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DATE: 06-18-2012

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

15 February 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : [redacted] Report

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
[redacted]
for William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

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
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Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY Warsaw Pact



DATE OF 1 November 1973
INFO.

DATE 15 Feb 1974

SUBJECT

Reports and Schedules Presented at Ninth Meeting
of Warsaw Pact Military Council in Prague

SOURCE Documentary

Summary

The following report is a translation from Russian of the SECRET documents issued following the ninth meeting of the Warsaw Pact Military Council in Prague from 30 October to 1 November 1973. These documents include a review of 1973 training and a directive for 1974, a schedule of combined exercises for 1974, and a lengthy report on organization of rear services support for combined exercises. Both the draft and final version of the 1974 training directive were received. Brackets are used to show the portions of the final version which were not in the draft, while those portions of the draft which were not included in the final version are marked by double brackets.

End of Summary

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RECOMMENDATIONS

of the ninth meeting of the Military Council
of the Combined Armed Forces on
the first question on the agenda

The Military Council, having examined and reviewed the results of operational, combat, and mobilization training of the Combined Armed Forces during the year of 1973 and the draft Directive and draft Plan for Joint Measures to Be Undertaken During 1974,

Reports:

The tasks set forth in Directive No. 0073 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces and in the Plan for Joint Measures to Be Undertaken by the Combined Armed Forces During 1973 have, on the whole, been carried out.

In all branches of the armed forces the problems involved in achieving complete mobilization and in bringing the troops and naval forces to combat-ready status have been fully and competently solved. The capability of the troops, naval forces, staffs, and rear services agencies to carry out mobilization plans under difficult conditions has increased. As a result, the Combined Armed Forces have achieved a higher level of combat readiness and the tasks involved in converting the troops and naval forces from peacetime to wartime status are fulfilled more competently.

Joint measures undertaken by the Combined Armed Forces and measures carried out in accordance with the plans of national commands have brought about a further increase in the level of

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operational and combat readiness of the staffs, troops, and naval forces. Coordination between combined groupings of troops and naval forces in carrying out joint combat tasks has improved, and the friendship and teamwork in combat displayed by the allied armies is continually growing stronger.

Concludes:

The fulfilment of the tasks set forth in the Directive of the Commander-in-Chief and in the Plan for Joint Measures to Be Undertaken During 1974 would raise the combat and mobilization readiness and the combat and operational training of the Combined Armed Forces to a higher level and would strengthen the friendship and teamwork in combat displayed by the fraternal armies.

Recommends:

That the Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces and the national commands take the necessary measures to fully and competently carry out the tasks facing the Combined Armed Forces during 1974.

That a special effort be made when joint measures are being conducted to find better solutions to problems involved in the organization of the control, coordination, and comprehensive support of troop groupings and naval forces.

Approves:

- the draft Directive of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces on operational and combat training during 1974;

- the draft plan for joint measures to be undertaken by the Combined Armed Forces during 1974.

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THESES OF THE REPORT

at the ninth meeting of the Military Council:
"Review of Operational and Combat Training
of the Combined Armed Forces for 1973
and Planning of Joint Measures for 1974"

The Combined Armed Forces of Warsaw Pact members in the 1973 training year resolutely continued to accomplish the tasks of further increasing combat and mobilization readiness, of improving the operational and combat training of staffs, troops and naval forces and of strengthening combat friendship.

To accomplish these tasks according to the plans of the Combined and national commands, a large number of varied training measures were carried out during the past academic year. This involved using the most appropriate and advanced forms and methods of training. More so than in the past year, command-staff exercises with representational troops and tactical exercises with field firing of all types of weapons were conducted.

While carrying out Combined Armed Forces joint measures, along with working out operational-tactical problems, a great deal of attention was devoted to further strengthening of military unity and mutual understanding among the staffs and troops of the armies of Warsaw Pact countries. This was conducive to developing in the soldiers of the fraternal armies a high sense of internationalism, friendship and military comradeship, and to raising their combat, morale and psychological qualities.

The plan for joint measures of the Combined Armed Forces was for the most part fulfilled in 1973. (The major joint measures conducted in 1973 are set forth later.)

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The successful and qualitative fulfilment of the plan of joint measures and the plan of the national army commands was conducive to the increased combat and mobilization readiness of the Combined Armed Forces, and made it possible to improve the training of formations and large units of the allied armies for actions in complex situations. The measures provided an opportunity to practice working out the problems of control, coordination, and comprehensive support of allied troops and naval forces in the joint fulfilment of combat missions.

The generals, admirals, officers and staffs of all branches of the armed forces increased their operational-tactical knowledge and skills in the use of all available allied troop forces and means and in the organization and maintenance of coordination when troop groupings and naval forces are in action, as well as in working out the problems of their combat and material-technical support.

Field training, efficiency, and teamwork in staff work were increased. Staffs were able to reduce somewhat the amount of time required to formulate planning and combat documents and to improve their quality. Staff work became more organized in allocating tasks to subordinates, in providing them with assistance, and in controlling troop activities.

At the same time, some formation commanders and staffs still have not mastered the art of organizing and conducting joint combat actions in the complex conditions of the initiation of war.

Individual commanders (commanding officers) and staffs have not fully resolved the problems of protecting troops, naval forces, and rear services installations from nuclear weapons and flame-throwing incendiary means.

Transferring control from the primary to the forward command post or rear services control post is rarely practiced in exercises. ←

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The staffs of a number of large units, units, and ships still have not fully resolved the problems of organizing coordination and they have not planned and organized reconnaissance with adequate precision.

The Ground Forces in the current year have achieved definite successes in increasing field training and in preparing formations, large units, and units to operate as coalition groupings under varied conditions of the situation.

Large units and units of motorized rifle (mechanized) and tank troops improved their march training somewhat, and gained practice in organizing and conducting combat actions in complex situations, in deep penetrations, and in crossing water obstacles, and zones of destruction and contamination. They increased the weapons firing training of personnel, especially in the fulfillment of firing tasks, by conducting tactical exercises with field firing to a greater degree than before, they devoted attention to training for night operations.

Large units, units, and subunits of the arms of troops and special troops improved to some extent the quality of their special and technical training.

Along with the successes achieved in the training of the Ground Forces there still are many deficiencies, especially in respect to organizing and conducting combat actions in complex situations. During exercises, large units and units have received little training in the solution of suddenly-arising tasks, in the conduct of maneuvers to deliver surprise and decisive strikes on the enemy flank and rear, and in the maximum exploitation of the combat capabilities of weapons and combat equipment.

The coordination of motorized rifle (mechanized) and tank large units and units with attached and supporting artillery, and with special troop units and subunits has not always been firmly organized and has been frequently disrupted during combat actions. A significant improvement in the march training of troops is required. ||

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The Air Defense Troops of the Warsaw Pact countries in 1973 more definitely and purposefully solved the problems of improving the common air defense system and of increasing the combat readiness of large units and units to repulse the surprise massive attacks of an air enemy.

The joint measures carried out further improved the combat teamwork and weapons training of the troops. The skills of commanding officers and the training of staffs in controlling large units and units under varied situations were increased. Automated means and electronic computer equipment began to be used more widely in troop control, thereby improving the operating efficiency of command post combat crews and improving troop activities.

However, the Air Defense Troops of the Warsaw Pact countries have not yet worked out adequately the problems of coordination among air defense large units and units of adjacent allied countries and of coordinating ground forces air defense troops with the air defenses of naval forces.

The combat crews of some command posts are still not fully prepared to control combat actions in complex air situations.

In the Air Forces important work has been done to increase the combat readiness of large units and units. Sufficient attention has been given to developing methods of air combat actions which support the ground forces in battle and in operations. Flight personnel have increased their knowledge and practical skills in piloting techniques and combat tactics.

Along with this, the air forces have paid insufficient attention to the training of flight personnel for actions under conditions of powerful enemy air defenses and active radio-electronic countermeasures.

In the navies of the allied countries, the mastery of new warships, equipment, and armament has continued, and the most effective methods of using them in various types of combat actions have been sought.

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The naval training of naval personnel and the level of firing training of ships and boats have been increased.

The problems of comprehensive support to naval forces in battle and in operations have been more fully and qualitatively resolved. Definite successes were achieved in the training of submarines, anti-submarine ships, and minesweeper and amphibious landing forces.

At the same time, some navies have not yet worked out adequately the problems of controlling forces during the mobilization deployment phase and the methods of training large units and units to conduct mobilization.

The agencies of rear services control, rear services units, and installations of the allied armies have increased their readiness to provide comprehensive rear services support for the combat actions of troop groupings, aircraft, and naval forces. Some experience was gained in mutually coordinating the agencies of the operational rear services of allied armies and in supplying major groupings with materiel. The mobilization deployment of rear services units and installations was better organized and carried out in a short time. Materiel resources began to be moved more extensively.

In the 1973 training year, the methods of organizing and carrying out all training measures were further developed and improved. Command-staff, tactical, and tactical-specialist, various kinds of training drills, and other training measures were conducted as a rule in an organized manner, and thus assured the achievement of established goals.

The organization and conduct of courses of instruction for command personnel and command training for officers were markedly improved in substance and quality.

Much work has been done to further develop, improve and effectively use the material training base.

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This report emphasizes that as a result of the overall efforts of the Combined and national commands, and formation commanders, commanders, and staffs of all levels of the Combined Armed Forces, the operational and combat training tasks charged to them in the Directive of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces and the orders of the Ministers of Defense of Warsaw Pact countries for 1973, were fulfilled as a whole.

Many large units and units achieved high results in military and political training. (The report lists the large units and units which achieved the best results in 1973 according to an appraisal of the national commands.)

The problems of planning joint measures for 1974 are set forth further in the report. When the draft plan of joint measures for 1974 was being developed, it should be noted that it was based on the prospective plan approved at the fifth meeting of the Military Council in October 1971 and the directives of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Forces, and that the proposals and desires of the general (main) staffs of the allied armies were taken into consideration.

(Attached are the principal joint measures of the Combined Armed Forces stipulated by the draft plan for 1974.)

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DIRECTIVE
on
Operational and Combat Training
of the Combined Armed Forces
of the Warsaw Pact Members for 1974

No. 0074 Combined Armed Forces

1 November 1973

Moscow

Training of the Combined Armed Forces in 1973 was carried out under conditions of strengthening political unity among the countries of the Socialist Commonwealth, of their growing economic and defensive power, and of successes in the struggle to reduce international tension.

Fulfilling the requirements of the Central Committees of the Communist and Workers Parties and of the governments carrying out the decisions adopted at the meetings of the Political Consultative Committee, and fulfilling the orders of the Ministers of Defense and of Directive No. 0073 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces, during the past year the Combined Armed Forces have resolutely continued to increase their combat and mobilization readiness in order to further strengthen the defensive power of the Warsaw Pact countries.

All allied armies have carried out planned and purposeful work to improve the methods of converting the armed forces from peacetime to wartime status and to raise the combat and mobilization readiness of large units, units, and ships. The training measures implemented have improved the practical skills of command personnel in accomplishing their tasks and have also permitted

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verifying the practicability of the combat and mobilization readiness plans which were developed.

The operational and combat training of troops and naval forces was carried out in an organized manner and was characterized by the purposeful activities of commanders and staffs, by the intensive work of all personnel, and by the further approximation of training processes to actual combat conditions. The following practices were more widely disseminated: conducting joint army and front command-staff exercises with skeleton troops; conducting troop tactical exercises with field firings, rocket launchings, and bombing by aircraft; having air defense large units conduct exercises with field firings by SAM troops and fighter aviation, and conducting tactical-specialist and rear services exercises. In naval exercises the complex employment of all types of weapons was increased.

Joint measures carried out in 1973 helped improve the operational-tactical skills of generals, admirals, officers, and staffs; improved training in combined operations of the armed forces of the allied armies; and increased the field, flight, and naval training of troops, aircraft and naval forces. These measures afforded commanders and staffs the opportunity to solve realistically problems of control, coordination, and the comprehensive supply of allied troops and naval forces when they are fulfilling joint combat tasks.

Combined exercises, meetings, and conferences helped to strengthen mutual understanding and to unify views on problems of military theory and practice; they helped to broaden the combat friendship of the fraternal armies and to implant in personnel the spirit of international friendship and military comradeship.

By and large, the operational and combat training tasks laid down for 1973 were accomplished.

The ground forces, air defense troops, air forces, and naval forces increased their combat readiness, their organization and ability to deploy quickly and fulfil their combat tasks under varied conditions, and they improved their coordination during jointly conducted operations.

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All measures carried out for operational and combat readiness were improved in quality.

At the same time, there were also deficiencies in the training of troops and naval forces.

✓ In some allied armies [the combat readiness of a number of large units and units does not fully satisfy modern requirements]. The search has been slow for ways and means of reducing the time required to carry out measures which place troops and naval forces at various levels of combat readiness and of ensuring the security of actions. There are defects in the operation and maintenance of combat equipment, armaments, and reserves of material-technical means. //

✓ Individual formation commanders have not as yet fully mastered the art of organizing and conducting combined combat actions with groupings of allied troops and naval forces in the complex conditions of the initiation of war. During training and in the course of operations, plans are sometimes adopted without properly estimating the situation and the combat capabilities and actual qualitative status of our own troops and the enemy. [The problems of combatting nuclear weapons with conventional means have not been investigated adequately.] ✓

✓ Some headquarters have not fully mastered the practice of organizing the control, coordination, and comprehensive supplying of allied troops and naval forces engaged in combined actions. Much time is spent developing planning documents, formulating decisions, and making the combat tasks known to subordinates. They do not constantly monitor fulfilment of the tasks.

The tasks of improving the methods and developing the means of reconnaissance and radioelectronic warfare are not being worked out with adequate perseverance. Means of automation and mechanization are being used inefficiently in control processes.

[The organization of communications does not always provide reliable troop control.]

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✓ In the ground forces not all motorized rifle (mechanized) and tank divisions and regiments have been trained in the conduct of highly mobile combat actions under complex situations. In some exercises uninterrupted combat actions have not been sustained, little attention has been devoted to working out tasks which suddenly develop and to the problems of providing troop combat actions with comprehensive support. Commanders of large units and units have not always obtained necessary practice in organizing combat directly on the terrain. In a number of cases headquarters have lost control over their troops and have not ensured that their troops are reliably coordinated during combat.

✓ Rocket troop and artillery headquarters have not mastered in full the problems of organizing and controlling the fire of large groupings of allied artillery troops when a breakthrough is being made in enemy defenses. The tactical training of rocket and artillery units has continued to remain at a lower level than their specialized training.


✓ Air Defense of the Country troops have not yet solved the problem of creating solid radar fields at very low altitudes. Insufficient training has been carried out by SAM battalions in the conduct of autonomous combat actions, in the destruction of high-speed and low-flying targets, and also in combatting an air enemy under conditions of electronic countermeasures.

In the Air Forces inadequate attention has been devoted to the training of flight personnel in the interception of targets at low and also at very high altitudes. Air forces troop branches have had little practice in combat actions under conditions of intense jamming and in joint actions of aircraft with naval strike forces. [Action tactics to cope with the enemy air defense system are being improved slowly.]

In the Navy the training of anti-submarine ships and helicopters is lagging. There is a need to improve the training of agencies controlling the forces and means of the fleets for actions under conditions of active electronic warfare.

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✓[Some rear services units and establishments are inadequately trained to fulfil] under field conditions the actual work of providing troops with material, technical, and medical supplies.

[In all branches of armed forces and arms of troops, little attention has been devoted to investigating the effectiveness of weapons, combat equipment, and the tactics of troops equipped with new weapons.]

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OPERATIONAL AND COMBAT TRAINING TASKS FOR 1974

1. The principal task in the training of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact countries is now and for the future, to increase in every way possible their combat power, to further strengthen combat friendship, to maintain high combat readiness to fulfil the mission of ensuring the security of the allied countries, and to repulse attacks by the enemy and defeat him decisively.

[Also, to devote special attention to improving the quality of training of the troops and naval forces and to study the effectiveness of new types of weapons and fully exploit their combat capabilities.]

To concentrate the efforts of all types of armed forces in the investigation of ways to further improve the system of converting troops and naval forces from peacetime to wartime status, to decrease the time required to bring large units, units, and ships to full combat readiness, and to raise the capabilities of rear services troops, staffs, and agencies to fulfil mobilization plans within established time periods under conditions marked by the initiation of combat actions.

To continue improving in operational and combat training the methods of organizing and conducting joint operations and combat actions with groupings of allied troops and naval forces employing nuclear weapons and conventional means of destruction under complex combat situations. To devote special attention to working out the problems of deploying ground, air, and naval groupings in theaters of military operations, of controlling them when the situation changes abruptly and to tasks to be accomplished within short time periods, and also of organizing and maintaining coordination between formations and large units of differing nationalities.

To work out methods of reliably covering national frontiers, of organizing the disruption and repulse of enemy blows during operational deployments, of having allied troops and naval forces deliver [sudden] powerful encounter blows against the attacking enemy, and of decisively defeating him in a short period of time.

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To improve the tactics of joint actions by troops, aircraft, and naval forces. To seek and learn new, and unexpected by the enemy, methods of fulfilling combat missions in complex situations. To master more effective methods of striking the enemy with the fire of conventional and incendiary means. To work out more fully problems of comprehensively supplying troops and naval forces during combat and operations. To raise the level of field, flight, and naval training, attaining high qualitative indices in the training of large units, units, and ships. Note

[To work out measures to raise the viability of troop groupings and restore their combat effectiveness subsequent to nuclear strikes.]

[[Continue to master new types of weapons and combat equipment and to instruct personnel in their effective use and the full exploitation of their combat capabilities. Introduce new methods of storing and preserving supplies of munitions and equipment and of preparing them for combat use.]]

2. In the training of generals, admirals, officers, and staffs, to concentrate special attention on the profound creative study of new problems in military art, to further raise the level of their theoretical and practical training in the organization of combined operations and combat actions, and to master, with the use of automated means, modern methods of controlling combined groupings of troops and naval forces.

For commanders and staffs to know thoroughly and profoundly the modern means of armed conflict and the combat capabilities and fundamental ways of using our own troops and NATO armed forces. To master methods of qualitatively assessing our own and enemy troops and of estimating how effectively the principal combat tasks have been accomplished, particularly those of destroying installations and targets by fire.

[An important task is to further improve the system of controlling troops and naval forces when the enemy makes massed use of radio jamming.] To raise the efficiency and reliability of control over groupings of allied troops and naval forces and to raise the cohesion, efficiency, and responsiveness of the work of commanders and staffs at all levels.

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To conduct more staff training and exercises in the control of troops, transmission of combat control signals, and verification of the readiness estimates of control posts and communications systems.

[To improve the information activities of staffs.]

To seek, in the planning of operations and combat actions by allied troops, ways of shortening the time required and of improving quality; [to continue improving the methods of integrated planning for combat actions with and without the use of nuclear weapons], and to master at all levels the organization of work using network timetables and the methods of parallel planning. To improve the forms and content of combat documents, ensuring they are clear, accurate, and convenient when used to control troops. To introduce more widely formalized documents for the transmission of combat orders and information by technical means of communication.

To continue further the improvement of the control system based on the integrated use of stationary and protected control posts and communications centers, mobile field posts (command posts, forward command posts, rear services control posts), airborne command posts, and control ships.

To work out the control of troops during exercises when primary command posts and communications centers and lines are put out of action. To devote particular attention to the rapid and skilful shifting of control posts while maintaining their viability, and also to provide stable communications with allied large units and units while conducting highly mobile combat actions. To afford more practice in the organization of all types of reconnaissance and radioelectronic warfare and to search for the most effective methods of protecting rear services troops and agencies from weapons of mass destruction.

3. Ground forces are to concentrate their main efforts on the study and practical mastery of methods of preparing and

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conducting [aggressive and mobile] offensive [actions] by allied troop groupings.

To improve the tactical and tactical-specialist training of all arms of troops and specialist troops, and on this basis, raise the level of their field training. To drill the troops by means of decisive and mobile combat actions. To perseveringly improve their march training by having them accomplish marches of 300 [[to 400 and more]] kilometers a day [at average speeds of 25 to 30 kilometers an hour] and be ready to quickly and efficiently move into and engage in combat under complex conditions. ✓


To train motorized rifle and tank troops to conduct swift offensives which break through defensive lines and fortified zones and areas, to force water barriers, and to operate in mountainous and forested terrain. To train troops in the seizure of enemy straits areas, islands, and naval bases on maritime axes in coordination with allied naval forces, and also to train them in the defense of our coasts against amphibious landings. To improve the organization and conduct of defense when repulsing an offensive by superior enemy forces.

Rocket troops and artillery are to develop more fully the organization and conduct of preparatory and supporting fires for an attack, especially when prepared enemy defenses are to be broken through. To continue to improve methods of delivering strikes against nuclear means, to master methods of combatting enemy self-propelled artillery, and to raise the accuracy of artillery fire by basing it on completely prepared data. To have rocket launchings carried out, as a rule, while brigades and battalions are conducting tactical exercises. To work out the control of rocket troop and artillery groupings, comprised of units and large units of various national armies, when they are delivering combined rocket and artillery fire strikes.

To devote primary attention in the training of troop air defense forces to the organization of reconnaissance and the training of subunits and units to destroy low-flying aerial targets, to improve their coordination with the fighter aircraft

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and troops of the Air Defense of the Country, and to constantly improve standards of firing in training, combat teamwork, and technical training of troops.

To continue training specialist troops to provide all-around reliable support and assistance to formations, large units, and units which are fulfilling their combat missions under complex combat situations.

4. Troops of the Air Defense of the Country are to raise their combat readiness to repulse surprise air strikes by the enemy and to improve coordination within the unified air defense system of the Warsaw Pact countries. To continue the task of mastering and introducing automated control systems, of creating mixed groupings of SAM troops and a solid radar zone at very low altitudes. To raise troop training standards in the conduct of combat actions to destroy aerial targets throughout the entire range of altitudes under conditions of electronic countermeasures. To work out fully the tasks of covering naval forces in their bases and when operating at sea.

5. The air forces are to be trained to conduct combat actions to rout opposing enemy aircraft groupings in coordination with large units and units of the other types of forces. To improve the training of flight personnel in the conduct of joint combat actions against the ground, naval, and air defense forces of NATO under conditions of electronic countermeasures. To seek and master new and more effective tactical procedures for overcoming enemy air defenses. To train all flight personnel in the conduct of aerial reconnaissance. In addition, fighter aviation is to develop the conduct of individual and group air combat at differing flight altitudes and speeds.

6. The navies are to train for decisive combat actions to destroy enemy naval forces quickly in coordination with allied fleets and other branches of the armed forces for the purpose of gaining and maintaining supremacy in restricted maritime theaters. To devote special attention to the improvement of the tactical training of all-arms naval forces in the conduct of combined combat

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actions by unified groupings of allied fleets. To develop reliable control over naval forces under conditions of intense electronic warfare. To improve the tactics of combined operations by minesweeper forces engaged in combatting the mine threat.

To devote attention to organizing the augmentation of combat support forces at sea and to develop for them effective methods of operation when searching for and tracking the submarines and surface ships of the probable enemy, and also when delivering the initial strikes against them.

When amphibious landings are made, to increase the tempo of the landings and improve the organization of control and the all-around support of the forces.

To constantly develop the joint actions of ship groupings with fighter-bomber aircraft to destroy the enemy's surface ships and neutralize his anti-amphibious landing defenses. To perseveringly improve the air defenses of base areas and ships at sea.

In training the operational and troop rear services, to devote special attention to further increasing their readiness to uninterruptedly support troops and naval forces engaged in combined operations, to shorten the deployment times required by rear services and units and installations and to improve coordination between the rear services agencies of allied armies.

To improve the organizational structure of the rear services, to accomplish the necessary measures to provide them with technical equipment, and to increase their mobility, viability, and controllability.

[To train rear services control posts to temporarily assume troop control when primary and forward command posts are put out of action.]

8. To continue studying the theaters of military operations. To use specialist and troop exercises for the practical implementation of coordinated measures which operationally prepare the

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territories of allied countries as part of the theater of military operations. To build up and improve the approaches to the locations of alternate bridges across water obstacles, to build up and improve the road network, transportation center bypasses, shelters for command posts and communications centers, and storage sites for materiel supplies; and also to carry out engineer measures aimed at improving the dispersed basing of aviation and naval forces.

9. To raise the quality and [improve the methods] of preparing and conducting exercises and training. To set up complex and rapidly changing situations in all exercises, to conduct them so they are instructive, and to work out support in full scope. [To research new problems in operational art and tactics.]

To assimilate and disseminate advanced experience in the operational and combat training of troops and naval forces.


To continue improving the instructional material base so that personnel are provided with high-quality training.

10. [To conduct the training of troops and naval forces with due regard for the specific features of the theaters of military operations.]

11. To achieve further strengthening of friendly relations between the armies and peoples of the fraternal countries in all combined measures for operational and combat training. To constantly improve and more effectively exploit all forms and methods of work which have proven in practice to strengthen combat collaboration, and on this point, to show creative initiative and energy. To perseveringly raise the political-idealistic and organizational level of the combined measures carried out and to maximize their efficacy in order to strengthen the defense capabilities of the socialist countries. To improve the combat and moral-psychological training of personnel and prepare them to fulfil their patriotic and international duty.

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12. The concepts of the combined front and fleet command-staff exercises and war games, and also of the operational exercises for air defense and air forces troops are to be submitted to the Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces for approval by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces two months before their conduct is to be initiated. The concepts of the remaining combined exercises are to be sent to the Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces no later than one month before they are initiated.

Supplement: Schedule for Joint Measures of the Combined Armed Forces for 1974.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

OF THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES

/s/

MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION

I. Yakubovskiy

CHIEF OF STAFF

OF THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES

/s/

GENERAL OF THE ARMY

Shtemenko


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
for the conduct of the ninth meeting of the Military Council and conference of command personnel of the armies of Warsaw Pact countries

Time (Local)	Measures	Location	Organized (Conducted) by
1	2	3	4
Until 1600	<p align="center"><u>29 October</u> (Monday)</p> <p>Arrival of participants in the Military Council meeting and the conference in Prague</p> <p align="center"><u>First Day - 30 October</u> (Tuesday)</p> <p><u>For all participants in the Military Council meeting and the conference</u></p>		Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces and Czechoslovak Army Command
<u>0730-0830</u> (1 hour)	Breakfast		
<u>0900-0910</u> (10 min.)	Opening by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the Military Council meeting and conference of command personnel of the armies of Warsaw Pact countries	Prague	
<u>0910-1010</u> (1 hour)	Report of the Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces: "Review of Operational and Combat Training of the Combined Armed Forces for 1973 and Planning and Joint Measures for 1974"		


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1	2	3	4
1010-1040 (30 min.)	Co-report on the review of training of Air Defense Troops of Warsaw Pact countries for 1973 and tasks for 1974		
1040-1100 (20 min.)	Break		
1100-1400 (3 hours)	Remarks by members of the Military Council and representatives of the armies of Warsaw Pact countries		
1400-1530 (1 hour 30 min.)	Dinner		
1530-1600 (30 min.)	Adoption of recommendations on the first question		
1630-1800 (1 hour 30 min.)	Viewing of Soviet Army training films: - "Mountain Training Center" - "Training Landing Forces"	Prague	Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces
ca. 1900	Supper		
	<u>Second day - 31 October</u> (Wednesday)		
	I. <u>For a group of generals and officers of the Ground Forces</u>		
0630-0730 (1 hour)	Breakfast		
0730-1100	Trip to the airfield at Ceske-Budejovice (150 kilometers)		
1100-1200 (1 hour)	Demonstration of airfield equipment with shelters for aircraft and the take-off of a fighter aviation regiment	Airfield (at Ceske-Budejovice)	Czechoslovak Army Command



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1	2	3	4
<u>1200-1300</u> (1 hour)	Dinner		
<u>1300-1400</u> (1 hour)	Trip from airfield to the Boletitse training center (40 kilometers)		
<u>1400-1800</u> (4 hours)	Familiarization with the methods of training personnel in: <ul style="list-style-type: none">- reconnaissance and disarming of nuclear land mines;- tactical-specialist training of rear services subunits;- special treatment of weapons and combat equipment. Demonstration of the organization and methods of conducting subunit exercises to work out the problems of: <ul style="list-style-type: none">- combat with enemy tanks and aircraft;- crossing water obstacles;- carrying out tank firing exercises.	Boletitse Training Center	Czechoslovak Army Command Czechoslovak Army Command
<u>1800-2100</u> ca. 2100	Return to Prague Supper		
<u>0730-0830</u> (1 hour)	II. <u>For a group of generals and officers of Air Defense Troops and Air Forces</u> Breakfast		

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1	2	3	4
<u>0900-1300</u> (4 hours)	Conference of Air Defense troop commanders (Air Defense and Air Force) to approve and define plans for conducting joint training measures, as well as air defense troop tactical exercises, SAM troop and fighter aviation field firing to be conducted at USSR ranges in 1974.	Prague	Deputy Commander of Air Defense Troops of Warsaw Pact countries
<u>1300-1400</u> (1 hour)	Dinner		
<u>1400-1800</u> (4 hours)	Continuation of the conference		
ca. 1900	Supper		
<u>0730-0830</u> (1 hour)	<u>III. For a group of admirals and officers of the navies</u> Breakfast		
<u>0900-1300</u> (4 hours)	Conference of naval formation commanders to approve and define plans for conducting naval exercises, firings, and other measures planned for 1974	Prague	Deputy Chief of Staff of the Combined Armed Forces for Navies
<u>1300-1400</u> (1 hour)	Dinner		
<u>1400-1800</u> (4 hours)	Continuation of the conference		
ca. 1900	Supper		
<u>0730-0830</u> (1 hour)	<u>IV. For a group of generals and officers of finance services</u> Breakfast		

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1	2	3	4
0900-1300 (4 hours)	Conference of chiefs of finance services to discuss the draft budget of the Combined Command for 1974 and to render an account of the implementation of the 1972 budget	Prague	Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces
1300-1400 (1 hour)	Dinner		
1400-1800 (4 hours)	Exchange of work experience in using and exploiting computer equipment in the financial-economic service of the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries	Prague	Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces
ca. 1900	Supper		
	<u>Third day - 1 November</u> (Thursday)		
	<u>For all participants in the Military Council meeting and the conference</u>		
0730-0930 (1 hour)	Breakfast		
0900-0950 (50 min.)	Report of the Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces: "Fundamentals of organizing rear services support for large units and formations of the Combined Armed Forces of Warsaw Pact countries when conducting joint operations"	Prague	Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces
0950-1050 (1 hour)	Comments of Military Council members and conference participants		
1050-1110 (20 min.)	Break		
1110-1210 (1 hour)	Continuation of comments of Military Council members and conference participants. Adoption of recommendations on the second question		

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
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1	2	3	4
1230-1330 (1 hour)	Dinner		
1340-1350 (10 min.)	Information of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces on the draft plan for meetings of the Military Council in 1974		
1350-1410 (20 min.)	Exchange of opinions of Military Council members and approval of the plan for meetings in 1974		
1410-1540 (1 hour 30 min.)	Remarks of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces		
1540-1600 (20 min.)	Break		
1600-1650 (50 min.)	Briefing on NATO Armed Forces strategic exercise WINTEX-73		
1650-1720 (30 min.)	Signing of the Minutes and closing of the meeting of the Military Council and conference of the command personnel of the armies of Warsaw Pact countries		
1800-1900 (1 hour)	Concert by amateur talent of the Czechoslovak Army	Prague	Czechoslovak Army Command
ca. 1930	Supper given by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces		
From 2100 1/11 and morning of 2/11	Departure of participants in the Military Council meeting and conference of command personnel of the armies of Warsaw Pact countries to their homelands		

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Commander-in-Chief of the
Combined Armed Forces

Marshal of the Soviet Union /signature/
I. Yakubovskiy

SCHEDULE

1 November 1973

Joint Measures of the Combined Armed Forces
of Warsaw Pact Members for the Polish Army
for 1974

No.	Period when conducted	Designation of the measure	Conducted (supervised) by	Those involved (participating)	Location where conducted
1 2	March October	I. <u>MEETINGS OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL</u> Meeting of the Military Council Meeting of the Military Council			Hungary East Germany
1	September	II. <u>MEASURES CARRIED OUT BY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES</u> Command-staff exercise of allied fleets in the Baltic Sea with the forces designated for "VAL-74"	Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces	from the Polish Navy and Army- operations group from Navy directorates, naval amphibious landing division, Air Force large unit and Air Defense corps, head- quarters of principal naval large units and rear services. Designated forces: submarines-2, destroyers-1, small subchasers-11, rocket launching craft (rkab)-2, PT boats (tkab)-4, small mine- sweepers (tschm)-7, large mine- sweepers (tschb)-9, landing ships medium-12, landing craft (dka)-10, roadstead minesweepers (tr)-2, ASW helicopters-3, reconnaissance aircraft-2,	Poland, et a Polish Navy base

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No.	Period when conducted	Designation of the measure	Conducted (supervised) by	Those involved (participating)	Location where conducted
2	October	Conference on results of operational, combat, and mobilization training for 1974 and tasks for 1975	Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces	amphibious landing regiments-1, motorized rifle battalions-1 to 2, bomber aircraft flights-2 Command personnel of the Ground, Air Defense, Air, and Navy forces, and finance agencies, of the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries (WPC)--by individual delegation	East Germany, at an East German Army base
III. <u>MEASURES CARRIED OUT BY THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES</u>					
1	January	Conference of medical service specialists to edit and coordinate the Guide for Medical Support in Wartime of the Air and Air Defense Forces of the WPC	Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces	Medical service specialists, 1 or 2 persons from each army	Soviet Union
2	January	Operational assembly of command personnel of the USSR Baltic Fleet, East German Navy, and Polish Navy on the destruction of the combined fleets of the enemy in the Baltic Sea and the blockade of straits areas	Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces	Command personnel of the USSR Baltic Fleet, East German Navy, Polish Navy; formation commanders of the air army of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, East German air defense division, and Polish air defense corps and amphibious landing division. In all, 7 or 8 persons from each country	Soviet Union
3	February	Operational-tactical meeting (conference) of command personnel of the Air Forces and Air Armies (composite air corps) on the planning of air force combat actions in <u>front</u> operations	Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces	Commanders (of formations) of Air Force air armies (composite air corps) and chiefs of operations departments (directorates). In all, 4 or 5 persons from each army	East Germany, at an East German Army base
4	March	Meeting of command personnel of the military medical services of the	Headquarters of the Combined	Group of representatives of military medical services. In	East Germany,

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No.	Period when conducted	Designation of the measure	Conducted (supervised) by	Those involved (participating)	Location where conducted
		armies of the WPC on restoration to duty and speeding up of diagnoses following nuclear and chemical weapon strikes and when there are contagious diseases; with practical demonstrations in the field	Armed Forces	all 10 or 11 persons from each army	at an East German Army base
5	April	Meeting (conference) of command personnel of the chemical troops of the armies of the WPC on the organization of troop training for defense against weapons of mass destruction and methods of training chemical troops	Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces	Chiefs of chemical troops of the ministries of defense, the branches of armed forces, military districts, (armies), and armies of the WPC	Poland, at a Polish Army base
6	May	Meeting (conference) of command personnel of the rocket troops and artillery of the armies of the WPC on the organization and methods of controlling rocket troops and artillery during combined operations by allied troops	Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces	Chiefs (formation commanders) of the rocket troops and artillery of the ministries of defense, military districts (armies), and chiefs of rocket troop and artillery staffs	Czechoslovakia, at a Czech Army base
7	May	Seminar to exchange experience in the field of training cadre personnel for automated control systems	Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces	Three or four persons from each army	Hungary, at a Hungarian Army base
8	June	Meeting of radio frequency service experts on the problems of allocating frequencies in the aviation frequency band and of allocating additional frequencies for radio-relay communications	Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces	Experts of the General (Main) Staffs of the armies of the WPC. In all, 5 or 6 persons from each army	Hungary, at a Hungarian Army base
9	July	Meeting of senior personnel of the General (Main) Staffs of the armies of the WPC	Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces	Senior personnel of the General (Main) Staffs of the armies of the WPC. In all, 4 or 5 persons from each army	Czechoslovakia, at a Czech Army base

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No.	Period when conducted	Designation of the measure	Conducted (supervised) by	Those involved (participating)	Location where conducted
10	August	15th conference of air force and air defense doctors on the subject: "The Psychological Characteristics of Pilot Actions Under Flight Conditions and Medical Service Measures to Raise the Combat Effectiveness of Flight Personnel"	Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces	Representatives of the military medical services of the armies of the WPC, 4 or 5 persons from each army	Soviet Union
11	September	Meeting of representatives of the hydrometeorological services to examine the technical documentation of plans to coordinate the meteorological services of operational formations and to improve the exchange of meteorological data within the system of coordinated airfields	Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces	Representatives of the hydro-meteorological services of the armies of the WPC, 2 or 3 persons from each army	Czechoslovakia, at a Czech Army base
12	October	Meeting of chiefs of the military topographical services of the armies of the WPC to discuss the projected regulations on topographic-geodetic and special map support of the combined actions of troops of the armies of the WPC and to examine the draft basic regulations for the production of topographic maps and the draft for the planned modernization of maps in 1976-1980	Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces	Chiefs of the military topographic services with a group specialist. In all, 3 or 4 persons from each army	Bulgaria
13	November	Meeting of command personnel of the fuel and rocket propellant services of the armies of the WPC on the following problems: organizing quality control and use of POL special fluids for military equipment and their interchangeability and deploying front and army fuel depots and pipeline equipment during combat actions; with practical demonstrations of technical means	Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces	Command personnel of POL supply services. In all, 5 or 6 persons from each army	Soviet Union

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No.	Period when conducted	Designation of the measure	Conducted (supervised) by	Those involved (participating)	Location where conducted
14	November	Meeting on results and exchange of work experience in 1974 and on coordination of work in 1975 in the area of improvements in the control of troops and naval forces by using means for automation and mechanization	Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces	Deputy chiefs of the general staffs, chiefs of operations directorates and of communications of the general staffs, and automation specialists. In all, 5 or 6 persons from each army	Soviet Union
15	December	Meeting of chiefs of staffs and specialists of the allied fleets on the problems of improving radio-electronic warfare, of developing common tactical-technical requirements for naval automated control system, of agreement on the specifications for the compilation of naval maps by a single collective, and the organization of joint research efforts in the Baltic and Black Seas	Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces	Chiefs of staffs of the Bulgarian, East German, Polish, Romanian navies and of the USSR Baltic and Black Sea Fleets, with a group of officers. In all, 5 or 6 persons from each navy or fleet	Bulgaria
IV. MEASURES CARRIED OUT BY THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES					
1	March	Meeting of command personnel of the engineer troops of the armies of the WPC on the problems of developing reconnaissance and obstacle clearing means and of camouflaging and fortifying positions	Technical Committee	Chiefs of engineer troops of the armies of the WPC with a group of officers. In all, 3 or 4 persons from each army	East Germany, at an East German Army base
2	April	Meeting of command personnel of the rocket-artillery armament services of the armies of the WPC on the problems of improving the rocket-artillery armament services as a means of raising the combat effectiveness of the troops	Technical Committee	Chief of the rocket-artillery armament services of the armies of the WPC with a group of officers. In all, 3 or 4 persons from each army	Romania

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No.	Period when conducted	Designation of the measure	Conducted (supervised) by	Those involved (participating)	Location where conducted
3	May	Session of the Military Scientific-Technical Council (MSTC)	Technical Committee	Members of the MSTC and representatives of the armies of the WPC. In all, 3 or 4 persons from each army	Bulgaria
4	June	Meeting of command personnel of the engineer-aviation services of the Air Forces and Air Defense Forces of the armies of the WPC to exchange experiences in the operation of new aviation equipment and ways of ensuring its high combat readiness	Technical Committee	Chief engineers of the air forces and air defense forces of the armies of the WPC with a group of officers. In all, 3 or 4 persons from each army	Czechoslovakia, at a Czech Army base
5	November	Session of the Military Scientific-Technical Council	Technical Committee	Members of the MSTC and representatives of the armies of the WPC. In all, 4 or 5 persons from each army	
<p>V. MEASURES CARRIED OUT BY NATIONAL COMMANDS WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF STAFFS AND TROOPS OF THE ARMIES OF THE WPC</p> <p>a. Operational exercises, meetings, and seminars</p>					
1	June	Front two-level command-staff exercise on the terrain with communications means	Minister of National Defense of Poland	from the Polish Army - a front directorate, a front rocket brigade, two military districts (in role of army directorates), front and army air force units. An operational group from the Air Defense of the Country and border troops, from the Soviet Army (Northern Group of Forces) - an operational group from an army directorate and one air division	Poland

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No.	Period when conducted	Designation of the measure	Conducted (supervised) by	Those involved (participating)	Location where conducted
2	September	Work of a group of specialists from the allied armies to modify in final form the principles of establishing and exploiting a data base for the solution of operational-tactical tasks in large units and formations	General Staff of the Polish Army	Groups of specialists, 2 or 3 persons from each army	Poland, at a Polish Army base
3	October	Seminar on the preparation of algorithms and programs for third-generation electronic computers	Main Staff of the East German Army	Specialists in the preparation of algorithms, 3 or 4 persons from each army	East Germany, at an East German Army base
4	December	Meeting (conference) on the problems of studying and transmitting algorithms and programs for operational-tactical tasks, obtaining problem solutions on electronic computers, and of introducing these means in the practical work of staffs	General Staff of the Romanian Army	Programmers, 4 to 6 persons from each army	Romania
1	April	<p>b. <u>Tactical (tactical-specialist) exercises</u></p> Combined arms tactical exercise of large units of the Soviet Army (Northern Group of Forces) and Polish Army	Command of the Northern Group of Forces	from the Polish Army - one mechanized (tank) division with reinforcement means	Poland
2	By agreement	Tactical exercise of rocket troops with launchings of combat rockets at the firing range in the Soviet Union	As decided by Minister of National Defense of Poland	Composition of troops - as decided by the Minister of National Defense of Poland	Soviet Union
1	March	<p><u>VI. MEASURES FOR THE TRAINING OF AIR DEFENSE AND AIR FORCE TROOPS OF THE WFC</u></p> Assembly (meeting of chiefs and chief engineers of radiotechnical	Commander of the Air Defense Troops	Chiefs, chief engineers of radio-technical troops and two officers	Poland, at a base

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No.	Period when conducted	Designation of the measure	Conducted (supervised) by	Those involved (participating)	Location where conducted
		troops of the air defense forces of the WPC on the problems of raising the combat readiness of radio-technical troops and of organizing the combat use and operation of radar equipment	of the WPC	from each air defense of each Warsaw Pact country	of Polish air defense radio-technical troops
2	June	Exercise of air defense troops of the WPC with actual flights by aerial targets on the subject: "Conduct of Combat Actions by Air Defense Troops to Repulse Attacks by Enemy Aircraft and Cruise Missiles When Radioelectronic Warfare Means Are Used"	Commander of the Air Defense Troops of the WPC	Command, staffs, and troops of the air defenses of the WPC	Territory of the WPC
3	By agreement	Two-sided practice to develop tactical coordination, with actual flights of aerial targets	Commanders (of formations) of air defense troops of the WPC	Cooperating large units and units of air defense troops of the WPC	Territory of the WPC
4	By agreement	Tactical exercises of air defense large units with field firing by SAM troops and fighter aviation at firing ranges in the Soviet Union	Commander of Polish Air Defense Troops.	Air defense large units--as decided by the command of Polish Air Defense	Soviet Union
5	By agreement	Field firings by units and subunits of SAM troops and by interceptor pilots at firing ranges in the Soviet Union	Unit and subunit commanders	Air defense units and subunits--as decided by the command of Polish Air Defense	Soviet Union
6	By agreement	Flying from coordination airfields of the Warsaw Pact countries	Commands of the Air Defense Forces and Air Forces of the WPC	Flight personnel of large units and units of Air Defense Forces and Air Forces of the WPC in combat and transport aircraft--as decided by the commands of the Air Defense Forces and Air Forces of the WPC	Territory of the WPC

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No.	Period when conducted	Designation of the measure	Conducted (supervised) by	Those involved (participating)	Location where conducted
7	By agreement (twice a year)	Controlled check of the combat readiness of duty forces and means of Air Defense troops of the allied countries	Commander of the Air Defense Troops of the WPC	Duty forces and means of Air Defense of the WPC	Territory of the WPC
8	By agreement (May)	Complex training to develop the radio and wire communications of unified air defense system of the WPC	Headquarters of the Air Defense Troops of the WPC	Operations groups of the command posts of formations and large units of Air Defense of the WPC	Territory of the WPC
9	By agreement (September)	Training to develop radio communications for coordination and warning of Air Defense of the WPC under conditions of premeditated radio jamming on the Western Axis	Headquarters of the Air Defense Troops of the WPC	Operations groups of the command posts of formations and large units of Air Defense of the WPC	Territory of the WPC
VII. MEASURES FOR NAVAL TRAINING					
1	April (first ten days)	Develop the anti-submarine defense tasks of the East German Navy with a Polish Navy submarine (training lasting 5 consecutive days)	Command of the East German Navy	from the Polish Navy - one submarine	
2	June	Rocket firing by rocket ships and boats of the Polish Navy at the firing range of the Baltic Fleet of the USSR	Command of the Polish Navy	from the Polish Navy - destroyer "Narazawa"-1, rocket-launching boats-4 to 6, small submarines-6, auxiliary vessels-1; from the USSR Baltic Fleet - target project 436 B18-3, M6-2, photographic aircraft-3, auxiliary vessels-3	
3	By agreement (May)	Training by minesweeper forces of the allied fleets in the Baltic Sea	Chief of Staff of the Polish Navy	from the Polish and East German navies and USSR Baltic Fleet - one minesweeper ship group from each (3 or 4 minesweepers from each navy)	

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No.	Period when conducted	Designation of the measure	Conducted (supervised) by	Those involved (participating)	Location where conducted
4	By agreement (three times a year)	Combined exercises to develop the control of strike groups of boats in the Baltic Sea	Large unit commanders	from the East German and Polish navies and USSR Baltic Fleet - operations groups of agencies controlling large units and boats - as decided by navy commanders	
5	By agreement (twice a year)	Combined exercises to develop the control of all-arms antisubmarine ship groups in the Baltic Sea	Large unit commanders	from the East German and Polish navies and USSR Baltic Fleet - operations groups of agencies controlling large units and ships - as decided by navy commanders	
6	By agreement (monthly)	Exercises to develop the coordination communications of allied fleets in the Baltic Sea	Communications chiefs of the allied fleets	Communications centers of the headquarters of the allied fleets	
<u>VIII. INSPECTION OF THE LARGE UNITS OF THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES OF THE WPC</u>					
1	September	In the Polish Army	Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces	A mechanized division, air defense corps, and air force fighter aviation division	Poland
<u>IX. RECIPROCAL VISITS OF TROOP UNITS</u>					
1	November	Familiarization of admirals and officers of the allied navies with the training base of the Caspian Higher Naval School i/n of S. M. Kirov	Commander of the Red Banner Caspian Flotilla	Groups of admirals and officers of the Bulgarian, East German, Polish, and Romanian navies, and of the USSR twice Red Banner Baltic and Red Banner Black Sea Fleets, 4 or 5 persons from each navy	Soviet Union
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES					
General of the Army			Shtenenko		
1 NOVEMBER 1973					

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DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS

of the Military Council on the second question
on the agenda of the ninth meeting

After hearing the report of the Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces on "The Principles of Organizing Rear Services Support for Joint Operations of Large Units and Formations of the Combined Armed Forces of the Member Countries of the Warsaw Pact", the Military Council reports that the national commands and the Combined Command have worked hard to implement the recommendations of the sixth meeting of the Military Council. They have jointly drawn up an important paper defining common principles and the most direct and effective ways and means of solving the problems involved in providing rear services support to allied troops and naval forces during joint operations. If the provisions of the draft of "The Principles" are implemented, progress will have been made toward achieving common understanding of the problems involved in organizing rear services support and greater efficiency in coordinating the efforts of the rear services agencies to fully meet the requirements of allied troops (naval forces).

The Military Council recommends:

1. That "The Principles of Organizing Rear Services Support for Joint Operations of Large Units and Formations of the Combined Armed Forces of the Member Countries of the Warsaw Pact" be approved and that the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces be asked to implement them.
2. That the national and Combined Commands continue their effort to further improve all forms of rear services support of

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the Combined Armed Forces, and do so in conformity with the provisions of "The Principles of Organizing Rear Services Support for Joint Operations of Large Units and Formations of the Combined Armed Forces of the Member Countries of the Warsaw Pact."

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SUMMARY OF REPORT

on the draft paper, "The Principles of Organizing Rear Services Support for Joint Operations of Large Units and Formations of the Combined Armed Forces of the Member Countries of the Warsaw Pact." This paper was presented at the ninth meeting of the Military Council.

In the first section of the report it is pointed out that the draft of "The Principles" was drawn up by the Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces and based on the proposals of the general (main) staffs of the allied armies. These proposals were themselves based on recommendations made at the sixth meeting of the Military Council and on experience gained during a series of training exercises and other measures conducted during recent years by the national and Combined Commands on problems involved in the support of allied troops by the rear services. The materials thus obtained were summarized and discussed in 1970 during the first military-scientific rear services conference of the Combined Armed Forces. Work subsequently done on this subject by the Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces and by all the allied armies made it possible to clarify a number of proposals and to prepare a discussion of the topic of the principles of rear services support of large units and formations of the Combined Armed Forces during joint operations for consideration at the sixth meeting of the Military Council.

Materials from conferences of the leadership personnel of the various rear services of the allied armies were also taken into consideration when "The Principles" were drawn up.

As a result, the draft of "The Principles" that was presented to the Military Council for consideration constitutes the end result of a great, cooperative, fruitful endeavor on the part of the allied armies and the Combined Command.

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This section emphasizes the fact that in drawing up "The Principles" full recognition was accorded the fact that the fraternal unity of the socialist countries and their mutual assistance and cooperation in all military, political, and economic spheres of life constitute the basis of the combat readiness of the Combined Armed Forces and a firm foundation for providing comprehensive and timely rear services support to allied troops (naval forces) during joint operations.

The second section of the report contains a brief summary of the provisions of "The Principles of Rear Services Support".

It gives special emphasis to the fact that the basic provisions in this document fully conform to the principles of rear services support that were approved during the sixth meeting of the Military Council.

It also discusses the requirements and procedures for providing the troops with uninterrupted support, which during war-time are as follows: to fully and promptly meet the need of the troops and naval forces for weapons, equipment, missiles, ammunition, fuel, and other material resources; to ensure the successful completion of all types of military shipments; to maintain weapons and combat equipment in combat-ready condition, etc.

The problems of maintaining transport facilities are also taken up. The necessity of coordinating the use of the general communications and transportation means of the allied countries and the military transportation means of the allied armies of the Combined Armed Forces is emphasized.

The problems involved in supplying troops of different nationalities with material resources are discussed.

One of the technical support problems considered is the procedure for repair and salvage of weapons and equipment to be used by the troops during joint operations.

The problems involved in medical support are set forth in the report, with special emphasis on the organization of close

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coordination of the forces and means of the military-medical services during joint operations and the mutual exchange of ambulance facilities and medical supplies, etc.

As regards the procedure for making payment for material resources and services supplied to the armed forces of another nationality, the report states that compensation for expenditures will be made in conformity with agreements between the countries concerned.

Several problems of rear services control and of the organization of coordination between the rear services agencies of different nationalities are also discussed.

The third section contains a discussion of proposals and remarks pertaining to the draft of "The Principles" sent to the Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces by the general (main) staffs.

The majority of them supplement and add depth to the contents of individual provisions in the original draft of "The Principles" and were taken into consideration during the revision of the paper.

In conclusion, the report emphasizes that a single, coordinated approach to the solution of the problems of rear services support of the allied troops will facilitate the further improvement of the system of rear services support for the Combined Armed Forces and will increase their combat readiness.

PRINCIPLES

of the Organization of Rear Services Support for Large Units and Formations of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States During Combined Operations

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. One of the vital conditions for successful combat actions by the Combined Armed Forces in modern war will be the comprehensive and coordinated advance preparation of their rear services, which are based on the growing economic capabilities of the Warsaw Pact members, and on the efficiently organized rear services support of troops engaged in combat and operations.*

2. Rear services support of the Combined Armed Forces is designed to satisfy all requirements for weapons, equipment, missiles, ammunition, fuel, and other materiel; to carry out all types of field transport on a timely basis; to maintain weapons and equipment at combat readiness and restore them rapidly; to provide medical aid to the sick and wounded on a timely basis; to set up stable conditions for the basing of air and naval forces; and to carry out other special tasks in support of the combat activity and daily existence of the troops.

3. Rear services support is set up by planning and implementing a system of coordinated measures which prepare the rear services for rapid transition from peacetime to wartime status; which provide logistic, transport, equipment, medical, engineer-airfield, airfield equipment, emergency rescue, and other types of rear services support which maintain continuous and firm control over the rear services and preserve the viability of the entire rear services support system during combat operations.

4. Rear services support of allied troops in combined operations is organized through close cooperation among the rear

*Here and throughout, the term "troops" also includes naval forces.

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services elements of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact members on the basis of the following common principles:

a. during the preparation and conduct of combined operations, rear services support of national groupings of troops is usually carried out by the forces and means of each grouping, using their own resources;

b. when it is difficult to provide rear services support for allied formations or large units (units) directly from their own territory, they may receive such support from the rear services of the front (army, fleet) to which they are temporarily assigned. In this case, a front (army, fleet) which includes allied troops must incorporate national rear services elements and the required logistic and transport means within its own rear services.

c. in individual cases, national large units (units) can be completely supported by the rear services of the front (army, fleet) to which they are temporarily assigned, except for personal gear and certain specific items of supply. The replenishment of material resources expended by them, or payment therefore, and other types of support, are handled by the appropriate military or national agencies on the basis of mutual agreements.

5. The overall requirements for high effectiveness in the organization of rear services support include:

- that the readiness of the rear services match the combat readiness of the troops to be supported;

- that the rear services be ready to support suddenly initiated combat actions using the rear services forces and means available in peacetime and to subsequently expand their efforts;

- that the viability of the rear services support system be maintained under any conditions in which combat actions might be initiated or conducted;

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- that the rear services support organization be appropriate to the combat missions of the troops, the operational situation, the conditions in the theater of military operations, and the strength and condition of the rear services forces and means;

- that the main efforts of the rear services be concentrated on supporting the troop grouping which is carrying out the main mission;

- that in regard to rear services support, troop groupings be afforded maximum self-sufficiency;

- that conditions be set up ensuring that troops engaged in uninterrupted operations are provided with stable rear services support;

- that the senior command be responsible for the comprehensive, full, and timely rear services support of the troops subordinate to it.

6. The peacetime preparation of the rear services of allied armies is carried out in conformity with the plans for the development and combat employment of troops. This preparation includes: the constant improvement and standardization of organizational structures, the equipment being provided, and the principles of rear services functioning; the maintenance of rear services large units, units, and installations at constant readiness in peacetime; the taking of measures which ensure rapid mobilization and deployment of the rear services, the timely establishment, correct echeloning, and reliable protection of materiel reserves; and the constant improvement of the field skills and of combat, operational-logistic, and specialist training of the personnel of rear services large units, units, installations, and control agencies.

7. Successful rear services support of the national formation and large units of each allied army is achieved by maintaining in peacetime the necessary rear services large units, units, and installations and by deploying them within a short period of time during special periods.

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The immediate rear services of those large units and units held at constant readiness by all of the allied armies and fleets are to be kept in a state of readiness to support the troops. The peacetime operational rear services and the rear services of Central Headquarters must be kept at a status which will enable them to support national formations and large units in combat until the main rear services forces can be deployed, to provide for the rapid mobilization and deployment of rear services large units, units, and installations, and to maintain materiel reserves at established levels.

During peacetime, formations of the army rear services maintain the following: the required depots with materiel reserves, transport and medical units and installations, and additionally, for aviation elements: air-technical, engineer-airfield, and maintenance units and subunits capable of ensuring the constant combat readiness of the troops. The remaining rear services units and installations are mobilized in time to support the deployment of the army rear services.

The makeup of the front (fleet) rear services depends on its combat strength, its missions, the nature of the theater of military operations, and the operational logistics situation. In all instances, the front must have front supply bases and hospital bases able to operate away from railroads, as well as rear services large units, units, and installations which provide automotive, railroad, and road transport, pipelines, maintenance, evacuation, and other support. Corresponding rear services units and installations are also planned for the navies.

In the rear services of the Central Headquarters of national armed forces it is also advisable to have in addition to fixed bases and depots with reserve materiel and maintenance and medical elements, a certain number of mobile (field) rear services large units, units, and installations which can be moved forward on those axes where they are needed for the reinforcement or full support of a given grouping of national armed forces.

Such mobile (field) rear services elements will usually be subordinate to a national command. Where support of national

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forces from their own territory is difficult, it is advisable to subordinate them to the command of coalition formation.

8. In peacetime, rear services support forces and means at all levels of national armed forces must be so disposed as to facilitate their best utilization during initial operations.

For this purpose, the immediate rear services are deployed together with corresponding field units and large units. The peacetime forces and means of operational rear services and of the rear services of Central Headquarters are generally echeloned in depth and positioned on the main operational axes, taking into consideration the operational deployment and utilization of their own troops and the requirement to support their own formations and large units and also the troops of other allied countries advancing into theaters of military operations.

To assure the mobility of rear services large units, units, installations and of materiel reserves, rear services agencies supporting their own and allied troops are deployed near transportation facilities. They must have access to the nearest highways, railroad stations, ports (anchorage, docks), and airfields.

Groupings of rear services large units, units, and installations must be under continuous and stable control.

Viability of the rear services support system is achieved by the dispersed deployment of rear services large units, units, installations, and materiel reserves and by the maximum exploitation of the protective and concealment features of the terrain. Shelters are prepared for the most important of these elements.

9. The rear services of allied troops make the transition from a peacetime to a wartime status in accordance with the plans of the commands of the national armies, taking into account the specific situation and the recommendations of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces. This transition, conducted simultaneously with the deployment of troops, includes the following: bringing all rear services levels to full combat

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readiness; mobilizing the rear services and receiving the stipulated material resources from the rear services of Central Headquarters; moving forward the required rear services support forces and means into the theaters (areas) of military operations; and setting up the rear services and immediately preparing them to carry out their assigned functions.

First of all, the immediate and operational rear services of the main troop groupings are brought to full wartime strength. Special attention is given to the mustering of those rear services large units, units, and installations which are earmarked for the direct support of troop combat operations.

The time needed for rear services agencies to reach readiness can be reduced by maintaining in peacetime, at reduced complements, the necessary minimum number of headquarters organizations for supply and hospital bases and for large units, units, and subunits of automative, railroad, road, and pipeline troops; and also by utilizing the resources of the national economy capable of implementing within short periods of time the planned mobilization (reforming) of rear services units and facilities.

10. A front is assigned a rear services zone for the following purposes: to establish and operate an operational rear services and also to fix responsibility for the maintenance of order in the combat zones, to deploy and redeploy rear services large units, units, and installations; to organize the protection, defense, and security of rear services; and to exploit the lines of communication and the local military-economic base. An army* operating on a separate operational axis or on the defensive is also assigned a rear services zone.

11. The establishment of rear services during an operation consists of mustering those groupings of rear services large units, units, and installations which provide comprehensive logistic support to the troops during an operation. This

*Here and throughout, the term "army" may also include an army corps.

establishment must correspond to the operational structure of the forces, to the tasks assigned to the rear services and to the specific situation; it must ensure that rear services agencies are always ready to move, that best use is made of rear services communications, forces, and means; and it must ensure the controllability and high viability of the entire system of rear services support during the operation.

12. The establishment of the rear services of a formation during the preparation and conduct of an operation is determined by its command in conformity with the operational plan and by agreement with control agencies of the rear services of the Central Headquarters of the armed forces of the country on whose territory the rear services of the formation is deploying.

13. The relocation of rear services large units, units, and installations of a front (army, fleet) during an operation is organized according to the plan for troop rear services support developed by the headquarters of the front (army, fleet) rear services after taking into consideration suggestions from the control agencies of the national formations or large units assigned to the front (army, fleet).

The immediate and army rear services are to displace following the troops they are to support, depending on the rate at which the troops are advancing and their needs for materiel resupply, medical aid to the wounded, and restoration of damaged equipment.

The following elements are to displace, as needed, following the troops and using their own means: front forward bases; forward hospital bases; traffic control, maintenance, evacuation, and other large units, units, and installations of the front rear services earmarked for direct support of armies of the first echelon; and also some mobile rear services agencies subordinate to the Central Headquarters of national armed forces and to the armies assigned to a multinational front.

As a rule, a portion of the front rear services and of the rear services agencies subordinated centrally to national armed

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forces (rear services supply bases, rear services hospital bases, repair installations, and others) are moved forward as the railroads are restored.

The displacement of rear services agencies of air and naval formations is carried out by rebasing these forces in new areas.

II. MATERIEL SUPPORT


14. The goal of materiel support is the timely satisfaction of troop requirements for weapons, equipment, missiles, ammunition, rocket propellant, fuel, foodstuffs, various technical stores, and other types of materiel needed to conduct combat actions and for everyday living. Materiel support of troops is organized by the respective national rear services control agencies and is carried out according to type of supplies in the sequence: Central Headquarters-front-army-division-regiment, or, where the composition of the armed forces does not include the front level--Central Headquarters-army-division-regiment.

15. Each allied army, for the support of its own armed forces, establishes and permanently maintains materiel reserves which provide what is required for the deployment of troops in a special period and also replenish the resources expended in the initial and subsequent operations before the national economy changes over to military production in accordance with wartime plans. The quantity of reserve materiel maintained at the immediate, operational, and central levels of the rear services is determined by each national command in conformity with overall operational plans and with the recommendations of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces.

16. In order to provide for the timely satisfaction of unforeseen allied troop requirements in a special period, a materiel reserve of the Combined Command is created during peacetime with resources provided by the Warsaw Pact members. The quantities and locations of these reserves are determined by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces by agreement with the respective national commands.

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17. Materiel is issued from the reserve of the Combined Command by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces based on requisitions from the respective national commands.

18. Materiel expended from the reserve of the Combined Command is replaced as soon as possible, in equal amounts from resources of the country whose troops received the materiel. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces determines the times and places where replacement materiel is to be delivered.

19. During the preparatory stages and the course of an operation, individual national large units and units operating away from their own supply bases as part of a multinational front (army, fleet) are supplied with materiel from the reserves of that front (army, fleet). Special materiel is delivered by the national commands to front (army, fleet) bases or directly to the troops. The assumption of supply responsibilities for national large units and individual units is formalized by order of the front (army, fleet) troop commander.

These large units and units submit supply certificates at the rear services control agencies, along with information on the weight per unit of supply of the respective types of materiel (ammunition units of fire, fuel refuelings, daily issue of rations, etc.) for each type and listed item.

These large units (units) are supplied with materiel according to their national standards.

20. Formations and large units (units) temporarily subordinated operationally to a formation of another nationality must be supplied with all types of materiel according to the established standards of their own country.

Troops are to have with them established reserves when they arrive in areas of concentration or areas designated for combat.

Equipment transported by rail (water transport) must be supplied with the additional fuel necessary to proceed from the unloading stations (ports) to the areas of concentration.

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21. When aviation large units, units, or individual aircraft (helicopters) land at airfields of allied countries, materiel support is provided by forces and means of the countries to which the airfields belong (by previous agreement when support is for large units and units). At these airfields, aircraft (helicopters) are refueled, ammunition reserves are replenished, and flight personnel receive all types of support. If the required type of ammunition is not available in the country at whose airfields aircraft of an allied country have landed, the ammunition is to be delivered by transport aircraft from supply bases (airfields) of the allied country to which the aircraft belong.

22. Naval ships, units, or large units calling at naval bases and ports of allied countries are to be supplied, by previous agreement, with all types of materiel by the forces of the navy in whose zone of responsibility the bases are located, and ship maintenance services are also to be made available to them when requisitioned by the appropriate commanders.

23. Crews of aircraft and helicopters making forced landings at airfields of allied countries; individual groups, detachments, and personnel separated from their military units and transiting the territory of allied countries; and also the wounded and sick being cared for in hospitals of allied countries, are provided with materiel support according to the standards applicable in the armed forces of the country on whose territory they are located.

Support responsibilities for crews, wounded, sick, detachments, and individual groups of personnel are carried out by order of appropriate unit commanders and the chiefs of the installations where they happen to be located.

24. Individual groups and detachments of military personnel transiting the territory of another allied country are usually issued dry rations by the military units to which they are attached for rations or they are supplied by ration points set up by forces and means of their own army. When these

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capabilities are not available, ration support can be provided through ration points of the country in which they are located by means of special coupons issued by the command of the military units of that country's armed forces. These coupons are the same for all allied forces and are valid in all Warsaw Pact member states. Their format has been prescribed by the Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces.

25. Individual vehicles transiting the territory of another allied country are provided with fuel by military units or at refueling points of the traffic control service of that country on the basis of standard coupons prescribed by the Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces. ✓

26. Upon discharge from hospitals of another allied army (country), recovered personnel are to receive the uniforms in which they arrived. If the uniforms are unwearable or missing, the hospital is to obtain the necessary uniforms from the appropriate national army or is to issue uniforms of its own armed forces, which are to be subsequently returned where they belong.

27. The maintenance of personal and other equipment, and the provision of laundry and bath services for allied troops, are handled by forces and means of the national units, large units, and formations themselves. In some cases, laundry service and major overhauling of equipment of national troops may be provided on reimbursement by forces and means of the multinational formation to which they are assigned.

28. The procurement of agricultural products and other materiel from local sources, and the exploitation of local enterprises and resources for the production and maintenance of military equipment in allied countries on behalf of the Combined Armed Forces, are based on bilateral or multilateral agreements.

In accordance with centralized requisitions by national formations, procured materiel is usually delivered to allied troops from depots and bases of local procurement organizations ✓

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and industry. Procured materiel is transported by forces and means of the formations (large units).

Outside the territorial limits of allied countries, the utilization of local materiel and enterprises for the production and maintenance of military equipment is organized by rear services control agencies of the appropriate formations on behalf of all of the allied troops assigned to them.

In procuring animal and plant products for troops in the territory of allied states, the procuror is to adhere to "Basic Conditions for the Delivery of Provisions", an agreement concluded among the foreign trade organizations of the allied countries, and "Veterinary Medical Regulations Implemented by the Member-States of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance Regarding the Export, Import, and Transit of Animals, Raw Materials and Processed Products of Animal Origin, and Goods Which May Be Carriers of Infectious Diseases".

29. The supplying of commercial products and daily necessities to allied troops is organized and implemented by forces and means of their own national trade organizations. When it becomes necessary to provide commercial products for national large units and units assigned to multinational fronts (armies, fleets), this can be organized by the military trading agencies of formations by allotting the necessary funds.

The sale of commodities and the daily maintenance of personnel on the territory of allied countries are carried out in accordance with agreements among the countries, while outside the allied territory these functions are carried out by procedures established by the command of the formation.

III. TRANSPORT SUPPORT

30. Transport support is organized for the purpose of fully satisfying in a timely manner the troop movement requirements of the Combined Armed Forces. It includes a system of measures for

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the preparation and operation of lines of communication and transport means, for the technical protection and restoration of communications, and also for the organization of troop movements using all types of transport. Transport support is carried out on the basis of mutually coordinated utilization of all types of transport designated for the common use of Warsaw Pact member states and of all military transport means of the allied armies. ✓

31. Using its own forces and means, each allied country is to prepare in advance (in peacetime) and in wartime its own lines of communication and transport means. This preparation is carried out in order to provide for the rapid conversion to wartime operating conditions of all types of transport and for their integrated use, for the stable operation of the transportation system during war, and for the complete satisfaction of the transport needs of the national and Combined Armed Forces during the conduct of combined combat actions. ✓

Stable operation of the lines of communication and transport means in the border areas of contiguous allied countries is ensured by the previously coordinated preparation of: railroad border stations and route sectors, permanent reloading areas at the junctions of railroad lines of different gauges, temporary transloading areas, frontier road crossings and adjacent road sectors, and alternate bridges and ferry crossings over large frontier rivers. This preparation is to be carried out by each allied country within its own territorial limits in accord with bilateral or multilateral agreements. ✓

32. The maintenance, protection of equipment restoration, and operation of communications within the zone of responsibility of a formation of a single nationality or of a multinational composition which is deployed on the territory of another allied country are carried out by the forces and means of that country in cooperation with and on behalf of that formation; outside the borders of allied countries these are the responsibility of the forces and means of the formation itself. ✓

Railroad troops and specially created formation in their assembly position can only partially be drawn upon for the ✓

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technical protection of railroad installations in allied countries. Their main mission is to restore railroad lines behind the advancing forces.

33. During movements of allied forces and transport of materiel over the territory of Warsaw Pact member states outside the boundaries of the formations, the maintenance and technical protection of automotive vehicle routes is organized by forces and means of the allied countries whose territory the routes cross, while traffic control service is handled by road troops and specially created elements of those countries in cooperation with the forces being moved.


34. The operation, technical protection, and restoration of temporary reloading areas established by combined forces and means in the border areas of contiguous states, as well as the loading, unloading, and other activities, are effected by forces and means of each allied country on its own territory in accordance with bilateral (multilateral) agreements.

35. The order of priority and the time limits for the restoration of key transportation installations and of through traffic on march routes are established jointly by the national commands of the allied states with the commands of the formations deployed on their territory if barrier zones (installations) are within the area of these formations; or jointly by the national commands with the Combined Command if barrier zones (installations) are located on agreed upon march routes outside the zones of responsibility of the formations.

36. The transportation needs of the Combined Armed Forces are provided by the allied countries by allocating to the former, on the basis of agreements, transit (transport) capacity from their lines of communication and the required amount of transportation means, or by placing at their disposal independent transport lines with the corresponding transport means.

In wartime, in accordance with agreements concluded or by decision of the governments of the allied countries, part of

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the merchant and river fleets, ports, civil aviation, and civil transport airfields, required to support the joint combat operations of the Combined Armed Forces, may be temporarily placed in operational subordination to the military command.

37. Outside the territorial limits of the Warsaw Pact countries, lines of communication and local transport means in the zone of responsibility of a front (army), and military transport means of formations, are used to support all allied troops in accordance with the plans of the command of the formations. ✓

38. Measures for the combat, material-technical, and medical support of troop movements of the Combined Armed Forces using various types of transport are carried out on the basis of conditions, and their implementation procedures, coordinated beforehand between the military and civil transport agencies of the Warsaw Pact countries.

IV. DELIVERY OF MATERIEL

39. The delivery of materiel to troops of a multinational front (army, fleet) is organized and carried out by forces and means of the front (army, fleet) and of the formations (large units) of national armed forces assigned to it.

The basic principle of delivery is that higher command levels of national armed forces will deliver materiel to their own forces. //

40. Successful accomplishment of the task of delivering materiel is achieved by the integrated use of all types of transport and by complying with the following requirements: ✓

- delivery must replenish the troops daily with the established levels of materiel reserves;

- delivery is to be made first of all to the rocket troops, formations, and large units carrying out the main mission;

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- second-echelon formations and large units; as well as combat and rear services units and installations located in the rear services area of a front (army) are to use, as a rule, their own transport to bring up materiel from unloading stations, depots, and bases;

- during an operation, army mobile bases and front forward bases (detachments from them) with reserves of materiel are to move up toward the troops in a timely manner so that at all delivery echelons the distance separating bases from troops is less than half the average distance covered by motor transport in twenty-four hours;

- containers, packaged items, and standard sets of materiel are to be used as much as possible, and transloading at intermediate levels of the rear services is to be reduced in every way possible.

41. In an assembly position, a front (army, fleet) is to bring up materiel from front (central, fleet) bases and depots by rail (water) and vehicle transport to the formations and large units of its own nationality.

Delivery of materiel to formations (large units) of other allied countries assigned to a multinational front (army, fleet) is to be made from bases and depots of the respective armed forces by direction of the national command, or in individual cases involving mutual aid procedures, from bases and depots of the multinational formation.

Deliveries are made from army bases and depots to divisions, and also from division depots to regiments and on down to sub-units, by army and troop transport respectively in accordance with the plans of the respective armies, large units, and units.

42. As an offensive develops, particularly when national forces are widely separated from their own supply bases, the rear services of a multinational front (army, fleet) play a greater role in the delivery of materiel to them. Under certain

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conditions, national formations (large units) may use their own transport to deliver materiel from front (fleet) forward and rear bases and may obtain fuel from front depots set up along the main pipelines in the field. In individual cases a multinational front (army, fleet) may deliver shipments directly to the bases and depots of the national formations (large units) assigned to it. In such cases national commands are to allocate the necessary transport means to the multinational formation. ✓

V. TECHNICAL SUPPORT

43. Troop technical support is designed to maintain weapons, combat equipment, and other equipment in a combat-effective condition; it includes the correct technical utilization, servicing, maintenance (storage), repair, and recovery of weapons and equipment.


Technical support of a multinational front (army, fleet) is organized and implemented primarily by the forces and means of the troops themselves and partially by the repair facilities of the multinational formation. ✓

Unit repairs are carried out by the repair means of units and large units, medium repair by repair units and installations of formations and partly by those of large units, and major overhaul by central repair installations and partly by those of the front.


44. We can reduce the volume of work and the time required to repair weapons and equipment, and also increase the productivity of repair agencies, by bringing repair means up to the areas where weapons and equipment have been put out of action on a massive scale; by repairing damaged equipment and weapons right on the battlefield; by restoring first of all the weapons and equipment requiring the least work; by using the unit replacement method of repair; by organizing in an integrated manner the repair of the most complex weapons and equipment systems; by coordinating the work of repair and recovery units and ✓

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installations; and by making use of the local production-technical base.



The first to be restored are those types of weapons and equipment which are necessary to carry out the main mission.

45. A front (army, fleet) usually provides for the recovery and repair of the weapons and equipment of the formations and large units of its own nationality.

The recovery and repair of weapons and equipment of formations and large units of other nationalities assigned to a multinational front (army, fleet) are carried out by the forces and means of the respective national armies.

When possible, a front (army, fleet) and the formations (large units) of other nationalities assigned to it are to provide each other with mutual assistance in the recovery and restoration of weapons and equipment.

National agencies are to provide in all cases for the repair of non-standard equipment by allocating repair means, specialists, and by delivering the required spare parts.


46. Emergency rescue support for ships and assistance to sunken submarines are provided by forces and means of the emergency rescue services of allied navies in accordance with mutually coordinated plans and operating instructions.

47. Engineer-airfield and airfield-technical support for combat and transport aviation large units, units, subunits, and of individual aircraft (helicopters) of the air forces, air defense forces, and navy, are provided by forces and means of the allied armies to which the airfields belong.

If aviation large units and units of one allied army operate for an extended period from airfields of another allied army, their own forces and means are to provide airfield-technical support. ✓

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48. The utilization of local factories, technical maintenance stations, refueling stations, and repair and other facilities to accomplish the tasks of providing technical support to multinational formations on the territory of allied countries is carried out on the basis of multilateral and bilateral agreements.

Outside the borders of the allied countries, local repair-technical facilities are utilized as determined by the command of the multinational formations in support of all of the allied forces.

VI. MEDICAL SUPPORT

49. Troop medical support is designed to improve the health of personnel and to preserve their combat effectiveness, to provide timely medical aid, to treat and evacuate the wounded and sick, to return them to duty as soon as possible, and to prevent infectious diseases from breaking out and spreading among the troops.

Medical support comprises organizing and implementing measures for treatment and evacuation, sanitation and hygiene, prevention of epidemics, and medical protection of troops against weapons of mass destruction.

50. So that the military medical services of the allied armies accomplish treatment and evacuation measures in a timely manner during joint operations, they are to carry out their work based on standard principles of organizing medical support for the troops, standard methods of providing medical aid and treatment to wounded and sick, and standard medical documentation.

51. First aid and skilled emergency medical treatment, even in centers of mass destruction, are provided by forces and means of the medical service of national units, large units, and formations. By decision of the rear services command of a multinational front (army, fleet), national formations (large units) can be reinforced with medical units and installations of the front (army, fleet).

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Professional and specialized medical aid and treatment of wounded and sick are provided at the hospital bases of a front (hospitals of a fleet) and also in the hospitals of the appropriate allied countries.

52. Medical subunits, units, and installations of allied troops are to accept for medical aid and treatment all wounded and sick regardless of nationality. Upon recovery, military personnel are to be sent from the treatment installations to their own national forces.

53. Medical evacuation is to be handled by the medical and general transport facilities of the national armed forces concerned. By order of the rear services command of a multinational front (armies, fleet), front (army, fleet) transport may be called upon to augment evacuation from any national formation (large unit).

54. During an operation, wounded and sick requiring extended treatment are to be evacuated from hospital bases (hospitals) of the multinational front (fleet) to centrally-subordinated national hospitals, either of their own country or of other allied countries. Evacuation procedures are to be established by the national armed forces commands of the respective countries by agreement with the front (fleet) command and with authorized agencies of the allied country over whose territory the evacuation is to proceed.

55. When allied forces are regrouping on the territory of Warsaw Pact member states, wounded and sick requiring professional or specialized medical aid and treatment are, by agreement with the national command of the given country, to be evacuated to the nearest military or civilian hospitals, i.e., either already-existing hospitals or those set up for this purpose along the routes of troop movement. Wounded and sick are to be evacuated by the troop transport means carrying out the regrouping, and when necessary by transport of the local country as well.

56. Sanitation-hygiene measures and antiepidemic measures in national troops are to be carried out by their own forces and

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means. In case of necessity, the medical service of national formations (large units) can be reinforced with front (army, fleet) means.

57. If there is an outbreak of cholera, plague, smallpox, or other contagious diseases among the personnel of a unit (large unit) which jeopardizes the combat effectiveness of the troops, that unit (large unit) is to be quarantined by order of the commander of the front (army, fleet) troops.

Prophylactic and antiepidemic measures in the quarantined large units (units) are to be carried out by their forces and means and also by the medical and veterinary installations of the multinational front (army, fleet). By direction of the commander of the front (army, fleet), troop units (subunits) are assigned to guard the quarantined large units (units).

58. When troops of national armies are regrouping on the territory of an allied country, troops receive information on the medical-epidemic situation along the movement routes from medical service agencies of the Ministry of Defense of the country in which they are located. Medical reconnaissance, the detection and isolation of contagious personnel, and observation measures are to be carried out by forces and means of the regrouping troops.


59. Veterinary-hygiene and antiepidemic measures are to be carried out by forces and means of the national command; the troop veterinary forces and means are to cooperate closely with the military and civilian veterinary agencies of a given country.

VII. BILLETING SUPPORT

60. On the territory of Warsaw Pact member states, the temporary allocation to allied forces of immovable resources (military encampments, separate quartering buildings, messhalls, storage space, training fields, firing ranges, etc.), together with the integrally appurtenant equipment and property, is done

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by agreement between the front (army, fleet) command and the corresponding national command.

61. Adaptations to the allocated buildings and installations are made by the troops for whose use they are designated. Supplying these troops with the required building materials and equipment, in the amounts agreed upon, is carried out by appropriate agencies of the countries in which the troops are located.

62. Fuel and utilities are to be provided to units and large units of allied forces by the country in which they are located, in accordance with the norms established by the Ministry of Defense of that country.

Fuel is to be issued in kind or permission is to be given to procure it from local resources. Procurement is to be conducted by forces and means of the troop units and large units requiring the fuel, observing all of the requirements for fuel production in a given country.


63. Outside the territorial limits of the Warsaw Pact member states, the providing of formations and large units with immovable resources is to be organized as planned by formation commanders (commanders) on behalf of the troops of all the allied armies. Troops are to be supplied with building materials, utilities, and fuel from local resources. In case of necessity, such materiel is to be provided from their own countries.

VIII. PROCEDURES TO SETTLE ACCOUNTS
FOR MATERIEL AND SERVICES PROVIDED

64. The mutual supplying of materiel and services between two allied forces of different nationalities in wartime is made official by a bilateral settlement act. The settlement act is drawn up in four copies (two each in the languages of the two countries). Two copies remain in the appropriate agencies of the country furnishing the materiel and services, and two are issued to the receiver. ✓

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65. The weapons, equipment, ammunition, rocket propellant, fuel, provisions, and other materiel received by the allied troops are, as a rule, to be compensated for, in kind, by the two sides, in quantities of equal cost value. Settlement for materiel not compensated for, in kind, and also for services provided, is to be made in accordance with the trade and payments agreement in force between the countries concerned on the day of payment. ✓

66. Settlement between allied countries for the movement of troops of the Combined Armed Forces is to be made on the basis of agreements concluded by the allied countries concerned.

67. Immovable resources with their appurtenant equipment and property are provided free of charge to the troops of another Warsaw Pact member state for the duration of joint combat operations.

68. Settlement for the repairs of immovable resources, and also for the supplying of fuel, building (repair) materials, utilities, and other services relating to all types of support and facilities for allied forces, is made by a centralized procedure in accordance with existing bilateral agreements (treaties) among the countries.

IX. CONTROL OF REAR SERVICES

69. Rear services control in a multinational front (army, fleet) is based on the centralized direction of all of the principal types of rear support provided to allied forces by the front (army, fleet) command, together with the continuous coordination of the respective control agencies of the national armed forces with each other and with the control of the rear services of the multinational formation. ✓

70. Direct control of rear services support for front (army, fleet) forces of multinational makeup during operations is carried out by command and control agencies of the rear services of the given front (army, fleet) in coordination with

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rear services agencies of the commands of the armed forces whose troops make up the multinational formation.

The commander of the troops of a multinational front (army, fleet) has the right, within the limits of the functions delegated to him, to issue rear services support directives (orders) and instruction which are binding on all formations (large units) assigned to the front (army, fleet).

71. In order to maintain close coordination among rear services control elements and to resolve more rapidly rear support problems which arise during the joint operations of allied troops and naval forces of different nationalities, the rear services of a Central Headquarters of national armed forces can send an operations group (representatives) to the headquarters and if necessary also to the individual rear services control agencies of a multinational formation, while multinational formations can send operations groups (representatives) to national large units and formations operationally subordinated to them. By mutual arrangement there can also be other variants for sending out operations groups.

72. The planning of rear services support of allied troops in rear services control agencies of a multinational front (army, fleet) is to take into account the needs and capabilities of all formations (large units) which comprise it, regardless of nationality.

In national formations (large units, units), rear services support is to be planned in accordance with the rear services directives (orders) of the multinational front (army, fleet) and instructions of the superior national command.

73. The planning among countries for centralized troop transport, delivery of materiel, and evacuation, using the transport lines of allied countries in support of the Combined Armed Forces, is to be done jointly by the Ministries of Defense of the countries concerned on a bilateral basis and in coordination with the Ministries of Transport of the respective countries.

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74. The planning for military transport in the zone of responsibility of a multinational front (army) deployed on the territory of an allied country is to be done by front (army) control agencies in close coordination with the Ministry of Defense of that country and taking into account the traffic and transport capacity of the transport lines allocated to the front (army).

75. The control among countries of centralized military transport using all types of general transport in support of allied formations and large units, is to be effected by the Ministry of Defense of the country in which the transport is taking place in coordination with the commands of the allied armies concerned and with the Combined Command.

76. Control of the military transport performed by different types of general transport within the front zone of responsibility is organized:

- in an allied country within whose borders a formation is deployed--by appropriate control agencies of the formation, working through authorized agencies of the national commands;

- outside the borders of allied countries--directly by control agencies of the formation.

77. Within the regulation time limits and using a standard format, all units, large units, and formations of a multinational front (army, fleet) are to submit reports (summaries) and records on rear services to the large unit (formation) to which they are assigned. National units, large units, and formations are to additionally submit the necessary records to their own superior military command.


If the situation changes abruptly, or upon demand of the senior commander, non-scheduled summaries (reports) on rear services are to be submitted.

78. Communications are set up from the rear services control post of a multinational front (army, fleet) to its own command

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post, to the rear services headquarters of the allied army whose troops comprise the primary force of the given formation, to the rear services headquarters of the army of the country on whose territory the multinational formation is deployed, to the rear services control posts of all formations (large units) assigned to the front (army, fleet) regardless of nationality, and to the services, bases, large units, and units of the rear services of the front.

The rear services control post of a national formation (large unit) forming a part of a multinational front (army, fleet) is to establish and maintain communications with its own command post, with the rear services control post of the corresponding multinational front (army, fleet), with the rear services headquarters of its own army, with the rear services control posts of the large units (units) of the given formation (large unit), and also with rear services bases and units.

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