


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

4 August 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: Our Experience in
Conducting Command-Staff Exercises




1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on articles from a SECRET Soviet publication called Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This article examines work in the Bulgarian Army in increasing the efficiency of training commanders and staffs through theoretical investigations and experimental command-staff exercises. Proceeding from an enumeration of certain previously existing deficiencies in the work of the directing body and umpires within the training system, the author indicates measures, regarding the organizational structure of the directing body complement and the training methodology, to eliminate these deficiencies. This journal is published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This article appeared in Issue No. 10, which was published in 1975.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned the

[Redacted] Codeword [Redacted]. [Redacted]
[Redacted]
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William W. Wells

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Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY BULGARIA/WARSAW PACT

DATE OF
INFO. 1975

DATE 4 August 1977

SUBJECT

WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: Our Experience in Conducting
Command-Staff Exercises

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article from a SECRET Soviet publication called Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This journal is published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This article was written by Colonel General T. Papazov, Deputy Minister of National Defense of the People's Republic of Bulgaria. This article indicates success achieved in the Bulgarian Army in increasing the efficiency of training commanders and staffs to meet present-day demands through theoretical investigations and experimental command-staff exercises at various levels. Proceeding from an enumeration of certain previously existing deficiencies in the work of the directing body and umpires, which largely deprived commanders and staffs from showing creativity and activity and did not train them in independence and initiative, the author examines measures, regarding the organizational structure of the directing body complement and the training methodology, directed toward eliminating these deficiencies. This article appeared in Issue No. 10, which was published in 1975.

End of Summary

Comment:

The names of authors are given in Russian transliteration.

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Our Experience in Conducting Command-Staff Exercises

by

Colonel General T. PAPAZOV
Deputy Minister of National Defense of the
People's Republic of Bulgaria

The equipping of troops with modern weapons and the newest combat equipment has not only changed the organizational structure of large units and units, but also the nature of modern combat, and has brought about profound changes in the methods of its conduct. Combat actions are now characterized by: the massed employment of nuclear weapons and other means of destruction, decisiveness, high mobility, fluidity, rapid and drastic changes in the situation, uneven progress, and great spatial scope.

There has been a sharp increase in the extent of the measures for the preparation and all-round support of combat and for troop control, but the time allowed for their implementation has been considerably reduced.

These changes have imposed new requirements on the training of commanders and staffs. At the present time, a commander must possess high organizational abilities, originality, decisiveness, foresight, rapidity of thought, boldness in adopting a decision, and perseverance in carrying it out.

The role of staffs has markedly risen. Within short periods of time they must collect, collate, and analyze data on the situation and prepare all of the information and calculations a commander needs in order to make a decision. The duty of a staff is: to rapidly relay the tasks to the subordinates, to organize the accomplishment of the tasks, to provide assistance to the commander in control, to organize the comprehensive support of combat actions, and to carry out monitoring.

The increased requirements for the training of commanders and staffs has forced us to seek new and more efficient forms and methods which ensure that training is given in what is needed in a war.

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In order to achieve this aim, the Bulgarian People's Army has carried out a number of theoretical investigations and experimental command-staff exercises at various levels, as a result of which it has succeeded in eliminating many of the deficiencies of the old methodology, and in considerably increasing the efficiency of the training of commanders and staffs.

What were some of the principal deficiencies in the work of the directing body and umpires while conducting command-staff exercises under the organizational structure and work methods which had existed up to now?

In most cases, the directing body and umpires strictly adhered to a plan prepared in advance for the conduct of the exercise and seldom took into consideration the decisions of the trainees. This deprived commanders and staffs of the opportunity of showing creativity and activity, and also did not train them in independence and initiative.

As a rule, the trainees were handed written instructions and orders, which is possible only before an operation is initiated, but as is known the majority of all the necessary information is transmitted by technical means of communications. The trainees were issued prepared maps and the situation was built up by just being told and not through the superior staff in the form of information or by reports from subordinates or adjacent units.

A large number of officers was allocated to the umpire group. They were diverted from fulfilling their functional duties and, in our opinion, increased the burden of directing the exercise. The natural working routine, one which was close to combat reality, was frequently infringed upon, the players were often prompted to make particular decisions; the work of commanders and staffs was facilitated by letting them have prepared data, which objectively led to conventionality and oversimplification; and the umpires frequently interfered in the work of the trainees, exercised tutelage, etc.

The trainees, knowing that the exercise was being conducted according to a specific plan, put their complete trust in the umpires. There were cases when the trainees freed themselves of the responsibility for a number of deficiencies in their work,

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justifying their mistakes by means of the instructions of the umpires.

It should also be mentioned that occasionally officers with inadequate operational-tactical training and methodological experience were appointed as umpires, leading to training of low efficiency. In addition, the umpires sometimes deliberately overrated the trainees because later, in the next exercise, the trainees and umpires were to exchange roles.

The director and his assistants received the necessary information on the fulfilment of the exercise plan primarily from the umpires and did not always have a personal idea of whether the planned training topics had been worked out.

It must be noted that with this method the trainees did not fully learn to assign tasks to subordinates nor to draft and send reports to the superior staff via technical means of communications (only 10 to 15 percent of the communications channels were kept busy with information).

Excessive tutelage over the trainees was exercised on the part of the directing body, which was not conducive to a normal operating routine.

These and other deficiencies of the method employed interfered with the achievement of greater efficiency in the training of tactical level commanders and staffs and hindered the training from approximating conditions of a combat situation. Meanwhile, the experience we have gained has made it possible to maximally eliminate the existing deficiencies of the method that had been used up to now for the conduct of command-staff exercises and has opened up reserves for the improvement of training efficiency.

Let us set forth briefly the essence of our proposals concerning this subject.

First of all, regarding the organizational structure of the directing body when conducting command-staff exercises.

The complement of the directing body is organized as follows:

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- the exercise director;
- the chief of staff of the directing body. The operations group and the servicing group are subordinate to him. He coordinates the activities of the directing body staff in collecting and processing data, in setting up a situation which is in keeping with the planned training problems, and he also proposes alternative decisions to the director. He is the first deputy of the director, and in the director's name he can issue instructions and assign tasks to the director's assistants and to the officers of the directing body staff;
- the assistants to the director for the branch arms -- the chiefs of the departments, branch arms, services and rear services or their deputies from the army headquarters -- [words missing]. Their functional duties correspond to the training problem (?) planned for being worked out during the given phase. On the basis of (?) [words missing] of the director, of the stipulated training problems, [words missing] decisions of the trainees they develop the necessary [words missing] to the branch arms or services in order to formulate the decisions [words missing] the working out of the training problems with the permission of the director [words missing] are sent to the commanders and staffs so as to render assistance [words missing];
- the operations group is made up of the group for collecting and processing data on the situation, the group building up the situation, and the critique group. It is subordinate to the chief of staff and has the function of collecting information, collating and analyzing the work of the staffs being trained, and formulating proposals for the decisions of the directing body. Based on the orders of the director and on the planned training problems, the group develops a new instructive situation, which is then built up for the players. It prepares the critique of the exercise;
- the group collecting and processing data on the situation consists of four to five officers (an operations officer, artillery officer, intelligence officer, rear services officer, an officer from the chemical troops or another branch arm), which, on the basis of the orders received from the director or the chief of staff, and with the help of the chiefs of the departments, the branch arms, and the services, develops the

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requisite situation. Then the situation is received by the group building up the situation, which transmits it by technical means of communications to the trainee commanders and staffs.

This group fulfils the role of the axis officers of the army staff [words missing] appropriate large units. It builds up all of the data which [words missing] is received by the players as information [words missing] improvement of the knowledge and methods of working [words missing] the advisability of including in this group additional [words missing] temporary axis officers:

- the group building up the situation [words missing] or commanders, chiefs words missing of the units and subunits being trained [words missing] situation and in the role of the commanders [words missing] battle formation are transmitted [words missing] of the battalions). In addition, [words missing]

- the critique group [words missing]

[Approximately 12 lines missing]

The director and his staff operate as the staff of an army (large unit). They exercise monitoring over the passage of information from bottom to top and back, and they know the decisions of the trainees, the instructions and orders which these give to their subordinates, and how they are supported; that is, they comprehensively know the troop control activities of the trainees. In this manner they more profoundly and reliably discover the positive and weak aspects of the training of the trainee commanders and staffs and take timely measures to correct poorly assimilated problems.

In order to obtain a more complete idea of the activities of the commanders and staffs, it is advisable that the directing body spend the greater part of its time in providing assistance to the trainees and in monitoring. In this manner, greatest effectiveness is achieved if all of the activities of the directing body are planned ahead of time according to the phases of the exercise.

In conducting a two-level command-staff exercise with a regiment, the directing body uses approximately the very same



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organizational structure and method of work.

Also, it should be noted that in conducting command-staff exercises at the tactical levels, these have made it possible to eliminate to a great degree the existing deficiencies, to enhance the effectiveness of the training, and to more fully approximate the conditions of a combat situation. In the Bulgarian People's Army all of the command-staff exercises with large units are conducted following the above-indicated structure and methodology.

The further and continued raising of the level of training of commanders and staffs requires the timely introduction of the necessary improvements and changes in the forms and methods of instruction for the purpose of raising the level (?) of the training of commanders and the cohesiveness of staffs as a fundamental approach in accordance with the demands of present-day combined-arms combat.



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