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6 August 1976

HR70-14

SECTION I - SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCES
AND THE MILITARY BALANCE IN EUROPE

Introduction

I. This part of the briefing will concentrate on four principal topics:

Graphic

-- First, the reasons why Soviets are deterred from attacking NATO:

- The main reason is NATO's capability to escalate to nuclear war and threaten the USSR with unacceptable destruction,
- But there is also the fact that NATO can put up a stout conventional defense which would deny the Soviets the possibility of a quick grab of a substantial piece of NATO territory. We will discuss the salient elements of this "local deterrent" in some detail when we address the balance in Europe.

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NATO-Warsaw Pact Military Matters

- **The Soviets are deterred from attacking NATO.**
- **If deterrence should fail, Soviets plan to seize initiative and complete offensive quickly.**
- **Trends for NATO and PACT lie in modernization of ground, air, and naval forces.**
- **NATO and PACT have significant asymmetries, weaknesses, and strengths, but rough balance reinforces deterrence.**

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- Second, the Soviets plan on launching the offensive, and completing it quickly, if deterrence should fail. The Soviets don't want a repeat of their last major wars: the fighting, if they have their way, is to be on foreign -- not Russian -- soil.
- Third, the trend toward qualitative improvements in military equipment, for both sides. But NATO is making some additions to its combat forces.
- Finally, despite major asymmetries in their force postures there is a rough balance between NATO's and the Pacts military capabilities and that reinforces deterrence.

Develop

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DETERRENCE

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- (1) In the mid-1960s, NATO moved from a nuclear tripwire strategy to the "flexible response" doctrine which defers using nuclear weapons until -- and unless -- the conventional defense fails.
 - b. By the late 1960s the Soviets had come to believe that a war in Europe would likely be non-nuclear at the beginning and began to reorganize their general purpose forces to give them more non-nuclear punch.
 - c. However, the Soviets still believe that rapid escalation is likely once NATO's tactical nuclear weapons are used, even in strictly limited numbers. Thus the deterrent holds.
2. We also know the Soviets have a number of uncertainties over the conduct of a European war.
 - They are sobered by NATO's ground and air strength, especially the

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West German and US forces.

- They are impressed by NATO's potential for quickly building up its forces to a war footing (the West German mobilization potential particularly concerns them).
- They are concerned about the reliability of their East European allies.

3. Another factor is that for the last six years Soviet leaders have been pushing the line that Soviet objectives can be attained by peaceful means -- witness their policy of detente toward Europe.
4. The Kremlin is also concerned over the prospect of a two-front war. They do not, to say the least, trust the Chinese.

B. The second question is: what is the nature of the military "balance?"


Graphic

1. The broadest considerations include a NATO Gross National Product that is nearly three times the size of the Pact's, and a NATO population advantage of 54 percent. The Pact, however, has an advantage of about 20 percent in

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Worldwide NATO-Pact Balance



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uniformed servicemen. However, the best way to address balance is to examine the military situation in the three main potential conflict areas in Europe, i.e., the Northern, Central, and Southern Regions.

Graphic
(Map)

2. I will turn first to the "balance" in Central Europe, which contains the main concentration of Eastern and Western military power. Both sides see it as the decisive theater in any East-West conflict in Europe. As you know, historically, major East-West invasion routes have led across Central Europe.

Graphic

- a. Let's start with how the ground forces stack up.
 - (1) They are the strongest element of Warsaw Pact general purpose forces.
 - (a) Pact ground manpower in Central Europe exceeds NATO's by about 20 percent.

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The Balance in Central Europe

Ground Forces

NATO Forces in West Germany,
Belgium, Netherlands, and
Luxembourg

Pact Forces in
East Germany, Poland,
and Czechoslovakia

790,000

Men

950,000

25

Divisions

58

9,000

Tanks

18,400

2,600

Artillery Pieces

5,600

3,380

Anti-Tank Guided Missile Systems

1,460

1,255


SAM Launchers

1,400

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- (b) Half the Pact's ground forces are Soviet; only about one-quarter of NATO's are American.
 - (c) Pact has roughly twice as many divisions as NATO, although most of NATO's are larger.
- (2) As for the tanks, the Pact has twice as many as NATO. However, NATO has twice as many major antitank missile launchers.
- (3) The Pact also has twice as many artillery pieces, but this advantage is diminished by NATO's superior ammunition and gunnery technique.
- (a) The West is well ahead in development of artillery shells with greatly improved lethality.
 - (b) The West has far more self-propelled artillery pieces.
- (4) The two sides are roughly equal in SAMS, launchers.

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Graphic 5

b. In Tactical Air Forces, NATO has strong advantage in quality. In numbers of aircraft, however, Pact has twice as many in Central Europe.

(1) Despite numbers, Soviets evidently see NATO air forces as a major threat to what might otherwise be a decisive Pact advantage in Central Europe.

Graphic 6

(a) NATO aircraft, like the F-4 Phantom, have better systems for finding and hitting targets and are more versatile, overall.

(b) NATO's aircraft fly further and carry more ordnance than the Pact's.


(c) NATO's pilots are better trained and more experienced; they fly twice as much as Pact pilots.

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The Balance in Central Europe

NATO-Pact Tactical Aircraft




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


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Comparison of Radius and Payload Capabilities




Typical Long Range Interdiction



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Graphic

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c. In tactical nuclear systems, NATO currently has the edge in numbers.


- (1) This is because NATO adds some 650 nuclear artillery pieces to its total while we have not confirmed any for the Pact. There is evidence, however, that the Soviets may also be acquiring nuclear shells for their artillery.
- (2) The nuclear balance inside Central Europe is of course, only part of the story.
 - (a) As we have indicated in an earlier briefing, the Soviets have a large force of missiles and bombers in the western USSR that are targeted mainly against NATO Europe.
 - (b) NATO also has impressive nuclear systems outside Central Europe, including US and UK strike aircraft in Britain and some ballistic missile submarines committed to NATO.

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The Balance in Central Europe

Tactical and Theater Nuclear Systems



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d. Another important factor in the balance is combat readiness. Both sides need some warning time to get on a war footing. Warsaw Pact ground forces are not in a high state of combat readiness on a day-to-day basis.

(1) None of their divisions in Central Europe are kept at war strength.

However, Soviet divisions in Central Europe are nearly so and could go on a war footing in a few hours.

East European divisions all need filling out with reservists -- some are manned only by cadres. This would take several days.

(2) A basic Soviet planning assumption is that hostilities would be preceded by a period of rising tension which would give the USSR at least a few days of warning.

(a) The Soviets expect to use this period of warning to make some advance preparations, most of them covert.

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
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- (3) Warsaw Pact mobilization system is based on traditional European practice: universal conscription in peacetime, and a standing army, not fully manned in peacetime, designed to be filled out with reservists and fielded against an enemy in a matter of days.
- (4) Most NATO countries (except US and UK) have similar systems. Both West Germany and France plan to double the personnel strengths of their armies within 72 hours after mobilization begins. US units in West Germany are maintained at manning levels near war strength and need no manpower augmentation. However, there are plans to move additional US ground and air force units to West Germany by air in an emergency.
- (5) All the European countries rehearse parts of their mobilization systems from time to time, and we have no reason to suspect their systems would not work.

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NATO - Warsaw Pact Ground Forces

Manpower in the Central Region



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Graphic

158

(6) This graph shows how we estimate the two sides could build up their forces in Central Europe through mobilization and reinforcement over a 30-day period.

(a) In the first three days, both sides expand their forces in place by calling in reservists; 600,000 NATO and 350,000 Pact.

Graphic

(b) NATO builds up faster between M+3 and M+15 because of the expected early arrival of French and British reinforcements and additional mobilization in the Low Countries, while the movement of Soviet forces in from the western USSR does not pick up momentum until about M+10.

(c) US Reformer units arrive from the US after M+15.

(d) As the divisional curve shows, mobilization gives the Pact a pronounced advantage in divisional manpower; on the order of 1.4:1.

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Deterrence in Europe

III. In examining deterrence in Europe, I will deal with two questions.

A. First, why do we believe the Soviet Union is deterred from attack on NATO?

1. The answer lies mostly in Moscow's wish to avoid the high risk that even a limited conflict would escalate to a general nuclear war and bring unacceptable damage to the USSR. This could come about with or without US nuclear retaliation. France and the UK have sufficient nuclear strike forces to destroy tens of major Soviet cities.

a. In the Khrushchev era, Soviet military planners assumed that any East-West war would either begin with a massive nuclear exchange or quickly escalate to nuclear war. Soviet thinking on the nature of nuclear war has changed over the past 10 years or so, however, mainly in reaction to evolution in NATO nuclear doctrine.

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3. The "balance" in the flanks presents a somewhat different picture.

a. Unlike in the Central European theater, naval forces are of major interest in the flanks.

(1) A naval balance is difficult to assess because of differing missions of the opposing navies and the asymmetries in forces.

(2) In the Northern Region of Europe, the principal Soviet forces are naval. The Northern Fleet located near Murmansk is the largest of the four Soviet fleets.

(a) Most of the Soviets' submarines are based in the Northern Fleet.

(b) It is the principal base for the ASW forces and the aircraft and cruise-missile submarines that would be the primary threat to ^{NATO} naval task forces in the Atlantic.

Graphic #11

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Graphic

#12

(3) The Baltic Fleet is the smallest of four fleets.

(a) Its primary mission is to control the Baltic Sea and its approaches.

(b) It consists mostly of minor combatants.

Graphic

#13

(4) In the Southern Region, the Black Sea Fleet provides the surface units and logistic support for the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron.

(a) The mission of submarines and surface ships of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron is to counter US carriers and submarines operating in the area.

Graphic

#14


b. Despite the growth of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, pressure on the NATO base structure and other constraints, the military balance in the Mediterranean still rests with the West.

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The Balance in the Flanks

Northern Fleet



Graphic 11 Add-ON

US*

Submarines total 61 (all nuclear)

- missile (26)
- attack (35)

Major surface ships total 118

- carriers - 6
- cruisers - 13
- destroyers-53
- frigates - 46

Soviet

Subtotal 176 (93 nuclear)

- missile - 91
- attache - 85


Major surface ships

- total 61
- carriers - 0
- cruisers - 9
- destroyers-16
- frigates - 29

*See back-up book #1 for other NATO assets.

The Balance in the Flanks

Baltic Fleet




Graphic 12 Add-On

NATO*		Pact* (USSR)	
Subs total	30	Subs total	32 (28)
-- missile	0	-- missile	2 (2)
-- attack (all direct)	30	-- attack	30 (26)
Major surface ships	9	Major surface ships	50 (47)
-- cruisers	0	-- cruisers	4 (4)
-- destroyers	7	-- destroyers	19 (19)
-- frigates	2	-- frigates	27 (24)

*West Germany, Denmark

*Poland, GDR, USSR

The Balance in the Flanks
Black Sea



Graphic 13 Add-On

<u>NATO*</u>	<u>Pact** (USSR)</u>
total subs 7	total subs 28 (24)
-- missile 0	-- missile 4 (4)
-- attack	-- attack 24 (20)
Total major surface - 0	total major surface 60 (58)
	-- carrier (and helicopter carrier) 2 (2)
	-- cruisers 8 (8)
	-- destroyers 24 (24)
	-- frigates 26 (24)

*Only NATO assets based in black sea, 7 Turkish subs
 **Bulgaria, Romania, USSR

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(1) Key Western assets in Southern Europe include:

- Land- and sea-based tactical air superiority over the Mediterranean that the Soviets will not be able to redress unless they obtain air bases on the littoral.
- Land bases in the Mediterranean which are, for the most part, not vulnerable to conventional attack.
- A tactical nuclear capability as a credible deterrent; and
- Increased French naval interest and strength in the Mediterranean. The French recently shifted two carriers with their supporting combat ships from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean.


(2) These advantages, however, are tempered by several constraints.

- (a) The number of US warships annually deployed to the area

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**The Balance in the Flanks
Mediterranean Sea**



Graphic 14 Add-On

US 6th Fleet

total subs - 9
 -- missile - 5
 -- attack - 4

total major surface ships -35
 -- carriers - 2
 -- cruisers - 6
 -- destroyers and
 frigates - 27

Soviet


total subs -12
 -- missile - 2
 -- attack -10

total major surface ships-13
 -- carriers - 0
 -- cruisers - 2
 -- destroyers and
 frigates -11

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Balance in the Southern Region

Ground Force Manpower



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has decreased slightly since the mid-60s, while Soviet naval deployments and anti-carrier capabilities have increased.

(b) Also, the number of US warships available for rapid reinforcement in the Mediterranean has declined substantially, while the number and quality of Soviet warships available for that purpose has steadily increased.

(3) Nevertheless, NATO's naval forces throughout this period have far exceeded Warsaw Pact naval forces there.

Graphic #15

c. In ground forces in the Southern Region, NATO has nearly 30 percent more men than the Pact. This numerical advantage is difficult to evaluate, however.


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- (1) Pact forces in the Southern Region there are less effective than those in Central Europe.
- (2) But so are NATO's forces there less effective than those of the Central Region Allies'.
- (3) Political uncertainties plague all of the southern NATO countries.

Graphic



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Graphic 17: Add On #1

<u>Soviet Pacific Fleet</u>	<u>US Western Pacific</u>	<u>US Mid-Pacific*</u>
total subs 105	Carriers 2	Cruisers 2
-- missile <i>(19 cruise)</i> 50	Cruisers 4	Destroyers 4
-- attack <i>28 diesel</i> 55	Destroyers 8	Frigates 8
	Frigates 8	Submarines - <u>10</u>
total main surface 57	Submarines - <u>11</u>	
-- cruisers 7		24
-- destroyers 23	33	
-- frigates 27		

225 acft

*May include some ships allocated to US 7th Fleet

Graphic 17: Add On #2

1. Far East Manpower

- Soviet 445,000
- Chinese 1,565,000

2. US Forces in Korea

- 1 infantry division (2nd div) and support elements - eighth Army - Approx. *33*,000 men
- 3 sqdrn F-4 (59 acft)*
- 1 sqdrn OV-10 (16 acft)*

3. US Forces in Japan (Okinawa)


- Marines
 - 1 Marine division (3rd div) (Okinawa)
 - 11 sqdrns Marine combat and support aircraft (including helicopters)

- Air Force
 - 1 sqdrn C-130 (4 acft)*
 - 1 sqdrn RF-4 (18 acft)*
 - 4 sqdrns F-4 (67 acft)*

4. US Forces in Phillipines

- 2 sqdrn F-5 (50 acft)*


*Excludes aircraft aboard US carriers.




Graphic 17

4. The USSR has other large general purpose forces, not directly concerned with Europe.

a. The Soviets' quarrel with China has prompted a major military buildup in the Soviet Far East.



(1) Since 1965, starting with about 12 low-strength, ill-equipped divisions spread over 4,000 miles of border, the Soviets have built up a force of 40 divisions opposite China, many of them first-line, modern divisions.



(2) The Soviets also have built up a tactical air force of some 1,200 combat aircraft opposite China.

USSR: Other Forces

★ Moscow

CENTRAL
28 divisions
430 aircraft

FAR EAST
43 divisions
1,200 aircraft

PACIFIC
105 submarines
57 major surface ships
280 naval aircraft



IF DET. FAILS

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- (5) Although occasional naval exercises are conducted in the Philippine Sea or western Pacific waters, most naval activity is confined to local waters.
- e. The USSR also maintains small naval task forces in Indian Ocean and West African waters.



If Deterrence Should Fail

IV. Although the Soviets acknowledge that deterrence prevails, their strategy aims at winning a war in Europe if one starts.

Graphic

18

- A. There are three key elements of this strategy.
 - 1. First, the Soviets intend to seize the initiative.
 - a. Thus, equipment and training and tactical doctrine emphasize the offensive.
 - b. Relatively minimum attention is paid to fighting a defensive war, as NATO plans for.

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Key Elements of Pact Strategy

- Seize the initiative
- Conduct quick offensive
- Prepare for nuclear escalation

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2. Second, Moscow plans to do it quick. Soviet doctrine emphasizes speed to knock out the West Germans before they can draw on their buildup potential, and to preempt the mobilization of the West and the US buildup in Europe.

3. Third, the Soviets prepare for nuclear escalation. Because they would expect to have the advantage in non-nuclear war, Pact planners expect that NATO will eventually escalate to nuclear war.

B. Let us now take a deeper look at the Soviet view of war in Central Europe.

Graphic

1. Whether or not they had warning, we believe the Soviets would expect to fight for at least the first few days using only the 58 Pact divisions they now have available in Central Europe. Large-scale reinforcements from the western USSR would not begin moving forward until the war started.

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✓ MODERNIZATION

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(b) An invasion, if it were staged, would probably be spearheaded by tactical air and airborne operations, followed by about 30 ground force divisions attacking from several points in Hungary and Bulgaria.

(2) The Yugoslav deterrent rests on a highly organized capacity for protracted resistance and guerrilla war. Yugoslavia plans a wartime mobilization of territorial and civil defense forces numbering some five million people.

Trends

Graphic 24 V. I will now speak of the trend in both NATO and Pact general purpose forces toward more modern and sophisticated weapons and equipment.

A. The Soviets have made extraordinary efforts over past decade to renovate ground forces that were neglected by Khrushchev.

1. Major improvements have been made in armor and mechanization of divisions.

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Trends

NATO

Warsaw Pact

Ground Forces

- New armor, advanced anti-tank weapons, more mobile and better armed West German Territorial Army, more French artillery and tanks, and new combat brigades (3 FRG and 2 US)
- New armor, new self-propelled artillery, mobile air defense

Tactical Air Forces

- New air superiority fighter (F-15), close air support fighter (A-10), and NATO's Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA)
- Greater range and payload aircraft (MIG-23 and SU-17), introduction of precision guided munitions

Theater Nuclear Forces

- Doubling number of F-111s in theater, introduction of F-16s (1980), increase in French SLBMs
- New and mobile IRBM (SS-X-20), new tactical missile (SS-X-21), and nuclear artillery

Naval Programs

- Reorientation of French navy to Mediterranean, new anti-ship missiles
- Improved air defense, new and better ships, major ASW effort

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(It is a huge effort just to maintain inventory of 45,000 tanks.)

2. An impressive program is under way to provide the ground forces with dense, highly mobile, air defenses.
 3. The Soviets are making their field artillery more compatible with tank forces by conversion to self-propelled cannons (they are decades behind NATO in artillery).
- B. NATO also has a variety of programs to modernize and improve combat capability of ground forces. Most significantly, new combat units are being added.
1. West Germany is forming three new combat brigades.
 2. The US is adding two new combat brigades.
 3. The Germans are reorganizing their territorial army to give it much more mobility and firepower.
 4. The French plan to reorganize their army to have more combat units -- especially more tanks and artillery.

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5. NATO armies continue to acquire more antitank guided missiles and new tanks.

C. In their tactical air forces, the Soviets are replacing old aircraft with new ones more comparable to NATO's in range and load-carrying capacity.

Graphic

1. The Soviets are also beginning to acquire modern precision-guided munitions, although they are still far behind NATO in this respect.

2. But NATO is about to make a major leap forward with its tactical air forces.

a. A new air superiority fighter (F-15) is going to Germany next year to replace F-4s.


b. A new close air support fighter (A-10) will be deployed to Europe in 1981 to replace other F-4s.

c. The F-16 will replace F-4s and F-104s in strike and attack roles in several NATO air forces, beginning in 1981.

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Trends in Total Deliverable Payload by Warsaw Pact and NATO Tactical Aircraft in Central Europe



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- d. NATO's multi-role combat aircraft, developed jointly by West Germany, Italy, and the UK, is going into their air forces beginning in two or three years.
 - e. These new NATO aircraft are far superior to anything in sight for the Pact.
- D. Both sides are improving their theater nuclear forces.
- 1. The Soviets will be producing their SS-X-20 mobile IRBM in large numbers. This missile is less vulnerable than the old systems, and gives the Soviets a more flexible nuclear capability.
 - a. A new tactical SSM, the SS-X-21, is to replace less accurate systems.
 - b. The Soviets may be acquiring nuclear shells for artillery.
 - 2. On the NATO side, the US is doubling F-111s in UK, the F-16 tactical fighter will be entering NATO air forces in the 1980s,

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and the British and French are building
5 or 6 new submarines.

E. Naval programs present a similar picture of modernization.

1. The Warsaw Pact is improving air defense for its fleets and building new and better ships. The Soviets are continuing their major effort to develop an effective ASW capability.
2. For NATO, the French navy is being reoriented to the Mediterranean, and NATO navies are acquiring new antiship missiles.

Strengths and Weaknesses

VI. The many asymmetries between NATO's and the Warsaw Pact's general purpose forces make direct comparisons difficult. We can, however, assess the main strengths and weaknesses of the two sides to get a sense of where the balance lies.

A. First, the balance sheet on the Pact.

1. The Pact's main strengths are in:
 - Tanks: twice as many as NATO.
 - Standardization: all the Pact armies use similar organizations, tactics, and equipment.

Graphic
26

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Warsaw Pact

Strengths

- Tanks—twice as many as NATO
- Standardization of organization, equipment and tactics
- Geographic proximity to USSR—the main supply base
- Protection for major command posts

Weaknesses

- Problematic reliability of the East Europeans (50% of Pact forces in Central Europe)
- Critical importance of Pact initial air assault—a high risk enterprise
- Potential vulnerability of tanks to NATO's sophisticated anti-tank systems



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- Geography: proximity of the USSR, the main supply base.
- Protected Command Posts: the Pact is building hardened command posts for all of its major headquarters.

2. The Pact has weaknesses as well:

- Unreliable allies: the Soviet offensive strategy is critically dependent on potentially unreliable allies.
- High risk air plan: if the Soviet tactical air assault fails, NATO's airpower may stop the ground offensive.
- Dependence on a huge tank force: this is a potential weakness if NATO's anti-tank capability continues to grow.

Graphic

27

B. NATO's pluses and minuses shape up like this:

1. NATO's advantages lie mainly in:

- Modern sophisticated equipment, especially aircraft and precision weapons.
- Excellent and relatively more accurate nuclear delivery systems.

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NATO

Strengths

- Equipment—modern and sophisticated (particularly aircraft, tanks, and anti-tank weapons)
- Tactical nuclear delivery systems—excellent
- Reliable and ready allies in critical central region

Weaknesses

- Lack of standardization
- Lack of secure and survivable command and control facilities
- Malpositioning and vulnerable LOCs, disarray of southern allies

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-- Reliable and militarily powerful allies, especially in the critical Central Region.

-- The German mobilization capability.

2. NATO's most serious weaknesses are:

-- A lack of standardization.

-- Malpositioning, especially a vulnerable LOC and a shortage of ground forces in the northern sector of Central Region.

-- The political disarray of southern allies, and

-- The fact that NATO's command centers are less well protected than the Pact's.

(As with most other factors we have examined, there are major asymmetries in the two sides' approaches to command and control. The Pact's system is highly centralized and standardized. NATO has more advanced equipment but is less centralized and less able to integrate its communications. Both sides, from the professional military point of view, have problems with achieving central command in wartime over Allied armies.)

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

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CONCLUSION

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Conclusion

VII. Netting out all the factors raised in this presentation is, of course, highly problematical.

- A. The best we can say is that the Pact, despite its numerical superiority in most ground combat elements, is faced by an impressive NATO defense that it could not count on defeating without enormous risks.
- B. This leads to the judgment that a rough balance continues to prevail.

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6 August 1976

[redacted]
OUTLINE

Section I - Soviet Conventional Forces and the Military
Balance in Europe

Comment on Sources

Deterrence in Europe

Why the USSR is deterred
The nature of the balance

If Deterrence Should Fail

A win-the-war strategy
The Soviet view of war in Europe
The potential for invasion of Yugoslavia

Modernization Trends

Ground forces
Tactical air forces
Theater nuclear forces
Naval programs

Strengths and Weaknesses

Conclusion

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
I. Today we will brief you on the Warsaw Pact-NATO military balance. As such, our briefing will, of course, emphasize the forces in Western Europe. Since the Soviet Union is so large a country, however, and has at least one potential foe outside the European scene, we will completely cover her conventional forces.

Before getting into the briefing itself, however, it would be useful to touch briefly on the intelligence sources we use to develop estimates on the forces, plans and capabilities of Warsaw Pact armies, navies and air forces.

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
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
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
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Documents

D. Then there are documents.

1. These include

-- open sources: regular press,
magazines, military journals,
technical journals

-- sometimes photos: articles with
details we don't have otherwise

-- classified documents we sometimes
acquire.


2. Some of these documents are good, and some
poor, often written in communist jargon for
party consumption without much weight.

a. Sometimes we acquire a gem: doctrine,
or one side of a doctrinal debate, or
a plan or critique.

E. All in all, based on these sources, our large
numbers -- our aggregated figures -- are of
high confidence, although our details can be
spotty.

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e. Another consideration is logistical endurance.

- (1) Warsaw Pact logistical support doctrine and posture is consistent with Soviet quick-war strategy, that is, that an attacking force in Central Europe should have enough supplies on hand for 3-4 weeks of high-intensity combat. This is roughly the length of time they expect to complete a campaign.
- (2) Our information on their actual stocks in Central Europe are sparse but their depots could contain 30 days worth of supplies.
- (3) Most NATO countries also foresee a short war and stockpile supplies for only a month or so of combat, relying mainly on the US for re-supply.

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f. My final point on the balance in Central Europe concerns the MBFR talks. The MBFR negotiations could enhance Central Europe stability, but the goals of two sides presently far apart.

(1) The West seeks to reduce the Pact advantage in tanks and ground force manpower through removal of a Soviet tank army and Pact manpower cuts nearly three times as large as NATO's. The Western objective is to achieve parity.

GRAPHIC

(2) The East seeks to maintain its relative advantage in numbers through equal-percentage reductions of ground, air, and nuclear forces. Establishing a ceiling on West German military strength is a principal Soviet goal.

(3) During the latest session of the MBFR talks, the Soviets took an unprecedented step. For the first time in international arms control negotiations, they actually tabled data on their own forces.


GRAPHIC

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The Common Ceiling

In Thousands



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Warsaw Pact Manpower in Reductions Area

In Thousands

	US Estimates	(Difference)	Figures Tabled by East	NATO Manpower
Ground	950	(-145)	805	791
Air	200	(-17.7)	182.3	193
Total	1,150	(-162.7)	987.3	984

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
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- (a) They stated that Warsaw Pact air and ground force manpower in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany totals 987,300.
- (b) Our estimate of the number of Pact servicemen in these same forces is 1,150,000. Thus their figure is lower than our estimate by over 160,000.
- (c) We are persuaded, however, that the Eastern data do not include all of what we consider active duty military manpower in the MBFR reductions area.
- (d) We believe their initial data have been compiled in a way that supports their claim that manpower parity already exists, thus supporting their position that equal percentage reductions should be the way to take MBFR cuts. I emphasize "initial" because in earlier sessions the East has argued for exclusion

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
of a part of its forces on the grounds that the West employs a large number of civilians to perform functions which, in Eastern forces, are performed by soldiers -- cooks, typists, technicians.

(e) We expect that an East-West discussion of data and methods of counting ground and air forces will bring out the fact that -- when all active duty military personnel are counted -- a substantial manpower disparity indeed exists.

(f) Before this discussion can begin, however, the West will have to table updated figures on NATO's forces. This poses a problem, because the French now refuse to allow the Allies to include their 60,000 troops in West Germany in the count of NATO's strength for the MBFR data discussions.

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The Aegean Area



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- (3) The Soviet forces in the Far East are probably mainly for defense. They are more mobile and have more firepower than opposing Chinese forces, and could not only deliver a sharp rebuff to any Chinese aggression, but also could carry out substantial offensives into peripheral Chinese areas such as Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, or Sinkiang.
- (4) Fear of a Chinese nuclear retaliation and concern about getting hopelessly bogged down in a protracted land campaign inside China are deterrents against Soviet military action.
- b. The Soviets have a general reserve of some 28 divisions and 400 tactical aircraft in the central USSR that could be used against either NATO or China.
- c. Barring a radical improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, we do not believe many -- if any -- of the 40 divisions

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facing China would be turned against NATO.


d. The Soviets also have a fourth fleet, the Pacific Fleet:

- (1) It is large but less modern than other fleets; modern surface ships and submarines are transferred from other fleets. The pace of upgrading seems to have quickened in last two years.
- (2) It is designed primarily to defend sea approaches to the USSR and to destroy Western offensive naval forces.
- (3) The principal bases at Vladivostok (in the Sea of Japan) and Petropavlovsk (in the Kamchatka Peninsula) have submarines and aircraft that are designed to counter US naval forces in the western Pacific.
- (4) Virtually all Soviet naval units that operate in the Indian Ocean come from the Pacific Fleet.

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Soviet Concept for the Offensive



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
- a. Since they no longer expect a massive nuclear exchange at the outset of war, they no longer see a need to get the reinforcements out of the USSR before war begins.
 - b. Even if they had enough warning time, the Soviets might fear that a large buildup in Central Europe would provoke a NATO counter buildup, or even a NATO nuclear strike.
 - c. Anyway, the Soviets seem to believe their currently available ground forces could press an offensive well into NATO territory.
2. Aside from the risk of a NATO nuclear strike, the Soviets see NATO's air power as the main threat to success of their offensive.
- a. To counter the air threat, they plan a massive, phased air attack against NATO airfields.

Graphic

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The First Assault of the "Air Operation" Missions and Operating Areas of the First Three Waves



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(1) The scheme would commit most Pact tactical aircraft, plus much of the medium bomber force in the USSR.


b. The Pact scheme is risky, however.

(1) It depends on tactical surprise which will be hard to achieve.

(2) NATO's airfields are not soft targets.

(3) If it fails, Pact aircraft losses will be heavy.

C. The Soviet view of war in the flanks is somewhat more limited.



Graphic

1. In the northern area, Soviet objectives and missions are threefold:


- to counter naval forces within striking distance of the USSR,
- to protect the entrance to the Norwegian and Baltic Seas, and
- to secure the Danish Straits.

Graphic 21

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Atlantic Ocean Theater of Military Operations: Postulated Initial Wartime
Disposition of Soviet Naval Forces



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Possible Warsaw Pact Airborne Operations
against the Danish Islands and Turkish Straits¹

Danish Islands

1 airborne division (Polish)

Turkish Straits

1 Airborne division (Soviet)

Soviet Airborne Divisions

Number - 7 combat
1 training


Strength per division - 8,000 (total)
- 7,000 (in assault elements)

Transport Aircraft


	<u>Inventory</u>	<u>Surge Availability</u> <u>Days 1-3</u>
AN-12	615	490
AN-22	50	45
IL-76	35	30

¹ Only the combat elements of 2 airborne divisions or 1 full airborne division can be airlifted simultaneously by Soviet military transport aircraft.


Central European Theater of Military Operations: Planned Warsaw Pact Naval and Amphibious Operations



Southern European Theater of Military Operations: Planned Warsaw Pact Naval and Amphibious Operations



**Mediterranean Theater of Military Operations: Postulated Initial Wartime
Disposition of Soviet Naval Forces**



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


2. In the southern area, the Soviets aim to seize the Turkish Straits by land attack through the Balkans and by amphibious landings from the Black Sea, and to counter Allied naval forces, primarily in the eastern and central Mediterranean.
 - a. We have of course also studied the special problem of the Soviet potential for invasion of Yugoslavia.

(1) We conclude that Soviet intervention does not appear to be likely, even after Tito's death, because of the enormous difficulties it would present.


- (a) The USSR and its Pact allies would have to mobilize more forces than in 1968 Czechoslovak intervention. They would need to prepare for both Yugoslav resistance and possible NATO reaction.

Graphic



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Scale 1:1,000,000