUG-A missile brigade includes a headquarters battery, with an acquisition radar and a target tracking radar, a technical battery and three missile battalions. Each battalion has three batteries of three missile-launchers each, for a total of 27 missile launchers in the brigade. In normal combat deployment the batteries would be about 5-10 kilometers apart. The missile is mounted on a tracked SU-120M self-propelled vehicle. It ensures the destruction of targets from altitudes of 250 meters to 23,500 meters, at speeds up to 2,160 kilometers per hour. The maximum range of fire is 50 kilometers. The system and missile operate in a single-channel fashion against a target. The missile operates on command guidance.

S-125 (SA-3 GOA) Missile Regiment

The S-125 missile regiment includes a headquarters battery with a P-12 radar and a P-15 radar, a technical battalion, and six missile battalions. Each missile battalion has a radio-technical battery with a P-15 radar and a missile guidance radar, and 4 two-rail missile launchers 5P71. The regiment is equipped with 48 transporter-loader vehicles PR14A, (two missiles per vehicle), 6 transporter vehicles 5T52 (two missiles per vehicle) and 180 vehicles of various kinds.

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
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Antiaircraft Artillery Division

An antiaircraft artillery division is organized as in the chart below:



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Total:

24 KS-19 and S-60 antiaircraft artillery sites
6 P-12 radar reconnaissance and target designation sets
4 P-15 radar reconnaissance and target designation sets
24 SON-9A (RPK 1-60, RPK 1-19) fire control radars
12 PUAZO 6-60 Antiaircraft gun directors
96 100mm KS-19 antiaircraft guns
96 57mm S-60 antiaircraft guns
658 vehicles of all types
34 prime-movers

A tank division (motorized rifle division) has a KUB surface-to-air missile regiment or an S-60 antiaircraft artillery regiment.

KUB (SA-6 GAINFUL) Missile Regiment

A KUB regiment includes five missile batteries, each equipped with four self-propelled missile launchers and one SURN (STRAIGHT FLUSH) fire control and acquisition radar. In addition the regiment includes a headquarters battery with two P-40 reconnaissance and target indication radars and a technical battery. To each of the seven batteries is attached a squad of three STRELA-2M (SA-7 GRAIL) portable missiles.

The KUB missile is mounted on a tracked GM-578 self-propelled vehicle. It ensures the destruction of aerial targets flying at a speed up to 2,200 kilometers per hour (from 60 to 600 meters per second) at any time of day at altitudes from 30 to 7,000-8,000 meters. Maximum range is 24 kilometers. It is a single channel system, that is, it can fire against only one target at a time.

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


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S-60 Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment

An S-60 regiment has four (or six) antiaircraft artillery sites, each with six S-60 57mm automatic antiaircraft guns, a SON-9A or RPK 1-60 fire control radar and a PUAZO-6-60 gun director. In addition the regiment has a headquarters battery with two P-15 radars and, attached to the headquarters battery, an antiaircraft squad of three STRELA-2M missiles. The regiment is equipped with 98 vehicles of all types and 8 tracked prime movers. An S-60 regiment may be in an antiaircraft artillery division, motorized rifle division or tank division (when there is no KUB regiment) and in an army corps (when there is no surface-to-air missile regiment).

In a motorized rifle regiment (tank regiment) of a motorized rifle division and tank division



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In a motorized rifle company there is a squad of STRELA 2M (three portable surface-to-air missile systems).

On tanks -- on every third tank of a motorized rifle division (tank division) there is one 12.7mm tank-mounted antiaircraft machinegun mounting.

Quantity of STRELA-2M surface-to-air missile systems in a motorized rifle division:

- in a motorized rifle battalion, three squads (9 systems)
- In a motorized rifle regiment, ten squads (30 systems)
- in three motorized rifle regiments, 30 squads (90 systems)
- in a tank regiment, one squad (3 systems)
- in the antiaircraft artillery regiment, 5 squads (15 systems)
- in the headquarters company of the motorized rifle division, 2 squads (6 systems)

A total of 38 squads (114 surface-to-air missile systems)

Quantity of STRELA 2M surface-to-air missile systems in a tank division:


- in six tank regiments, 6 squads
- in the motorized rifle regiment, 10 squads
- in the antiaircraft artillery regiment, 5 squads
- in the headquarters company, 2 squads

A total of 23 squads (69 surface-to-air missile systems) in a tank division


A regiment can conduct reconnaissance of the air enemy along a 300 kilometer sector of the front (at medium and high altitudes) or along a 150 kilometer sector of the front (at low and relatively low altitudes) up to a depth of 120 kilometers. Radar companies, when necessary, can guide fighter aviation.

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


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


Totals:

- 4 to 5 P-40's
- 9 PRV-9A's
- 9 P-12MA's
- 4 to 5 P-15's



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
(Forces and Means of the Rear of a Front)

Possible composition of the rear of a front (for the Western and Southwestern Theaters of Military Operations):

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Missile-technical units | depending on the composition of the Rocket Forces |
| 2. Forward <u>front</u> bases with depots, motor transport regiment and service units | 2 - 3 |
| 3. <u>Front</u> bases with depots, motor transport battalion and service units | (illegible) |
| 4. Motor transport brigades with cargo capacity of (6,600?) tons | " " |
| 5. Separate motor transport battalion for transport of missile fuel with a capacity of (540?) tons | " " |
| 6. Depots for missile fuel | " " |
| 7. Pipeline brigades | " " |
| 8. Traffic control brigades | 3 - ? |
| 9. Bridge brigades | (illegible) |
| 10. Separate road construction brigades | 2 - 3 |
| 11. Separate bridge construction brigades | 2 - 3 |
| 12. Railroad brigades | 3 |
| 13. Forward <u>front</u> hospital bases for 6,500 beds | 6 |
| 14. <u>Front</u> rear hospital bases for 20,000 beds | 3 |

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
15. Separate motorized medical battalions	6
16. Separate medical detachments	6 - 10
17. Separate medical evacuation air regiments	1 - 2
18. Separate battalions for armored equipment recovery	2 - 3
19. Separate battalions for mechanical transport equipment recovery	2 - 3
20. Separate tank repair battalions	9 - 12
21. Mobile tank repair shops	3 - 4
22. Mobile tank assembly repair shops	3 - 4
23. Separate battalions for tank disassembly	2
24. Separate vehicle repair and recovery battalions	(illegible)
25. Separate vehicle assembly repair and recovery battalions	10
26. Separate tracked-vehicle assembly repair and recovery battalions	(illegible)
27. Division for the security of the rear	1

In general the number of independent rear units and facilities in the rear of a front may reach 250 to 300 entities (160,000 to 170,000 men, 25,000 to 27,000 vehicles and a great deal of other equipment).

The forward front base is designated for maintaining the established reserves of materiel and ensuring their timely delivery (issuance) to army bases (troops). The forward front base consists of a headquarters base with an independent

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communications company, of depots for all types of supplies (one for each type), of a motor transport regiment with a cargo capability of 3,300 tons, two service companies, a separate rear engineer company, a separate rear chemical defense company, shops for the repair of personal equipment, food service assemblies, technical means of the fuel supply service, mobile stations for the reclamation of lubricants, three mechanized field bakeries, two field laundry detachments, a test laboratory and a field post office.


Organizationally a base may allocate one branch and move to a new area with materiel reserves in organic motor transport in two trips. Materiel reserves at forward front bases are set up for three to four days of combat operations of armies of the first echelon.

Front rear bases are designated for maintaining the established reserves of materiel, ensuring their timely delivery to forward front bases (sub-units) and issuance to the troops who are located in the depth of the sector of the front. A front rear base has the following: a headquarters base with a separate communications company, three depots for artillery shells, eight depots for fuel, an artillery equipment depot and one depot for each different type of supply, a separate transportation battalion with a load capacity of 1,100 tons, a separate battalion for rear services, shops to repair personnel equipment, assemblies for food service and technical means of fuel supply service, two mobile stations for the reclamation of lubricants, three mechanized field bakeries, (seven?) mechanized field laundry detachments, a front post for water distribution transport, a testing laboratory and a field post office.

Organizationally the base may allocate two branches for the distribution of materiel at front rear bases for ten days of combat operations of the troops of the front.

In the composition of the rear of the army there may be 30 to 65 rear units and facilities, a mobile army missile-technical base, a mobile army base with depots for all of the main types of supply with a transport regiment having a load

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
capacity of up to (5,000?) tons (several words missing); a rear engineer company (several words missing) and a mobile field bakery; two road and traffic control battalions and a separate (bridge company?); separate medical detachments - two for each division - a sanitary/anti-epidemic detachment, a detachment for (vehicle?) reinforcement, and a separate motorized medical company which can evacuate (? ,000) wounded in one trip; an armored equipment recovery battalion and a vehicle recovery company; a separate communications company for the rear; military trading organs and military post offices. Altogether in the organization of the rear there may be more than 7,000 men and about 2,500 vehicles.

As research and the experience of past exercises show, for the efficient rear support of troops from the beginning of a war it is necessary in peacetime to have a completely ~~deployed tactical rear, 45 to 50 percent of an army's rear~~ and 30 to 40 percent of a front's rear. For the support of rocket troops and surface-to-air missile troops, all of the forces and means of support must be in full complement in peacetime. The rest of the operational rear must be kept in depots or in such a state as to ensure rapid deployment and intensification of efforts of the rear at the beginning of a war or in the first days of an operation.

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
Material Requirements for an Army in an Offensive Operation

		Ammunition (units of fire)					Fuel (fuelings)			Food
		Small Arms	Artillery, Mortar rounds, Rockets	Tank	Anti-aircraft	Aviation	Truck gas	Diesel fuel	Aviation	(daily rations)
Consumed in the Operation	Using Nuclear Weapons	-2.5 1.0-1.6	3-3.5 2.1-3.2	3.5-4.5 2.4-3.2	5-6 3.5-5.6	15-16	4.5-5.0 1.4-2.4	5.5-7.0 2.5-4	15-16	15 7-8
	Without Nuclear Weapons	2.5-3.0 1.8-2.0	5.5-7.0 4.5-5.0	4.5-5.0 3.0-4.0						
For establishing reserves at the end of the operation		1.5 1.15	2.0 1.3	3.0 2.65	3.5 2.5	7.5 7.5	7.5 2.16	3.5-4.0 3.4	5.5- 6.0	15
General Requirements for the operation	With Nuclear Weapons	3.5-4.0 2.15- 2.75	2.0 3.4-4.5	3.0 5.05- 5.85	6.0-8.4	3.56- 4.56	3.56- 4.56	5.9- —		22-23
	Without Nuclear Weapons	2.25- 3.5	5.8-6.3	5.65- 6.65						

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
Disposition of Materiel Reserves in a Front

	Ammunition (units of fire)					Fuel			Food (daily rations)
	Small Arms	Artillery, Mortar, Rockets	Tank	Anti-aircraft	Aviation	Truck Fuel	Diesel Fuel	Aviation Fuel	
Total in the <u>front</u>	2.15	3.25	5.25	5.75	17.5	5.15	7.65	15	28-29
Including:									
Organic	1.0	1.0	2.25	2.0	--	1.7	2.4	--	13
Army	0.15	0.3	0.4	0.5	--	0.46	0.7	--	2
Air Army reserves	1.75	--	--	--	17.5	3.0	3.5	7.5	21
At forward <u>front</u> bases	0.22	0.45	0.6	0.7	--	0.6	1.0	--	3.4
At <u>front</u> rear	0.78	1.5	2.0	2.55	--	2.3	3.5	7.5	10

NOTE: Reserves at forward front bases are figured at 3-4 days for an army of the first echelon of a front.

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A. Chemical Troops of the Front


- 1) Chemical defense brigade (three to four separate chemical-warfare defense battalions, a separate chemical-warfare terrain decontamination battalion, and a separate radiological and chemical-warfare reconnaissance company):

- 8 TMS-05 thermal engine stations or 16 DVK smoke sets
- 16 ARS truck-mounted sprayer stations
- 74 DDA truck-mounted shower/disinfection sets
- 29 BTR-40rkh (GAZ 40) vehicles outfitted for radiological/chemical warfare
- 4 PRKhM vehicles
- 1 AL mobile laboratory

It provides full decontamination treatment of a motorized-rifle division (tank division) in three to four hours, conducts radiological, chemical-warfare and non-specific biological reconnaissance of 20 routes at a speed of 20 to 30 kilometers per hour for up to four divisional concentration areas, and provides chemical-warfare decontamination (disinfection) of up to 15 kilometers of roads with one loading.

- 2) Separate chemical-warfare defense battalion (three decontamination treatment companies):

- 2 TMS-08 thermal engine stations or 4 DVK smoke sets
- 26 ARS truck-mounted sprayer stations
- 6 DDA truck-mounted shower/disinfection sets
- 1 PRKhM vehicle



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- 2 GAZ-69 trucks outfitted for radiological/chemical warfare

In one and one half to two hours it conducts chemical-warfare decontamination of the combat equipment for seven to eight motorized rifle battalions (tank battalions), radiological decontamination of the combat equipment for five to six motorized rifle battalions (tank battalions), and personnel decontamination of two motorized rifle battalions and four tank battalions.

- 3) Separate chemical-warfare terrain decontamination battalion (two chemical-warfare terrain decontamination companies):

- 36 ARS truck-mounted sprayer stations

Conducts chemical-warfare decontamination (disinfection) of up to nine hectares of 18 kilometers of road on one filling; complete decontamination treatment of large combat equipment, up to 25 units per hour.

- 4) Separate radiological and chemical-warfare reconnaissance company (four radiological/chemical-warfare reconnaissance platoons - VDK):


- 21 GAZ-69 trucks fitted out for radiological/chemical warfare (BTR-40 rkh)

- 1 AL mobile laboratory

Conducts reconnaissance of up to 20 routes at a speed of 20 to 30 kilometers per hour or up to four concentration areas of large units; analyzes 20 samples of toxic agent contaminants and 60 samples of radioactive contaminants in 10 hours; monitors radiation exposure of 900 men or up to 180 units of large combat equipment and transports in one hour.

- 5) Separate technical battalion (three technical companies):

- 15 (TFA?) smoke-producing vehicles



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-- 8 ARS truck-mounted sprayer stations

-- 9 MSAO mechanical smoke agent mixers

Disinfects the terrain of up to 25 square kilometers in two to three hours; provides smoke camouflage of an area up to six or seven square kilometers.

6) Separate chemical-warfare decontamination battalion (three chemical-warfare decontamination companies):

-- 9 AGV mobile chemical-warfare decontamination stations

-- 9 BU clothing decontamination units

-- 3 ARS truck-mounted sprayer stations

Chemical-warfare decontamination of up to 7,100 sets of summer uniforms or 5,400 sets of winter uniforms and up to 19,400 pairs of boots in 10 hours.

7) Aerial radiological reconnaissance air squadron (two flights of MI-4's and two flights of YAK-12's):

-- 6 MI-4 helicopters

-- 6 YAK-12 aircraft

Conducts aerial radiological reconnaissance of roads by helicopters at 120 to 140 kilometers per hour, by aircraft at 100 to 125 kilometers per hour. Reconnaissance by helicopter (aircraft) of terrain in one hour: bordering the area of a nuclear burst, up to 200-300 square kilometers; allocated from the location of a nuclear burst, up to 300-400 square kilometers.


8) Computation-analysis station (RAST):

-- radio sets: 1 R-824M
1 R-118 bmz
1 R-103M

radio receivers: 2 R-311
2 R-313

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-- 2 (staff buses?)

Gives out information one hour after receipt of the initial data on radiation contamination (60 to 70 bursts) and chemical contamination (30 to 50 areas where chemical agents have been used).

- 9) Platoon for chemical-warfare defense of a front missile brigade.
- 10) Separate company for chemical-warfare defense of the rear (5 platoons).
- 11) Chemical laboratories.

B. Chemical Troops of an Army

Separate chemical-warfare defense battalion
Separate chemical-warfare terrain decontamination battalion
Separate radiological and chemical-warfare reconnaissance company
Computational-analysis station (combined arms army, tank army, air army)
(several words missing)
Technical equipment and capabilities of similar units of the front

C. Chemical Units and Sub-units with the Troops


Separate chemical-warfare defense company of a motorized rifle or tank division (radiological/chemical-warfare reconnaissance platoon, decontamination platoon):

- 1 DDA chemical-warfare decontamination shower unit
- 2 DKV smoke-producing sets
- 3 ARS truck-mounted sprayer stations
- 3 BDRM rkh vehicles

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
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Platoon for chemical-warfare defense of a motorized rifle or tank regiment (one squad for decontamination treatment, four squads for radiological/chemical-warfare reconnaissance):

- 1 DKV smoke producing set
- 1 ARS truck-mounted sprayer station
- 1 GAZ-69 truck fitted out for radiological/chemical warfare

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(Ground Forces, Air Forces and Nuclear Warheads
of the 1st Western Front)

The 1st Western Front is composed of the following:

a) Ground Forces

Four combined arms armies (5th, 7th, 9th and 12th Armies)
two tank divisions

total: 20 divisions (15 motorized rifle and 5 tank)

On Day One the composition is augmented with the following:

three motorized rifle divisions from the 4th Army Corps
two tank divisions from the 6th Tank Army
35th Motorized Rifle Division
40th Motorized Rifle Division
38th Motorized Rifle Division

thus: 28 divisions (21 motorized rifle and 7 tank)

On Day Two the composition is augmented with the following:

two tank divisions from the 6th Tank Army
one tank division from 46th Tank Division
50th Tank Division

thus: 32 divisions (21 motorized rifle and 11 tank)

On Day Two the front can also be augmented with one airborne
division.

b) Rocket Troops and Artillery


Front missile brigades 2 X 12 = 24
Army missile brigades 4 X 9 = 36

60 R-300 operational missile
launchers

60 R-65 tactical missile launchers

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On Day One 60 + 9 = 69 operational missile launchers
 60 + 32 + = 92 tactical missile launchers

On Day Two 69 operational missile launchers
 92 + 16 = 108 tactical missile launchers


Artillery divisions of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command	2 X 246 =	492 guns and mortars	
Army artillery brigades	4 X 72 =	288 guns and mortars	
Artillery of motorized rifle divisions	15 X 144 =	2160 guns and mortars	
Artillery of tank divisions	5 X 108 =	<u>540</u> guns and mortars	
total		3480	
Army tank-destroyed artillery regiment	4 X 63 =	252 antitank guns and guided missile combat vehicles	
Tank-destroyer artillery regiment of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command	1 X 108 =	108 " " " "	
Motorized rifle divisions	15 X 81 =	1215 " " " "	
Tank divisions	5 X 21 =	<u>105</u> " " " "	
total		1680 antitank guns and guided missile combat vehicles	

c) Air Defense

KRUG-A surface-to-air missile brigades 5 X 9 = 45 sites

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S-75 surface-to-air missile regiments	9 X 3 = 27 sites
S-125 surface-to-air missile regiments	3 X 6 = 18 sites
KUB surface-to-air missile regiments	10 X 5 = 50 sites
S-60 light antiaircraft artillery regiments	12 X 4 = 48 sites
Air defense radiotechnical regiment	1
Air defense radiotechnical battalions	4

d) Tanks

Motorized rifle divisions	15 X 238 = 3570
Tank divisions	5 X 310 = <u>1550</u>
total	5120

Altogether in the course of an operation: 33 divisions, including 21 motorized rifle, 11 tank and one airborne division.


Front missile brigades: 2 X 12 = 24 operational missile launchers

Army missile brigades 5 X 9 = 45 operational missile launchers

Separate missile battalions 32 X 4 = 128 tactical missile launchers

total 197 missile launchers

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Artillery:


Artillery division of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command	2 X 246 =	492
Army artillery brigade	5 X 72 =	360
Artillery of the divisions--		
Motorized rifle divisions	(illegible)	
Tank Divisions	11 X 108 =	1188
Artillery of the Army Corps	1 X 54 =	54
	Total	5118

--Guns and mortars--4974
Including 654 rocket artillery

Antitank Artillery:

Tank-destroyer artillery regiments	6 X 63 =	378	
Tank-destroyer artillery brigade of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command	1 X 108 =	108	
Motorized rifle divisions	21 X 81 =	1701	
Tank divisions	11 X 21 =	231	
Tank-destroyer artillery (group?) of the Army Corps	1 X 27 =	27	
	Total	2445	(2854 including 1680 anti-tank guided missiles)

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Air Defense:

KRUG-A surface-to-air missile brigades	6 X 9 =	54 sites
S-75 surface-to-air missile regiments	9 X 3 =	27 sites
S-125 surface-to-air missile regiments	3 X 6 =	18 sites
KUB surface-to-air missile regiments	14 X 5 =	90 sites (sic)
S-60 light AAA regiments	21 X 4 =	84 sites
Total		273

Air defense radiotechnical regiment 1


Air defense radiotechnical battalions 5

Tanks:

Motorized rifle divisions	21 X 238 =	4998
Tank divisions	11 X 310 =	<u>3410</u>
Total		8408 8528 tanks

For an operation the Western Front is allotted:

- a) 609 nuclear warheads
 - tactical missiles (R-65) 330
 - operational-tactical missiles (R-300) 29
 - (nuclear bombs?) 250
- b) 20 army sorties/ of the air army of the front including (3?) army sorties for the fulfillment of tasks according to the air operation plan.
- c) In support of the 1st Western Front, one airborne division is landed.



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
kt = kiloton

									Total	Grand Total
Released for an operation		68	74	78	220	23	32	74	129	349
On hand	203	32	54	58	144	20	20	60	100	244
Alloted for immediate task	63%	22	49	54	125	17	18	58	93	218
First Nuclear strike uses	38%	1	34	37	72	7	11	42	60	132
Alloted for subsequent task	30%	36	20	20	70	3	12	14	29	105
Army & Front commanders reserve	7%	10	5	4	19	3	2	2	7	26


1. The overall yield of the first nuclear strike is
2. In the first nuclear strike, 24 missile launchers of the separate "A" missile battalion(s) of the first echelon deliver a repeat strike after one hour and 45 minutes.
3. There is one missile reserve for the separate "A" missile battalion(s) of the first echelon and one (for each) front (unit).

Alloted for the operation	30	90	80	30	30	260
First nuclear strike	-	40	40	10	10	100
Immediate task	10	24	23	13	10	80
Subsequent task	18	22	12	5	8	65
Reserve	2	4	5	2	2	15
						TOTAL

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


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	Quantity		Ratio		Overall on the axis		SOUTHERN AXIS		Overall		MARRINE AXIS		Overall		LASSER AXIS		Overall					
	Our	Enemy	Quantity	Considering Quality			In the First Echelon															
Total delivery means for nuclear weapons	541	735	1.00:1.36	1.00:1.14	29	36	1.00:1.17	29	14	1.00:1.00	135	248	1.00:1.84	88	74	1.00:1.00	33	66	1:2	25	60	1.00:2.64
Missile delivery aircraft	344	378	1.00:1.13	1.00:1.13			2:21			1.35			1.00	42	40	1.00:1.00	9	4	2:23		4	2:25
Operational-tactical missile launchers	69	52	1.35:1.00	1.00:1.05	9	4	1.00	9	4	3:00	51	44	1.00			1.00			1:00			1.00
Tactical missile launchers	140	110	1.10:1.00	1.27:1.00	20	12	1.00	20	4	5:1	84	74	1.00	56	54	1.00	24	24	1:1	16	24	1.15
Atomic artillery guns		184				18					130											38
Total number of Divisions	33	29	1.14:1.00	1.00:1.00	9	6	1.00:1.20	9	3	1.00	22	28	1.00	14	9	1.50:1.00	9	3	1:3	4	5	1.00:1.25
Motorized rifle divisions	20	24	1.00:1.20	1.00:1.25	4	6	1:3	4	3	1.33:1.00	12	15	1.35	11	6	1.00	4	3	1:3	3	3	1:1
Tank (armored) divisions	12	5	2.40:1.00	1.94:1.00	1	1	Absolute	1	1		9	3	3:1	3	3	1:1	2	1:1	1	2	1:1	1:1
Airborne division	1		Absolute	Absolute			1:14		3:06		1		1:27			1:40						1
Total tanks	8528	6812	1.25:1.00	1.20:1.00	1260	1110	1.14	1260	614	1	5082	4470	1.27	3560	2400	1.50	1500	1350	1:20	1020	1220	1:19
Of this, medium tanks	8528	6290	1.35:1.00	1.25:1.00	1260	1020	1.25	1260	580	1	5082	4120	1.38	3560	2250	1.50	1200	1180	1:37	1020	1220	1:12
Total guns and mortars	4974	4608	1.08:1.00	1.20:1.40	444	1080	1:40	644	590	1	3330	2704	1.23	2562	1392	1.85	960	730	1:34	900	730	1:23
Of this, rocket artillery	654	206	3.14:1.00	4.09:1.00	190	48	1.00	1	90	16	456	112	4:07	324	64	5:06			2:25			72
Total antitank guns and antitank guided missiles	2854	3467	1.00:1.21	1.00:1.15	486	1127	2:32	486	500	1	1855	1815	1:02	1460	816	1:77			1:37	507	525	1:35
Of this, antitank guided missile	1480	1247	1.35:1.00	1.14:1.00	300	394	1:31	300	185	1	1059	449	1	846	210	1	521	205	1	137	205	1
Total Aircraft	2108	1114	1.00:1.01	1.00:1.01																		
Fighter aviation	581	424	1.37:1.00	1.37:1.00																		
Fighter-bomber aviation	234	182	1.00:1.63	1.00:1.63																		
Number aviation including fighter-bomber (naval carrier-based bombers, dive bombers)	293	308	1.00:1.05	1.00:1.05	39	48	1:1	39	25	1:56	144	120	1:2	100	53	2:04	42	31	1:35	30	31	1:02

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Number of aviation actions in the Front sector

Formation	Total Composition		Delivery Vehicles		In a Nuclear Strike		Without a Nuclear Strike	
	T/O	In good working order	T/O	In good working order	Total	Delivery Vehicles	Total	Delivery Vehicles
Baltic Strait Air Force	197	134 .68	-	-	107	-	114	-
2nd Allied Tactical Air Force	596	416 .69	192	138	333	111	272	92
Carrier Strike Large Unit	220	150 .68	115	80	45	25	45	25
4th Allied Tactical Air Force	90	63	90	63	50	50	44	44
Total	1094	763	397	281	535	186	475	161

Immediate tasks

Depth 200-250 kilometers
Duration Six days
Speed 33 to 42 km per day

Width of sector
315 to approx.
500 km.


Subsequent tasks

Depth 250 to 300 kilometers
Duration four to six days
Speed 45 to 70 km per day

500 kilometers
in 10 to 12 days
at 42 to 50 km
per day

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The main principles for the use of nuclear weapons by ground forces are:

1. The massing of nuclear strikes on the main axis.
2. The surprise (factor) of nuclear strikes.
3. The delivery of nuclear strikes against installations (targets) which have been reconnoitered with certainty.
4. The broad maneuver with nuclear strikes by missile large units and units.
5. The coordination of nuclear strikes being delivered by missiles of the strategic rocket forces, frontal aviation, long range aviation and neighboring formations (large units).
6. The combining of nuclear strikes with the application of chemical and conventional means of destruction *

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
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Operational Disposition of an Army in the First Nuclear Strike of a Front




IIIrd Echelon

Three fighter regiments to repel enemy raids and to reinforce fighter aviation of the first two echelons.

"Launch" - "Launch" + 0.50


- LEGEND**
- bap = bomber regiment
 - bad = bomber division
 - ae = air squadron
 - rap = air reconnaissance regiment
 - iap = fighter regiment
 - apte = radio-technical air regiment
 - apid = fighter-bomber regiment
 - adib = fighter-bomber division
 - arp = air radio regiment
 - iad = fighter division

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Operational Disposition of the 3rd Air Army in the First Mass Strike



IIIrd Echelon, Four fighter regiments

"H" - "H" + 0.50

LEGEND

- bap = bomber regiment
- bad = bomber division
- ae = air squadron
- rap = air reconnaissance regiment
- iap = fighter regiment
- apte = radio-technical air regiment
- apib = fighter-bomber regiment
- adib = fighter-bomber division
- arp = air radio regiment
- iad = fighter division

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
WARNING NOTICE—SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS/NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR-
CONSULTANTS/DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR

CHRYSANTHEMUM

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Schedule
Aircraft
Total of 812



69/7	30/2	148	150
⚙️		Aerial Reconnaissance	
IIIrd Echelon			
Army in contact			

275

280

298

402 399/52

853 (41) ?

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(Air Defense Forces of the 1st Western Front)

In the course of an offensive operation of the front, mass raids of enemy aviation are repelled by the forces of fighter aviation in cooperation with the air defense troops of the front and of the country, and fighter aviation of the 2nd Air Army, under the centralized control of the (combat operations control center? - TsBU) of fighter aviation of the air army at the command post of the air defense chief of the front. The destruction of individual air targets and small groups of the enemy, in the course of covering troops and targets, is conducted by forces of three fighter divisions in their own sectors of combat operations, based on the decision of the commanders of the fighter divisions guiding them from their own command posts (forward command post), the command posts of the regiments and the appropriate (combat operations control center? - TsBU) of the air army.


Search and destroy for nuclear/missile means is carried out by the forces of two fighter-bomber divisions at a depth of up to 200 kilometers from the line of the front in sectors designated for them and also in the course of air support for troops; by the forces of bomber aviation at a depth of 300 kilometers on the entire sector of the front. There are alert forces in each fighter-bomber and fighter air regiment composed of one to two air wings in Readiness No. 1 for the destruction of nuclear/missile means operating (on call?).

To fulfill this task part of the forces of fighter aviation are enlisted (as are?) the overall flight resources - up to 25 regimental sorties, including up to five regimental sorties of reconnaissance aviation, during the period of the immediate task.

Throughout the period of the offensive operation of the front, combat operations are conducted to weaken enemy aviation groupings. Forces of fighter, fighter-bomber and bomber aviation act to destroy aircraft at airfields and in the air, mine airfields and destroy airstrips. For this purpose, during the period of fulfillment of the immediate task, the following flight resources are allotted: up to six regimental sorties of fighter aviation, up to seven regimental sorties of (words missing), including up to five regimental sorties of reconnaissance aviation.

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
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Combat Composition of the 3rd Air Army of the 1st Western Front

Aviation large units and units	Number and type of aircraft (helicopters)	Delivery Vehicles	Crews By Class				Rear Support Units
			Tot	1	2	3	
13th Fighter Division (3rd, 4th, 5th Fighter Regiments)	77 MiG-21PPM; 40 MiG-2315	-	168	70	60	30	1st Air Technical Regiment (26th, 28th, 30th OBATO)
14th Fighter Division (6th, 7th, 8th Fighter Regiments)	37 MiG-21PPM; 40 MiG-2315	-	160	65	65	30	2nd Air Technical Regiment
15th Fighter Division (10th, 11th, 12th Fighter Regiments)	78 MiG-21PPM; 30 MiG-2315	-	159	7	7	7	3rd Air Technical Regiment
Total Fighter Aviation	390		7	7	7	7	
17th Fighter-bomber Division (16th, 17th, 18th Fighter-bomber Regiments)	76 Su-7BKL; 40 Su-20	116	222	367	7	7	4th Air Technical Regiment (32nd, 34th, 36th OBATO)
22nd Fighter-bomber Division (13th, 14th, 15th Fighter-bomber Regiments)	80 Su-7BKL; 38 Su-20	138	105	60	7	7	5th Air Technical Regiment (44th, 46th, 48th OBATO)
Total Fighter-bomber Aviation	234	234	327	116	127	7	
19th Bomber Division (50th, 51st, 52nd Bomber Regiments)	70 YaK-28; 20 YaK-28PP	70	128	90	20	10	7th (Air Technical Regiment)
22nd Air Reconnaissance Regiment	13 YaK-28R	-	-	-	-	-	9th OBATO
23rd Radiotechnical Air Regiment	18 MiG-21R	-	-	-	-	-	10th OBATO
29th Radiotechnical Air Regiment	19 MiG-21R	-	-	-	-	-	14th OBATO
30th Air Radio Regiment	20 YaK-28PP; 10 Mi-4PP	-	-	-	-	-	23rd OBATO
Total Reconnaissance Aviation	130 aircraft/10 helicopters	-	195	130	40	17	
Total Combat Aircraft	912	304	1129				
3rd Air Communications Regiment	10 YaK-12; 10 AN-2; 10 Mi-4						24th OBATO
118th Air Transport Regiment	30 AN-12						25th OBATO
21st Helicopter Regiment of the Air Army	20 Mi-6; 40 Mi-8						118th OBATO
10th Separate Front Helicopter Reg.	20 Mi-6; 40 Mi-8						27th OBATO
9th Separate Helicopter Regiment	40 Mi-8						28th OBATO

OBATO-Separate Airfield Technical Battalion

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Notes:

In the composition of an air army there are:

three "VP" systems;
seven airfield-engineer battalions;
three reserve separate airfield technical battalions of
the air regiments;
the 117th Engineer (portion illegible) battalion;
a (gp?) separate chemical defense battalion;
a mobile repair technical base in each regiment of bomber
aviation and fighter-bomber aviation.

On Day Two there is added the 15th Independent Helicopter
Regiment, MI-8's with crews.

On Day Three there is added the 16th Independent Helicopter
Regiment with crews, 55 MIG-21PFM's, five YAK-28 PP's, SU-20
(three lines illegible) MIG-21PFM--95; YAK-28--5; SU-7BKL--
(95?); YAK-28R--3; MIG-21R--10; altogether 210 aircraft with
crews.


Combat composition and capabilities of air defense forces and
means

a) Air defense troops of the front:

KRUG-A surface-to-air missile brigade	-	6
S-75 surface-to-air missile regiment	-	5
KUB surface-to-air missile regiment	-	17
S-125 surface-to-air missile regiment	-	3
Light antiaircraft artillery regiments	-	19
ZSU-23/4 (SHILKA) self-propelled anti- aircraft platoon	-	128
STRELA-2 surface-to-air missile launchers	-	2949 (983 squads)
Air defense radar company	-	29

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b) Fighter aviation of the 3rd Air Army:

13th Fighter Division	MIG-21PFM	-- 77	MIG-23IS	-- 40
14th Fighter Division	MIG-21PFM	-- 37	MIG-23IS	-- 80
15th Fighter Division	MIG-21PFM	-- 78	MIG-23IS	-- 38
		<hr/>		<hr/>
	Total	192		158

c) Cooperating forces and means of Air Defense of the Country and of adjacent units:

From the 25th Air Defense Corps:

- Three surface-to-air missile brigades consisting of 16 S-75 complexes and 12 S-125 complexes
- Three surface-to-air missile regiments (12 surface-to-air missile complexes)
- Three fighter regiments (116 aircraft)
- One air defense radiotechnical brigade
- One air defense radiotechnical regiment
- One SPETSNAZ radiotechnical battalion

From the 26th Air Defense Corps:

- Three surface-to-air missile brigades consisting of four S-75 complexes and six S-125 complexes
- One S-75 surface-to-air missile regiment (four surface-to-air missile complexes)
- Three fighter regiments (115 aircraft)

From the 2nd Western Front:


- One KRUG-A surface-to-air missile brigade
- One fighter regiment

From the Baltic Fleet formation:

- Three radar picket ships

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d) The combat capabilities of the air defense forces and means in the sector of an offensive operation of a front, when repulsing the first mass strike of enemy aviation under conditions of strong radioelectronic jamming, are such that they:

- destroy 89 aircraft, or 29 percent of approaching aviation, on the northwest axis;
- destroy 108 aircraft (27 percent) on the western axis.

In all, under conditions of strong jamming, they destroy 197 aircraft which make up 28 percent of the forces of approaching aviation;

(several lines illegible)

Organization of air defense and support of cooperation of its forces and means:

A) Reconnaissance of the air enemy

In the departure area for an offensive, radar reconnaissance in the sector of the 1st Western Front is carried out by the 18th Air Defense Radio Technical Brigade and 16th Air Defense Radio Technical Regiment of the 25th Air Defense Corps. For this purpose, radar subunits are deployed on the borders of the front which ensure the creation of unbroken radar coverage. In order to set up a closed radar system with the forces and means of radio-technical units of air defense troops of the front, the following are deployed:

- in the first line, radar companies of army air defense radiotechnical battalions;
- in the second line, radar companies of the (8th?) Air Defense Radiotechnical Regiment.



In the course of an operation, the 25th Air Defense Corps establishes radar coverage on the islands of Sjaelland and Lolland, and the 18th Air Defense Radiotechnical Regiment (brought in on Day Three) is responsible for radar coverage on the littoral of the North Sea.

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In the course of fulfilling its immediate task, the 1st Western Front sets up two lines and in the course of fulfilling its follow-up task it sets up two to three lines of radar coverage.

In each subunit of troops of the front, visual observation posts are organized for observation of the air enemy.


B) Warning of troops of the front

Prior to activation of radar means of air defense troops of the front and armies, troops of the front receive warning about an air enemy from the command posts of the 25th and 26th Air Defense Corps. After activation of the radar means, troops receive warning about an air enemy from the air defense command post of the front and armies. Data on the air enemy is received as follows:

1) At the air defense command post of the front from:
the command post of the 18th Air Defense Radiotechnical Brigade;
the command post of the 16th Air Defense Radiotechnical Regiment;
the command post of the 25th Air Defense Corps;
the command post of the 26th Air Defense Corps;
the air defense command post of the 2nd Western Front;
army and front radar means (after their deployment and inclusion into combat operations);
radar sites of radiotechnical regiments of air defense of the front;
command posts of the air defense of armies.

2) At the command posts of air defense of armies from:
the command post of the 18th Air Defense Radiotechnical Brigade or 16th Air Defense Radiotechnical Regiment;
radar companies of radiotechnical battalions (after their inclusion into combat operations);
the air defense command post of the front.

Data from radar picket ships No. 1, No. 2 and No. 3 are received at the command posts of the 25th Air Defense Corps, the 26th Air Defense Corps, the air defense command



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post of the 5th Army and, in the course of an operation, at the air defense command post of the 7th Army.

Data on the aerial situation is received at the rear control post of the front via the radio warning network of the front and, in the course of an operation, after the armies of the first echelon have fulfilled their immediate tasks, from the command post of the 25th Air Defense Corps as well.

The observation posts of subunits send pre-established signals on the flights of low-altitude aerial targets.

In the course of an operation (when the radar means of air defense troops are included in combat operation), data on radar reconnaissance of the front is received at the command posts of the 25th and 26th Air Defense Corps and at air defense command posts of adjacent units via the appropriate radio warning networks of the front.

C) Combat utilization and cooperation of antiaircraft large units and units

Surface-to-air missile large units and units of the 1st Western Front, jointly with the 25th and 26th Air Defense Corps of the 3rd Army, set up area and close cover of troops and installations of the rear in a sector of the front from altitudes of 100 meters to 30,000 meters.

In sectors of an offensive of large units, aerial targets are destroyed by surface-to-air missiles on the decision of chiefs of air defense large units and commanders of surface-to-air missile large units and units, except for targets in assigned sectors of aviation, where firing is permitted only when the identification of our own aircraft is ensured.

Short-range surface-to-air missile sites (S-125 and KUB) in the zone of operations of medium-range missile sites (KRUG-A and S-75) destroy targets preferably at altitudes of 3,000 meters and lower. In zones where these sites are not operating jointly, they destroy the air enemy at all

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altitudes. Medium-range surface-to-air missile sites in the zones of short-range missile sites destroy targets preferably above 3,000 meters.

The destruction of targets by low-altitude surface-to-air missile sites at altitudes above 3,000 meters and by medium-range surface-to-air missile sites at altitudes below 3,000 meters in combined zones is carried out by commands from the air defense command posts of the front and army.

The allocation of targets between adjacent surface-to-air missile large units and units is carried out from air defense command posts of the front and armies and control posts of air defense chiefs of divisions (in accordance with the subordination of the large units and units).

The designation of targets for destruction by anti-aircraft artillery is carried out by air defense chiefs of divisions; in the absence of such designation, targets for anti-aircraft artillery fire are chosen based on the decisions of commanders of units and subunits of anti-aircraft artillery.

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(Forces and Operations of the Baltic Fleet
in Cooperation with the 1st Western Front)

To accomplish the tasks assigned to the formation, the Baltic Fleet may call upon:

-- submarines of the 27th Submarine Division and 72nd Submarine Brigade (26 vessels) for the destruction of surface ships, submarines and transport ships in the Baltic Sea and also for the destruction of attack aircraft carriers, convoys and amphibious landings in the North Sea;

-- aviation of the fleet (28th Naval Reconnaissance Air Division, 51st and 76th Separate Fighter-Bomber Regiments, 43rd Long-Range Reconnaissance Air Regiment, 27th Antisubmarine Air Regiment, 25th Antisubmarine Helicopter Regiment) for the destruction of attack aircraft carriers from the 402nd Carrier Strike Large Unit, of ship strike groupings in the Baltic Sea, of mine depots and of mine barriers in the straits zone;

-- surface ships - 51st Destroyer Brigade, 52nd, 73rd and 81st Missile Boat Brigades of naval bases (16 destroyers, 38 missile boats, 72 torpedo boats, 26 escort vessels and 222 minesweepers) for the destruction of enemy ship strike groupings in pre-straits and straits zones and submarines in the Baltic Sea, for cooperating with troops of the 1st Western Front in capturing islands in the straits zone and on the Jutland Peninsula, and also for battle with enemy amphibious landings;


-- landing ships - 65th, 74th, 84th, 127th Landing Ship Brigades and transport means of the Ministry of Merchant Marine (90 landing ships, 50 landing boats, 40 transports and up to 50 barges) for disembarking amphibious landing forces consisting of two motorized rifle divisions and for sea transport;

-- coastal missile and artillery units and marines (three coastal missile and artillery regiments, two coastal missile regiments and two marine regiments) for destruction of ship strike groupings in the Baltic Sea and straits zone and for

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cooperation with troops of the front in capturing islands of the straits zone and Jutland Peninsula.

For the conduct of radioelectronic warfare, a SPETSNAZ battalion will operate, as will also jamming means on ships and at naval airfields.

For the purpose of reinforcing the combat service ship grouping in accordance with the plan of the first operations, it is necessary in addition to deploy nine submarines into the Baltic Sea.

For establishing conditions conducive to accomplishing the fleet's assigned tasks, including the implementation of an amphibious landing operation, it is necessary from the outset of war to capture Bornholm Island:

-- a strong grouping of "western" naval forces is arrayed against the fleet; the grouping is capable of delivering more than 60 nuclear warheads in the first mass strike;

-- the composition of the naval forces, antisubmarine defense and air defense, the presence of a large number of naval (bases?) and the discontinuous (insular) nature of the area of the straits zone allow the enemy greatly to hinder operations of the forces of the fleet.

The main targets of the first nuclear strike of the Baltic Fleet Formation are:

the 402nd Carrier Strike Large Unit, ship strike groups in the pre-straits and straits zones and submarines in the Baltic Sea.

The forces of the Baltic Fleet Formation in cooperation with troops of the 1st Western Front and the Red Banner Northern Fleet, using 158 nuclear weapons will, as calculations show, be able to fulfill their assigned tasks.


III

In case the "westerners" unleash war with the use of nuclear weapons, the Strategic Rocket Forces destroy their main naval

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bases and control posts of the naval formation west of the meridian of Cape Skagen - Luebeck.

IV

Concept of the Operation

To destroy the "western" naval formation in the operational zone of the fleet and capture the straits zone jointly with troops of the 1st Western Front, the main forces of the Baltic Fleet Formation, with the onset of combat operations, use 102 nuclear warheads (96 of these in the first nuclear strike), concentrating on destruction of surface strike groupings, submarines and mine barriers of the "westerners" in the Baltic Sea and straits zone, with simultaneous destruction of their naval formation command post in the straits zone and of mine depots. The efforts of naval missile-carrying aviation with the expenditure of the resources of three regimental sorties, of 42 nuclear warheads and three (screens?) of submarines deployed in the North Sea, using 18 nuclear torpedoes are directed at destruction of the 402nd Carrier Strike Large Unit in the first nuclear strike.

When the 1st Western Front has fulfilled its immediate task, using the results of the first nuclear strikes by Strategic Rocket Forces, by the Baltic Fleet Formation and by the 1st Western Front, the main efforts of the fleet, using ten nuclear warheads, are directed with the troops of the front at an amphibious landing, capturing the islands of the straits zone, ensuring the destruction of ship groupings and the destruction of submarines of the enemy in the straits zone and Baltic Sea.


When the 1st Western Front has fulfilled its follow-up task, the efforts of the fleet, using 42 nuclear warheads, concentrate on cooperation with the troops of the front in capturing the Jutland Peninsula and the southwestern littoral of the North Sea, on the destruction of ship groupings and convoys and, jointly with the troops of the front, on amphibious landings of the "westerners" in the North Sea.

The transport of troops and cargo in support of the 1st Western Front is carried out by individual transports and small

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convoys along the shore (protected by?) surface-to-air missile troops and fighter aviation of the Air Defense of the Country and front from enemy air strikes, with direct protection and cover by surface ships and aviation of the fleet from enemy sea strikes.

Destruction of the "brown" naval aviation at Eggebeck and (Jagel?) is carried out by the 51st and 76th Fighter-Bomber Air Regiments operating simultaneously with the strike echelon of the 3rd Air Army in the first and second mass strikes.

In the reserve of the commander of the Baltic Fleet Formation there are two regimental sorties of naval missile-carrying aviation with eight nuclear-armed air-to-ship cruise missiles and two regimental sorties of the 27th Separate Antisubmarine Air Regiment with two nuclear-armed antisubmarine aerial bombs.

The operation of the forces on the main axis ensures:

- the laying of mine barriers by aviation at the exits of "western" ships and transports from bases and ports;
- the capture of Bornholm in the first day of the war by the naval forces of the Polish People's Republic;
- sweeping of the channel and areas of combat operation of the ship strike groups of the fleet;
- destruction of large-scale enemy hunter-killer groups in the North Sea with the forces of naval missile-carrying aviation to ensure the operation.

The disposition of forces is shown in the following table.

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Large Units and Units	Number of Large Units			TOTAL	Number of Units				Nuclear Warheads	
	Number of Fighting Ships/Baltic Fleet	Polish Navy	German Navy		Baltic Fleet	Poland	Germany	TOTAL		
Submarine Brigades	3	1	-	4	Submarines	33	6	-	39	44
Brigades and Separate Divisions of Small Surface Ships	20	4	4	28	Cruisers	3	-	-	3	
Aviation of the Fleet					Destroyers	16	3	-	19	
Naval Missile-Carrying Air Regiments	3			3	Escorts & small subchasers	63	18	22	103	
Fighter-Bomber Air Regiments	1	1	-	2	Rocket & missile boats	88	24	30	142	657
Antisubmarine Air Regiments	2			2	Landing ships	50	18	20	88	
Reconnaissance Air Regiments	1			1	Landing boats	24	10	6	40	
Coastal Missile, and Missile and Artillery, Regiments	3	1	1	5	Mine Sweeper	203	60	60	323	
Marine Regiments	1	1	-	2	TU-16	80			81	84
					SU-7 r7	34	SU-7 r7-34		68	20
					BB-6	28			28	10
					MI-4	35			35	
					TU-16R	24			24	
					Missile launchers	12	4	4	20	
					130mm guns	18			18	
					100mm guns	9			9	
					1519 personnel		1519		3038	
					44 tanks		44		88	
					24 guns & mortars		24		48	

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Sequence and Methods of Operation of Forces:

On receipt of the signal for the onset of combat actions with nuclear weapons by the forces of submarines deployed at sea, of aviation of the fleet, of surface ships and of coastal missile units, (it is necessary) rapidly to deliver the first nuclear strike against ship groupings and mine depots of the enemy in the straits zone and Baltic Sea and against aviation strike groupings in the North Sea or Norwegian Sea.

Simultaneously, the forces of aviation mine the Kiel Bay and approaches to the naval base at Flensburg, in order to prevent the exit of "western" submarines and surface ships into the straits zone and Baltic Sea.

In the first day of war the naval forces of the Polish People's Republic capture Bornholm Island.

In the course of fulfilling the immediate task by troops of the front, from the morning of Day Two, upon decision by the commander of the front, an amphibious landing force debarks consisting of the 9th Motorized Rifle Division and the 204th and 39th Marine Regiments. The goal is to capture, by the close of Day Six, the islands of Sjaelland, Falster, Lolland and Møn.

The fleet is to ensure the landing of troops and the transport of equipment of the amphibious landing force by landing-transport means, to cover for the landing force against enemy strikes from the sea, to ensure the landing of the force on shore and to support its operations to capture the islands of the straits zone.

With the capture of the islands of the straits zone, the fleet is to ensure the destruction of "western" ship groupings and submarines in the straits zone and Baltic Sea, and to cooperate with troops of the 5th Army in their advance on the Jutland Peninsula. With the capture of the Kiel Canal, jointly with engineer troops of the front, the fleet is to clear the canal and to transfer some of the Baltic Fleet Formation's ships to Helgoland Bay.

While troops of the front are fulfilling the follow-up

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task, forces of the People's Navy of the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic Navy and fighting ships of the Baltic Fleet continue to cooperate with the 5th and 7th Armies in the complete capture of the Jutland Peninsula and the southwest littoral of the North Sea. During this time, aviation forces destroy ship groupings and convoys and also amphibious landing forces of "westerners" in the North Sea jointly with troops of the 1st Western Front.

In order to prevent reinforcement of the grouping of forces in the straits zone and to prevent the laying of mine barriers by the enemy in the Kattegat and Skagerrak, it is necessary, with the capture of Copenhagen and the northeast part of Sjaelland, to dispatch the forces of the fleet to the straits, keeping them free of mines by clearing narrow channels with line charge bursts and by sweeping them with mine-clearing devices. It is also necessary first to sweep the channel with the maximum number of minesweepers to ensure the exit of submarines and surface ships of the line through the Baltic straits during Day Nine and Day Ten.

The destruction of groupings of surface ships of the enemy at sea is carried out by delivering simultaneous and sequential strikes from various axes by the forces of ship, aviation and coastal missile strike groups. Enemy ships in bases are destroyed by the forces of aviation by mining exits from the bases. The "western" air strike grouping is destroyed by delivering a series (of strikes?) (mutually coordinated with ships and naval missile-carrying aviation?)

From Day Two, the forces of naval bases and aviation of the fleet conduct a search operation in the Baltic Sea in order to detect and set up unbroken tracking of enemy submarines and, with the onset of combat operations, to destroy them by using conventional and nuclear means of destruction.


In the case where combat operations begin without the use of nuclear weapons, the main efforts of aviation of the fleet and of submarines are directed at the destruction of the 402nd Carrier Strike Large Unit and ship grouping of "westerners" in the straits zone and the Baltic Sea. The destruction of mine depots is conducted only in Korsør.

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While landing and operating on shore, amphibious landing forces are covered by missile- and torpedo-artillery boats constituting three (support/covering detachments?) and nine fire groups, and also by a coastal missile and artillery regiment, a coastal missile regiment and fighter-bomber aviation. With one naval missile-carrying air regiment and two regiments of fighter-bomber aviation, Fort Stevens and the coastal artillery batteries on Falster and Møn Islands are neutralized. For the neutralization of air defense in the sector of flights of naval missile-carrying aviation, apart from the forces and means allotted by the front, fighter-bomber aviation of the fleet is employed.

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(Premise of War Exercises)

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TO THE COMMANDER OF TROOPS
OF THE FIRST WESTERN FRONT

Operational directive of the Supreme High Command No. 14/op.
Moscow 8:00 20/3, map 500 000, edition 1909

1. "Westerners" are making preparations to unleash war in Europe.
2. "Easterners" are to prepare armed forces for battle against possible aggression of the "westerners" in Europe and, in the case that they unleash war, conduct a strategic operation with the goal of destroying groupings of troops of the Northern Army Group, Central Army Group, troops of the Baltic straits zone, 2nd and 4th Allied Tactical Air Forces, air forces of national subordination of the NATO countries and naval forces of the "westerners", and take the "Browns", "Grays", "Purples" and "Violets" out of the war.

During operations without the use of nuclear weapons, according to the plan of the Supreme High Command an aerial operation will be conducted in which the 3rd Air Army of the front will participate with an expenditure of three army sorties.

In the event the enemy uses nuclear weapons, the Strategic Rocket Forces will deliver the first and subsequent nuclear strikes, to destroy troops and targets in the sector of the front. On the Jutland axis, the northern border is Svendborg - Schleswig; on the Hannover axis, the western border is Cuxhaven, Oldenburg, Osnabrueck, Hamm, Siegen.

3. The 1st Western Front (5th, 7th, 9th and 12th Armies, 3rd Air Army, 5th and 23rd Tank Divisions, 3rd Airborne Assault Brigade, 8th and 14th Front Missile Brigades, augmented

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on Day One with the 6th Tank Army, 4th Army Corps, 35th and 40th Motorized Rifle Divisions and 38th Tank Division, and augmented on Day Two with the 46th and 50th Tank Divisions), along with the 5th and 11th Artillery Divisions and 23rd Tank-Destroyer Artillery Brigade in cooperation with the Baltic Fleet Formation should be ready to repel possible enemy invasion into the territory of the German Democratic Republic. In case the enemy unleashes aggressive operations, the 1st Western Front should be ready to conduct an offensive operation on the Berlin, Brussels and Jutland axes, with the goal of destroying troops of the "westerners" in the sector of the front's advance to occupy their territory.

The initial task of the front: to destroy opposing forces of the zone of the Baltic Straits, the main forces of the Northern Army Group and part of the forces of the Central Army Group in the area of Hamburg, Bremen, Osnabrueck, Kassel; to destroy the aviation and, on the sixth day of the operation, to hold a line from Norden through Meppen, Meunster and Luedenscheid to Siegen and on the Jutland axis from Esbjerg to Vejle and the islands of Sjaelland, Fehmarn, Falster and Lolland.

To capture the islands of the straits zone the front, jointly with the Baltic Fleet Formation, should land an amphibious landing force from the morning of Day Two.


The follow-up task of the front: to develop the offensive by the main forces on the Brussels axis with part of the forces toward The Hague; an assault crossing of the Rhine from the march; to deliver conclusive destruction against approaching enemy reserves and, on the 10th to 12th day of the operation, to hold a line from Leeuwarden through Den Helder, The Hague, Brugge, Brussels, Chatelet to March en Famenne and on the Jutland axis to complete destruction of the enemy and capture of the Jutland Peninsula.

The front should organize the defense of troops jointly with the Baltic Fleet Formation so as to (facilitate) their breakout to the littoral of the North Sea and for the capture of the islands of the straits zone.

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In support of the 1st Western Front, on the order of the Supreme High Command, the 1st Airborne Division is landed; area and time of landing are decided by the commander of troops of the front.

For the operation, 609 nuclear warheads are allotted to the front (220 tactical missiles, 129 operational-tactical missiles and 260 nuclear bombs). (Comment: This breakdown differs from the figures given on page 45). There are also allotted 20 army sorties of the air army of the front, including three army sorties for fulfilling the tasks of the air operation plan.

On the right, the Baltic Fleet Formation has the tasks of: destroying enemy carrier strike groupings in the North Sea and his ship groupings in the straits zone and Baltic Sea; jointly with troops of the 1st Western Front, capturing islands of the straits zone; operating with them to capture the Jutland Peninsula and the southeast littoral of the North Sea; taking part in the defense of the coastline being captured; preventing enemy amphibious landings; destroying "western" sea transport in the operations zone of the fleet; ensuring sea transport in support of troops of the front.

On the left, the 2nd Western Front conducts an offensive operation for the purpose of destroying the Central Army Group and the 4th Allied Tactical Air Force jointly with the 1st Western Front. Its 10th Army strikes in the direction of Eisenach - Koblenz. The 1st Western Front's boundary line with the 2nd Western Front runs from Forst through Muehlberg, Weissenfels, Eschwege, Frankenberg and (Zinzing?) to Neufchateau. The commander is responsible for the junction boundary.

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(Defensive Operations of an Army)

DEFENSE

Soviet military science recognizes the possibility of applying various types of operations and combat operations in war, but considers that only through a decisive offensive with the application of all of the strength of the branches of the armed forces, various types of weapons and combat capabilities of the troops is it possible completely to destroy an aggressor and achieve the goals of a war. Along with this, on individual axes or in any given theater of combat operations, it is possible temporarily to have conditions which are not conducive to waging or continuing an offensive. For this reason some operational formations might, on the order of the high command, switch to defense in order to bleed white groupings being transferred, exhaust them, inflict maximum losses and ruin their offensive. They hold the lines already occupied, gain time, amass the necessary forces and create the very conditions necessary to switch their own troops to a decisive offensive. Thus Soviet military doctrine recognizes, along with the offensive, the efficacy of defensive operations.

The General Disposition of an Army in a Defensive Operation

Defense in modern war is a necessary but temporary type of combat operation. It is used mainly in support of an offensive. The most important role of a defensive operation of an army comprises the creation of conditions for the transition of our own troops to the offensive (or for the resumption of an interrupted offensive). Defensive operations are conducted in support of delivering destruction, as a rule, against the strongest advancing groupings of the enemy and in support of the conduct of decisive offensive operations of adjacent formations on the most important axes of the theater of combat operations.

Conditions for the transition of an army to defense and conditions for its conduct can be most varied. They are determined by the specific situation and, in the first place, by the composition, combat capabilities and nature of operations of our own troops and of the enemy; by the balance of

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forces which is developing in the sector of the army and in the sectors of operations of adjacent formations; by the weapons being used; by the importance of the axis being defended and by the concept of the front operation; by the physical/geographic peculiarities of a given area and by the availability of time to prepare a defense.

According to the view of Soviet military art, defense in modern warfare is used when, for a number of reasons, an offensive is not possible or, at a given time, is not feasible (useful) and also when it is necessary to conserve forces and means in order to ensure an advance on other, more important axes (Field Service Regulation, Article 29). Most often, defense is conducted when there are insufficient forces and means for an offensive.

The Goal of a Defensive Operation and Tasks of an Army in Defense

The goal of a defensive operation and tasks of the army in defense are determined by the overall concept of the front operation and by the specific conditions of the situation which are established on the axis of operations of the army. The main goal of a defensive operation of an army under modern conditions may include repulsing an offensive (attack, counter-attack) of the opposing enemy and the delivery against him of significant destruction while protecting our own troops; ensuring the development of an advance on other, more important axes; maintaining important strategic lines and areas and creating conditions conducive to the transition of our own troops to the offensive. Sometimes the goal of switching an army to defense might include supporting the flank of the main strike grouping of the troops of the front.

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Defensive Disposition of a Motorized Rifle Division (Variant)

Legend

- ∩ dummy position
- MCD motorized rifle battalion
- Bp OTT temporary fire position
- MCD c motorized rifle battalion with a ..

- TP tank company
- AAH artillery battalion
- TTT P23 antitank reserve
- TTT tank regiment
- MCD motorized rifle division
- MCTT motorized rifle regiment

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Legend (cont.)

OTB separate tank regiment
CPX3 separate chemical warfare defense company
CAF2H separate surface-to-air missile battalion
TB tank battalion

ДАГ division artillery group
3 alternate (position)
n antitank (position)


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ПОСТРОЕНИЕ ПОЛОСА ОБОРОНЫ НАСДП (Варшавы)



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In an offensive operation when nuclear weapons are used, one of the reasons for an army to go over to defense might be to restore the combat effectiveness of its troops who have incurred significant losses and are therefore unable to deploy into an offensive.

The achievement of the main goals of a defensive operation ensures the accomplishment by the troops of the army of a number of tasks. Some of these tasks might be the destruction of the nuclear strike means of the enemy and the destruction of his main groupings on the approaches to the defense - when he is moving and deploying them for an offensive; repulsion of an offensive of large groupings of troops and of enemy aviation strikes; holding the most important lines and areas of the terrain; destruction of groupings of troops breaking through (or who have broken through) into the depth of the defense and the creation of conditions for going over to the offensive.

Depending on the conditions which have developed, the enemy grouping, the composition and condition of our own troops and the nature of the terrain, a combined-arms army (composed of four to five divisions) for defense on the main axis may have a sector 100 to 150 kilometers wide. In theaters of military operations and on axes with special terrain conditions (mountainous, desert, polar or taiga areas or sea coast) an army is able to defend a wider sector.

The depth of an army defense sector may reach 100 to 150 kilometers or more; this ensures a dispersed distribution of large units of the first and second echelons, or rocket troops, reserves and equipment in the operational depth of the defensive boundaries and position areas.

The Field Service Regulations (Article 429) define the main requirements for modern defense thus: "Defense must be stable and active, able to withstand strikes of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction of the enemy, his aviation and artillery, able to repulse mass attacks of tanks, must not permit landings or operations of airborne landing forces and, in case the enemy breaks through, must be able to destroy him." And from the same article: "Troops do not have the right to

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leave occupied lines (positions) and retreat without the order of the senior officer in charge. They must be prepared to operate without tactical communications with adjacent units and when surrounded."

Defensive Disposition of an Army

The defensive disposition of an army includes: the operational disposition of the troops and a system of sectors (lines) of their defense, prepared strikes with nuclear and chemical weapons, a system of fire of conventional means of destruction, an air defense system and engineer preparation of the terrain. The defensive disposition of an army must always correspond to the concept of a defensive operation and ensure: the most efficient use of all forces and means; active air defense and protection of troops from weapons of mass destruction; stability as regards antitank means; holding important lines (areas); fullest use of maneuver capabilities of the troops of the army for rapid buildup of forces and means for personnel destruction; the comfort and continuous coordination and control of troops being defended.

As is shown in the Field Service Regulations (Article 431): "In each case, the grouping of forces and means and the defensive disposition must be varied and not have a definite structure or pattern; they must mislead the enemy and force him to deliver nuclear and fire strikes against areas not occupied by troops."

On each axis different variations of disposition in depth of forces and means may be utilized. But in doing so, the defensive groupings must be capable of repulsing an offensive (attack) of the opposing forces of the enemy either with the use of conventional means of destruction or with nuclear weapons.

The operational disposition of the troops of the army in defense depends on the goals of the operation, the tasks of the army, the conditions for going over to defense, the composition and situation of the troops of the army, the composition of the groupings and nature of operations of the enemy, terrain conditions and other information on the situation. The



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operational disposition might be in one or two echelons and might include large units of the first echelon, a second echelon or combined-arms reserve, a grouping of rocket troops and artillery, air defense troops, engineer and chemical troops of army subordination, reserves of various designations (antitank, engineer, chemical troops) and mobile (obstacle?) detachments. To ensure stability and activity, modern defense must have a deep operational disposition of the troops of the army and a deep disposition of battle formations of large units and units with a concentration of efforts on axes of the offensive of the enemy strike groupings. "The depth of the defensive disposition", as noted in the Field Service Regulations (Article 430), "must ensure increasing opposition to the enemy, freedom of maneuver of the troops, especially of the second echelons and reserves, and the dispersal of all units (subunits) for the purpose of protecting them from weapons of mass destruction."

In accordance with the operational disposition selected, the defense sector of the army in an engineer preparation sense might include:

- the first defensive sector occupied by large units of the first echelon of the army;
- second and third defensive sectors (army lines) for large units of the second echelon (combined-arms reserve);
- position areas of rocket and surface-to-air missile troops;
- fire positions for artillery and antiaircraft artillery;
- concentration areas of the reserves;
- alternate lines (positions) and deployment lines of the second echelon and reserves;
- build-up areas of army units of special troops, control posts of units and facilities of the army rear, routes for maneuver of troops, transport of materiel and evacuation and also a system of engineer obstacles.

The first echelon of the army is designated for repulsing

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an enemy offensive, inflicting maximum losses on his advancing groupings, preventing their breakthrough into the depth of defense, holding the most important lines of the terrain and creating at the same time conditions for the destruction of an enemy which is breaking through by means of a counterattack of the second echelon (combined-arms reserve). The number of divisions allotted to the first echelon depends on the width of the sector, the tasks of the army, the importance of the axes being defended by it, the conditions of going over to defense and the balance of forces of the sides.

Large units of the first echelon establish the first sector for the defense which is most often the main sector of the defense. The Field Service Regulations (Article 430) have determined that a division occupies three or more positions for defense, a regiment defends two positions and a battalion defends one position. The bases of each position are the strong points of motorized rifle and tank companies, unified into battalion areas of defense and connected with each other along the front and in depth with a unified system of fire and barrage. The depth of each position is about two kilometers. The distance between two positions may vary and be up to about five kilometers. In consideration of this, the depth of a regiment defense sector may be up to ten kilometers and the depth of the sector of defense of a division may be up to 25 kilometers. The width of a defense sector of a division (motorized rifle or tank) on the main axis may be up to 30 kilometers, the width of defense of a regiment may be up to ten kilometers and the width of a battalion defense area may be up to five kilometers.

On the most important axes, a forward position may be set up ahead of the first edge of the defense at a distance of three to five kilometers, defended by separate subunits from the regiments of the first echelon. This position is intended to mislead the enemy as regards the defensive disposition, to protect units of the first echelon from surprise attack of the enemy and to force the premature deployment of his main forces.

Ahead of the first defense sector, a forward security zone can be established with a depth of 15 to 20 kilometers and sometimes more. This sector is set up for the purpose of delaying an enemy offensive, forcing him to deploy and advance on an axis unsuitable for him and also for the purpose of revealing the grouping and the enemy's intentions. It is

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defended by forward detachments composed of reinforced motorized rifle and tank subunits (units) allotted from the divisions of the first echelon and sometimes by all of the forces of one of the divisions. During transition to defense in a border area at the onset of a war, the forward security zone is defended by troops allotted to cover the movement and deployment of the main forces of the army.

In accordance with Article 433 of the Field Service Regulations, the forward edge of defense is indicated by the commander of the armies and refined on the spot by the commander of a division.

The second echelon of the army is designated, as a rule, for delivering the counterstrike in the course of a defensive battle. Part of the forces of the second echelon or all of its complement might be used for the stable holding of defense lines or destruction of airborne landing forces and groupings of the enemy which are penetrating into the depth.

Combined-arms reserve is usually allocated when it is not possible to establish a second echelon. It may be designated to conduct a counterattack, reinforcing troops who are operating on the most important axes or replacing units which have lost combat effectiveness, to destroy tank groupings or airborne landing forces of the enemy which are breaking through and also to fulfill other tasks which arise suddenly in the course of an operation.

One to two (army?) defense lines, 50 to 70 kilometers distant from each other and from the forward edge of the defense sector, are set up with the forces of the second echelon and reserves of the army in the operational depth.

Grouping of rocket forces is 60 to 80 kilometers from the forward edge.

Artillery grouping
Air defense troop grouping
Reserves of the army

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Planning of a Defensive Operation

The planning of a defensive operation is carried out on the basis of a decision by the commander of the armies and on the basis of his orders. An operation is planned according to tasks of the troops and axes of the probable enemy offensive. The main tasks according to which the planning of the operation is carried out may be:


- delivery of destruction against groupings of the enemy on approaches to the defense (including destruction of enemy groupings preparing for an offensive);
- repelling an offensive and holding sectors of the defense of large units of the first echelon of the army with simultaneous destruction of airborne (amphibious) landing forces;
- destruction of groupings of the enemy penetrating or breaking through into the depth of defense.

In the course of planning an operation, all questions decided by the commander are worked out in detail and the sequence and methods of fulfilling each task are established. The (allocations?) of troops and materiel according to tasks and axes of operations are established; the sequence is determined for cooperation of the troops in fulfilling the tasks assigned them; problems of all types of support of combat operations and control of troops are worked out.

During the preparation of a defensive operation in peacetime or in the course of combat operations when nuclear weapons are not being used, along with the detailed planning of the use of conventional means, SPECIAL ATTENTION IS GIVEN TO PLANNING MEASURES DIRECTED AT THE MAINTENANCE OF A HIGH DEGREE OF READINESS OF ROCKET TROOPS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FIRST NUCLEAR STRIKE of the front and the transition by troops of the army to operations under these conditions.

The sequence and procedures followed by the field headquarters of the army in planning the operation and the extent of problems reflected in the plan depend on the situation and, above all, on the time available.

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The plan of a defensive operation of an army is usually developed graphically on a map (usually on a scale of 1: 200,000) with explanatory notes attached. Sometimes a plan of an operation can be developed in texts with a map attached. When the plan is developed graphically on a map, the following is usually shown:

- grouping of troops of the enemy and possible axes of his offensive;
- possible areas where the enemy will land airborne landing forces and amphibious landing forces (when the defense is on a coastal axis);
- grouping of forces and means of the army and their maneuver calculated on the expected operations of the enemy;
- tasks and targets for destruction with nuclear and chemical weapons, aviation and artillery;
- tasks of the large units of the first and second echelons (combined-arms reserve) of the army;
- lines of deployment of the second echelon (reserve) and routes of movement to them;
- tasks of air defense troops and aviation;
- tasks of the antitank reserve and reserves of special troops;
- engineer preparation of the sector of defense and creation of a system of obstacles and (destruction?);
- control posts;
- placement of rear units and facilities;
- other data.

In the explanatory notes the following is set forth:

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- conclusions from an evaluation of the situation;
- goal and concept of the operation;
- combat composition of the army;
- allocation of reinforcement means;
- availability, times of receipt and allocation of nuclear and chemical warheads *;
- balance and density of forces and means in the entire sector of the army and on the axes;
- calculation of the time to move troops and for them to take the defense;
- availability, receipt and allocation

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Defensive Disposition of an Army (Variant)

Legend

МСТ motorized rifle regiment

МДА motorized rifle division

ТТ tank regiment

ТД tank division

резерв войск. supply troops reserve


ТТ резерв А antitank reserve of the army

МОЗ А mobile obstacle detachment of the army

резерв хим войск chemical troops reserve


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
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ПОСЛОВОСННЕ ОБОРОНЫ АРМИИ (ВАРИАНТ)



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The 1st Western Front with the main forces develops an offensive on the Ruhr axis. The 5th Tank Army, in cooperation with the 1st Airborne Division, has forced a crossing over the Rhine and captured a bridgehead (to the west of?) the strategic line of the enemy defense. The front has reserves for further developing the offensive.

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