



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
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DIST 12 NOVEMBER 1973

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COUNTRY: EGYPT-ISRAEL
DOI: 11-12 NOVEMBER 1973
SUBJECT: STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF SIX-POINT EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI
CEASEFIRE ACCORD.

ACQ:
SOURCE:



1. THE SIX-POINT EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED ON 11 NOVEMBER 1973 AT A TRIANGULAR TABLE IN A TENT AT KILOMETER 101 ON THE CAIRO-SUEZ ROAD, WITH GENERAL SILASVUO OF THE UNITED NATIONS, GEN. YARIV OF ISRAEL AND MAJOR GENERAL MUHAMMADAL-GAMAZI OF EGYPT SEATED AT THE THREE SIDES OF THE TABLE. THE SIGNING WAS CONDUCTED IN A MANNER WHICH THE EGYPTIAN SIDE FOUND PROPER AND CORRECT, AND WHICH GAVE NO GROUNDS FOR ANY EGYPTIAN COMPLAINT.

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2.

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VERY FEW EGYPTIAN MILITARY

PERSONNEL, WERE IN EVIDENCE IN THE VICINITY OF THE SIGNING, AND THESE FEW APPEARED VERY SUBDUED. ON THE OTHER HAND, ISRAELI MILITARY PERSONNEL, WHO WERE PRESENT IN LARGE NUMBERS, EXUDED AN AIR OF CONFIDENCE VERGING ON COCKINESS, WITH MUCH RIB-ELBOWING, JOKING AND BANTERING. U.N. TROOPS ATTEMPTED TO SEPARATE THE EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI SIDES BUT THIS EFFORT QUICKLY BROKE DOWN AND IN THE INTERMINGLING THAT ENSUED, SMALL INSTANCES OF CIVILITY WERE OBSERVABLE SUCH AS EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI OFFICERS LIGHTING CIGARETTES FOR EACH OTHER.)

3. APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR AFTER THE SIGNING, THE FIRST MEETING WAS HELD, IN THE SAME TENT, TO DISCUSS THE SIX POINTS. GENERAL YARIV IMMEDIATELY INDICATED THAT HE WISHED TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS. GEN. GAMAZI IN REPLY NOTED THAT THE QUESTION OF PRISONERS OF WAR IS POINT NUMBER SIX AND THAT THE AGREEMENT SPECIFICALLY STATES THAT PRISONER EXCHANGE WILL OCCUR ONLY AFTER ISRAELI CHECKPOINTS ON THE SUEZ-CAIRO ROAD HAVE BEEN REPLACED BY THE U.N. (POINT NUMBER FIVE). GAMAZI THEREFORE ARGUED THAT THEY SHOULD

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
BEGIN WITH THE FIRST PRIORITY, POINT NUMBER TWO, SINCE BOTH SIDES ALREADY WERE OBSERVING THE CEASEFIRE PER POINT NUMBER ONE. THE MEETING LASTED APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR AND ENDED WITHOUT ACCOMPLISHMENT AS BOTH SIDES HELD TO THEIR POSITIONS ON THE ORDER OF DISCUSSING THE POINTS. YARIV SAID AT THE END THAT HE WOULD ASK HIS GOVERNMENT FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON THE ORDER OF DISCUSSION OF POINTS. A SECOND MEETING WAS SCHEDULED FOR 1200 HOURS 12 NOVEMBER.

4. THE CEASEFIRE WAS AGAIN OBSERVED BY BOTH SIDES 12 NOVEMBER, BUT THE MEETING OF 12 NOVEMBER, WHICH LASTED ABOUT TWO HOURS, AGAIN ENDED WITHOUT RESULTS. THE ISRAELI SIDE AGAIN INITIATED THE DISCUSSION WITH POINT NUMBER SIX CONCERNING PRISONER EXCHANGE. GEN. GAMAZI GAVE GEN. SILASVUO A LIST OF ISRAELI PRISONERS WHICH EGYPT HOLDS BUT REITERATED THE OBJECTION HE HAD MADE 11 NOVEMBER TO DISCUSSING PRISONER EXCHANGE BEFORE THE OTHER MATTERS.

5. THE ISRAELIS THEN RELENTED AND PERMITTED DISCUSSIONS OF TWO OTHER POINTS: (A) MOVEMENT OF SUPPLIES TO SUEZ; AND (B) MANNING OF CHECKPOINTS. ON THE FORMER POINT, THE ISRAELIS PRESSED FOR CONDITIONS ON THE MOVEMENT OF SUPPLIES BY LIMITING THE NUMBERS AND WEIGHTS OF TRUCKS AND THE TYPES OF SUPPLIES. THE EGYPTIANS OBJECTED TO THE PLACEMENT OF ANY LIMITATIONS, AND THE ISRAELIS IN CONSEQUENCE

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
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REFUSED TO ALLOW ANY SUPPLIES TO ENTER SUEZ 12 NOVEMBER. ONE EGYPTIAN TRUCK LOADED SOLELY WITH BLANKETS, WHICH WAS WAITING TO PASS, WAS OBLIGED BY THE ISRAELIS TO RETURN TO CAIRO.

6. ON THE QUESTION OF CHECKPOINTS, ON THE CAIRO-SUEZ ROAD, THE ISRAELIS TOOK THE POSITION THAT U.N. PERSONNEL MAY BE STATIONED AT THESE CHECKPOINTS BUT SIDE BY SIDE WITH ISRAELI TROOPS AND NOT IN REPLACEMENT OF THE LATTER. THE EGYPTIANS MAINTAINED THAT THE AGREEMENT CLEARLY DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR ISRAELI-U.N. COEXISTENCE AT THE CHECKPOINTS.

7. A THIRD MEETING WAS SCHEDULED FOR 13 NOVEMBER.

8. GEN. GAMAZI RETURNED TO CAIRO AFTER THE 12 NOVEMBER MEETING AND REPORTED TO THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT HIS CONVICTION, BASED ON THE TWO MEETINGS OF 11 AND 12 NOVEMBER, THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE PURSUING A CALCULATED POLICY OF DELIBERATE OBSTRUCTIONISM ON EVERY CONCEIVABLE FACET OF THE PROBLEM OF IMPLEMENTING THE CEASEFIRE ACCORD. *

9. [REDACTED] DISSEM: [REDACTED] SENT TO USUN, [REDACTED] CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, USCINCEUR, USAREUR, USAF. REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

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