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FBI'S TRENDS

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ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

MOSCOW HAS LITTLE COMMENT ON NEW EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT

Moscow has reacted to the six-point Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire stabilization arrangement, signed on 11 November, with the same caution which has been displayed in the face of past U.S.-initiated peace moves in the Middle East. The minimal followup comment on the agreement has deferred to Egyptian interpretation, a pattern consistent with Moscow's handling of the June 1970 U.S. initiative calling for a cease-fire and a resumption of the Jarring mission.

While TASS did not report the six points of the agreement until almost 24 hours after they had been made public on 9 November, this may well have stemmed from the confused sequence of reports from Cairo. Soviet media had displayed some concern to cite Cairo as the source of the details of the agreement. Most Soviet reportage, before and since the signing of the agreement, centered on alleged Israeli cease-fire violations and on Israeli obstruction of the UNEF functions.

In an effort to balance the U.S. initiative, Moscow has taken pains to play up Arab expressions of gratitude for its aid and support and has reiterated that such assistance would continue. Receiving the new Kuwaiti ambassador, Podgorny declared, according to an Arabic-language broadcast on the 12th, that the USSR would continue its "active assistance" to secure a just peace and insure the security of all countries and peoples of the Middle East. Brezhnev referred to "effective support" for the Arabs provided by all socialist states in his 12 November speech in Kiev at a dinner for Yugoslavia's Tito. He otherwise mentioned the Middle East only in citing the war there and the Chilean situation as attempts by "imperialist reaction" to counteract the deepening of detente.

At the same time, TASS selectively quoted Secretary Kissinger to demonstrate that detente has not been affected by the Middle East crisis. In a brief 13 November report datelined New York on Kissinger's "interview with American television stations"--not identified as taking place in Peking--TASS featured his rejection of the idea that events in the Middle East "allegedly 'exposed the myth'" of Soviet-U.S. detente. The account summed up his remarks on the Arab-Israeli conflict in one paragraph, noting that U.S. goals were stabilization of the cease-fire and the

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holding of a peace conference. TASS added that Kissinger stressed, however, that the United States would continue unconditional support to Israel which was "allegedly necessary to guarantee Israel's 'existence.'" The dispatch concluded by reporting Kissinger as saying the Arab decision to limit oil production would not influence the U.S. position.

Follow-up to the 11 November agreement cited an Egyptian spokesman's explanation that it was a first practical step toward implementation of UN decisions providing for complete Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territory. The spokesman was also quoted as saying the measures being taken are in preparation for a peace conference. Moscow has made a few other passing references to peace negotiations, and in one notable instance, a Volskiy article in NEW TIMES of 9 November, indicated that "most" of the Palestinian leaders did not object in principle to participation in peace talks.

REPORTS OF SIX POINTS TASS' belated and confused handling of the six-point agreement, outlined by Secretary Kissinger in a letter to UN Secretary General Waldheim and made public on the 9th, may have been due to conflicting reports from Cairo and uncertainty over Israeli acceptance. Joint announcement of the agreement in Washington, Cairo and Jerusalem was scheduled for 1700 GMT on the 9th. The announcement actually came first from Washington an hour or so in advance of the scheduled time. The agreement calls for Egyptian-Israeli observance of the cease-fire; discussions to settle the question of return to the 22 October positions "in the framework of agreement on the disengagement and separation of forces" under UN auspices; supplies to the town of Suez and evacuation of wounded Suez citizens; no impediment to the movement of nonmilitary supplies to the east bank of the canal; replacement of Israeli checkpoints on the Cairo-Suez road by UN checkpoints, with Israeli participation at the Suez end "to supervise the nonmilitary nature of the cargo at the bank of the canal"; and exchange of all prisoners of war "as soon as the UN checkpoints are established."

+ The Israeli radio at 1800 GMT on the 9th carried the text of the six points as officially announced in Washington; at 2300 GMT the radio reported an Israeli cabinet announcement that the government's position was "positive" regarding the signing of the agreement, but that further contacts with the United States would be held. A newscast at 1100 GMT on the 10th said the signing would not take place that day since some points still "required clarification." It was not until 1800 GMT on the 10th that Mrs. Meir was reported as stating that authorization to sign the agreement had been given.

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+ In Cairo, the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) at 2010 GMT on the 9th incorrectly reported a set of four points said to have been agreed upon as a result of Secretary Kissinger's visit; this erroneous report was repeated by Cairo radio at 2100. But at 2225 GMT MENA carried the text of the actual six-point plan.

+ TASS in a dispatch from New York at 2208 GMT on the 9th reported that Kissinger had sent Waldheim a letter stating that during his consultations with Egyptian and Israeli representatives an "understanding" was reached on settling a number of matters pertaining to the cease-fire.

On the 10th at 1223 GMT a TASS multi-dated item from Cairo, Washington and Paris juxtaposed the incorrect MENA report on a four-point agreement with the six-point "text of the agreement quoted in Kissinger's letter" to Waldheim. The latter was an accurate rendition except for the omission of one clause providing for Israeli participation in supervising the nonmilitary nature of the cargo at the Suez end of the Cairo-Suez road. TASS went on, under the Paris dateline, to point to discrepancies "noted here" between the Cairo and Washington versions.

While TASS thus failed to acknowledge the second, correct MENA report on the agreement, at 1528 GMT it killed the multi-dated item incorporating the erroneous MENA report and substituted the text of the six points as "reported in the Cairo press." The overlooking of the correct MENA version is inexplicable, but it would seem that TASS, while it had a correct text in hand from Washington, was waiting to attribute it to an official Cairo source.

The confusion over the versions of the agreement and Egyptian-Israeli acceptance seems also to have been reflected in remarks by PRAVDA political observer Zhukov in his television program on the 10th. Excerpts of his TV remarks were broadcast by Moscow radio's domestic service at 1745 GMT, but according to Moscow's TV program schedule, his television appearance was some two hours earlier. Thus his statement would appear to have been prepared while there was still some doubt as to what set of points Cairo had actually accepted. Zhukov noted the Kissinger letter to Waldheim enumerating "several questions" connected with implementation of the cease-fire on which Kissinger "supposedly" reached agreement with Egypt and Israel. He went on to say that the Western press and radios had carried a host of reports on this matter, some of them contradictory, and added that it was his impression these reports should be treated "with utmost caution while waiting for the real state of events to be clarified."

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The signing of the agreement at 1300 GMT on the 11th was reported by Soviet media shortly thereafter--in an Arabic-language broadcast at 1730 GMT and by TASS at 1817 GMT. The TASS account referred to the signing of "a protocol on the observance of the cease-fire, ending of military operations, and the return of troops to positions they occupied on 22 October." This language paralleled to some extent the MENA announcement on the signing of the "UN document" concerning the cease-fire arrangement on the West bank "and the return of Israeli forces to their positions at the time of the cease-fire on 22 October."

PALESTINIAN The Volskiy article in NEW TIMES (No. 45,
ROLE IN TALKS 9 November) for the first time broached the
 possibility of Palestinian participation in
the peace talks called for in Security Council Resolution 338. In line with the USSR's previous caution vis-a-vis its relations with the Palestinian organizations, Moscow had ignored the flurry of reports in Arab media since the end of October that the Soviet Union, through its ambassador to Lebanon, had advised the Palestinians to be prepared to participate in a peace conference. According to Arab reports, Moscow also brought up with the Palestinians the question of formation of a Palestinian state and of a Palestinian government in exile.

Volskiy summed up the readiness or interest expressed by Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon in participating in peace talks, adding that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leadership was also discussing its attitude toward talks. He noted that PLO chairman Yasir 'Arafat had held a series of conferences on this topic with leaders of various Palestinian organizations, and attributed to the Beirut paper AN-NAHAR the view that "most of them" did not object in principle to participating in such talks. Volskiy went on to observe that "despite certain shades of differences" between their positions, the leaders of the Arab countries and peoples were displaying a "constructive approach" to a just settlement of the conflict.

Other than a scattering of reports on fedayeen participation during the fighting, Soviet media have made few references to Palestinian activities. TASS did report from Beirut on 20 October a PLO Executive Committee session chaired by 'Arafat, noting that a PLO spokesman said results of the session would promote a stepup in Palestinian fighting against Israeli troops. TASS and Moscow's Arabic-language service on

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11 November and PRAVDA on the 12th reported 'Arafat's arrival in Cairo, the Arabic broadcast adding that he had previously visited other Arab capitals. For the past few days Arab media have carried a spate of rumors about an imminent visit to Moscow by a Palestinian delegation led by 'Arafat, along with reports of postponements and denials of such a visit. In light of past practice, Moscow would not be expected to give advance announcement of such a visit.

An 'Arafat message of congratulations to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman on the October Revolution was broadcast by Moscow in Arabic on the 11th and published in PRAVDA the following day. 'Arafat praised the USSR's "firm support" for the Palestinians "national rights and legitimate aspirations" and referred to the "unlimited aid" given by the Soviet people to the Arab people in general and the Palestinian people in particular.

BACKGROUND ON
1970 INITIATIVE

The U.S. initiative of June 1970, which called for resumption of the Jarring mission and a cease-fire, was also handled by Moscow in a cautious fashion. Initial response to that move was largely confined to replays of Arab and West European assessments that the U.S. proposals contained nothing new. After President Nasir's acceptance of the U.S. initiative in his 23 July anniversary speech--somewhat belatedly noted by TASS--Moscow comment repeated Nasir's argument that the U.S. plan did not differ from Security Council Resolution 242. Moscow did not specifically address itself to the substance: while it did endorse resumption of the Jarring mission, references to a cease-fire were infrequent and imprecise. Soviet media did attempt to bolster Nasir in the face of Arab criticism of his acceptance of the U.S. initiative and accusations of a sellout on the Palestinian issue. Coordinated Egyptian, Israeli, and U.S. announcements of a cease-fire effective August 7 were promptly reported by TASS in a brief triple-dated item, and Moscow began crediting the agreement to an "Egyptian peace initiative."

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

MOSCOW DEPICTS DEEPENING WORLD CRISIS OVER OIL CUTBACKS

The Arabs' oil squeeze on the West and the efforts by the Western countries to deal with the crisis have been a constant though subordinate focus of Soviet news reporting since the beginning of the recent Middle Eastern fighting. Relying mainly on foreign news reports and keeping self-initiated comment to a minimum, Moscow has presented a picture of deepening crisis in the West brought about both by the imminence of severe oil shortages and by the inability of the oil-consuming countries to devise an effective common policy. The disruptive impact of the crisis on Western alliance relationships has been particularly noted. While Moscow has assumed an air of detachment in reporting these developments, it has taken care to remind the West of its own oil resources and to hint at the prospective advantages of commercial arrangements for exploiting these resources.

WESTERN DISCORD Moscow has shown ill-concealed relish in reporting signs of discord in the West provoked by the Arab oil squeeze. This was a major element in its interpretation of the rift between the United States and its NATO allies at the end of October. Moscow repeatedly pointed out at that time that the resistance of the FRG and other NATO countries to the U.S. supply of war materials to Israel was prompted by a self-interested concern to avoid Arab retaliation. More recently, it has reported in minute detail measures adopted or suggested by various Western countries which reflect a differentiated response to the oil embargo. It has noted, for example, the decision of a Japanese oil company to stop oil supplies to the U.S. armed forces, and it has reported a suggestion by Denmark that NATO forces participating in a current military exercise bring their own fuel.

Moscow's main exhibit in this line of reporting was the resolution adopted by EEC foreign ministers at their meeting in Brussels on 6 November. Widely regarded in the West as at best a stopgap declaration designed to reassure the Arabs regarding Europe's interest in a "just" Middle East settlement, the resolution has been presented by Moscow as an example of European faint-heartedness. Accurately

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anticipating the tone of the resolution, a PRAVDA commentary on 6 November reported that the EEC members were showing little enthusiasm for a Netherlands' proposal to pool the oil stocks of the member countries for future rationing according to need. Quoting the London TIMES, it observed that the attitudes of the European countries proved once again that at a time of trial for the rival partners of the Common Market "charity begins at home."

A TASS report on the resolution the next day expanded on this theme. Noting that the ministers evaded an answer to the Dutch proposal, it observed that the "partners of Holland clearly could not bring themselves to come out in her support for fear it would lead to an extension of the Arab boycott to other countries of the European Economic Community." Neither in this report nor in others has Moscow referred to reports, noted in the Western press, that the EEC declaration was influenced by tacit assurances, conveyed through the French, that Europe, including the Dutch, would not lack for oil. Nor has it noted that the Netherlands, as a member of the "Nine," participated in formulating the EEC resolution.

SOVIET OIL RESOURCES Moscow has taken pains to emphasize the contrast between the West's straitened circumstances and its own favored situation with respect to oil resources. It has suggested, moreover, that the West might find a solution to its energy problems by taking advantage of the offers of improved trade relations that the Soviet Union has extended. In a discussion program beamed to North America on 4 November, for example, one commentator asserted that the Soviet Union's energy resources could "contribute most decisively to taking the edge off the American energy crisis." He went on to quote a Soviet scientist as saying that the day might come "when cold Siberia will light and heat New York." Another commentary beamed to North America on 13 November described with approval the interest being shown by many American companies in joint arrangements for developing Soviet energy resources.

The Soviets have also conveyed more specific assurances along this line to other countries victimized by the oil squeeze. In an interview with DER SPIEGEL on 12 November, CPSU Western affairs expert Vadim Zagladin responded to a question whether the FRG could get energy from the Soviet Union in the event of shortages produced by the Arab embargo, by saying that such an opportunity existed and, indeed, was

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already being implemented. He insisted, under close questioning, that the FRG could rely on any commitments the Soviet Union made to supply energy in the future. These topics were apparently discussed by FRG Foreign Minister Scheel and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko during the former's visit to Moscow at the beginning of November. According to a DPA report on 2 November, Gromyko assured his visitor that the Soviet Union would "favorably examine" the questions of Soviet deliveries of oil and natural gas to the FRG. Tokyo sources have also reported that the Soviet Union has decided to increase oil supplies to Japan, although no Soviet confirmation of the decision has been published.

In the meantime, indications have begun to emerge in Eastern Europe that the Soviet bloc has not escaped entirely unscathed from the Arab cutbacks of oil production. On 8 November the Moscow domestic service reported in a seemingly gratuitous reassurance that the supply of oil to Soviet refineries from the CEMA countries was proceeding without interruption and "in complete accordance with the plans." On 13 November, AGERPRESS reported that the Romanian party central committee had adopted a number of measures aimed at conserving energy resources. The text of the Romanian decisions published the next day showed that the measures included such stringent economies as cutting down on highway speed limits and reducing the consumption of fuel for heating. No explanation of these events has been provided by Soviet bloc sources.

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