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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

20 May 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: From the
Exercise Sphere--1971 Exercises

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DIVISION DATE:
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1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on articles from a ~~SECRET~~ Soviet publication called Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This article reviews eight exercises held in different Warsaw Pact states in early 1971. They included ground forces and tank winter tactical exercises in Bulgaria and Hungary; a combined exercise in conventional offensive tactics with the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany; a combined map war game in long-distance regrouping under combat conditions in Romania; combined staff exercises in naval strike force actions and communications in the Baltic and Black seas; a combined army command-staff exercise in readiness and planning for transition to nuclear warfare in Czechoslovakia; and a combined missile and torpedo boat exercise involving air support in the Baltic. This journal is published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This article appeared in Issue No. 2, which was published in 1971.


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William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

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Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR/WARSAW PACT

DATE OF
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SUBJECT

WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: From the Exercise Sphere--1971 Exercises

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article from a ~~SECRET~~ Soviet publication called Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This journal is published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This article reviews eight exercises held in different Warsaw Pact states in early 1971. They included ground forces and tank winter tactical exercises in Bulgaria and Hungary; a combined exercise in conventional offensive tactics with the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany; a combined map war game in long-distance regrouping under combat conditions in Romania; combined staff exercises in naval strike force actions and communications in the Baltic and Black seas; a combined army command-staff exercise in readiness and planning for transition to nuclear warfare in Czechoslovakia; and a combined missile and torpedo boat exercise involving air support in the Baltic. This article appeared in Issue No. 2, which was published in 1971.

End of Summary

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From the Exercise Sphere

Winter Tactical Exercises in the Bulgarian People's Army

In January -- February 1971, the Bulgarian People's Army conducted winter tactical exercises involving large units, units, and subunits. The principal purpose of these exercises was to train the troops to conduct combat operations in mountainous terrain and under adverse tactical and meteorological conditions. Large unit exercises lasted up to 18 days, unit exercises - 11 days, and subunit exercises - 4 days.

Multiple tasks were worked out during the exercises.

Subunits of the motorized rifle and tank large units learned how to make lengthy marches by day and by night, under any weather conditions, and under the difficult conditions of extremely rugged and mountainous-wooded terrain. Much attention was given to rapid deployment from march formation into approach march and battle formation, to making an organized attack on the forward edge of the battle area, to seizing enemy strong points, and to developing a high-speed offensive in the depth. Coordination between subunits and support of combat actions also were worked out.

The conduct of tactical exercises involving field firing, with the motorized rifle and tank subunits working in close coordination with artillery and aviation, also was practiced extensively. Attention was given to limiting simulations and to actually working out the problems of negotiating areas contaminated with combat toxic agents, overcoming fires caused by incendiary means such as napalm, and negotiating an actual minefield. Artificial obstacles such as barriers and landslides were set up on roads and in gorges in mountainous-wooded areas, and the troops had to actually negotiate them. The subunits and units gained experience and acquired practical skills in reconnaissance, and in seizing and destroying nuclear land mines and low-flying enemy targets.

The special problems of conducting combat actions under winter conditions were considered more realistically. The efforts of the subunits

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and units were directed toward seizing and retaining junctions, roads, inhabited locations and accessible sectors, with extensive use of flanking detachments and groups to approach the flank and rear of the enemy and seize mountain passes. Much attention was devoted to fire control - the timely concentration, allocation, and switching of fire. This made it possible to develop decisive combat actions at high speeds and to achieve the objectives of the battle within a short period of time.

During the tactical exercises, special attention was given to finding the most desirable organization and composition of assault groups and detachments and the methods of operation for them to use when breaking through a fortified area and conducting a battle in an inhabited location, bearing enemy weapons emplacements in mind.

In organizing the defense more attention was given to its intensity, to engaging in battle when encircled, and to combatting enemy airborne landing forces, flanking detachments, and sabotage-reconnaissance subunits. The subunits also were trained to carry out engineer preparation of strong points, to organize a fire system and antitank defenses, and to coordinate the fire of the subunits with the engineer obstacles.

The experience of the winter tactical exercises shows that they constitute a good means of improving the field training of commanders, staffs, and troops, and of increasing their readiness to conduct skilful combat actions in winter under the adverse conditions of mountainous-wooded terrain.

The Experience of One of the Field Exercises in the
Hungarian People's Army

This January a five-day tactical exercise involving a tank division of the Hungarian People's Army was conducted.

The exercises were conducted under extremely adverse conditions. The terrain and the roads were almost impassible, and during the exercise fog alternated with snow, rain mixed with snow, etc. All this required a maximum effort from all personnel, especially from the drivers of the vehicles.

An original method of evaluating the transmittal of tasks to subordinates was used during this exercise.

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In order to ascertain and evaluate the actual efficiency of the work of commanders and staffs; the exercise plan provided in advance for an operational pause during which time the situation which had developed could be carefully analyzed and the manner in which orders were transmitted to subordinates, from the large unit commander down to and including the squad commander, could be checked.

For this purpose, two combined-arms monitoring groups and one monitoring group from each of the arms of troops were formed, using officers from the directing staff. These groups were prepared for their tasks in advance and began carrying them out just before the operational pause. First they checked on how well the commanders of the units and subunits were acquainted with the situation which had developed and the tasks, and on what decision they had made in regard to this situation. Then the examining groups at a predetermined time heard the report of the commander of the large unit at the command post and checked to see what orders and directives had been issued by the staff of the large unit pursuant to changes in the situation and refinements made in the tasks of the units and subunits.

Next the monitoring groups in turn, beginning with the regiment commander and ending with the battalion (division), company (battery), platoon, and squad commanders, made an on-the-spot check of the transmittal of tasks to the appropriate commanders and the execution of these tasks. Particular attention was paid to the transmittal to subordinates of orders and directives pertaining to changes in the organization of coordination and combat support and to monitoring the carrying out of these orders.

At the conclusion of the check, the director of the exercise, together with the commander and staff of the large unit, conducted a critique based on the experience gained, and took steps to eliminate the shortcomings revealed. Immediately after this he gave the order to continue the exercise.

This method of monitoring provided the directing staff with an opportunity to draw accurate conclusions regarding such important questions as troop control, the information system and the methods, timeliness, and accuracy of the information, the reliability of transmittal of tasks to the executors, continuity of coordination, and the providing of combat support during one of the most complex stages of the battle.

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A Combined-Arms Tactical Exercise of Large Units of the
National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic
and of the Soviet Army -- SIGNAL-71

In February 1971 a combined, combined-arms tactical exercise involving large units of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic and of the Soviet Army (Group of Soviet Forces, Germany) was conducted under the code name SIGNAL-71. The exercise was two-sided.

The commander of the forces of a military district, General-Leytenant Ernst, directed the exercise. The directing staff was made up of generals and officers from a district staff of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic and from an army staff of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany.

In preparation for the exercise, the large units of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic and of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, together with the staffs of the divisions and regiments, conducted two-stage command-staff exercises and staff training drills using communications means in place. The motorized rifle and tank subunits held tactical-drill exercises and the artillery and engineer units and communications subunits held specialist arm tactical exercises.

In all about 30,000 personnel, more than 550 tanks, 1,100 armored personnel carriers, and 5,000 motor vehicles, and over 600 guns and mortars participated in the exercise.

The principal task of the exercise was to train commanders, staffs, and troops to repel an enemy offensive without using nuclear weapons; to conduct a high-speed offensive that included negotiating obstacle zones, making forced crossings of large water obstacles and repelling enemy counterattacks and counterstrikes; and to skilfully employ nuclear weapons and exploit the results of nuclear strikes.

During the exercise the following problems were worked out: organizing and improving combined marches, covering a state border and carrying out engineer preparation of the sectors covered, conducting a defensive battle followed by a transition to the offensive, and breaking through prepared enemy defenses from the march.

The exercise was conducted in an area with good engineer preparation. A specially prepared obstacle zone made it possible to train the troops in

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surmounting engineer, chemical, and nuclear obstacles under adverse conditions of a situation.

The method devised for conducting the exercise is of interest. Combat actions at most stages of the exercise were acted out in accordance with the plans of the commanders, taking the activities of the troops into account. Individual standdowns were held to critique the activities of commanders, staffs, and troops, and to repeat problems that had been inadequately worked out.

Much attention was given to working out the problems of coordination between large units and units of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic and the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany during combined combat tasks. For this purpose, during combat actions units of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic were temporarily subordinated to a division of the Soviet Army and, conversely, units of divisions of the Soviet Army were subordinated to large units of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic. The staffs of the divisions of the Soviet Army and of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic exchanged operations groups which had communications means.

To gain time, the control organs made extensive use of the method of having higher and subordinate command echelons engage in parallel work in organizing and planning combat actions. All staffs worked out a single battle plan, both with and without the use of nuclear weapons. Mechanized and automated means were used in staff work to make calculations and to reproduce graphic and textual combat documents. The staff of a division of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic used a special portable machine to reproduce outline maps, diagrams, and other graphic documents.

In order to provide timely information on the situation, selective circuit communications were organized at division and regiment control posts; in addition, information groups of two to three officers were formed in division staffs.

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A Combined Operational War Game on Maps on the Territory
of the Socialist Republic of Romania

In accordance with a plan for combined measures by the Combined Armed Forces of the member states of the Warsaw Pact, during the period 20-27 March 1971, in the Socialist Republic of Romania, a combined front two-stage war game on maps was held on the theme, "the organization and conduct of a long-distance regrouping of front and army troops, involving the negotiation of important natural obstacles while simultaneously repelling enemy aggression and preparing an offensive operation; the regrouping of troops and the conduct of an offensive operation using conventional means, with the subsequent use of weapons of mass destruction".

The game was directed by the Ministry of Armed Forces of the Socialist Republic of Romania. Taking part in it were headquarters of combined-arms formations, the Air Defense of the Country and the Navy of the Armed Forces of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and one operations group from each of the formations of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union and of the Bulgarian People's Army.

The directing staff was drawn from the General Staff, the staffs of the arms of troops, and other central organs of the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the Socialist Republic of Romania. The deputy directors of the exercise came from the Bulgarian and Soviet Armies, along with operations groups composed of six to eight persons each.

During the game the following problems were worked out: the regrouping and combined movement of troops involving negotiation of complex natural obstacles; the preparation and conduct of a defensive operation on mountainous-wooded terrain and transition to the offensive accompanied by a breakthrough of defenses; the repelling of strong counterattacks and counterstrikes; the elimination of the aftereffects of the use of weapons of mass destruction by the enemy; and, the forced crossing of large water obstacles.

The operation was prepared under conditions of a period of threat. At the beginning of the operation, combat actions were acted out without the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons were used by both sides on the seventh day of combat actions.

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During the game, the operations groups were given three hypothetical situations. Two of them specified that the director of the war game hear the reports of the leaders of the operations groups of all the armies. The third specified that each deputy director hear the report relating to his own army.

During the war game, much attention was given to solving the following problems:

- the formation of strong groupings of troops, echeloned in depth on the operational axes;
- the destruction of permanent weapons emplacements in fortified areas, using artillery fire and incendiary means;
- the extensive use of forward and flanking detachments and airborne landing forces to seize passes, defiles, mountain passes, and man-made structures in water obstacles;
- comprehensive support of forced crossings of water obstacles from the march;
- the organization of dependable air defense of rear troops and installations by the combined efforts of the air defense troops of the allied armies;
- the organization of rear services support to strike groupings under conditions of a limited number of highly vulnerable lines of communication;
- the organization and maintenance of coordination between a navy and ground forces operating on a coastal axis;
- the organization and maintenance of operational and combat support to troops engaged in operations using both conventional means and nuclear weapons.

To perform calculations concerning the regrouping of troops, the balance of forces, as well as all types of materiel-technical support, mobile computer stations and several mechanized means were used; this facilitated staff work and reduced the amount of time needed to make calculations.

In conclusion the director provided an overall critique in which the operational course of the war game was examined. A detailed critique containing an analysis of the decisions and an evaluation of the work of the participants was made by each deputy director for his army.

The war game permitted the generals and the officers of the operations groups to exchange experience, acquaint themselves with the methods used in planning an operation, and work out several coordination problems. The game helped to further strengthen friendship and collaboration between the

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fraternal armies of the member states of the Warsaw Pact.

A Two-Level Staff Exercise in the Baltic Sea

In March 1971 the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet, the People's Navy of the German Democratic Republic, and the Navy of the Polish People's Republic held a combined staff exercise to work out the problems involved in the control of their strike forces when destroying enemy ship groupings.

The following components of the allied navies were assigned to participate in the exercise: the staffs and communications centers of the navies, staffs and communications centers of formations and large units, ships of commanders of ship strike groups, and patrol ships.

The problems involved in planning combined combat actions by strike forces of allied navies, and of controlling them in a battle to destroy enemy ship groupings, were worked out. The exercise plan stipulated that the organization of tracking of the enemy by the multiple-arm forces of the allied navies be worked out prior to the beginning of combat actions. It was anticipated that at the beginning of combat actions, preemptive strikes would be delivered to destroy the main forces of the enemy within a short period of time. Ways of countering enemy minelaying activities were worked out.

Control of the forces was ensured despite intensive enemy radio jamming in both the operational and tactical control networks.

The forces were coordinated on the basis of permanently operative documents. This substantially reduced the amount of time needed to plan and organize combat actions and the system of control.

The exercise confirmed the advisability of developing a combined plan for radioelectronic countermeasures. This makes it possible to direct the efforts of each navy more appropriately toward severing or disrupting the operation of enemy radioelectronic means, and toward improving the operation of our own radioelectronic means.

The communications system in effect during the exercise ensured control of the forces. During the exercise, opinions were expressed that it would be advisable to improve communications further by equipping the command posts of the main large units and the ships of the commanders of

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the tactical groups with secure communications means, and that standard forms be used extensively.

A Staff Exercise of Allied Navies in the Black Sea

In February 1971, a combined staff exercise was held, in which the staffs and communications centers of the navies of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Socialist Republic of Romania, and the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet took part.

At the exercise the problems involved in planning combined combat actions by strike forces of allied navies and in controlling ship strike groups during a battle to destroy enemy ship groupings were worked out. Special attention was given to ensuring radio control under conditions of intensive enemy radio countermeasures.

During the exercise, the staff of the navies made an assessment of the enemy and his combat capabilities, worked out proposals on the utilization of forces, and developed organizational documents on combined actions by strike forces and the organization of their control. The documents pertaining to the organization of coordination communications met the requirements of control.

During combat actions, the staffs exercised control over both the national and the coalition groupings.

During the exercise much attention was given to organizing control properly and to making the best choice of operational structure for the forces.

To improve the organization of coordination and control of the forces, the staffs of the allied navies exchanged operations groups.

The volume of information transmitted during this exercise increased somewhat in comparison with last year's exercise. During the exercise approximately 440 messages with an average content of 80 groups were sent. Message transmission time on the whole was within the established norms.

During the exercise it became necessary for the staffs of the navies to develop a whole series of measures designed to sever or disrupt the operation of enemy radioelectronic systems or means and thereby impede

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detection of the strength, battle dispositions, and main axis of combat actions of our forces; to ensure the element of surprise in the delivery of strikes; and to disrupt control of enemy forces and decrease the effectiveness of their use against our forces and weapons.

In concluding his critique, the director of the exercise noted the need to improve the coordination communications system of the allied navies.

A Combined Army Command-Staff Exercise of the
Czechoslovak People's Army and the Soviet Army

In February 1971, under the direction of the commander of a military district of the Czechoslovak People's Army, a combined two-stage command-staff army exercise was held in the field, using communications means and representational troops. The following forces from the Czechoslovak People's Army participated in the exercise: an army staff, the staff of one motorized rifle division with the staff of a motorized rifle regiment and one motorized rifle battalion; the staff of a tank division with the staff of one tank regiment and a tank battalion; the staffs of two artillery brigades, two border brigades, an antitank regiment, and an airborne-air transport regiment. The operations groups consisted of an air army staff and the staffs of two air divisions and two motorized rifle divisions. The staff of one motorized rifle division from the Soviet Army was assigned to participate.

During the exercise the following problems were worked out: bringing the troops to full combat readiness, covering a state border, and planning and organizing an offensive operation using conventional means of destruction with a subsequent transition to the use of nuclear weapons.

The representational troops were brought into the exercise so that the timeliness and thoroughness of the transmission of orders and instructions to the executors could be verified. At the same time the tank and motorized rifle battalions undergoing training were given the objective of working out the problems involved in a long-distance march, commitment to battle from the march, and the conduct of an offensive battle.

The exercise lasted five days. Two days were allocated to solving the problems involved in bringing the troops to full combat readiness, organizing the coverage of a state border, and planning an offensive

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operation. Three days were spent working out the problems involved in conducting the operation: the first day included the repelling of enemy aggression, the second day -- the transition of the army forces to the offensive, and the third day -- the use by the enemy of nuclear weapons and the repelling by the army of strong counterstrikes while developing an offensive with the use of nuclear means of attack.

The total depth of the exercise was 300 kilometers. The activities of the representational units and subunits were conducted to a depth of 180 to 200 kilometers.

During the exercise practical work was done on the problem of incorporating a division of another nationality into an army and organizing communications with it by various methods.

During the exercise a great deal of attention was given to finding a practical solution to the problems of operational camouflage designed to conceal the purpose of the exercise, the composition of the staffs participating, and the acting out of combat actions.

According to the evaluation of the director of the exercise, the training tasks set were, on the whole, accomplished during the exercise.

A Tactical Exercise in the Baltic Sea by Missile and
Torpedo Boat Large Units of the Allied Navies

In April 1971, a combined tactical exercise was held by a missile boat brigade from the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet, a flotilla of the People's Navy of the German Democratic Republic, a flotilla of the Navy of the Polish People's Republic, and aviation of the Polish Armed Forces and the Soviet Army.

The exercise involved working out problems in combatting groupings of enemy surface ships.

A detachment of combat ships composed of a large antisubmarine ship, three destroyers, and twelve patrol ships were made to represent an enemy large unit that had entered the Baltic Sea.

The search for and tracking of the enemy at sea was carried out by reconnaissance aircraft of the Navy of the Polish People's Republic, the

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air forces of the Soviet Army, as well as by torpedo boats assigned from the allied navies, and shore observation and communications posts of the Navy of the Polish People's Republic.

The coalition grouping, which consisted of ship strike groups of the allied navies, using reconnaissance information, delivered successive strikes against the enemy surface ship grouping. The strikes were delivered from different directions at intervals of up to 30 minutes. A total of six ship strike groups participated in the exercise. They delivered four missile-torpedo strikes. The ship strike groups were controlled from the shore command post of the commander of the missile boat brigade of the Baltic Fleet.

Fifteen aircraft from the air forces of the Soviet Army delivered strikes against the naval enemy prior to or following strikes by the ship strike groups. They were controlled by aviation representatives from the command post of the commander of the missile boat brigade. Fighters requested by the directing staff provided air cover for the ships.

The aviation of the Navy of the Polish People's Republic (24 aircraft) independently carried out strikes against the enemy surface ship grouping. They were controlled by the commander of the aviation regiment from his command post.

Aviation used jamming to impede the use of detection and fire control radar by enemy ships. Jamming was initiated prior to the delivery of strikes against the enemy by ship and aviation strike groups.

In addition, the tasks of rear services support to ships in temporary basing areas, and eliminating the aftereffects of the use of weapons of mass destruction by the enemy were worked out, and ship anchorages and coastal channels were swept.

The exercise confirmed the feasibility of creating a coalition ship strike grouping and controlling it from one command post on the basis of permanently operative documents.


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The use of front aviation during exercises makes it possible to work out the problems involved in coordinating naval and aviation forces and to train the staffs of the aviation large units and the aircraft crews to carry out combat tasks at sea.



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