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ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

MOSCOW SUPPORTS CAIRO'S PULLBACK DEMAND, DENIGRATES U.S. ALERT

The first explicit Soviet acknowledgment of the worldwide U.S. "precautionary" military alert ordered on 25 October came in a brief TASS statement early on the 27th. The statement was issued a few hours after President Nixon had explained at his press conference, on the evening of the 26th, that the alert had been prompted by indications of Soviet plans to send a substantial military force to the Middle East. TASS mentioned neither the President's nor Kissinger's remarks but rejected "absurd" justifications by "officials" for the military alert, on the grounds that some actions of the Soviet Union "allegedly" gave cause for concern.

Brezhnev in his speech to the World Peace Congress in Moscow on the 26th had seemed to be alluding to the U.S. alert when he spoke cryptically of actions "in some NATO countries" disseminating "fantastic speculations" concerning Soviet intentions in the Middle East. Brezhnev disclosed that in response to President as-Sadat's 24 October request for U.S. and Soviet troops, the USSR had already sent "representatives" and hoped the United States would do the same. He characterized the 25 October Security Council resolution establishing a UN emergency force to supervise the cease-fire as a "useful decision," and placed stress on the "significance" of Arab-Israeli negotiations. Brezhnev accused Israel of ignoring Security Council demands for withdrawal of troops to the 22 October positions, and propaganda has underlined Egypt's insistence on an Israeli pullback.

Moscow reports of the President's press conference came belatedly some nine hours after the release of the TASS statement. While ignoring the President's reference to the possible dispatch of Soviet military forces, the reports highlighted his statement that the United States would send observers to the Middle East if this were requested by the UN secretary general. Moscow since then has only briefly alluded to either the Soviet "representatives" in Cairo or possible U.S. observers. The cautious treatment of the Middle East situation has focused on Security Council discussions and UN measures to dispatch and position observers and UNEF troops.

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KISSINGER
PRESS CONFERENCE

Soviet media selectively reported Kissinger's remarks in his 25 October press conference on U.S. and Soviet activities related to the Middle East war. Both prompt TASS reports on the 25th and PRAVDA on the 26th struck a positive note in citing the Secretary as saying that on the basis of talks with Brezhnev and constant diplomatic contacts, he had every reason to suppose that "a common standpoint can be reached between us in our efforts" to achieve a stable peace in the Middle East. Both reported his expression of belief that during his talks in Moscow the weekend of the 20th a formula had been worked out which "in our opinion, was acceptable to all sides and which, as we continue to believe, was a just settlement of this tragic conflict."

However, much of Kissinger's explanation of developments was left obscure by the Soviet accounts. While TASS noted his opposition to the idea of sending U.S. and Soviet troops to insure implementation of the cease-fire--as requested by President as-Sadat on the 24th--this was not included in the PRAVDA account. PRAVDA reported his statement that the United States did not consider itself to be in a state of confrontation with the Soviet Union but gave no indication of why anyone should think such a situation might exist. Thus, there was no mention of the U.S. military alert and Kissinger's explanation that it was a precautionary measure taken in the face of indications of Soviet actions in the Middle East.

BREZHNEV SPEECH

Brezhnev's speech to the World Peace Congress in Moscow, anticipated but not announced for the opening day on the 25th, was not delivered until the following day, a delay apparently occasioned by the Middle East crisis. Brezhnev made no specific mention of the U.S. alert but it was clearly in mind in a passage which criticized Israel and wound up deploring actions he attributed to "some NATO countries." Without mentioning the United States by name, he referred three times to "outside forces" and "outside patronage" in support of Israel's "adventurist course." Brezhnev did not identify "those" who "recklessly" violate peace, but he added that "the experience of recent days makes us vigilant" and called for "urgent and resolute measures" to insure implementation of the UN resolutions on a cease-fire and troop withdrawal.

He disclosed that in response to as-Sadat's request for U.S. and Soviet forces--which Brezhnev described as "representatives"--the Soviet Union had already sent such representatives, and he expressed hope that the United States "will act in the same way."

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Without elaboration he added that the USSR was considering "other possible measures" that the situation might call for. Brezhnev described as a "useful decision" Security Council Resolution 340, adopted on the 25th, establishing a UN Emergency Force, but placed more emphasis on Resolution 338 which called for the cease-fire, implementation of Resolution 242 of 1967, and the beginning of talks. In what might have been a response to Kissinger's press conference remark that cooperative action precludes unilateral action, Brezhnev declared that the Soviet Union was prepared to cooperate with all countries concerned in normalizing the Middle East situation. But he went on to say that such cooperation could not be furthered by actions which he attributed to "some NATO countries" which "artificially fanned passions by disseminating all sorts of fantastic speculations" about Soviet intentions in the Middle East. In the present situation, Brezhnev said, "a more responsible, honest, and constructive approach" would be "more appropriate." Brezhnev's target was made clear in an IZVESTIYA article, reported by TASS on the 30th, which employed his description of the proper approach to international affairs in the course of criticizing the "totally unjustified" U.S. alert.

An Arabic-language broadcast on the 26th summarizing Brezhnev's remarks on the Middle East noted his expressions of readiness to cooperate with all countries concerned and said he denounced "the spreading of various false reports about Soviet intentions" in the Middle East. It also reported Brezhnev's announcement that Soviet "representatives" had been sent to the area and his hope that the United States would take the same step. Moscow's only subsequent reference to its "representatives" came in a broadcast in Arabic on the 28th which attributed to Cairo papers a report that contacts had been made concerning the participation in the UN observer group of "some 70 Soviet observers who are currently in Cairo."

Brezhnev's remarks on substantive questions of a Middle East settlement reiterated established Soviet positions with the notable exception of his emphasis on negotiations.

+ Up to now, Moscow had consistently gone along with Arab rejection of Israeli-Arab negotiations under conditions of continued Israeli occupation of Arab territories. Brezhnev pointed to the call for talks embodied in Resolution 338--which the Soviet Union co-sponsored--and declared that "the significance of such talks cannot be overestimated." Echoing the language of

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the resolution that the talks should be held under "appropriate auspices," he went on to assert that the Soviet Union was ready to make "its constructive contribution to this cause." In the only elaboration thus far provided by Soviet media, PRAVDA commentator Zhukov said in a Moscow television talk, reported by Moscow radio on the 27th, that talks should be held under appropriate aegis, "that is, under the trusteeship and with the help of specific states and international organizations."* Not surprisingly, Moscow ignored Kissinger's remark in his press conference on preliminary conversations with Ambassador Dobrynin about site, participation, and procedure for the talks, indicating joint American-Soviet auspices.

† Urging implementation of Resolution 242, Brezhnev cited the November 1967 resolution as foreseeing the withdrawal of Israeli forces from "all" occupied territories. The 27 October PRAVDA version of Brezhnev's speech deleted the word "all," perhaps reflecting no more than adherence to the ambiguous language of Resolution 242 which calls for Israeli withdrawal. Since the 1967 war Moscow has supported the Arab position on total withdrawal but Soviet elite pronouncements have not always been consistent in specifying "all" territories. Brezhnev made the usual reference to Palestinian "lawful rights," noting that Resolution 242 calls for a just settlement of the refugee problem.

† Brezhnev reiterated, with additional stress, the formulation which in effect supports Israel's right to exist as a state, declaring the Soviet Union to be firmly in favor "of all, I repeat all" states and peoples in the Middle East being insured peace, security, and inviolability of frontiers. And he again pledged Soviet readiness to take part in "corresponding guarantees," a position he had stated in his 30 March 1971 speech at the CPSU 24th Congress, when he said the USSR was prepared to join powers which are permanent members of the Security Council in creating international guarantees for a Middle East settlement. The Soviet Mideast proposals made public by PRAVDA in January 1969 had suggested Security Council adoption

* Moscow's Arabic-language service on the 29th reported Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister Hatim as saying the talks must take place within the UN framework. He called for convening an "international conference on peace in the Middle East" as soon as possible, with participation by representatives of Arab countries, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Security Council permanent members.

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of a decision on guarantees for Arab-Israeli borders, "possibly not excluding" guarantees by the council's permanent members. The 1969 proposals also called for agreement between the sides on secure and recognized frontiers and guarantees of the territorial inviolability and political independence of each state in the region. More recently, in speeches on 10 and 11 July this year, Brezhnev had called for "restoration" of the frontiers of the Middle East states so that security of the area's countries could be protected, and had said that the state frontiers of all the region's countries must be guaranteed.

NIXON PRESS CONFERENCE The TASS account of the President's 26 October press conference--and a slightly truncated version broadcast by Moscow's domestic service the same day--selectively quoted the President to point up the intention of the two powers, despite differing aims in the Middle East, to avoid confrontation in the area and to work to achieve a settlement. The TASS account opened by highlighting the President's announcement at the beginning of his press conference that the United States would send observers to the Middle East if this was requested by the UN secretary general, and that the United States had reason to believe such a request would be forthcoming.* TASS then turned to the President's assessment that prospects for the future were more hopeful than in the past week, since the Soviet Union and the United States had reached agreement to exert efforts "toward achieving a settlement between the interested parties." (The President in fact referred to agreement to "participate in trying to expedite the talks" between the parties.)

TASS also noted the President as saying the events of the past week had shown that the United States and the Soviet Union "have now come to agree" that confrontation in the Middle East is not in their interests, and that "if we want to avoid this, we must use our influence" to achieve a permanent peace. The President believed, TASS said, that "if we were not now engaged in a course of easing tension," it is possible that a serious conflict could have occurred in the Middle East.

* A TASS dispatch from Washington on the 26th had reported State Department spokesman McCloskey as announcing that the President "has decided" to send unarmed U.S. observers to the Middle East.

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The President's remarks on the U.S. military alert were handled in guarded, cryptic fashion and not broached until almost the end of the account. Without acknowledging his reference to the Soviet Union, TASS said the President "tried to justify the adoption of the decision taken" to place U.S. forces "in certain regions" on an "enhanced state of combat readiness." It did not attribute to the President any explanations for this action other than to say that "without citing a source he referred here to 'information' which allegedly gave rise to the need to adopt, as he put it, 'precautionary measures.'"

TASS linked the "information" with Soviet actions in awkward fashion by going on to note that Secretary of Defense Schlesinger in an earlier press conference "was obliged to admit that he had 'no information' about any actions by the Soviet Union which gave grounds for concern." TASS' only comment was to cite the assessment of the "international public" that the United States' "precautionary measures" were "far from promoting the easing of international tension which, in Nixon's words, the United States is striving for."

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS TASS' reportage on Middle East developments has reflected Cairo's insistence on an Israeli pullback to the positions held at the time of the 22 October cease-fire. Thus TASS in the first Soviet report on as-Sadat's 31 October press conference cited him as saying that Israeli return to the 22 October positions would be the first step toward the establishment of peace. TASS also reported him as stressing Egypt's readiness to cooperate with the United Nations for immediate implementation of the cease-fire resolution and talks between the sides.

In the same vein, TASS reported the "UNEF call" for a meeting of Egyptian and Israeli military representatives to discuss "the question of return to the 22 October cease-fire lines." Jerusalem radio reports said that the meeting, arranged with U.S. mediation at Israeli initiative, was to discuss cease-fire arrangements and supplies to Egypt's Third Army. Moscow has shown reluctance to broach the predicament of the Third Army cut off on the east bank of the canal, as well as the issue of POW exchange. TASS reported without explanation on the 29th and 30th that supply trucks had reached the Third Army and supplies were "passing normally." The POW issue was acknowledged in a TASS report on the 30th that Egypt had announced that a POW exchange would be effected after Israel returned to the 22 October positions.

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Soviet media have briefly noted the arrival of as-Sadat's envoy, Isma'il Fahmi, in Washington for talks. TASS reported on the 30th that the visit was described by State Department spokesman McCloskey as the beginning of U.S.-Egyptian discussions on prospects for Arab-Israeli talks to settle the conflict. Secretary Kissinger was reported as having said the discussions dealt with the "entire complex of problems, including the cease-fire."

Moscow also announced the arrival in Cairo on the 30th of Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov for talks with as-Sadat. While Soviet media do not normally mention Soviet ambassadors' diplomatic contacts, a Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 26th reported that as-Sadat had received Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov. They also met on the 27th, according to Cairo reports, and AL-AHRAM said on the 28th that Cairo had received a note from Moscow the previous day to the effect that the USSR was in constant contact with the United States and the UN secretary general to stress that a return to the 22 October cease-fire lines was a "basic position." After this took place, the second and third clauses of Resolution 338 must be implemented immediately.

Moscow has provided few details of the Security Council discussions on composition of the UN observer and force groups. TASS on the 25th reported council adoption that day of Resolution 340, submitted by eight nonaligned nations, which provided for the establishment of a United Nations Emergency Force under the council's guidance and comprised of personnel from UN member states with the exception of permanent members of the Security Council. Soviet delegate Malik was cited by TASS as saying the USSR supports the resolution but adding that the principle of "fair geographic representation" should be followed with respect both to the UN observers and the UNEF. Malik called it "intolerable" that the present 200-man observer group was drawn almost entirely from Western countries and said the "additional contingent of observers" should be formed of representatives of socialist and nonaligned countries.

TASS on the 26th summarized some elements of the UN secretary general's report on the basic principles and tasks of the UNEF, noting that contingents would be selected in consultation with the council and the parties concerned, "bearing in mind an adequate geographic representation." Reporting council adoption of the report on the 27th "with amendments," TASS did not mention that

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the point on composition was changed to read "bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographic representation." TASS did report Malik as saying that the Soviet delegation did not object to council endorsement of the report although it had "a number of reservations," and reminding the council of the USSR's "well-known" position on financing of UN peacekeeping operations.

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PEKING HITS CEASE-FIRE, STRESSES U.S. "INTIMIDATION" OF USSR

A 26 October PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial and a speech by Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei the following day provided the first authoritative comment on the U.S.-Soviet cease-fire resolutions, routinely castigating them as superpower efforts to reimpose a "no war, no peace" situation. But while playing the propaganda theme that the superpowers have worked together to suppress the Arab struggle, Peking has stressed that the main factor is still U.S.-Soviet contention. Thus, the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial pointed to the use of U.S. pressure to "intimidate" the Soviet Union and have it curb Arab military actions while NCNA has portrayed the U.S. military alert as an effective brake on Soviet ambitions.

As usual the Soviet Union bore the brunt of Peking's criticism, with the Chinese charging Moscow with stifling the Arab struggle in favor of the USSR'S own selfish interests and with allowing the Israelis "to hang their swords over the heads of the Arab peoples." The editorial reaffirmed Peking's long-standing position that no stable peace would be possible until Israel withdraws from occupied Arab territory and provision is made for Palestinian national rights; it sidestepped reference to Chinese support for the Arab struggle, but Chi Peng-fei duly promised Chinese backing in general terms.

Chinese UN representatives have continued to play up the allegation that the superpowers have heavy-handedly used the Security Council to "rubber stamp" their joint resolutions. In a speech during debate on the second resolution on 23 October, however, PRC Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua in effect acknowledged Arab support for the resolution when he said that "only after taking into consideration the desire of certain countries" did China refrain from vetoing the cease-fire resolution. Chiao reiterated his view that the "broad masses of the Arab people will never allow themselves to be controlled by the two superpowers perpetually." In subsequent Security Council debates, PRC representatives labeled the UN peace-keeping force a superpower instrument for "further international intervention and control in the Middle East" and served notice that China will not contribute to its support.

U.S. ALERT Peking reportage on the U.S. general military alert has presented the action as a blunt and effective effort to block the unilateral dispatch of Soviet troops to the Middle East under the guise of peace-keeping forces. A 26 October NCNA report charged that Moscow wanted to strengthen its position in the area by effecting a "de facto military

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occupation" and highlighted particularly U.S. opposition evident in Secretary Kissinger's remarks to the press on the 25th, noting his affirmation that President Nixon's decision to call the alert was to "make clear our attitude toward unilateral steps." Peking quoted approvingly Kissinger's warning that the United States would oppose attempts "by any country" to achieve a predominant position in the area or seek its own ends under the cover of detente. Similarly, a 30 October NCNA report played up remarks on the Middle East by President Nixon during his 26 October press conference that he decided on the alert so as to leave "little to the imagination of how we would react" to a unilateral Soviet move. The report also noted the continuing buildup of U.S. and Soviet naval forces in the area, observing that the two powers are "strengthening their positions for contention in the Middle East."

Peking pickups of Western press accounts have portrayed Moscow as timidly giving ground before U.S. pressure. NCNA noted on the 26th a UPI report that Moscow fell into line with U.S. demands "within hours" after the U.S. alert began. More pointedly, a 27 October NCNA replay of French press reports said that the "bluff of Brezhnev" to send forces to the Middle East had failed in the face of U.S. resolve because "as always, when one hits the table with equal arms, the Russians retreat." Drawing a direct parallel with Khrushchev's failure during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, NCNA quoted a French paper's rhetorical query whether Brezhnev would not accordingly be required to pay "the same price that Khrushchev paid."

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EAST EUROPEAN ALLIES MARK TIME ON QUEST FOR SETTLEMENT

In messages and speeches to the World Peace Congress which opened in Moscow on 25 October, Moscow's East European allies expressed pro forma support for a Middle East political settlement, denounced Israeli "aggression," and demanded withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied territories. The thrust of most East European comment on the U.S. military alert and the President's press conference has been noticeably circumspect except for Yugoslavia, which has been most outspoken in condemning the U.S. alert for undermining detente and endangering world peace.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA A Prague domestic broadcast of the 27th on the President's press conference included muted criticism of the alert, noting that the President "tried to justify his decision" on the basis of "alleged reports" indicating a need for "preventive measures." Such measures, it added, "definitely did not contribute toward reducing international tension." It also said the President had announced that the alert "had been cancelled for the forces in Europe" but was still in force "in some other areas." The report highlighted at the outset the President's optimism about prospects for a settlement. Another Prague radio report of the press conference, earlier on the 27th, noted additionally that President Nixon "described the danger of deliveries of Arab oil being stopped as one of the most important factors influencing the intensification of U.S. efforts" to find a solution to the crisis.

HUNGARY Budapest radio on the 27th reported only briefly the President's optimism regarding the Middle East and his readiness to send civilian observers if requested to do so by the United Nations. The broadcast was otherwise devoted to reporting without comment the President's remarks on the Watergate affair. Prior to the press conference, a commentary carried by MTI earlier on the 26th bluntly charged the President with using the Middle East crisis to divert attention from Watergate. On the 30th, a Budapest radio report on the Administration's decision to request Congress to suspend consideration of the most-favored-nation issue included a statement that "observers in Washington have expressed surprise that the Nixon government is trying to link" the question of a Middle East settlement with the expansion of U.S.-Soviet trade.

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YUGOSLAVIA The authoritative Belgrade daily BORBA devoted an editorial on the 27th to the U.S. alert, declaring that it had fed the flames of a "grave war crisis" not only in the Middle East but throughout the world. It went on to charge that the alert represented a threat of "a direct intervention in one of the key hotbeds of war" as well as a threat to the policy of detente. The editorial did not balance its harsh censure of the United States with any criticism of the Soviet Union. The Zagreb daily VJESNIK, also on the 27th, likewise ridiculed the President's statement that the greatest crisis since 1962 had been averted "thanks to detente." On the U.S. alert, the paper rhetorically questioned the stability of a relationship between the great powers resting on force or the threat of force.

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