

486

TOP SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

23 May 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : [redacted] Report

1. Enclosed is a [redacted] report. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword [redacted] has been assigned to the product of certain extremely sensitive agent sources of CIA's Directorate of Operations. The word [redacted] is classified [redacted] and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

2. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this report in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

[redacted]
for William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

TS #205445
Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

Distribution:

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U.S. Air Force

Director, National Security Agency

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Science and Technology

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers

TS #205445
Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET



- 3 -

Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY Poland

DATE OF 17 May 1973
INFO.

DATE 23 May 1974

SUBJECT

Polish Critique of Military Exercise
KRAJ-73

SOURCE Documentary.

Summary


This SECRET Polish Ministry of National Defense document presents five speeches which were given by senior Polish military and Party officials critiquing defense exercise KRAJ-73, which was conducted 16-19 April 1973. The purpose of this exercise was the evaluation of "The functioning of the central and regional executive and administrative elements and of the armed forces in time of threat to national security and in time of war". Among the topics discussed were: operational-organizational objectives of the exercise, the need for such an exercise during a period of apparent detente, defense preparedness of the national economy, and recommendations for overall improvement of relevant administrative functions.

End of Summary

TS #205445
Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



- 4 -

National Defense Committee
Secretariat of the National Defense Committee

Secret
Copy No. _____


Speeches at the Critique of Exercise
KRAJ-73

Warsaw 1973

TS #205445
Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



- 5 -

On 17 May 1973 the nationwide defense exercise KRAJ-73 was critiqued.

This publication is designated for use by the leadership cadre of the national defense system, down to the levels of provincial defense committees, provincial military headquarters, and commands of tactical large units.

A comprehensive report on exercise KRAJ-73 will be published at a later date.

TS #205445
Copy # 10


~~TOP SECRET~~



<u>Contents</u>	<u>Page</u>
1. Operational-organizational objectives of exercise KRAJ-73, by Major-General Tadeusz Tuczapski; Secretary of the National Defense Committee, Deputy Minister of National Defense	
2. Speech of Lieutenant General Wojciech Jaruzelski; member of the Political Bureau, Central Committee, Polish United Workers' Party, Minister of National Defense	
3. Speech of Mieczyslaw Jagielski, member of Political Bureau, Central Committee, Polish United Workers' Party, Vice Chairman of Council of Ministers	
4. Speech of Piotr Jaroszewicz, member of Political Bureau, Central Committee, Polish United Workers' Party, Chairman of Council of Ministers	
5. Speech of Edward Gierek, 1st Secretary of Central Committee, Polish United Workers' Party	

TS # 205445
Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~



-7-

Major-General Tadeusz Tuczapski
Secretary of the National Defense Committee,
Deputy Minister of National Defense

In compliance with the guidelines of the National Defense Committee, during the period of 16-19 April of this year, with participation of selected elements from the government administration, national economy, and command elements of the armed forces, there was conducted a nationwide, multilevel command game, jointly with practical defense exercises, in which there participated numerous military contingents, militarized units and civil defense formations:

The objective of the exercise, given the cryptonym KRAJ-73, was "The Functioning of the Central and Regional Executive and Administrative Elements, and of the Armed Forces in Time of Threat to National Security, and in Time of War".

Training objectives were:

1. To test the actual state of preparedness of nonmilitary elements of the defense system designated for participation in the exercise, and of commands and military headquarters, to quickly and harmoniously reach defensive (combat) readiness in the event of a threat to national security;
2. To compare existing and newly adopted organizational structures, functions, and executive and administrative (commands) systems with training practices;
3. To verify the structures and guidelines worked out for functioning of civil defense against the background of particularly complex military situations;
4. To test certain elements of practical operations of the armed forces, contingents, militarized units and civil defense formations, and to test the practical fulfilment of defense tasks by commands and institutions of designated departments;
5. To improve coordination and support of nonmilitary elements and forces of the defense system with command elements of

TS #205445
Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 8 -

the armed forces in the course of fulfilling assigned tasks in support of: mobilization expansion and redeployment of Polish and allied forces; civil defense; counterdiversionary action; salvage and rescue activities; and reconstruction;

6. To test implementation of conclusions from exercise KRAJ-68, their verification in the light of current requirements to improve the national defense system.

Exercise KRAJ-73 encompassed the whole range of preparations for a broadly conceived national defense system, i.e. pertaining to readiness of not only the armed forces but also of undertakings in the nonmilitary system; including primarily--political-defense, administrative-economic, civil defense, public security, and internal law and order problems.

The command-staff aspect of exercise KRAJ-73 included the entire Polish territory; however, of interest to the armed forces was also the territory of the entire Central European area of operations. Practical exercises were conducted in the provinces of Szczecin, Bialystok and Gdansk.

In the exercise there participated:


21 departments of central offices, as follows:

- Party leadership elements (Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party; Supreme Committee of the United Peasants' Party, and Central Committee of the Democratic Party);
- Planning Commission of the Council of Ministers;
- Ministries:
 - Internal Affairs;
 - Education, Schools of Higher Education and Technology;
 - Engineering Industry;
 - Heavy Industry;

TS #205445
Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



-9-

- Mining and Power;
 - Transportation;
 - Communications;
 - Shipping;
 - Health and Social Welfare;
 - Construction and Construction Materials Industry;
 - Local Economy and Preservation of Environment;
 - Domestic Trade and Services;
 - Food Industry and Purchases;
 - Agriculture;
 - \--Chemical Industry.
 - State Council of Materials Management;
 - Committee for Radio and Television Affairs;
 - Office of Atomic Energy;
 - Chief Directorate of Workers' Publishing Cooperative
"PRASA-KSIAZKA-RUCH"
- 5 defense committees, provincial level:
- Warsaw-Capital City;
 - Warsaw-Province;
 - Bialystok;
 - Szczecin;

TS #205445
Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-10-

--Katowice;

5 defense committees, county level:

--Plock

--Hajnowka

--Tczew

--Tarnowskie Gory

--Praga-North (district of Warsaw)

and also reduced-strength operational teams of the remaining regional defense committees.

From the armed forces participated:

--General Staff;

--Commands of military districts;

--Air Forces Command;

--Command and detached forces of the National Air Defense Forces;

--Navy Command

--Central institutions from the element of the Chief Inspector for Territorial Defense;

--Other military central institutions and all the provincial military staffs.

In order to compile a relatively sufficient amount of material to confirm the established defense objectives, most of the concepts and plans were tested on a broad scale in the course of a variety of practical exercises. In those exercises, there participated not

TS #205445
Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-11-

only the designated military contingents but also militarized contingents and civil defense formations.

About 32,000 persons participated in the exercise, including 13,000 soldiers, 3,000 civil militia functionaries and firemen, and 16,000 civilians. Used in the exercise were 2,200 various types of vehicles, 90 aircraft and helicopters, about 200 tanks and armored personnel carriers, 650 radio sets, radio-relays and telephone switchboards, 130 pieces of engineer vehicles, and much other equipment--military and nonmilitary.

Practical portions of the exercise were so designed that besides having training value, they also served definite social and utility purposes. The exercise also presented a convenient and broad opportunity for the population to perform social services. As a result, e.g. 12 kilometers of roads were surfaced with asphalt; many local roads were repaired; about 90 old, condemned buildings were leveled; 6 cities and 18 hamlets were cleaned up; limited assistance was given to construction of housing areas, auditoriums, athletic fields, commercial installations, etc.

As a setting for the unfolding situation of the exercise, we accepted the existing reality, characterized on the one hand by the universal tendency to develop an atmosphere of detente, and on the other hand--the hotbeds of war existing in the world which in certain political conditions could spread, with the possibility of becoming a worldwide conflict. It was also assumed that should such a situation come to pass, the cold-war activities of the backward, revisionist forces of the German Federal Republic could revive, take advantage of growing world tensions and fulfil their policies and announced slogans.

On this background were laid the intentions of the "West", which, motivated by the thesis of "unification of the German nation", decided to use force, and quickly overcome the German Democratic Republic. It was also assumed that with active engagement of the Warsaw Pact forces on behalf of German Democratic Republic interests, the conflict will spread to the other countries of the Socialist Camp and to the NATO countries.

In preparing the possible objectives for the operational-strategic deployment of armed forces, and the switch of the enemy

TS #205445

Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-12-

economy and government to wartime conditions, we took into consideration conclusions drawn from actual exercises conducted early this year: REFORGER, CRESTED CAP, WINTEX, and others.

Acting on information about increased mobilization preparations in the NATO countries, the "East" initiated essential actions to increase its defense readiness, and made appropriate preparations to repel possible aggression.

The basis for actual fulfilment of the tasks was the decision made by the Political Consultative Committee of the member-countries of the Warsaw Pact at its 3 April session to "increase combat readiness".

Consistent with the increasing threat, the National Defense Committee put into force appropriate laws and ordered fulfilment of appropriate, pre-planned defense tasks.

On 6 April the state of increased combat readiness of armed forces was called, and the national government and economic institutions were ordered to proceed to fulfil defense tasks according to checklist I and part of checklist II, to strengthen the forces of the internal affairs department, and to implement civil defense plans.

The successive decisions and resolutions made by the central authorities during the period 7-15 April ordered extension of tactical duty in the missile, national air defense, air and naval forces; improvement of operational situations of tactical large units of ground forces; fulfilment of all defense tasks of checklist II and part of checklist III; initiation of preparations to disperse the population; and preparation of control posts for the central and regional authorities.

Full implementation of tasks pertaining to expansion of forces to states of combat readiness and to defense readiness of nonmilitary organizations and forces took place after 1200 hours on 16 April, on decision of the State Council to declare "a state of direct threat to national security".

The "state of war" was declared by the State Council at 1000 hours on 17 April.

TS #205445
Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-13-

From 6 to 15 April the teams participating in the exercise worked independently on the initial tasks, then, in successive days, completed them according to additional announcements and detailed orders.

For organizational purposes, exercise KRAJ-73 was divided into 3 phases: the first phase included the period from 0800 hours 6 April to 0500 hours 17 April. The theme of this phase was expansion to higher states of defense readiness during the period of growing threat of an armed conflict.

The primary objective of the first phase of the exercise was to test the degree of preparedness of the nonmilitary elements and the armed forces to reach defense readiness in a harmonious integrated process.

As a result of the preparations, the required states of readiness of armed forces were reached; adjustments in the economy and the fulfilment of plan "30" were made; many civil defense functions were performed; and steps were initiated to secure proper internal law and order and public safety.

The second phase of the exercise was from 0500 hours 17 April to 0600 hours 18 April. The theme of this phase was conduct of military operations by the armed forces, and functioning of the government administration and national economy during conventional war.

The primary objective of this phase was to test the state of preparedness of the nonmilitary elements of the defense system and of the armed forces to cope with the results of attack by conventional weapons.


The background for work of the teams was the situation existing on the national territory as of 1500 hours 17 April, i.e. 10 hours after the Bundeswehr aggression against the German Democratic Republic (violation of German Democratic Republic borders), and 5 hours after NATO air attacks on Polish territory.

It was assumed that approximately 700 enemy aircraft operated over Poland, attacking 98 areas with conventional weapons. As a

TS #205445
Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



-14-

result of enemy operations, according to the scenario of the exercise, over 600 entities of the national economy suffered losses and indeterminate casualties among the civilian population resulted in the attacked areas.

Enemy military operations over the national territory caused disruptions, especially in the transportation and signal communications systems, causing certain losses in the economy; however, they did not succeed in causing serious disorganization of the national way of life and the functioning of the national economy. The armed forces suffered certain losses, but this did not affect the capabilities of the forces to fulfil the tasks of the operational plan.

The main tasks fulfilled by the participants in this phase of the exercise included: elimination of the results of the first enemy air attack; continuation of the organization of work and mobilization; replacing losses and moving troops.

The duration of the third phase of the exercise was

--in astronomic time--from 0600 hours 18 April to 1400 hours 19 April;

--in operational time--from 0600 hours 18 April to 1800 hours 21 April.

This phase was devoted to the resolution of defensive problems by the national government and economy and improving operations of the armed forces in conditions of nuclear war, conducted at first on the tactical-operational level, then on a global scale.

The main objective of the third phase was to verify the degree to which the administrative elements and the armed forces had prepared the national defense system to overcome the results of mass employment of nuclear weapons against the nation, and to restore the fundamental economic and social functions of the country.

In the first part of this phase, played on 18 April, further escalation of war operations was planned where the aggressor employed nuclear weapons on a tactical-operational scale, at first

TS #205445
Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-15-

in the area of the front. The "West" decided to use nuclear weapons when the probability of losing the strategic initiative first appeared as a result of the rapid buildup of the "East" forces in the forward zones. At that time the country was still being attacked by conventional weapons.

At 1600 hours 18 April we made an operational time jump to 1600 hours 21 April, i.e. to the fifth day of war. The situation was characterized then by a qualitative change of the ratio of forces in favor of the "East", and by global nuclear war provoked by the opponent.

At the moment the opponent began the global nuclear war, the missile forces and strategic aviation of the "East" carried out a simultaneous nuclear attack against the forces and the hinterland of the NATO countries participating in the war, which considerably weakened the strength and scope of the subsequent series of nuclear strikes of the "West".

According to the scenario situation, NATO forces suffered substantial losses: they lost most of German Federal Republic territory and Belgium, Denmark and Norway decided to withdraw from the war, while the strategic initiative decidedly shifted to the "East".

During this phase--according to plan--the opponent delivered 107 nuclear strikes against our country (including 21 nuclear surface bursts), inflicting heavy losses and destruction.

Population losses were assessed at 760,000 killed and 650,000 wounded, which, together with casualties for 5 days of war, totaled approximately 1,700,000 not counting casualties caused by radiation sickness.

In the national economy there occurred a 30-40 percent drop in reserves and production potential, and more than 1,300 organizational entities suffered losses. As a result, rail transportation of troops was suspended, and rail shipments destined for national economy needs were possible only over some of the local lines. Signal communications on a nationwide scale were seriously disrupted.

TS #205445
Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



-16-

In connection with serious disruptions created in the government and the direction of the national economic system, including mobilization processes, steps were taken to restore its full functional efficiency. Also, as a result of losses, there was an urgent need to replace at once the arms and equipment of the forces.

In the last phase of the exercise, the attention of the participating teams was concentrated on problems emerging from the existing situation, organizing rescue action in areas of nuclear strikes, and on working out plans for action assuring restoration and maintaining the vitality of the principal domains of political-social activities and the economic life of the nation. This phase concluded exercise KRAJ-73.


* * *

In order to more fully present the political-strategic objectives of the exercise, and depict the practical course of some of its tactical elements, allow me to show you a film prepared for that purpose.

TS #205445
Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



-17-

Member of the Political Bureau, Central Committee,
Polish United Workers' Party, Minister of National Defense
Lieutenant-General Wojciech Jaruzelski

Esteemed Comrades:

Exercise KRAJ-73 was conducted during the development of positive processes in the international arena, in circumstances of apparent detente. Nevertheless, reflecting the vital needs and defensive tasks of our nation, it constituted a measure still remaining to be performed.

It is true that a potential military confrontation, so conspicuous during the first postwar exercise, recently moved to second place, as if forming a discreet background for the continuing talks and negotiations. The substance of this background remains unchanged, however, and the essence of the facts is that it (a potential military confrontation) is created by the realities of alignment and the ratio of forces in the respective zones or regions and particularly on a worldwide scale.

Unfortunately, realities formed at present do not remain so forever. The ratio of forces is a function of many factors of social-economic, scientific-technical and military processes on both sides; it is a category of change, and therefore it should be looked upon not only as an established state of being but also as a unified, future view and long-range potential dynamic. Awareness that in the last resort this very ratio of forces will be synthetically determining the assurance and future position of socialism in global competition with capitalism, evokes constant concern and the highest responsibility in this regard.

Regardless of the various controversies, internal contradictions, and even decentralizing tendencies, despite the sensing of realities by some leading politicians and certain Western circles particularly interested in economic relations with the East, a common anti-Communist denominator in the final analysis still ties together the capitalist centers of the world--from the USA through Europe to Japan.

The United States, commanding the greatest military power of the West, strives to retain the leadership--formulates the overall

TS #205445

Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-18-

objectives, and influences the distribution of global tasks. At the same time she aims for greater freedom of movement, freedom for intercontinental maneuver. For this reason she concentrates her efforts to react on strategic weapons, channeling substantial additional funds for their further development, e.g. funds freed by withdrawal from direct involvement in Vietnam. She continues to encircle the world with her bases while arguing that the European situation constitutes a remarkable strategic trump card for the Soviet Union. The truth is that the United States has moved up forward and maintains in the European sea-land zone a substantial part of its submarine-missile forces, strategic air bases, and large air strike forces, including aircraft carriers, which, as happened in 1971, have penetrated as far as the Baltic Sea. They have moved their forces far out beyond their territory, beyond the American continent but close to the Warsaw Pact countries, at operational ranges reaching into the vital centers of the Soviet Union. This is the situation which creates the specific geo-strategic asymmetry which must be taken into consideration in all disarmament deliberations.

In turn, in Europe, the integration of the Common Market countries is progressing. Simultaneously, within the general framework of NATO, more and more perceptible is the image of the so-called Eurogroup, reaching for a certain form of autonomy where, among other things, there are noticeable, especially in recent years, intense processes of cooperation in armaments production. Other examples of this tendency are the recently intensified efforts to form the so-called independent European nuclear power on a common, allegedly exclusive, British-French base--which, in practice, sooner or later, the German Federal Republic could inevitably join.


On a parallel axis, under American pressure and against the resistance of some of the partners, the armaments budgets grow bigger and intensive strengthening of the military potential of Western European NATO countries as a whole continues. Their share of the joint armament effort within that pact increased from 10 percent in the first half of the fifties to almost 30 percent realistically predicted for the current five-year period, where the fastest increase in the rate of those expenditures--as high as 25 percent--and only in the 1970-1972 time frame--appears in the German Federal Republic.

TS #205445

Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



-19-

Finally, in the Far East area--Japan, upon reaching the economic status of a world power, with the consent and, recently, even with US encouragement, refuses to accept the contemporary postwar role of a military "Cinderella". Her continued, and possibly accelerated arming can mean a duplication of the concepts earlier applied in the German Federal Republic.

Also, Chinese arming is without a doubt indirectly or directly taken into account in the calculations of imperialist strategists, in connection with their reckoning on confronting the Soviet Union with the necessity of extensive disruption and deconcentration of defensive forces. This is one of the fundamental conditions for starting a new war, or even for attempting blackmail against socialism, against its European positions and territories.

In addition, careful attention should be given to the still unextinguished hotbeds of war; to the superficial or even illusory character of some of the armistices; and to numerous, still open or only partly resolved problems.


A highly characteristic feature of the current phase is the simultaneous process of detente and continuing growth of military budgets and the armaments race--even though recently this term is used less frequently.

So, on one hand--armaments, being a tool of the classically reactionary interests of imperialism, a means of war and brute force, constitute at the same time, for all sorts of particularly influential industrial-military complexes--maximum profit production. For this reason, the idea of armaments limitation encounters from those quarters double resistance--the main objective brake on detente.

On the other hand, meaning us, in order to overcome this resistance, in order to assure peace policies a chance for consistent consolidation and the acceleration of detente processes--it is essential to have a defense force for socialism which is reliable and appropriately powerful to the task. This is how we interpret and try to implement the comments of Comrade Edward Gierek, made at the Party Conference of the Pomeranian Military District: "One of the primary factors making peace policies of the socialist community successful--which we will systematically

TS #205445
Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~



continue to strengthen--is our collective defense force. It is a shield for building socialism, a guarantee for international security; it creates indispensable conditions for fulfilling the rules for peaceful coexistence".

As a rule, the factors of military potential appropriately modified are presented in the West for hasty, internal or external consumption. Sometimes they are used to demonstrate the superiority of the Warsaw Pact, and on other occasions to boastfully brag about the alleged superiority of their own weapons and armies. In this situation we have to view the ratio of forces especially soberly. Evaluating military potential we should see the result of many constantly developing reciprocal and complementary elements: nuclear and conventional weapons, offensive and defensive weapons, strategic and operational-tactical forces, capability to operate on land, sea, in the air and in space, the state of scientific-military research, the efficiency of the control system, combat readiness and readiness of the mobilization base, intellectual values, discipline and the training level of the soldier. From this list, still incomplete, it is evident what a highly complex problem is, and continues to be, to find during disarmament negotiations a common approach and language expressing equal security.

At this point it would be relevant to direct attention to several current trends in the development and activities of the probable enemy.

To start with, a few remarks on the subject of development of intercontinental strategic weapons. This development is mainly expressed in the outright bounding growth of the missile salvo. As a result of rearming with so-called multiple warhead missiles launched from US territory and from nuclear submarines, this salvo more than doubled during the last three years, to a total of 3,600 nuclear warheads (not counting the relatively small British salvo, and for obvious reasons, the French), and by the end of 1975 it will increase 2.5 times, to a total of 9,300. Further qualitative improvement of those weapons, no doubt, will aim for introduction of maneuvering warheads aimed independently at a given target.



American strategic bombers which only a few years ago appeared to be a weapon of a doubtful future, are going through a

renaissance. Their low resistance to antiaircraft weapons improved again as a result of rearming them with modern and continuously improved missile/nuclear missiles of the "air-ground" class, and with qualitatively superior radio-electronic warfare equipment. Having this in mind, work on construction of a new, future type, strategic bomber (codename B-1) is currently in progress.

A characteristic phenomenon is--so to say--removal of the most powerful striking power--strategic nuclear weapons--from land launchers and placing it on submarines in the depths of seas and oceans, and to a lesser degree in aircraft, therefore into space. If in 1959--100 percent and currently about 90 percent of the American arsenal of nuclear missiles were on land, then in the future, after completing construction of the projected series of new nuclear-powered submarines (the Trident program)--only 10-15 percent of them will remain on land.

The increasing popularity of the multi-purpose, tactical missiles installed on all classes of ships, is the other particularly important trend in the development of modern naval forces.

In short, the development of strategic weapons continues intensively, despite limitations within the framework of SALT-I. However, it is not "shooting at one target". It is a matter of great historic importance, that the power of the strategic weapons of the Soviet Union created in this regard a new situation. Here, the outstanding growth of the Soviet Navy, constituting a strategic-psychological and military-technical phenomenon of the last 10 years, deserves special attention.

However, it would be a mistake to anticipate the twilight or the declining role of classic forces or--let us call it--forces of continental importance. They are an absolutely indispensable component factor of the military potential. Furthermore, the current tendency is to emphasize the significance of those forces. In NATO circles, lively discussions and all sorts of "options" for a longer phase of continental and conventional warfare continue.

This tendency, of immediate interest to us, is complemented by intensive modernization of NATO forces in the Central European area. Particularly increased is the mobility and strike capability of enemy forces. For example, during the last two years the

~~TOP SECRET~~

-22-

Bundeswehr itself absorbed an additional 330 Leopard tanks and 1,000 Marder, modern personnel carriers. Firepower, both conventional and nuclear, is increasing. The number of American and West German launchers for the Pershing operational missile deployed in the German Federal Republic, increased six-fold from 28 in 1970 to 180 currently. The present tactical missiles are being replaced this year by the Lance missile of three times greater range. Of course, other modern weapons and equipment could be mentioned here, and attention could be drawn to intensified duty procedures, mobilization momentum, vigorous training, etc.

We do not underestimate the offensive potential represented by the NATO ground forces. However, we believe that they do not constitute the primary factor of threat, nor particularly, of surprise. With the current ratio of forces, other means present the gravest threat: means which, in the event of massed and theoretically possible surprise employment against the defender, would be able to quickly and profoundly change this ratio. I would like to add, that thinking about the abovementioned possibility could, in some situations favorable to imperialism, lead to an adventuristic temptation.

NATO air forces, as the principal weapon of the first phase of attack, fit perfectly the criteria mentioned above. According to a recent statement of Lt.-Gen. Rall, Inspector of the German Federal Republic air forces, defensive combat is inappropriate for the Luftwaffe.

Indeed, to have 80 percent of the strike-reconnaissance type aircraft in the structure of NATO air forces in the Central European area indicates an unusually high coefficient of its offensive character. In addition, over the period of the last two years, the core of the strike force of this grouping was significantly modernized. As many as 30 percent of the aircraft were replaced by modern aircraft of considerably higher speed, range and payload parameters (e.g. total weight of their single missile/bomb salvo increased during that time by 55 percent).

So far, the new aircraft are primarily the American F-4 Phantom and F-111. But West European aircraft industry is also beginning to win strong positions; introduced into service were British Harrier vertical takeoff and landing aircraft and Buccaneer

TS #205445
Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-23-

bombers; they began to introduce the Anglo-French support aircraft Jaguar; West German research on the multi-purpose Panavia-200 (MRCA-75) continues; and West German-French work on the Alpha Jet is in progress. Simultaneously, improvement of aircraft armament is intensified. For example, the American pilots in Europe, the majority of whom received--let us call it--experience during the Vietnam aggression, were issued bombs with laser and television aiming systems for their Phantoms.

All of these activities are accompanied by comprehensive efforts in the field of signal communications and control. Underground command and control posts continue to be constructed, and over Western Europe, appropriately designed aircraft are continuously conducting airborne duty with replacement staff teams. Systems of strategic and operational tropospheric and satellite signal communications are expanded and deployed. The construction program of reinforced shelters for combat aircraft and equipment on airfields is in its final stage of completion. In addition, systematic exercises shifting the air forces--so-called double basing--from the USA to Europe coincide with the fact that the Americans are constructing on their bases in the German Federal Republic 50 percent more shelters than the number of aircraft permanently stationed there.

In this day and age, air is increasingly becoming an active area of war. At the same time, air strikes against ground targets appear more menacing. This fact finds confirmation in the conflicts of the postwar period, and it should draw our continuous and intensive attention, especially since Polish territory lies within range of practically every combat aircraft of NATO.

All this is organically tied to reconnaissance--the essential condition for calculating the effectiveness of a surprise strike. This is the sphere in which the potential enemy even now, in peacetime, is conducting vigorous activities; he is attempting not only to see us but to x-ray us.

Consequently, espionage--supported by the latest equipment and techniques--is required to intensify penetration of the countries of the Socialist Camp during political detente and increase various contacts in East-West relations. Participating in these activities also is the Western military attache personnel in

TS #205445

Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-24-

Poland, who last year made 175 field trips in order to detect military installations, most of them in the coastal provinces.

Reconnaissance of our areas, of our defense systems, is conducted continuously, particularly from sea and air. Special ships of the Bundesmarine, probing the Baltic coasts near Polish sea borders, stayed 41 days in 1971, and last year as much as 72 days. Special aircraft of the Luftwaffe and some American and British aircraft fly an average of two or three sorties a day.

NATO reconnaissance aviation, already strong and expanded out of proportion, received during the last two years 60 percent new, improved aircraft. Those aircraft have a much better photographic capability, especially at night and at low altitudes, and are capable of conducting radar, television and infrared observation. The next qualitative jump in long-range penetration of our territory might be made by the latest novelty in this area. I am thinking of American experiments with a specially equipped Boeing 707 which, while on duty in the air, can detect and track aircraft flying even at very low altitudes and at ranges up to 700 kilometers.

Finally, satellite reconnaissance--a relatively young activity, and already of impressive strategic consequence--continues to be rapidly developed. It should suffice to say that in every 24-hour period a radioelectronic reconnaissance satellite flies over Poland six times, and a photographic satellite twice. Also, the American experiments within the framework of the Skylab program which began a few days ago include some direct or indirect studies and activities serving reconnaissance purposes.

Elements of the currently waged radioelectronic warfare occupy a central position within the intelligence complex. These activities should pinpoint locations, the purpose and operating procedures of radio traffic of our military radioelectronic systems, especially those systems which support operations of our air defense. Obviously, this is preparing some sort of a base for an attack. This base would be capable, among other things, of employing a whole gamut of means, so-called radioelectronic countermeasures, with which enemy aircraft are richly equipped, with the intention of disrupting, blinding and jamming particularly sensitive commands, thus paralyzing the air defense system as a whole.

TS #205445
Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-25-

There are other important elements which also, from a long-range point of view, have a strong bearing on the estimate of the probable enemy--on the threat picture..

One of those elements is the infrastructure and operational preparation for military operations of the territory of the Central European NATO countries. The population density of those areas is a matter of common knowledge, on the average 2.5 times greater than of Poland, and stemming from this and from the industrial development achieved--a very high degree of urbanization. Finally, the density of airfield nets, railroads, highways (not to mention the net of superhighways) ports, harbors, waterways and other hydrotechnical installations, water, liquid fuels and gas pipelines, electric power nets, etc.--all of these are in a higher class than ours. Superimposed on this is the richly developed and appropriately integrated NATO logistical infrastructure.

Adding to this the armed forces and their mobilization reserves, the sum total constitutes a tremendous, saturated base, and also a great network and labyrinth of possibilities leading to the brink of a strike. This estimate is completed by the barrier-like effects produced on the axis from the East by mountain ranges, rivers, canals and flood areas, and especially by strongly developed antiaircraft, antitank and nuclear mine systems.

Of course, the picture of the West European area is not painted in just one color. Its dense, concentrated demographic-economic nature would be a particularly sensitive factor in the event of a nuclear war. Also, it is relatively shallow and to a great extent depends on support by sea lanes. Nevertheless, this area strongly unites and integrates NATO countries, making the military potential factor difficult to calculate and to subject to direct examination within the framework of possible disarmament negotiations.

In a long-range look at the ratio of forces, a particularly sharp outline is presented by scientific-technical progress, its momentum in general, and competent exploitation of its achievements for military purposes. Competition in this field indeed carries decisive importance: To fall behind may mean defeat.

Besides other difficulties, technical progress in military matters happens to be also the most costly. Not only each

~~TOP SECRET~~

TS #205445
Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

-26-

generation of weapons but even an improved version, means a high, frequently many times higher, price. At the same time, related and operating costs also grow. I'll give you at least one example of this: During rearming with MIG-17, MIG-21F, and MIG-21M, the prices went up, in ratio, 1 to 4.5 and 8.8 and operating costs (one hour of flying) 1 to 3.3 and 4.7.

In this situation, cost levels rise steeply, which even the most affluent countries appropriately reckon with. The time is past when there was a balance of the components of military growth potential between the qualitative and the quantitative. Now, preference must be given to one of these factors; to the one which is capable of making up for the other, and the one which cannot be contained: scientific-technical and technological progress, therefore placing the main emphasis on quality.

In the above light, it is not by accident that last year's agreements at the so-called SALT-I pertained only to quantitative aspects. Because here, regardless of all other considerations, the additional pressure of objective principles was helpful to induce the United States to agreement.


Therefore, competition oriented towards higher quality continues and is cumulative. A significant portion of the results of scientific research and development finding application in improvement of armaments is, after all, created in civilian sectors. This is particularly true in the sphere of basic sciences, where discoveries, as a rule, bring significant, higher order growth, and frequently even a qualitative breakthrough.

The postwar years introduced several revolutionary advances of this kind, to mention a few: nuclear weapons, jet and rocket propulsion, and electronics, including computers. In turn, the seventies will, no doubt, be under the influence of quantum electronics. Already today, lasers are used on an ever larger scale as rangefinders, in navigation, signal communications, and observation and detection systems. For tomorrow, the prospects for developing lasers into a neutralizing or countermeasures weapon against the flight of high speed air targets is, among other developments, realistic. Important strides are being made also in developing other techniques and weapons.

TS #205445

Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~



The momentum of development of modern military technology carries with it of course, the possibility of a leap forward which could place the socialist countries in a disadvantageous position, subject to pressure or blackmail. The current balance of forces therefore calls for special alertness in this matter. Every technological move of the probable enemy should be deciphered in advance, at its inception, and his every move should be met with appropriate reaction and readiness for active opposition. This is done effectively by the Soviet Union--the great, formidable socialist world power. Bearing the tremendous burdens of the scientific-technical effort, she assures for us and for the entire socialist community protection and assistance in this field. In these efforts we are participating and we intend to continue to participate, contributing the scientific and armed forces' potential of our country.

The current imperialist military doctrine changes rather frequently. This stems in great measure from their successive failures, meaning inability to assure fulfilment of anti-Communist goals. They should not be ignored, however. The probable enemy adapts himself with flexibility to new political and military-strategic situations, to changes in the ratio of forces, and to new weapons of warfare. He would like to enjoy freedom of maneuver between gradual and sudden entry into military operations, between gradual and sudden entry into military operations, between the options of nuclear and conventional warfare, including intermediate possibilities. It must therefore be assumed that the latest decision in the Pentagon to start mass-producing miniaturized nuclear charges will also bring into effect appropriate doctrinal modifications. Our exercise took this flexibility into consideration in its political-strategic background.

Exercise KRAJ-73 gave us the opportunity to familiarize ourselves more thoroughly with the principles and methods of operation against factors threatening our country which are variable in time and space.

The exercise emphasized once more the fundamental principle that ability to defend is and must always be the function of realistic evaluation of forces opposing us. During the process of fortifying our defenses, we must measure up to the actual status and to the projected capabilities of the probable enemy,

TS #205445
Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

-28-

and particularly to his capability to switch from a state of peace to a state of war. This cannot be allowed to develop into a gap. Catching up could be too expensive, if it were at all possible, in contemporary conditions.

Obviously, tied to this is the responsibility and complexity of projecting the development of armed forces. Planning becomes a platform for competing against the opponent; it should assure the feasibility of reacting defensively in every situation; it should properly define the essential boundaries of readiness and the modernity of the armed forces.

The factors determining the size and modernity of forces are our demographic-economic and scientific-technical potentials supplemented by the interallied cooperation system. Maximum efficiency of utilization of allotted resources demands constant modernization of methods of military economy, rationalization of organizational solutions, and meticulous observation of rules for intensifying and stimulating development of the armed forces, not through quantitative growth but through qualitative change. We visualize here a need for further widening of interrelations of military-administrative systems with the national economy, modeled on existing patterns in mobilization, research and development, maintaining reserves of supplies, etc.

Our greatest historical prize is the fact that we don't have to plan the defenses of our country and the development of our armed forces in isolation. Poland's participation in the Warsaw Pact, and particularly friendly working ties with the Soviet Army, create within the framework of interallied cooperation the possibilities to weld together and concentrate efforts on selected, specific problems and sectors. This gives us defense optimism, an awareness and a fully realistic feeling that the Combined Armed Forces are able to cope with all problems stemming from developing situations.

In compliance with these guidelines, the basis for our military doctrine is harmonious union of national elements with interallied elements. In the spirit of this doctrine, we are preparing our armed forces for operations on the external front (combat zone), and for fulfilling tasks in the internal system of national defense. These tasks rest at the foundation of our solutions in

TS #205445

Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-29-

the system of combat readiness of forces and their mobilization expansion, and also at the foundation of our ideological-educational, operational-training, structural-organizational, and resource-technical activities.

Operations on the external front (combat zone) which during the exercise were outlined for information only, in actuality--besides strategic nuclear weapons--will decide the conduct and the outcome of the war. Within the system of those coalition operations conducted by the Combined Armed Forces, we are an essential, dependable command. We make a substantial contribution; we have on that front a major position, and we are charged with responsible tasks. Finally, we contemplate our specific opponent, with whom, in the event of war, we could collide. In a possible encounter, our particularly strong point will be our tank force, our tanks and armored personnel carriers supported and protected by air forces and by missile fire, artillery, and also by the operations of other components of the armed forces. Even in conditions of nuclear operations we are not going to be just the victims. Because of our participation in the coalition, because of our cooperation with the Soviet Army, we also will be employing this very powerful weapon.

The next item which I desire to discuss is Air Defense of the Country. It is the first line of Poland's defenses. Its particularly vigilant combat-duty readiness, its infallibility must always be of highest quality. Repelling the first strike above all, and subsequently defending our skies--is obviously and eminently, an operation fulfilling the tasks of overall defense of the country. On the other hand, the key strategic task in that phase of the war will be the fastest possible, with minimum losses, movement of allied operational large units from the depths of the interior to the external front (combat zone). Therefore, also in this aspect, the role of our territory, and in particular the role of air defense, has its own great relative significance.

Consequently, the National Air Defense forces are a preferential command in our armed forces as far as structure and equipment are concerned. In those forces, the material value per soldier is almost twice as high as the overall army average. Protection of the coastal axis demands the most effort. The sea frontier of the Polish People's Republic is the point of direct

TS #205445
Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-30-

contact with the probable enemy, with his air, naval and air-borne forces. For this reason, coastal defense has a many-level, multi-form character, and requires unified effort of various military and nonmilitary commands. This was reflected in the substance of the operations of the participating headquarters of the Pomeranian Military District, the Navy, Border Guards, and appropriate regional military staffs in their coordination and support activities with appropriate defense committees and departmental elements. Continuous reinforcement of the impenetrability of the seacoast against any enemy will remain an unchanging, important task among our priority goals and needs.

Optimal employment of highly organized military forces armed with modern equipment requires appropriate support instruments. They include control, intelligence and security.

Control is, and must continue to be, improved on a broad front, in every aspect, and in all commands. We are fulfilling this comprehensive program. From rigorous training of commands and staffs, and methodical improvement of qualifications of the entire cadre, including scientific organization of work, through improvement of the organizational-administrative structures to intensive development of military information science in stationary and in field systems. Among other things, the exercise gave us the opportunity to share the results obtained by military information science, and to become familiar with its relation to the national information system.

The problems of intelligence always have the "green light" in all branches of the armed forces. We treat intelligence as the leading field in the encounter with the probable enemy even in peacetime, and we give it highest priority in all exercises without exception, emphasizing speed, precision and effectiveness of the entire intelligence cycle. The leading role in its development is played by electronic technology.


Security, in connection with the intelligence penetration conducted by the enemy, has become already in peacetime an element of active warfare. Therefore, security should also relate to countermeasures against sabotage forces. Present-day security, besides applying the traditional methods and means, such as safeguarding national, military and official secrets, counterintelligence, or physical and technical security, must progressively

TS #205445

Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



-31-

include--first--misinformation and deception, and second, radio-electronic methods and equipment.

The high ideological and moral level of a socialist army, acting as a material force, is an incomparable and very essential factor of superiority over the probable enemy.


Our people's army draws these values from the guidance of the Party, from her Marxist-Leninist ideology, and from the spiritual qualities of a nation building socialism. And the army is an active element of civil education. It is doing and will continue to do everything possible to make military service a better school of patriotism and internationalism, of ideology and discipline, of good organization and diligence, of technical culture and of socialist norms of coexistence.

Exercise KRAJ-73 as a successive, important phase of improvement of the defense system of our country, was simultaneously a deliberate review of the armed forces. The role and significance of the exercise are emphasized by the fact that it took place on the 30th anniversary of the Polish People's Army, and was a specific contribution in fulfilling the resolution of the Secretariat of the Central Committee referring to celebrations of this anniversary.

TS #205445
Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



-32-

Member of the Political Bureau, Central Committee, Polish United Workers' Party, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers
Mieczyslaw Jagielski

Exercise KRAJ-73 served as an indicator of the economic-defensive potential of the nation, which has been achieved, and of the preparedness of the national economy to function in conditions of threat to national security, and in conditions of war. The results of the exercise, in general, justify positive assessment of the state of defense preparedness, and also confirm the correctness and effectiveness of current social-economic policies of our Party.

Founded on the program of the VIth Party Congress, the swiftly progressing growth of the economic potential of the national and its modernization, directly or indirectly serve also the expansion purposes of the defense system of the nation. Based on guidelines furnished by the leadership of the Party and the Government, we take defense requirements into consideration in plans for social-economic development of our country, during their implementation, and during routine guidance of economic processes.

They find expression in dynamic and modern industrial expansion, including the armaments industry, the power industry and other economic areas, and also in:

--accelerated construction of modern arterial road, city bypasses, collision-free road crossings, etc., facilitating fast movement of forces in time of threat;

--progressive accumulation in the national economy of motor transport stock, allowing its more efficient utilization by the armed forces, and for rescue purposes;

--accelerated construction of hospitals and health service stations outside of the large administrative-economic centers, and of a tourist-recreation base which in time of threat could serve hospital purposes;

--development of a modern stockpiling and storage base situated in the environs of the cities which makes it less

TS #205445
Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-33-

vulnerable to destruction, and places the sources of supplies closer to the dispersed population.

Among the activities reinforcing the defense system of the country we intend to:

--first--prepare the national economy to meet the needs of mobilization expansion of the armed forces, and of efficient movement of our own and allied forces through our territory;

--second--prepare the national economy to operate and function in conditions of threat and of war;

--third--prepare civil defense, giving special consideration to safeguarding--in the event of enemy strikes--the most threatened, large agglomerations and concentrations of population.



Exercise KRAJ-73, in general, constituted justification of the current trend of defense preparations in the national economy, and of the basic defensive undertakings of ministries and of provincial defense committees.

Positively evaluated through testing during the exercise was the preparedness of the national economy for efficient fulfilment of deliveries and services to the armed forces in conditions of threat. In particular, this concerns assuring appropriate increase in the production of the armaments industry, immediate deliveries of equipment and quartermaster supplies, requisitioning of vehicle transport and construction machinery, deliveries of medical equipment and drugs, and mobilization callup and formation of militarized contingents. Also positively evaluated were efforts to systematically buildup technical stockpiles, especially medical, transportation, fuels and lubricants, and stockpiles of governmental supplies and raw materials in short supply..

Confirmed was the necessity to prepare estimated annual plans, and particularly, to define in them the production goals and investment programs requiring fulfilment in the event it becomes necessary to change the economy from peacetime to war conditions.

TS #205445
Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~



There became apparent the essential role of the prepared comprehensive program of tasks to be fulfilled in governmental administration and in the national economy in the event of threat to national security.

Those plans and programs, appropriately amended as a result of exercise KRAJ-73, will serve as guidelines for economic activity in time of threat and war.

I will not name other positive evaluation elements of state of defense preparedness. I have limited myself to the basic matters, to those most important from the point of view of objectives of exercise KRAJ-73. I will discuss, however, the weaker spots and gaps in defense preparedness of the national economy as revealed broadly during the exercise.

The problem which caused most discussion during the exercise was perhaps the issue of civil defense preparedness. In this relation, I want to mention some matters pertaining to dispersal of the population and construction of shelters. Having in mind the actual state of shelters in Poland, it can be said that the prepared concept for dispersing the population is, in general, correct. However, the methods implementing it require further work, even essential changes in the program.


The exercise revealed that the prepared plans for dispersing the population were not sufficiently integrated with activities conditioning the fulfilment of those plans, and in particular with potentialities for assuring transportation, shelter, food supplies, drinking water, medical care, etc. for the dispersed population. Therefore, it is of vital importance to prepare comprehensive population dispersal plans coordinated with the abovementioned activities.

The program for building shelters for conditions of threat should be thoroughly changed. From data furnished by the regional systems and recapitulated by the Ministry of Local Economy and Environment, it appears that for the condition of threat various shelters are needed for about 11 million persons.

Fulfilment of such an extensive building program of protective shelters for the time of threat is not feasible and it cannot

TS #205445
Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~



-35-

be centrally controlled. The functions of programming and organization of the construction should be completely taken over by the regional defense committees. By that I mean not only preparation of plans but also their implementation. Those plans must take into consideration realistic potential in building materials and in labor of a given region, and must assume broad participation of the population in construction of protective shelters. Involvement of construction enterprises in this work should be limited only to the biggest and most threatened structures and to municipal and industrial agglomerations in which we will continue construction of shelters within reasonable limits.

The exercise disclosed a lack of clear understanding and lack of definite concepts on utilizing, in conditions of threat and war, the great potential of the construction-installation industry, involved currently in fulfilling the most significant, priority construction work. This potential is, as a rule, grouped in several regions of the country and is characterized by excellent heavy construction and earthmoving equipment capable of performing a wide variety of work. Therefore plans should be prepared for moving it into appropriate areas, and for fulfilment of assigned tasks for the period of threat and of war.

Perceptible also was a lack of concepts for adapting the existing factories and plants producing houses and prefabricated housing to the production of elements needed for shelter construction. The Ministry of Construction should prepare appropriate proposals.

One of the basic problems which, besides civil defense, emerged most sharply in exercise KRAJ-73 was the problem of signal communications and its preparedness to operate in war conditions.

The exercise disclosed that the national wire telecommunications net is quantitatively inadequate and not resistant enough to assure adequate operation in conditions of nuclear strikes. This state of affairs was also influenced, besides unquestionable delays in developing signal communications, by the current process of defense preparations in this realm.

According to guidelines accepted at the last session of the National Defense Committee, the question of making the existing signal communications net less vulnerable requires an overall

TS #205445

Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-36-

solution. In particular, it is necessary for the Ministry of Communications to work out methods and ways to protect the signal communications net against effects of mass destruction weapons, and a program for fulfilling, in the next five years, the most urgent tasks in this problem area.

It concerns, among other things, the following: adequate space separation of the elements of signal communications nets, multiroute circuit networks facilitating operational manipulation of the remaining capability, and organizational-technical means increasing the viability of the signal communications system.

Because of the great sensitivity of the wire system to damage, it is necessary to think about the possibilities of gradual organization, in time of peace, of a radio communications net which could supplement the wire system in the event of war. Also, it is necessary to start improving equipment of militarized units, to raise their organizational efficiency, and assure their mobility so they can restore communications nets damaged by operations. In these matters we should draw on the experience of the communications department.

In light of the exercise conducted, it is necessary to revise current policies on stockpiling mobilization signal equipment. Particularly acute was the shortage of portable signal equipment, and what was accumulated in reserves was of questionable usefulness. The communications department should verify the stockpiles and submit conclusions as to their amounts and composition.


A separate problem urgently requiring a solution is our preparedness to counter enemy radio broadcasts beamed into the territory of our country. It is a technically complicated matter, in my opinion, impossible to resolve within our own competence. I believe that it is necessary to consult our allies, members of the Warsaw Pact, and propose to consider the possibilities of joint solution of this problem.

The national power system, like the signal communications net, is very vulnerable to damage in time of war. The Ministry of Mining and Power should therefore prepare a broadened program for gradual stockpiling of equipment and materials, for their location, and--

TS #205445

Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~



like the railroad system--for organizing appropriately equipped militarized reconstruction units.

Confrontation during the exercise of requirements of the armed forces with capabilities to fulfil them, indicates that it is necessary to give careful consideration to some problems connected with deliveries of weapons and military-technical equipment in conditions of war.

Undoubtedly, the potential of the armaments industry will be reduced as a result of enemy strikes. Most certainly cooperative ties will be disrupted. Therefore there exists a problem of assuring swift restoration of armament potential and organization of new cooperative ties based on surviving industrial potential. The present state of preparedness of the ministries to resolve this fundamental problem is not satisfactory. Except for the Ministry of Engineering Industry, other ministries, as a rule, have not started to work on the problems of conversion. It is not at all a question of investing many billions in order to prepare civilian plants in peacetime to revert, if necessary, to immediate production of armaments. This would be simply unrealistic. But there should be immediately formed, and systematically kept up to date, a bank of information facilitating making decisions as needed, on where to place armaments production or where to repair weapons in the surviving industrial plants; where to relocate qualified cadre, equipment, installations, machinery, etc.

Solution of this problem is also indispensable because we are unable to meet--according to the annual estimated plan--the requirements of the armed forces for certain items such as artillery and small arms ammunition, mines, bombs, etc. These are simple, technical items and their production can be quickly started in existing civil industrial plants.

Against this background, of special importance is the question of management of the armaments industry in time of war. So far, methods for central operational control of this industry in war conditions have not been prepared. Also, the role of unification within the management of the armaments industry was not defined. This question should be looked into this year yet, by the administration of interested ministries, together with the General Staff, and the conclusion drawn should be used in work on the principles of how the national economy should function in time of war.

TS #205445

Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

-38-

Further analysis should also be devoted to mutual deliveries of weapons and equipment, and to cooperation of the armaments industries of the member countries of the Warsaw Pact.

The next problem pertains to management of automotive transport in time of war. We all know that it is assumed that half of the 2.5-ton and above trucks will be transferred to the armed forces. Within the national economy only dispersed and unorganized automotive transport will remain; and--according to accepted concepts--it will be concentrated and subordinated to local authorities for fulfilling economic tasks assigned to them.

Correctness of these concepts was confirmed during the exercise. However, the possibility should be considered of allocating part of the motor transport stock to direct use by the Ministry of Construction--which will play a vital role in technical salvage--and of the armaments industry.

The nature of contemporary war requires a new look at the principles of how the national economy should function. The results from current work carried out in compliance with instructions from the National Defense Committee, and from experience gained during exercise KRAJ-73, even today permit formulating certain general conclusions:

First--the fundamental economic tasks and the means to fulfil them, particularly those pertaining to deliveries to the armed forces, construction and restoration of the power system, communications and railroad transportation, removal of results of major destruction and contamination in large concentrations--should be, even in conditions of nuclear war--formalized in central, operational plans.

Accepting any other solution would mean, in practice, dispersal of forces and means and it would prevent performing essential operational movements. From this the conclusion can be reached that in time of war, it is essential to strengthen the role of central planning and of central management of national resources. Strengthening of central planning should, of course, pertain to matters of strategic importance to economic-defense activities commensurate with the developing situation. This also calls for modification and streamlining, in

TS #205445

Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 39 -

keeping with anticipated war conditions, of methods for planning and for directing fulfilment of economic goals; and for preparation of such a system of routing information as would assure capability to effectively direct economic processes in constantly changing situations.

Second--strengthening the role of central planning and central management of resources must be accompanied by decentralization of decisionmaking authority in favor of the regional authorities. They should have full authority to make decisions in matters related to organization of rescue in their area, supplying and providing medical care to the population, managing manpower, particularly skilled labor, repairing local destruction, roads, regional communications and power lines, etc. Fulfilment of these tasks should be done using local resources.

Third--assurance of effective undertaking of economic decisions under wartime conditions requires a precisely formulated, simplified and clearly specified system of functional subordination of certain units and economic organizations on the regional level to departments, and also control over them.

Maintaining during wartime an excessively large system of subordination according to functions is impossible. These matters should be taken into consideration during the processes of improving the functioning of the national economy.

* * *

The evaluation presented by me of the state of preparedness of the national economy to function in conditions of threat and war and the conclusions reached, of course, do not exhaust the broad scope of problems of national defense. In my speech I have limited myself to presenting to you only the impressions of these problems gained at a glance by the team of the Planning Commission of the Council of Ministers participating in the exercise.

Comrades!


We--I have in mind the Planning Commission and the basic economics ministries--must use the conclusions drawn from exercise

~~TOP SECRET~~

TS #205445

Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~



-40-

KRAJ-73 in our work correcting the goals for the years 1974-1975, and preparing guidelines for the five-year plan for the years 1976-1980.


At the same time, the issues of defense must find their proper place in the long-range plans currently being prepared for the future, and in plans for overall growth of the national economy. Work on these plans is sufficiently advanced that an exchange of views with the Ministry of National Defense and establishing appropriate goals and resources within the plans for economic growth are possible. The problem now is to synchronize within these plans the goals of dynamic modern economic growth with the goals of national defense.

In our activities related to strengthening the defense system of our country, we utilize our own experience and the benefits from broadly developing collaboration with our allies--members of the Warsaw Pact. Further expansion of this collaboration between the various ministries and their counterparts abroad should be helpful in improving our defensive undertakings.

TS #205445
Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



-41-

Member of the Political Bureau, Central Committee,
Polish United Workers' Party, Chairman of the Council of Ministers
Piotr Jaroszewicz

Esteemed Comrades!

Our conference today, which is the final phase of a nationwide strategic exercise, presents in general terms the basic problems of the organization and functioning of the defense system of the Polish People's Republic.

The purpose of the exercise was to test some of the conceptual guidelines pertaining to defense problems, and to find proper ways and methods to prepare the nation's defense system. During the course of this complicated undertaking, we tested the actual state of defense preparedness within respective commands and governmental elements, and their readiness to perform tasks anticipated in time of threat, in time of breach of peace, and in time of war.

This process of constant verifying, supplementing and amending of guidelines conforms with the current conditions of acceleration of events and changes in social development, the economy, science and technology, and of course, in defense.

The essence of the exercise was the assumption that the proper view of national defense is a diversified system encompassing various spheres and aspects of national activities, binding into one entity military problems and the activities of defense preparedness of the entire nonmilitary system, accomplished in a common effort of political-social and administrative-economic elements and institutions.


During the exercise, particular attention was directed to analysis of specific priorities stemming from geopolitical characteristics of the location of the country, the development of its social-economic strategy, and its extensive economic life.

The unconventional and novel organizational conceptual solutions included in the operational intentions and in the exercise can be considered a substantial contribution to our war and to allied theoretical-defense assets, and also a contribution from the

TS #205445
Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



-42-

point of view of applying some of the methods and patterns to everyday activities of governmental and economic elements.

Our defense system, as an integral part of Warsaw Pact might, is a firm element of the unity and international solidarity of the socialist countries, which have created a modern defense potential at considerable effort with the Soviet Union playing the decisive role. This potential, combined with an active foreign policy, forced the more realistic Western politicians to reevaluate their intentions and to begin a dialogue on detente and normalization of relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence.

Let us remember that detente and elimination of war is not a spontaneous process, free of interference and the possibilities of counteractions. For this reason, we also have to anticipate other, less favorable and even unfortunate variants in the unfolding situation which can make our efforts and intentions more difficult.

For the political-strategic background of the exercise we used one of the possible options open to imperialism, to hold back the wave of progressive changes in the world and in Europe by accumulating and translating local discrepancies and conflicts--including armed conflict--into an open global confrontation between the capitalist system and the socialist system.

In the hypothetical training guidelines pertaining to probable development of the situation leading to universal armed conflict, we emphasized the gradual culmination of strategic-political events by deliberately decelerating the course of events preceding the universal conflict. In this manner we intended to create more favorable conditions for testing the factors comprising the strategic concepts examined in the exercise.

Assuming a theoretical possibility that a universal armed conflict could develop following a period of increasing political tensions, we desired to observe the process of setting in motion the defensive potential of the country and the mode of its operation during the critical period, when the country changed from peacetime to wartime operation.


It was especially important to examine the degree to which the peacetime structure of central and regional political administrative and economic elements answered wartime needs; and the

TS #205445

Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



-43-

degree to which those elements were actually prepared to make decisions and to perform in unusual and unexpected situations and simultaneously, to make decisions pertaining to the fate and security of millions of citizens and to attaining defense readiness of the country on schedule.

Discussing this problem I would like to emphasize the agreement of views at the National Defense Committee that, during the critical period of growing threat and looming conflict, major changes should not be made within the existing organizational structure of the central and regional organs of the government and economy.

Those organs and institutions and elements subordinate to them are directly or indirectly responsible for fulfilment of specific tasks within the processes of mobilization, organization of production, services and assuring general efficiency of activities during this most complicated period in national life. Of course, this does not preclude the possibilities and perhaps even necessity of making certain organizational changes at a later date.


This concept differs from the solutions reached during previous years when there was projected for the time of war integration of the governmental administrative-economic apparatus, at first within eleven, then within five departments of the National Defense Committee. Those solutions passed the test in conditions of that contemporary phase.

The transition from a department structure to full responsibility of respective ministries for defense preparedness should be viewed therefore as a process occurring on parallel lines with fulfilment of provisions of directives of the VIth Party Congress with regard to improvement of functioning of the economic and governmental systems, and to a gradual increase of independence of the departments.

However, rules established at this time by the National Defense Committee to keep the structures stable during the period when the country enters a state of war cannot extend to the sphere of functions performed at that time by the governmental and economic apparatus. Demands of wartime cause those functions to undergo fundamental transformations.

TS #205445
Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~



In peacetime, the organs of a socialist state are responsible to the Party, to the working class and to society for the all-around development of the country and society. At the same time, the State fulfils tasks related to strengthening defenses and national security, and protection of the socialist regime.

As symptoms of conflict increase and indicate irrefutably a breach of universal peace, the functions and tasks directly related to the defense system will rise to the top.

In particular, during that period, new subject matter in political-social activities will emerge; the political and economic effort will intensify; protection of the population and maintaining of public security will be of particular importance. All these key areas of governmental activity without exception will be subordinated to the rules and demands of war.

The resolution of the VIth Party Congress states: "The power of the people's government depends on the consistency of activity of all the elements of the governmental system with the ideological goals of Marxism-Leninism, with the political policy initiated and implemented by the Party, and with the support of the working masses."

This means that also during the most critical moments--during mobilization of all national forces to fight the aggressor--the government and its elements will be the fundamental instrument fulfilling tasks assigned by the Party.

Party instructions and guidelines must be reflected in the daily activities of the entire governmental and economic system charged with direct control and administration of current national matters, including the defense matters most important at that time. This also applies to military operations.

The most severe test of the correctness of predictions and accepted organizational-strategic objectives, and especially of the competence and flexibility of the control and governing system--is war. From its very first moment, and even earlier, all the governmental elements will be fulfilling various defensive plans under alert conditions.

TS #205445
Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

-45-

The main effort of those activities will be related to expansion of the armed forces and to transition of the entire governmental structure to a qualitatively new order subordinated to the rules and demands of war.

The effectiveness and operational course of the most important defense tasks at that time will depend not only on precise planning but also on energetic and consistent control of the defense matters of the country, performed by such a system of organization and coordination that the information, the analytical-decisionmaking and coordination-executive processes meet specific demands of the situation.

While emphasizing during the exercise the necessity to maintain maximum stability of organizational structures, we kept in mind the need to develop within the leadership cadre of the central and regional governmental, administrative and economic elements the feeling of full responsibility for proper preparation of institutions and organizational elements subordinate to them for operational and functional efficiency, particularly during the period of threat and during the first, decisive phase of war.

In order to meet this contingency we propose that already during peacetime, every civil worker and functionary holding a position of leadership should consider the aspects of defense in all actions of his institution and elements subordinate to it. The heads and chiefs of institutions should also strive to deepen in collectives subordinate to them the habits of conscientiousness, orderliness, dependable work and discipline--qualities which we observed with satisfaction in the participating teams.


Within the armed forces--because of their assignment and the character of their operations on the contemporary battlefield--there exist appropriate plans, training methods and habits acquired in many years of practice and other mechanisms preventing surprise and allowing them to reach full combat readiness at any hour of night or day.

We observed an operation of this kind--a model of perfection and automation integrating human spiritual and physical qualities with the power of contemporary combat equipment, a model of soldierly proficiency--during the first days of the exercise,

TS #205445
Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



-46-

when a tank regiment of the 12th Mechanized Division in Szczecin, moved out of its garrison demonstrating alert movement. We observed the same thing in Tczew, and again today, during practice operations of this division.

The reaching of combat readiness by the forces is not an independent undertaking contained within the framework of internal capabilities possessed by the armed forces. This is a process inseparably tied to the entire economic and social life of the country, and expansion of the armed forces to higher states of combat readiness is in equal measure military and political action. This process permeates all the commands and elements of the governmental system.

The multilateral and ever stronger ties of the armed forces to the economy and to the entire country--social infrastructure, and the necessity stemming from it to resolve problems of defense jointly--by joint effort of the political and governmental leadership, administrative elements, commands and military staffs--indicates that the process of reaching defense readiness on a nationwide scale must be appropriately correlated according to a uniform and comprehensive plan.

In our future efforts, we have to improve and strengthen the comprehensive schedule of procedures coordinating basic elements of our defense system--the armed forces, the economy, political-defense policies and the safety of the population--for reaching overall defense readiness.

Attempts to prepare a schedule of procedures such as this were made in the Planning Commission of the Council of Ministers and in the appropriate elements of the Ministry of National Defense which was also reflected during the exercise.

The exercise helped to pinpoint and reanalyze many complex issues comprising the overall picture of the unfolding political-social situation of the increasing conflict during the first days of war; it helped to examine various aspects of the political-defense preparedness of the population, and the formation of its moods, attitudes, behavior and motivations for activities in the most difficult time of the test.

TS #205445
Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-47-

I emphasize that in time of threat and war our Party will be the main strength of the nation, directing the issues of national defense and of national survival; that the Party authorities and her active members will constitute the principal power uniting and initiating the overall defense efforts of the nation, strengthening the ideological solidarity of the population and its confidence in the actions of the government; awakening patriotism and proletarian internationalism; conveying to the population a feeling of strength, awareness of the seriousness of the situation and the uncompromising fight against the aggressor.

I want to emphasize that at that time, the political-defense activities of all the political forces concentrated in the National Unity Front will play an important role.

It will be of great importance to fully utilize press, radio and television, which are principal instruments helping to mobilize the nation for defense, to counteract any signs of misinformation, any rise of attitudes of doubt, defeatism, and also of spontaneous actions.

Experiences gained from the exercise indicate that additional reanalysis of possible means of communication is needed in order to continue political-social and information-propaganda activities in conditions of a dispersed population and destroyed wire communications lines, and radio and television installations. This was reflected in the deliberations of the participating teams of the Ministry of Mining and Power and of the Committee for Radio and Television Matters.

The political-social and propaganda problems found their proper place and role in exercise KRAJ-73 because of efficient and fruitful work of groups of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, and of military-political organizations.

Efficient transition of the country to the qualitatively different conditions of the realities of war would have been impossible without maintaining adequate law and order, public obedience to regulations and orders, maintaining in all walks of life absolute social order and public safety.

In order to evaluate the importance of tasks facing the Ministry of Internal Affairs and forces subordinate to it in this

~~TOP SECRET~~

TS #205445

Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

-48-

enormously difficult period, it is necessary to consider not only the external factors of threat, but also all the internal aspects, which would then give a complete picture of the actual threat to the country.

Facing a specific situation, particularly under the shock of a possible nuclear strike, unfriendly initiatives from the outside, and the political-psychological influence of the enemy, increased penetration of espionage and special subversion and sabotage groups, and also destructive attitudes on the part of some circles-- it will be necessary to take into consideration manifestations of uncertainty, restlessness or disobedience of orders of authorities by certain groups, and of panic. These problems were very carefully considered during the exercise.

It was determined that maintaining adequate order and individual and collective discipline during the time of threat will greatly influence efficient mobilization, the processes of dispersal of the population and adapting the governmental and social system to the new conditions. These are comprehensive issues. They can be successfully resolved only with full and active involvement of all citizens and of the forces organized for defense, given proper direction for political and organizational action.

The elements of this activity should be formed even now by daily educational inculcation of a sense of order and civil concern for organizational efficiency and for effective functioning of all national elements and commands.

It is very important for the defense system of the country that Party organizations, the management of factories, schools, regional administrative and law-enforcing elements--as a matter of daily routine, pay special attention to the proficiency and organizational readiness of the citizens to act from a sense of duty, highly developed discipline and standards of socialist cooperation.

The participating apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs perceived in the predicated situation the complexity and varied aspects of its activities, and properly anticipated organizational, precautionary, and preventive actions.

TS #205445
Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-49-

The harmonizing in the exercise of nonmilitary elements and defense aspects with strictly military operations proved once more that it is absolutely necessary to examine comprehensively the problems of contemporary defense.

The times are gone forever when military commands and operational staffs preoccupied with autonomous, in a sense, military problems, limited themselves to submitting to the economy certain factual requests, and when the functionaries of the economic and governmental organizations viewed the matters of national defense narrowly, without feeling fully responsible for them.

The character of the contemporary threat, the objective laws of the revolution of scientific-technical and social developments, the ever closer conditioning and the multi-directional ties of the armed forces on various levels of cooperation with the economy have, to a previously unparalleled extent, tied the structure and the mechanism of functioning of the armed forces to the general system of economic production and administrative problems of the country.

We have had the opportunity to investigate those ties and relations during the processes of planning and working out decisions at operational headquarters, territorial headquarters and at military staffs which acted in coordination with the economic ministries and with the regional defense committee.



We observed some of the elements of those ties in the territorial defense system; we noted their refinements, their strong and, unfortunately, their weak sides during practical episodes of the exercise and during a demonstration of coordination and support operations of troops and militarized formations of the Ministries of Transport, Shipping, Agriculture and Communications.

The exercise disclosed a dialectic uniformity of goals and tasks of the armed forces with the tasks of the forces and means of the nonmilitary elements in practically every aspect of defense operations--beginning with mobilization expansion of forces, replenishing their supplies and equipment, supporting of regrouping and movement of troops--and ending with the fulfilment in common effort of the urgent combat missions on the tactical level, including salvage-rescue tasks.

TS #205445
Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



- 50 -

A particularly important role, from the viewpoint of requirements of the overall allied strategy, is played by the efficient and smooth support rendered to the movement of the successive echelons of allied and Polish forces through our territory. This task--because of the extent of the area involved, the complicated character of operational, medical, supply and technical support, and because of provisional use of rail centers and transport--must be taken into consideration in the calculations of all ministries and regional defense committees, in their mutual cooperative and territorial ties.

In fulfilment of this task, which also includes air defense, technical support rendered for maintenance of roads and railroads, and organization of crossings of wide water obstacles, there were employed specialized, highly technical military units which closely cooperated with the nonmilitary forces.

Movement of troops is therefore a difficult, complicated operation causing definite disruptions in the transportation system of the country. It will be of most important consequence during the first days of war. On the efficiency of this operation will depend to a great extent the overall ratio of forces in the area of direct contact with enemy forces, which in the end result will also be fundamentally influencing development of the situation on national territory.

The role of the armed forces in fulfilling tasks within the Combined Armed Forces system in the Central European Theater and in fighting enemy aviation in air defense of the country, active operations within the system of national defense, defense of the coast and the tasks of technical rescue within the framework of civil defense--objectively describe the importance of our troops as the principal, highly specialized command in the defense system of the country.

From this exercise we can draw the conclusions that our commands and our operational and regional staffs are well trained and prepared to solve the tasks of contemporary defense; that in daily training and education they know how to think not only in terms of the military art but also can equally well deal with the basic social-economic issues and problems of the country; that our officer corps, better and better prepared politically and

TS #205445
Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-51-

professionally, is capable of thinking in the terms of the political and government worker.

The exercise emphasized the particular role of the General Staff as the element inspiring and coordinating the process of strategic-defense planning on a national scale, supplying the jointly participating commands with forecasts, estimates and opinions pertaining to current perspectives influencing the strategic situation and the state of threat, and presenting the National Defense Committee with appropriate recommendations pertaining to defense readiness matters.

Attention was also focused on the need for further defining the role, place and tasks of the National Defense Committee Secretariat and of the secretariats of territorial defense committees as the responsible elements assuring proper processing of information and decisions within the system of defense control and administration.

During the exercise we analyzed some of the conceptual guidelines and rules for functioning of the national economy in anticipated conditions of nuclear war. In reality, work on those issues parallels work stemming from the resolutions of the VIth Party Congress, pertaining to reconstruction and modernization of the economic structure, territorial economic development, improvement of planning and administration, and raising the efficiency and effectiveness of the entire economic system.

In formulating the comprehensive program for our social-economic growth, we consider our participation in the international division of labor within the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid. Our active participation in this collaboration is viewed as one of the fundamental factors in sponsoring and accelerating the general development of the country and its defense potential.


Improving our defense system in the economic sense, we treat support of the armed forces with supplies, modern equipment and armament as a task of special importance. In addition to equipping the armed forces with equipment manufactured in Poland, we also import, mostly from the Soviet Union, a variety of weapons

TS #205445

Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



-52-

and equipment and also, in justified cases, we continue to take advantage of assistance in the form of licenses.

At the same time, national armaments production is an important vehicle of industrial progress, and some technical and technological solutions are successfully used in modernization of other types of production.

The exercise demonstrated the great importance of the ability to harmoniously unite defense needs with the program and trends of peaceful national growth, the development of the territorial economy, increasing motor and rail transportation, construction of superhighways, expanding the signal communications net and power system, expanding and sensibly situating the warehousing and trade-merchandise base, manufacturing centers, health service stations, and the essential growth of strategic national stockpiles.

Harmonious coupling of troop mobilization processes with economic activities makes mobilization more efficient and at the same time lowers the costs of maintaining troops in peacetime. Successive expansion of tasks of the administrative and economic elements, by forming specific military-service elements within selected factories keeps equipment and resources free to serve the economy during peacetime, rather than be frozen within the armed forces.

Of course, this short exercise, which integrated within its framework only the general issues of national defense, could not answer many detailed economic-defense questions which will be analyzed and resolved in separate undertakings.


The economic teams working on the solutions of problems assigned to them encountered many derivative and many new problems during preparation and conduct of the exercise. The sum total of the material is enormous already today, exceeding capabilities to explicitly and fully evaluate it.

It should be noted with satisfaction that many new problems were correctly detected and, whenever possible, taken into consideration by the participating ministerial and provincial teams. The

TS #205445
Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



-53-

exercise revealed substantial knowledge and theoretical and practical assets to be reckoned with, developed over many years in resolving defense tasks: it inspired in the participants initiative and vigor to search for new concepts. This was particularly noted in the work of the participating teams of the following ministries: Transportation, Engineering, Industry, Domestic Trade and Services, Local Economy and Environment, Heavy Industry, Health and Social Welfare.

However, there were encountered also certain difficulties in some of the ministerial and regional national defense committees, especially in the processes of making decisions. In some instances, inability to concentrate effort on the crucial problem of the ministry or province was apparent. Some reports with photographic accuracy reflected the existing and the known situation, but did not always contain sufficient elements of conclusion and decision, did not reveal the deeper significance of the situation, its dynamics and development, or the results of the losses and disruptions in delivery of power, raw materials, transport, communications, and cooperative ties. Especially conspicuous was the tendency to "autonomism" expressed in inadequate coordination and support among the ministries involved in solving complex problems.

Some teams of the central and regional levels, when faced with a crisis situation, did not actively enough seek solutions to urgent matters, first within their own capabilities or within the framework of collaboration but, as if reflexively, turned for help and intervention to higher authority, not concerned that at that time the central leadership confronted with enormous demands, many times greater than existing means and capabilities, was not in position to render adequate assistance.

The exercise emphasized the role of economic-defense planning as a multileveled factor meshing gears with military, political-defense and civil defense planning. Particularly apparent was the need for a comprehensive approach to the processes of planning national preparedness for coordinated effort to eliminate results of nuclear strikes, maintaining continuity of operation of the basic elements of the economic infrastructure, and creating for the population conditions for survival, then for reconstruction of devastated material objects, and finally, for production capability.

TS #205445
Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



-54-

The exercise in practical application revealed that in general, the commands of the central level and the regional systems properly comprehend the issues of defense preparedness of the economy. In particular, the participating team of the Planning Commission of the Council of Ministers was capable of coordinating the overall preparedness of the entire economic-defense system according to demands of the situation, to harmonize these demands with the demands of the armed forces and of the essential internal and external cooperational ties--acting in time of threat and in war as the National Economic Defense Staff.

Maintaining continuous and efficient functioning of the economy, and especially assuring effective protection for the population during the war, is the basic and one of the most difficult defense problems. The essence of the difficulty lies in the fact that there still exists too great of a disproportion between the destructive power of nuclear weapons and realistic capabilities to counter the results of their possible employment in the event of war.

The current issues of civil defense are being resolved in a fragmentary manner within the framework of general civil defense.


As a result of studies and conceptual work verified in practical exercises, we see the need to organize these matters on a much broader scale in a standard organizational and technical procedure, closely tied to the efforts of the armed forces, economic ministries and administrative institutions, therefore in a most comprehensive and versatile manner.

We are proposing that the principal practical aspects of civil defense be resolved primarily within the territorial system, i.e. on the level of provinces, countries, commune councils, places of work, therefore, where the direct and actual administrators are the local authorities having appropriate means and who take part in organizing, controlling and correlating civil defense issues, consistently with existing local conditions. Regrettably, we cannot afford a broad program of construction of shelters as is the case with the majority of countries even richer than we are. We can continue construction of shelters on a reasonable scale only for the most threatened facilities, urban and industrial centers.

TS #205445
Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



-55-

For this reason we must seek other solutions most suitable for our conditions. During the exercise we considered dispersing the population from cities and areas of heavy density. Despite the fact that this subject was discussed several times, we cannot say that we arrived at mature and clearly defined options and methods of their implementation. Comrade Jagielski discussed this.

Preparation of concepts and methods for dispersing the population on a national scope requires thorough analysis on the broadest possible scale of social, economic and defense contexts.

For answers to some of the questions pertaining to organization and implementation of this kind of operation, one could draw on the experiences of World War I and of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which, by moving part of the population to less threatened areas of the country, saved the lives of thousands of people.

Besides preventive issues such as universal training in civil defense, preparation of shelters, organization of dispersal and universal warning systems, an important element of civil defense is preparation of concepts and mastering of the art of organizing and conducting rescue action on a large scale in the great urban and industrial centers.

In the course of the exercise we analyzed the possibilities of using for that purpose various forces and means of territorial defense, militarized units of various compositions and designations, civil defense formations, fire departments, the Civil Militia and other forces.


We endeavored to work out for civil defense objectives of the kind which, in the event of nuclear strike, would enable us to employ the remaining forces most effectively and to assemble the basic potential of the rescue groupings for rescue operations in centers of key importance.

The exercise was basically of command-staff nature, and in its scope included also regional commands and institutions which play the principal roles in the civil defense system. Many practical episodes, fed into the exercise, in turn facilitated verifying

TS #205445
Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



-56-

many issues and exposed specific situations. For example, in Tczew we observed with pleasure the involvement of teenagers and adults in rescue action. In Bialystok Province the problems were handled in a comprehensive manner involving even the lowest command levels and institutions. In Szczecin, activities characteristic of a large port city were demonstrated. By fulfilling training objectives, much useful work was accomplished.

The complexity of tasks related to clearing the nuclear-devastated area; the necessity to consider in the rescue activities various physical and psychological factors; determination of the main center of threat and thus giving the rescue effort proper direction; proper distribution of forces and means; and coordination and support of supply and technical activities--all of this indicates that only fully prepared and trained staffs, grouping experienced specialists who have at their disposal proper equipment, theoretical knowledge, and practical skills gained in fighting natural calamities, can cope with the situation.

We must appoint, organize, train and give necessary authority to coordinate to those elements which, within the framework of regional military headquarters and on the central level, participated in the exercise in reduced strengths, forming for the purpose of the exercise the National Civil Defense Staff.


The processes of controlling and managing the overall defense system and the national mode of life, to a great extent, depend on control posts properly prepared, adequately supported and supplied with technical means, serving as places of work for the central and regional political, governmental and national administrative authorities. We examined the problems of the functioning of control posts, using as examples the Ministries of Communications, Local Economy and Environment, and Engineering Industry, which operated from both, the system of current places of work, and from alternate posts.

The principal purpose of the control post is to assure continuity and stability of control of national affairs. We believe that control and management on the central and regional levels should continue, as long as possible, from the present, actual places of work or from alternate, properly adapted buildings,

TS #205445
Copy # _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



-57-

situated if possible near the permanent residences of those elements forming a unified area of control posts.

Simultaneously, we will progressively prepare properly supported, alternate, conveniently situated control posts, in the event controlling from the previous post becomes impossible.

One of the most important factors conditioning continuity of control is an efficiently operating communications system connecting within the framework of a unified net all the nets of the control and management elements, from the central level down to the implementing commands and institutions.

The uniformity and proper efficiency of this system can be obtained only by integrating the total telecommunications potential of the country into one standard plan for the various kinds of signal communications means. The Ministries of Communications and Transportation fulfil a special role: they assure continuity of control and management, and the functioning of all the other elements of the country.

Composite improvement of conceptual and organization-technical aspects of the control post system is one of the more important items in the work plan of the National Defense Committee.

During testing of various aspects of the control and management systems tested for the first time was also readiness of the information science elements of ministries and of appropriate institutions processing information related to defense.

A mixed military-civilian Group for Coordination and Research of Information Science, appointed for the purpose of the exercise, stated that the participating elements using computers were not prepared to use the equipment objectively for defense purposes. They noted that in the process of expanding the base of information science for economic-social purposes, it is necessary--utilizing some of the information science assets of the elements of the Ministry of National Defense--to improve the proficiency

TS #205445
Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 58 -

of the various teams solving special problems, in order to accelerate the decisionmaking process.

* * *

We were unable to examine all the essential problems of national defense in the course of exercise KRAJ-73 because of the enormous scope of the problem and the extent of territory involved. Nevertheless, the number of issues which we did examine was impressive. We obtained informative, comprehensive material which will be the subject of analysis and research studies.


Noted with satisfaction should be the deep comprehension of defense matters by the functionaries of the Party-political elements, by the administrative and economic ministries, and by the people's councils. Because of the character of the exercise, the importance of the established objectives and training tasks, and the degree of their difficulty, those functionaries had to study prior to the exercise the basic problems and trends of contemporary strategy, define in the exercise their own role and scope of tasks, work out proper views on problems encountered at points of contact with pertinent commands and institutions of the armed forces, and prepare methods for political action which would attain more unified understanding of mutually fulfilled tasks.

In order to further expand and improve national defense readiness and benefit from the current activities, it is necessary for all the central and territorial administrative and national economic organs to draw general conclusions and analyze the experiences gained during exercise KRAJ-73, and apply them to organizational, planning and training activities, concentrating on problems of theoretical and practical expansion and improvement of the scope of the conclusions reached, and on verifying on this basis the conceptual organization-mobilization and standards-legal guidelines.

In the meantime we will work on improving principles for the following: the shift to alternate control posts, coordination and support among departments, organization of signal communications, preparation of the best models for processing decisions and

TS #205445
Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~



for methods of control and management of national, provincial, county and commune affairs, and affairs of every organizational element and place of work, in conditions of threat and armed conflict.

In our daily work and training we also recognize the necessity of paying special attention to the following problems:


Political-defense--there exists a need for re-analysis of various forms and methods of offensive political action during the time of threat, for stimulation of patriotic and international motivation for civic activities and for their effective guidance, and for defining ways to prevent and counteract destructive activities of the opponent.

Internal law, order and public safety--it is necessary to improve the tasks pertaining to comprehensive support of the process of reaching national and civil defense readiness, and its functioning during a time of threat and war. Special attention should be paid to maintaining internal order and security during mobilization, movement and deployment of troops, and during dispersal of the population, strengthening the security of buildings of special importance, detecting and engaging in combat subversive and reconnaissance forces, and developing effective methods of coordinated action with territorial and civil defense forces, including the self-defense formations under the control of regional defense committees.

Commands, staffs and forces--while fulfilling general coalition tasks and tasks within the national territorial defense system--should pay attention to closer coordination of action with the administrative organs, and improve combined fulfillment of operational missions, combat missions on the tactical level, and technical and salvage-rescue tasks, particularly within the framework of civil defense.

Prepare and integrate into daily training practice a method of briefing the elements acting in coordination on a developing strategic-military situation, and standardize methodology for processing information science-decisionmaking and coordination pertaining to mutual exchange of services in various conditions and situations in time of threat and war.

~~TOP SECRET~~



-60-

Economic-defense--in the light of experience gained during the exercise, test the methodology for preparing the annual estimated plan and, in particular, the transition phase of the economy from peacetime to wartime production. The Planning Commission of the Council of Ministers will fulfil this task in cooperation with the General Staff and in collaboration with ministries and regional authorities.

Prepare principles defining the manner in which the economic system will function in time of threat and in time of war, with special consideration given to increasing the role and independence of economic ministries whose activities will be coordinated by the deputy premiers.

Increase efforts to study the influence of accelerated economic integration and of foreign trade on mobilization readiness of the economy, and the influence of increasing employment of information science systems for planning and managing purposes.

Under the guidance of the Planning Commission, organize in 1974 or 1975 an exercise devoted to economic-defense problems, with participation of economic ministries and provincial commissions for economic planning.

Civil defense--it is necessary to accelerate work on standards, regulations and organization in order to control the basic problems pertaining to protection of the population. Based on detailed analysis of material gained during the exercise, work out principles for dispersing the population, taking into consideration all essential aspects and consequences of a plan of this type. Begin necessary steps to amend the principles for organization and conduct of rescue activities in urban and industrial centers. Using as background the regulations for universal service to defend the Polish People's Republic, relate training and preparation of the civil defense forces to daily practice of direct participation in preventing and eliminating the affects of natural calamities, disasters and accidents, and to participation in projects beneficial to the community. During nationwide training, stimulate political activity in the organs of peoples' self-government, so they act as the basic elements organizing and coordinating social-defense activities in their communities.

TS #205445
Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-61-

Within the framework of scientific-research activities--give consideration to stronger ties of the potential of contemporary science and technology to the mechanism of defense activities, and to the current and future programs resolving the most important questions of national defense. Expand projects dealing with theoretical principles of the organization and functioning of the defense system and disseminate the current wealth of theoretical thinking on defense of a socialist country.

In order to take fullest advantage of the experiences gained during exercise KRAJ-73, the secretary of the National Defense Committee will determine the procedure according to which the central and territorial elements will prepare detailed conclusions drawn from the exercise. The conclusions will be examined at the meeting of the National Defense Committee when the projected guidelines for training and activities within the national defense system for 1974-1975 will be also considered.

* * *

In conclusion, in the name of the National Defense Committee, I would like to express thanks and appreciation to the exercise directing staff and to the umpire and enemy simulating team, for the efforts invested and sacrifices involved in organizing and conducting this great event.


I would like to emphasize with pleasure that the exercise just concluded constitutes, in the processes of improving the defense system of Poland, a still higher level of new quantities, it introduced many new values, created a broader base for further conceptual, organizational and training work.

I sincerely thank all the participants in the exercise--Party workers, chiefs of ministries of the national administration and economy, chairmen of the regional defense committees, unit commanders and chiefs of military staffs, for conscientious, exemplary fulfilment of the objectives of the exercise, for a vigorous and creative approach to solving problems.

TS #205445
Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



-62-


Also, please convey to your subordinate workers, troops, and members of militarized and civil defense formations my appreciation of their sacrifices and discipline, and for demonstrating masterly skill in combat and technical training on the tactical level.

I also want to thank all the personnel who, by exceptional work and great concern, contributed to the support of the exercise, efficient in every respect.

TS #205445
Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



-63-

1st Secretary of Central Committee,
Polish United Worker's Party
Edward Gierek

Esteemed Comrades!

I listened with interest to the critique of exercise KRAJ-73. This exercise became a penetrating review of our defense capabilities, and an important phase of work improving the defense system of the Polish People's Republic.

The world in which we live and in whose transformation, according to the guidelines of our ideology, we actively participate, demanded and demands from the socialist nations possession of a full, internally and externally conditioned patriotic and internationalist concept and a doctrine for safeguarding their independent existence, and requires control over indispensable intellectual and material conditions assuring the maximum guarantee of peaceful growth.

We possess a doctrine of this kind. Its deeper study and improvement must remain the subject of daily concern, attention and organizational activity of the Party, of the government, and of all the national administrative and economic elements--of the entire population. This was fully expressed in the substance, in the scope and in the momentum of the exercise. It united efforts of Party and leadership elements of the entire country, of military commands and staffs, of troops and of the civilian population. It revealed the scale of the national defense effort, the complexity of the multilateral ties of the defense system, and unlimited opportunities to stimulate broad collective forces.

Developments in the international situation caused a real decline of the threat of confrontation in war, and progress in efforts to attain detente encourages optimism. The idea of collective security and peaceful collaboration initiated by the Soviet Union and endorsed by Poland and other countries of the Warsaw Pact, is finding even greater support. Many years of consistent policies of the socialist countries, aimed at fulfilment of the principles of peaceful coexistence, are bearing visible results. Examples of this are the development of relations between the

TS #205445

Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-64-

Soviet Union and the United States, and also positive trends in the European situation. In particular, the current progress of the preparatory consultations in Helsinki, and the beginning of initial talks in Vienna concerning mutual armed forces limitation in Europe, give hope for chances to secure peace and for deeper and broader international collaboration based on principles of equal partnership and mutual benefits.


The thirty postwar years prove irrefutably that the peaceful aspirations and initiatives of the socialist countries have better chances and are more fruitful whenever they rely strongly on the unity and cohesion of socialist solidarity, on its ideological political, economic and military potential. During the last few years, we brushed against a direct threat of war more than once. There were high and low tides of international tensions. It is a historic honor earned by the socialist countries, and especially and in decisive measure by the Soviet Union, that the threat of war was pushed aside, that the forces of war were paralyzed and deprived of their chances for success, and that peace was preserved. Currently, we find ourselves in a stage of an effective offensive of forces for peace. The basis of our justified satisfaction is the fact that among those forces, our country--People's Poland--occupies a worthy place. We know how and we desire to continue to properly fit together the two aspects of interdependent activities--vigorous pursuit of a foreign peace policy and strengthening the realistically calculated defensive strength of the country.

We are of unshaken conviction that by common effort of the socialist countries, with the support of the international labor movement and of the broad front of the forces of peace and progress, we are and we will continue to be in position to effectively influence the course of events, to give positive processes characteristics of permanence. In the historical, peaceful rivalry we possess all the structural advantages. We must use those advantages to the fullest extent and at the same time we must safeguard them most effectively. The Polish United Workers' Party, the people's government and the whole Polish nation--remembering its historic and so recent experiences--attaches greatest importance to the matter of security and lasting peace. We realize that negotiations, agreements, treaties and international conventions negotiated between the socialist and capitalist countries do not automatically settle all the issues. They do not eliminate

TS #205445
Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



-65-

the sources of class conflicts and the objectively existing economic and social foundations of imperialism, its militaristic structures and hegemonic tendencies, ideological subversion and open or covert interference in internal affairs of other countries. They also do not exclude fluctuations of the political climate in the capitalist countries or the dangerous nuances of the programs of the changing government makeup there. Lastly, it is difficult not to notice the adventurous, anti-Soviet policies of the Chinese Peoples' Republic and her possible attempts to disturb world balance and stability. This is a serious danger, especially for the distant future, and in evaluating it we are in full solidarity with our Soviet friends.

These are all realities of our contemporary period. We must continue to take them into account. We must contribute to the strength of the defense capability of the Warsaw Pact countries. This capability continues to be the essential foundation of the socialist peace offensive. Our foreign policies, conforming to the Leninist idea of peaceful coexistence, remain unalterably realistic. It is a policy of good will and active collaboration but also of vigilance.

For this reason and at this stage of events, on the eve of momentous meetings and conferences, it is of special importance to maintain good "condition", i.e. political cohesiveness, economic dynamism and defense determination. Those are concrete values taken into consideration realistically in world politics; they constitute our strong argument for peaceful coexistence and international collaboration.

Therefore, we consider it essential, to continue to maintain our own and the collective defenses, to consolidate our fraternal alliance with the Soviet Union, to strengthen the ties of friendship and collaboration with all the countries of the Socialist Community on the Party, economic and the military, planes. Strong confirmation of these objectives was the recent visit to Poland of Comrade Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Comrades!

As we improve the efficiency of our defense system we must also strengthen its permanent, fundamental factors.

~~TOP SECRET~~

TS #205445

Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

-66-

Specifically, we must--based on the program of the Party, and in the spirit of resolutions of the Vith Congress--expand the ideological-intellectual strength of society. Increase the economic power of the nation, using the creative vigor of the working people and of scientific-technical potential. Improve the system of governing and administration of the national economy. Raise the level of social organization and discipline. Mold patriotic-defense awareness of the nation on the foundations of past experiences and visions of the future; develop a sense of responsibility for the present People's Poland, and strengthen the traditional readiness of Poles to defend the Fatherland.

It is also our duty to strengthen our principal defense element--Polish Peoples' forces--in all aspects of their combat quality.

It can be stated with satisfaction that with regard to modernity of strategic-operational concepts, technical solutions, dependability of equipment and combat proficiency on the battlefield--our army is a fine organization, working with precision. The course of exercise KRAJ-73, and today's demonstration of high proficiency of the troops, reinforces our conviction that the weapons and combat equipment created by our designers, engineers, technicians and workers, and arms obtained within the framework of interallied cooperation, chiefly Soviet-Polish cooperation, are indeed in good, firm hands.

In the resolution of the Secretariat of the Party's Central Committee on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the armed forces, we expressed appreciation for the past services of our soldiers. We also expressed the great concern of the Party for the national defense system in the present historical conditions, in the actual political situation existing in the world. We believe that guiding the processes of defense will remain one of the more important spheres of theoretical and practical activity of the Party, and the idea of security for the Polish People's Republic--a high moral value integrating all of her citizens.

Fulfilment of defense policies is a process of never-ending creative verification of established guidelines for conceptual and practical activities, a search for the best possible systems. The exercise just concluded, KRAJ-73, served these purposes. It

TS #205445
Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-67-

produced many new values and experiences helpful in governing the country, in improving the economy and administration, and in organizing social forces for public service. We can state without reservations, that the exercise served the purpose of defending our Socialist Fatherland well.

The participating teams correctly concluded that successful fulfilment of defense objectives depends to a tremendous degree on Party members--Communists--political workers in the representative and executive national elements: that the broadest plane uniting all patriotic forces, all the citizens of Socialist Poland cognizant and active in matters of defense--are the political, social, youth, paramilitary and combatant organizations rallied in the National Unity Front.

Exercise KRAJ-73 was an expression in practice of ideological-political and organizational integration of all the elements of authority, the troops and the population, in fulfilling public defense tasks. The results and experience gained during the exercise are a valuable investment of the participants in the cause of strengthening the defense position of People's Poland.

Because of the sacrifices, honest effort, and demonstrated initiative, we gained better insight into the accepted model of our defense system. The unquestionable values of the system were revealed, but simultaneously, we gained awareness of issues requiring deliberation, study and improvement.

The Party is counting on creative and constructive application of knowledge gained here to the entire defense system, in all of its social-political, administrative and economic elements.


I thank the exercise directing staff and, specifically: Piotr Jaroszewicz, Member of the Political Bureau, Chairman of National Defense Committee, Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Lieutenant General Wojciech Jaruzelski, Member of the Political Bureau, Minister of National Defense, and all the participants, for exemplary preparation and conduct of the exercise. Through you, Comrades, I would like to convey my thanks to all the workers who, within the framework of the exercise, demonstrated political maturity and training initiative, and who took on and fulfilled so many useful tasks for the country and for their areas.

TS #205445

Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



-68-

I wish you, Dear Comrades, further successful results and achievements in developing and strengthening our Socialist Fatherland, in increasing its prosperity and in reinforcing its security.

TS #205445
Copy # 10

~~TOP SECRET~~