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06-18-2012

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[Redacted]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

2 July 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : [Redacted] Report

1. Enclosed is a [Redacted] report. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword [Redacted] has been assigned to the product of certain extremely sensitive agent sources of CIA's Directorate of Operations. The word [Redacted] is classified [Redacted] and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

2. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this report in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

[Redacted]

William W. Wells

[Redacted]


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Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY Poland

DATE OF INFO. June 1975

DATE 2 July 1976

SUBJECT

Mobilization Alert Exercise of Polish 13th Mechanized Regiment Criticized for Poor and Inadequate Performance

SOURCE Documentary

SUMMARY:

This report is a translation of a classified Polish general staff report entitled "Attaining Full Combat Readiness in an Alert Area by the 13th Mechanized Regiment" and four supporting attachments. This mobilization alert exercise which took place on 6 June 1975 appears to have been tragicomedy of confusion, ineptitude, and lack of discipline. The report briefly mentions similar problems in an earlier practice alert of the 45th Fighter-Assault Aviation Regiment. The author complains (Page 6, paragraph c) of discrepancies in the documentation concerning the actual number of men involved in the exercise which varies from 1,481, to 1,745 soldiers. The figures in the attachments are presented as they appeared in the original documents. Despite these apparent inconsistencies, the report is noteworthy for its detailed information on the table of organization and equipment of a Polish mechanized regiment.


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Attaining Full Combat Readiness in an Alert Area
by the 13th Mechanized Regiment

The 13th Mechanized Regiment attained full combat readiness under alert conditions, with call up of replacements for the 2nd Motorized Infantry Battalion and an increment for the 1st Motorized Infantry Battalion, recall of antitank artillery subunits from the Zagan Training Center, and the 7th Motorized Infantry Company from Gublin where it was engaged in a work detail. Other units which were outside of their place of permanent disposition were not recalled.

According to its own plan, the regiment, having subunits not requiring call up of replacements, should attain full combat readiness in an alert area within three hours and 35 minutes, that is by 1540 hours, and with subunits requiring call up of replacements, within eight hours, or by 2005 hours.


The Inspection Determined:

1. The Alert:

a. poor performance efficiency of the duty personnel, particularly of the regimental duty officer; the duty officer received the message at 1205 hours, at 1216 hours he repeated it from memory--erroneously omitting the decrypted text, repeated it at 1223 hours; present at the reading of the last part of the message were the regimental commander and the chief of staff who passively observed the operation of the helpless duty officer and the indifferent attitude of the regimental headquarters as a result of which, the message

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received by the regiment at 1205 hours was transmitted to the subunits only after 19 minutes (1224 hours), and the exit gates were opened after 34 minutes. This is a substantial loss of time, considering that the required time for vacating the garrison is 60 minutes;

b. inadequate internal technical system for alerting the regiment; the duty officer had no direct alert communications (signaling) to all subunits, and some of the existing equipment was out of order, resulting in an archaic method of alerting the subunits: a bugle call assembled the duty personnel to whom the duty officer relayed the alert mission.

2. While Vacating the Post and During the Road March:


a. lack of adequate organization and discipline in loading equipment and vacating the garrison, (equipment loaded on trucks was thrown in a pile, some of the soldiers in caps, some without helmets and gas masks), and in directing vehicular traffic in the motor pool and internal traffic within the garrison, as a result of which (also because of the delay in alerting the subunits), not all the forces and means vacated the garrison within the required time of 60 minutes;

b. inadequate organization, discipline, and support of the road march to the alert area (many separate vehicles, tarpaulin covers on many antiaircraft defense means, improper interval between vehicles, posted, but actually not functioning traffic guard); technical support was adequate.

3. While Attaining Full Combat Readiness in the Alert Area:

a. very inadequate support of operations, especially camouflage, antiaircraft defense and security (no air observation post at regimental headquarters; contamination observation sentry posted, but his windguage was out of order; he had a telephone out of order and could not communicate with the headquarters; the defense and security plan was

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schematic, the same as for previous exercises, totally formal); the soldiers (also includes cadre) know their duties poorly and have not acquired the ability to perform them from force of habit.


b. some of the subunit commanders did not properly understand what constituted the attainment of full combat readiness, which resulted in reporting its completion without issuing the troops appropriate gear, establishing communications (efficient communications between regimental headquarters and the radio link station deployed at Zagan, playing the role of divisional headquarters of the request of the commission, were established only at 2015 hours), removing covers from heavy weapons, or even taking gun barrels out of conservation;

c. discrepancies between reports on combat strength and actual strength, and figures of the subunit commanders and the assigned regimental strength (e.g. regimental assigned strength, according to combat allocations given by the regimental duty officer was 1605 soldiers, according to a report submitted in the alert area, it was 1481 (Attachment 2), soldiers, and according to a report submitted to the LIR [expansion unknown] on the day of inspection, it was 1745 (Attachment 3) soldiers.

4. Direction of Attaining Full Combat Readiness;

a. passive attitude, lack of vigor and effectiveness on the part of the regimental command and of some of the subunit commanders (their intervention is not necessary when attainment of full combat readiness is proceeding according to plan and efficiently, however, is imperative when disruptions occur--but in the 13th Mechanized Regiment not many individuals reacted to them or intervened);

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b. poorly organized command system (the commander and the chief of staff remained at the garrison and had no communications to the subunits after the subunits had vacated the garrison. The R-3 command car of the commander was practically unused);

c. the control team for attaining higher states of combat readiness played almost no role; it had no permanent location; "an alert control point" was organized in the basement of the headquarters building where one officer functioned, but he had no communications to the subunits, and only to the sentries at the gates from whom he received reports on departing vehicles, which in practice made him a recorder of incomplete and inaccurate data; the duty officer had communications with the subunits up to three kilometers; subunits proceeding to the alert area had no communications to the garrison.

5. Efficiency of Mobilization:

a. the majority of the replacements reported at the proper time;


b. variants for receiving replacements outside of the place of permanent disposition were not appropriate;

c. the regimental command did not demonstrate appropriate interest in the integration of the replacements and made no effort to direct the integration.

6. It was Established in Addition:

a. there was inadequate safeguarding of classified military information (open conversations conducted over regular telephones, failure to use available signal communications documents; on the wall of headquarters building, in a

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place visible from the street, an illuminated sign was hung indicating: OPL (=air alert), RA (=departure for the alert area) and the like).

b. the substantive level of regimental combat readiness documents was fairly good, but that of the staff was low;

c. there was a low substantive and formulative level of documentation in the subunits, and a total lack of uniformity (particularly of instructions for duty personnel and combat assignments);

d. the combat readiness training of the cadre was poor, there was a general lack of initiative and determination to maintain it on a high level and to improve it;

e. the percentage of personnel strength maintained at the permanent disposition location was low (63 percent of assigned strength--this percentage will drop to 48 percent when 250 soldiers are assigned to road construction work at Kamine, Oleszno County (on behalf of the national economy) which was planned, but departure of these soldiers was postponed for the period of the inspection; almost half of the regimental subunits do not maintain the required number of troops (70 percent) in constant readiness; the main reason for this is assigning soldiers to work details and demonstration and display trips.

7. Conclusions:

The staff of the Silesian Military District and the 5th Armored Division should prepare a plan for eliminating the deficiencies confirmed during the inspection and supervise its implementation. The plan should envisage additional training and exams on combat readiness for the cadre of the 13th Mechanized Regiment, improving the alert and command system, preparing standard alert procedures for the subunits (cadre and alert duty service) as well as additional training

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the subunits through the combat drill method and then in coordinated activities.

2. By the end of October of this year, the Staff of the Silesian Military District should conduct an inspection of the combat readiness of the 13th Mechanized Regiment in order to verify the elimination of the deficiencies.

3. By the end of July of this year, the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces should thoroughly examine and enforce the proper implementation by commands of military districts and tactical large units of the rules pertaining to the training-production activities and assignment of troops to work while maintaining combat readiness needs.


4. ~~Under the present authorized strength of an operational element--especially those that are poorly trained--the command of a regiment has serious difficulties in simultaneously attaining full combat readiness and in organizing combat operations.~~ This applies not only to the 13th Mechanized Regiment.

Secret Attainment of Full Combat Readiness
by the 45th Fighter-Assault Aviation Regiment

The 45th Fighter-Assault Aviation Regiment received an assignment to attain full combat readiness in secret within a period of 6 hours (2100 hours 2 March to 0300 hours 3 March). The purpose was to gain additional experience and draw conclusions with regard to the secret attainment of full readiness.

After receiving the assignment the command of the regiment did not analyze it nor calculate the time. As a result the message "to attain full combat readiness without the declaration of an alert" was transmitted to the subunits and the cadre in their quarters. The entire personnel strength of the regiment, even the receptionist at the garrison boarding quarters, was knowledgeable of the attainment of full combat readiness.

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The regiment, for practical purposes, attained full readiness in an alert status--without concealing it (with certain delays in time). In this situation, the actions of the commands and subunits were basically correct.

Conclusions:


1. After making the appropriate corrections to the written directives on combat readiness, training should be conducted with the commands of military districts and branches of the armed forces, tactical large units, and units on the subject of these corrections, particularly secret attainment of full combat readiness; subsequently, strict compliance with the newly introduced rules should be enforced.

2. The conduct of an inspection and "experiments" with regard to secret attainment of full combat readiness, without any previous training of the commands of units and tactical large units, misses the objective and should be suspended until corrections are made in Ministry of National Defense Directive Number 001 and appropriate training is conducted.

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Attachment No. 1
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General Staff
Mobilization and Replacement Directorate
11 June 1975

Remarks
on the Method of Implementing
Mobilization-Replacement Activities
During an Exercise
of the 13th Mechanized Regiment

As a unit mobilizing under an alert system the regiment received a major portion of its replacements from the reserve within 8 hours, that is, within the period specified by prescribed directives.


The progress of the exercise, however, revealed that the plan which the unit has for receiving replacements is too schematic and is based on utilizing the garrison facilities. Thus far, an appropriately thought out concept has not been prepared for providing replacements to the unit within the framework of attaining higher states of combat readiness under different variants or under disrupted conditions created by enemy operations. That is also why, in this specifically developed training situation, the essential factor of a threat was omitted, thus ruling out the possibility of conducting mobilization under garrison conditions, and, at the request of the Commission, the reserves were initially directed to the alert area; this, however, was carried out in a hasty manner.

The outcome of the exercise created the impression that, while attaining full combat readiness and in the decisions undertaken with regard to the use of this unit for tactical operations, no consideration was given to the consequences arising from the actual strength level of the regiment and subunits, and that mobilization problems were treated too casually and as outside of the sphere of the command.

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Attachment No. 1
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Conclusions

1. Variants should be worked out for providing replacements to the regiment and for conducting mobilization of the units formed by the regiment with consideration given to the various conditions which might occur in a military situation.
2. Problems on the expansion of units to wartime strength should be included in the sphere of activity and command system of the regiment and the control of their progress should be ensured under the different variants for attaining full combat readiness.


Inspector

Colonel Stanislaw Szybicki
General Staff Academy Graduate

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Attachment No. 3
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General Staff
Specialized Directorate


Report on the State of Combat Readiness
of the 11th Mechanized Regiment on 1 June 1975

Designation of the Information Code Name of the Military Unit	Allocation According to Peace-Time Strength	Assigned Strength According to Peace-Time Strength	Outside of Garrison		In the Garrison		Indicators			Dates	
			Can Be Used	Cannot Be Used	Un- ser- vice able	Serviceable	M-1	M-2	M-3	Updated	Actual Date
	2127	1970				1321	3	448	1774		
Officers	141	141	21	7	0	0	113	109	55	55	40675 26075
Majors	36	8	3	0	0	0	3	22	160	100	40675
Professional Noncommissioned Officers	100	82	23	3	1	0	55	58	95	95	40675 25075
Noncommissioned Officers	318	135	46	4	0	0	65	76	97	97	40675 26075
Privates	1250	1222	416	14	8	0	774	97	98	98	40675
Noncommissioned Officers of Extended Service	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	0	100	100	50575
Privates of Extended Service	0	30	14	0	0	0	20	0	100	100	40675
Vehicle Drivers	203	203	58	2	0	0	143	100	99	99	40675
Armored Transport Drivers	117	131	43	0	0	0	88	96	100	100	40675
Combat Vehicle Mechanic-Drivers	42	42	4	0	0	0	37	38	100	100	40675
T-55 Tank	31	31	4	0	0	0	27	100	100	100	40675
T-72 Tank	0	5	0	0	0	0	5	0	100	100	50575
Wheeled Armored Transporter	108	107	49	0	0	0	64	69	100	100	40675
Armored Cars	22	29	7	0	0	0	22	133	100	100	40675
122mm Howitzer	6	6	6	0	0	0	0	100	100	100	40675
120mm Mortar	9	9	3	0	0	0	6	100	100	100	40675
81mm Mortar	9	9	3	0	0	0	6	100	100	100	40675
82mm Antitank Gun	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	0	100	100	50575
Antitank Guided Missile Launchers-92111	0	6	6	0	0	0	0	0	100	100	40675
Antitank Guided Missile Launchers-9227	6	3	0	0	0	0	3	10	100	100	40675
SPG-9	6	3	1	0	0	0	2	50	100	100	40675
Mobile Antitank Group	103	103	46	0	0	0	57	100	100	100	40675
Mobile Antiaircraft Weapons	4	4	8	0	0	0	4	100	100	100	50575
Antiaircraft Machinegun Weapons	4	4	8	0	0	0	4	100	100	100	50575
Cross-country trucks	6	6	6	0	0	0	0	100	100	100	40675
Miscellaneous and Special Vehicles	111	100	39	0	0	0	62	80	100	100	40675
Command Cars	62	64	14	0	0	0	50	100	100	100	40675
Staff Command Cars for Special Control	7	7	2	1	0	0	4	100	86	86	40675
Armored Prime Movers	2	2	1	1	0	0	0	100	50	50	40675
Wheeled Prime Movers	3	3	0	0	0	0	3	100	100	100	50575
Trailers	22	22	6	0	0	0	15	100	95	95	40675
100-500W Shortwave Radio	2	2	16	0	0	0	35	171	100	100	40675
Ultra-Shortwave Radio Set G3 to 100W	136	149	9	0	0	0	0	100	100	100	40675
Mobile Communications Center	1	1	1	0	0	0	149	100	100	100	50575
FM and PMA Field Cable	130	120	0	0	0	0	0	100	100	100	40675
Bullcharger with Quick-Starting Battery	1	1	0	0	0	0	100	90	100	100	50575
SM-1 Bridge	2	2	2	0	0	0	1	100	100	100	40675
DM Tank Bridge	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	100	100	100	40675
DS, AS Vehicle-Mounted Chemical Spraying Installation	3	3	1	0	0	0	1	100	67	67	40675
Communication-Reconnaissance GAI-69	0	4	0	0	0	0	2	100	100	100	40675
Projectile for DM Antitank Guided Missile Launcher	72	57	0	0	0	0	4	100	100	100	50575
Projectile for DM-AM Antitank Guided Missile Launcher	72	113	0	0	0	0	67	100	100	100	50575

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Attachment No. 4
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Table of Organization and Equipment
for Peacetime and Wartime
of the 13th Mechanized Regiment
of the 5th Armored Division

	<u>WARTIME</u>	<u>PEACETIME</u>
<u>1. Personnel Strength</u>		
Officers	141	141
Warrant Officers	36	37
Noncommissioned Officers	314	319
Privates	1494	1252
TOTAL	1985	1749
<u>2. Weapons</u>		
Antitank Rocket Launchers on Armored Transporter ✓	6	6
122mm Howitzer ✓	6	6
120mm Mortar ✓	9	9
82mm Mortar ✓	9	9
73mm-SFG-9 Antitank Grenade Launcher	6	6
23mm ZSU-23-4 Antiaircraft Gun ✓	4	4
14.5mm Antiaircraft Machinegun	6	6
Military Pistol	307	307
Machine Pistol	1487	1184
Grenade-Launching Carbine	145	145
Sniper Rifle	27	27
Submachinegun	75	75
Heavy Machinegun	27	27
<u>3. Combat Equipment and Transporters</u>		
Medium Tank	27	27
Command Medium Tank	4	4
Armored Prime Mover	3	3
Wheeled Armored Transporter	90	90
Armored Car	12	12
Miscellaneous Armored Transporters	27	27
Miscellaneous Vehicles	206	205
<u>4. Equipment</u>		
Vehicle-Mounted Crane	2	2
Workshops: a) Armored; b) Automotive	8	8
MOC*/Armored Workshop	2	2
Landing Craft	2	2
Bulldozers	1	2
Mine Explorer (Sweeper) Tank Attachment	9	9
Mobile Bridges	5	4
Miscellaneous Radio Sets	140	140
Command Cars	7	7
Communications Center	1	1
Contamination Reconnaissance Equipment	4	4
Vehicle-Mounted Spraying Equipment	3	3
Field Kitchen	14	14

*[Expansion Unknown]

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