

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
25 OCTOBER 1973

- 1 -

## ARAB - ISRAELI WAR

## USSR JUSTIFIES CEASE-FIRE CALL, SCORES ISRAELI "VIOLATIONS"

Moscow media showed circumspection regarding Soviet diplomatic activity preceding the adoption on 22 October of the Security Council resolution calling for a cease-fire in the Arab-Israeli war. Thus, Kosygin's secret talks in Cairo, from 16 to 19 October, were reported only after he returned to the Soviet capital. Reports of Kissinger's trip to Moscow on the 20th to confer with Brezhnev did not indicate that it was taken at Soviet initiative. And Moscow made no official announcement that it had cosponsored the cease-fire resolution, merely reporting the White House announcement that the United States and the USSR had reached agreement regarding a joint resolution to be placed before the Security Council.

The immediate breakdown of the cease-fire, which had been accepted on the 22d by the Egyptians and Israelis, brought a Soviet Government statement on the 23d placing the onus on Israel. Moscow has cryptically reported subsequent developments, including the tabling on the 23d of the second joint U.S.-Soviet resolution calling for troop pullbacks to positions held when the cease-fire came into force as well as Egypt's request on the evening of the 24th for Soviet and U.S. forces to supervise the cease-fire.

On the 24th Soviet propaganda began asserting that Security Council members and other "observers" see the Brezhnev-Kissinger agreement in Moscow as having opened the way to a constructive search for a Middle East settlement. But except in carrying the text of the new Resolution 338 on the cease-fire, Soviet media have only indirectly touched on its call for negotiations between the parties and have been silent on possible procedures for carrying out the second operative paragraph calling for "immediate" implementation of Resolution 242 of November 1967.

KOSYGIN TRAVELS, Moscow's first acknowledgment of Kosygin's  
KISSINGER IN USSR 16-19 October visit to Cairo came in one-line  
items broadcast by the domestic service  
and carried by TASS around mid-day on the 19th which noted only  
that Kosygin had "had meetings" with as-Sadat. The domestic  
service also reported Kosygin's return to Moscow that day. A  
broadcast in Arabic on the 20th said that the Egyptian press

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
25 OCTOBER 1973

- 2 -

and public opinion, giving much attention to the Kosygin visit, referred to Soviet efforts to achieve a just solution of the crisis. The broadcast attributed to the Czechoslovak news agency a report that the Egyptian press viewed Kosygin's visit as a peace mission.

The visit had been announced by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY on the 18th, with Cairo papers providing some details on the 19th: According to AL-AHRAM and AL-AKHBAR, Kosygin was received by as-Sadat on the day of his arrival, and the two met twice on the 17th and twice again on the 18th. AL-AHRAM, as reported by MENA, added that Kosygin twice during the visit went to the Soviet embassy for telephone contacts with Brezhnev.

Cairo radio on the 20th said that Kosygin had visited Damascus en route home from Egypt, and various Arab media reported rumors that he had been in Baghdad on the 21st and had returned to Cairo on the 22d. Moscow said nothing about his movements after the report of his arrival from Cairo on the 19th and gave no explanation of his absence from the 20-21 October talks with Kissinger in Moscow.

Brief reports by TASS and Moscow radio early on the 20th cited the White House for the announcement that Secretary Kissinger had left for Moscow to discuss questions pertaining to the situation in the Middle East, but the reports ignored the White House statement that the trip was at Brezhnev's request. Moscow carried only brief accounts of the Secretary's talks with Brezhnev and Gromyko on the 20th and 21st. And a description of the talks was confined to TASS' formulation on the 21st, repeated in connection with Kissinger's departure the next day, that the situation in the Middle East was examined in detail and possible ways of establishing peace in the area were discussed.

TASS did not characterize the atmosphere of the talks, and in reporting Kissinger's departure statement it merely cited him as saying the discussions were "fruitful" and that in his opinion the resolution adopted by the Security Council that day would facilitate a Middle East settlement. (According to American press accounts of his departure statement, Kissinger said the talks would contribute to peace in the world in general and to a further improvement of Soviet-American relations. He was also quoted in U.S. media as describing the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
25 OCTOBER 1973

- 3 -

talks as "very extensive, very constructive" and held in a "cordial and warm atmosphere.") Both TASS and Moscow's domestic service reported the White House as having announced that Kissinger, at President Nixon's request, would visit Israel en route home "in connection with current efforts aimed at stopping hostilities" and speeding up full implementation of the joint U.S.-Soviet cease-fire resolution. TASS later noted without comment his arrival in Israel, his talks with Prime Minister Meir and Foreign Minister Eban, and his stopover in London for talks at the airport with Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home.

In its propaganda during the first two weeks of the war, Moscow had routinely voiced support for the Arabs' "just cause," but a subtle shift in treatment of the fighting began to be apparent around the 19th--the day Kosygin returned from Cairo and the eve of Kissinger's arrival in the Soviet Union. On the 19th for the first time there were calls for an end to hostilities by routine radio commentators and by Soviet citizens at meetings held to demonstrate support for the Arabs. At the same time, TASS reports from Egypt began to suggest the extent of the Israeli penetration of the west bank of the Suez Canal. On the following two days press comment intimated concern over the military developments, with RED STAR noting that "all kinds of turns of events are still possible." And by the 22d PRAVDA declared that the "protracted nature" of the hostilities "imperatively" dictated the need for a political settlement. Also over the weekend, pickups of reports on U.S. military aid to Israel diminished, the last such monitored references appearing early on the 21st.

JOINT CEASE-FIRE  
RESOLUTION

While the cease-fire resolution was jointly sponsored by the Soviet Union and the United States, Moscow made no announcement on its own behalf. Rather, TASS early on the 22d, in a Washington-dated dispatch, reported the White House announcement of U.S.-Soviet agreement regarding a joint resolution on cessation of military operations, to be placed before the Security Council late on the 21st. TASS said that White House Press Secretary Ziegler read a brief statement which said the agreement was reached as a result of the Brezhnev-Kissinger talks in Moscow, and that the President had instructed the U.S. representative at the United Nations, together with the Soviet representative, to request prompt convocation of the council.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
25 OCTOBER 1973

- 4 -

Prior to the voting, TASS reported the joint resolution which calls for an in-place cease-fire by all parties 12 hours after adoption of the resolution, for the parties concerned to immediately begin implementation of Resolution 242, and for peace negotiations between the parties "under appropriate auspices" "immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire." Soviet accounts of the Security Council session noted that U.S. delegate Scali described the resolution as a result of the talks in Moscow. Soviet delegate Malik was reported as having stated that it was the council's duty to end the bloodshed and achieve implementation of Resolution 242 providing for withdrawal from "all" occupied Arab territories as a basis for a political settlement. Egyptian agreement on the draft resolution was reported, as was the Israeli representative's statement that his delegation was "positively disposed." Moscow noted that the Chinese delegate, "displaying a lack of interest in a political settlement," did not take part in the voting.

Acceptances of the resolution by Egypt, Israel and Jordan were reported by TASS on the 22d. In noting President as-Sadat's statement of acceptance, TASS said only that the Egyptians took into consideration, among other things, "the talks and contacts with the leaders of the Soviet Union," thus ignoring his references to the "five working sessions" with Kosygin and to "assurances" received from Brezhnev in a "special message" handed over by the Soviet ambassador on the night of the 21st. In reporting Syria's delayed agreement to the cease-fire, a TASS dispatch from the United Nations cited a telegram received by the UN Secretary General. The Damascus announcement, similar to that of Cairo's, in fact said the Syrians had taken into consideration "the results of contacts with the Soviet Union and also the explanations and guarantees secured through these contacts," as well as "the assurances" made to Egypt "which provide guarantees for Arab rights."

GOVERNMENT STATEMENT,  
CEASE-FIRE BREAKDOWN

Following TASS reports on the 23d of Egyptian communique charging Israeli troop redeployment after the cease-fire and of Egypt's request for an emergency session of the Security Council, Moscow issued a government statement placing "full responsibility" on Israel for violation of Resolution 338. The government statement said that Israel's acceptance of the resolution had proved to be a "gross lie,"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
25 OCTOBER 1973

- 5 -

since Israeli troops attacked Egyptian positions as well as "peaceful populated localities."

The statement, while warning of "grave consequences" if Israel continued its "aggression" against Egypt and Syria, did not go so far as to hint at any Soviet action, as did Soviet Government statements of 6 and 7 June 1967 demanding Israeli compliance with cease-fire resolutions. The 6 June statement declared that the Soviet Government "reserves the right to take all steps that may be necessitated" by the situation. The 7 June statement, addressed to Israel, warned that if Israel did not respect the cease-fire the USSR would adopt a decision on maintaining its diplomatic relations with Israel (which were severed by Moscow on the 10th), and that the Soviet Government would also "consider and implement other necessary measures stemming from Israel's aggressive policy."

A second joint resolution tabled by the Soviet Union and the United States at the Security Council on 23 October and adopted--again with Peking the only nonparticipant--was reported by TASS as calling for troop pullbacks to positions held when the cease-fire came into force, but without specifying the troops of either side.\* The resolution also recommended that the UN secretary general take measures for immediately sending UN observers to monitor the Israeli-Egyptian cease-fire.

A TASS wrap-up of the cease-fire situation on the evening of the 24th cited the Egyptian Government statement of that day as charging Israel with deliberate cease-fire violations. TASS did not mention that the Egyptian statement placed "special responsibility" on the USSR and the United States, as sponsors of the cease-fire resolution, to guarantee its implementation.

CAIRO REQUEST FOR U.S., SOVIET TROOPS      Moscow media were slow to acknowledge President as-Sadat's request, made on the evening of the 24th, for U.S. and Soviet forces to supervise the cease-fire. Initial Soviet accounts of the Security Council meeting that night, convened at Egypt's request, said nothing about Egyptian Foreign Minister az-Zayyat's appeal to the Soviet Union and the United States to send forces to supervise implementation of the cease-fire.

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\* Moscow in an Arabic-language broadcast on the 24th said the council demanded a halt to military operations "begun by Israel" and pullback of "Israeli forces" to positions held when the cease-fire took effect.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
25 OCTOBER 1973

- 6 -

It was not until about 1200 GMT on the 25th that Moscow radio, followed by TASS, quoted Soviet UN delegate Malik as saying that he was "authorized to declare" that "the Egyptian proposal for sending Soviet and U.S. troops to the area of the conflict is fully justified and accords with the UN Charter." TASS cited U.S. delegate Scali as saying, with regard to Egypt's proposal, that "in his opinion the time has not yet come for participation by the great powers and for sending their forces to the cease-fire line." A later TASS report noted that Egyptian Foreign Minister az-Zayyat informed the council that as-Sadat "had appealed to the Soviet Union and the United States" to send troops to the Middle East to safeguard the truce lines.

On the 25th, TASS reported without comment that President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger briefed Congressional leaders that morning on "diplomatic steps being taken" to end the military actions in the Middle East and insure compliance with the cease-fire agreement.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
25 OCTOBER 1973

- 7 -

## PEKING ASSAILS CEASE-FIRE AS PRODUCT OF SUPERPOWER "COLLUSION"

Peking has offered no authoritative comment on recent Middle East developments but has publicized speeches by its representatives in the UN Security Council sessions on the Middle East. The PRC delegates, Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua and permanent UN representative Huang Hua, focused particular invective against Moscow's stance in the course of condemning the cease-fire resolutions as the product of U.S.-Soviet "collusion" to reimpose a "no war, no peace" situation against Arab interests. The Chinese representatives criticized the resolutions for failing to guarantee the return of occupied Arab territory and Palestinian national rights. But they softpedaled most specific issues in the crisis, preferring to play to the large third world gallery by holding up the example of the U.S.-Soviet "condominium" on the Middle East as proof of Peking's contention that superpower detente is invariably achieved at the expense of the interests of smaller states.

Though the United States came in for perfunctory criticism, both PRC delegates reserved their main attacks for the Soviet Union, reiterating Chinese claims that Moscow gives arms to the Arabs only to be better able to control Middle East events. In a particularly harsh rebuttal to Soviet delegate Malik's criticism of the Chinese on 23 October, Huang Hua broadened Chinese charges by asserting that the Soviet Union is stepping up contact with Israel so as to supplant the position of the United States in Tel Aviv.

While Peking had used the UN forum to exploit the theme of super-power collusion, its sole comment on events leading up to the big-power cease-fire arrangement, a 23 October NCNA article, reiterated the Chinese view that the current situation is merely a temporary compromise covering sharpening U.S.-Soviet rivalry. According to the article, Moscow was "intimidated" by U.S. pressure into agreeing to the cease-fire. As evidence, NCNA quoted remarks to the press by Secretary Kissinger pointing to the "great strain" in U.S.-Soviet relations stemming from the war and cited his reference to the crisis as a test of the "real meaning of detente." Quoting Western press reports, NCNA portrayed Kosygin as making his trip to Cairo to urge "restraint on the Arab side" in order to accommodate the United States and pave the way for successful talks by Brezhnev with Kissinger in Moscow.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
25 OCTOBER 1973

- 8 -

The Chinese have discreetly eschewed making any connection between Kissinger's recent activities and the postponement of his scheduled October trip to China, disclosing the change in dates for the visit to 10-13 November in a terse NCNA announcement on 24 October.

#### EAST EUROPEANS APPROVE TRUCE DECISION, ATTACK VIOLATIONS

In a relatively small volume of comment, Moscow's orthodox East European allies have registered low-keyed satisfaction with the 22 October UN cease-fire resolution. They expressed support for the Arab cause and called on Israel to ensure the success of the truce by withdrawing from all occupied territories. Credit for bringing about the cease-fire was generally given to the Soviet leaders, but it was also noted that the United States was prompted to cooperate by a realization that the balance of power had shifted in favor of the forces of socialism since the 1967 war. Prague, uniquely, charged that Chou En-lai sent messages to the Egyptian and Syrian leaders urging their rejection of the cease-fire resolution and promising material support to their continued struggle.

**HUNGARY** Budapest comment was notable for its generally favorable treatment of the U.S. role. In the 23 October NEPSZABADSAG, the authoritative foreign affairs commentator Ferenc Varnai viewed "the joint Soviet-American proposal" in the context of the developing Soviet-U.S. detente, which he said has passed its "first important test" and "helped to avert an extremely grave international crisis." The joint action by "the two leading powers of the two world systems" was also hailed in a Budapest radio commentary on the 22d. This commentary credited the cease-fire to the alleged shift in the balance of forces since 1967 and surmised that the United States is "obviously now urging its Israeli ally" to accept the cease-fire and withdraw from the occupied territories.

**POLAND** Polish leader Gierk, addressing the opening session of his party's conference on the 22d, referred approvingly to the UN Security Council resolution and expressed the hope that a solution to the Middle East situation "may be found" in that action. Going beyond the relatively mild language of the 8 October government statement on the outbreak of the war, Gierk blamed the resumption of hostilities on "the obstinate, aggressive policy of the Israeli government." He also praised the "constructive initiatives" of the Soviet government in bringing about the cease-fire.



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
25 OCTOBER 1973

- 9 -

CZECHOSLOVAKIA Czechoslovak comment was notable in citing the PRC delegate's abstention from the vote on the Security Council resolution, a Prague domestic service talk on the 22d noting that the Chinese delegate had "again turned his back on a reasonable course." A Prague foreign broadcast the same day conceded, however, that the PRC representative could have vetoed the resolution. The anti-Peking theme was further accented in an interview with a CPCZ official on Prague domestic TV on the 23d. The official charged that, in addition to the abstention in the Security Council, Chou En-lai had also on the 22d sent cables to the Egyptian and Syrian presidents urging them not to accept the cease-fire and "promising them material assistance." The speaker termed it "distressing that similar statements have also been made by certain irresponsible Arab officials," citing in this connection Libyan leader al-Qadhafi's opposition to the cease-fire. Such statements, he added, "simply play into the hands of Israel and its obstructionist policy."

On 25 October, Prague issued a government statement--it had issued a party-government statement on the 8th--which expressed "deep satisfaction" over the cease-fire resolution but condemned Israel for alleged violations of both the first and second Security Council resolutions and demanded that Israel withdraw to the 22 October cease-fire line.

GDR The same demands were recorded in a somewhat less vitriolic GDR party-government statement on the 24th, which voiced "great relief and satisfaction" over the 22 October resolution. The GDR had also issued a party-government statement on the 7th. The East Berlin agency ADN carried reports on the 23d on a joint statement of support for the Arab cause by the GDR Solidarity Committee and the GDR-Arab Countries Friendship Society, as well as on a "demand" by State Council Chairman Stoph that Israel implement the 1973 and 1967 Security Council resolutions. The East Berlin domestic service on the 22d reported its Cairo correspondent as noting both satisfaction and caution in the Egyptian capital over the truce, as well as an "unmistakable demand that it must under no circumstances be used by Israel as a cover to continue the policy of occupation."

BULGARIA Sofia media, predictably hailing the cease-fire resolution as a victory for the USSR's peace policy, also carried a declaration on the Middle East situation issued at the windup of the 15-22 October quadrennial congress of the

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
25 OCTOBER 1973

- 10 -

World Federation of Trade Unions in Varna, Bulgaria. As reported by BTA, the WFTU declaration did not mention the cease-fire resolution, registering instead a demand for "the immediate discontinuation of Israel's aggression" and its withdrawal from occupied territories.

ROMANIA, ALBANIA, A Romanian government statement on the 24th  
YUGOSLAVIA hailed the cease-fire agreement and suggested  
the immediate establishment of a 5-kilometer  
dividing zone between the opposing forces to ensure implementation of the cease-fire. A SCINTEIA editorial the same day expressed satisfaction over the Security Council resolution but noted certain unspecified "acts of violation" of the truce. Yugoslavia on the 23d issued a foreign secretariat statement which hailed the council decision as a success for the Arab countries' longstanding efforts to solve the Middle East situation, without mentioning either the Soviet Union or the United States. Albania issued no official statement, but a Tirana domestic service report of the 22d viewed the cease-fire decision as favorable to the interests of Israel and "the two superpowers" and contrary to those of the Arab countries.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
25 OCTOBER 1973

- 11 -

### MOSCOW APPROVES ARAB EFFORTS TO USE OIL AS POLITICAL WEAPON

Since the outbreak of new fighting in the Middle East, the Soviet Union has devoted a moderate level of attention to the Arabs' ability to use oil as a weapon against Western supporters of Israel, noting Western vulnerabilities to such pressure and reporting sympathetically on Arab actions in this regard. Reportage has pointed to U.S. concern over the energy situation, citing the President's statement calling on Americans to conserve fuel to meet energy needs, and at the same time has noted anxiety in Western Europe over dependence on Arab oil and the possibility of fierce competition among capitalist states for petroleum supplies.

A commentary broadcast in Arabic on 17 October linked Washington's military assistance to Israel with the oil question, noting that the U.S. decision had aroused anger among the Arabs, who were forced to use "all means available" in their struggle. It said the question of oil as a weapon was being intensely debated among the Arabs, and concluded that local and foreign policy difficulties facing the United States would increase as Arab resistance to the policy of Israel and its "protectors" increased. An Arabic-language commentary the next day observed that the United States had shrugged off Arab warnings of a halt to Arab export of oil to the United States in retaliation for Washington's pro-Israeli policy; it concluded that should the Arabs use "all means" at their disposal, including oil, they would achieve a speedier success in their struggle.

An article in SOCIALIST INDUSTRY on the 20th said that economists viewed with skepticism Washington's calculations on reducing its energy shortage by means of petroleum imports from the Middle East, since it was precisely in this region that U.S. foreign policy was running into trouble. One of Moscow's major commentators on oil questions, Boris Rachkov, wrote in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA on the 21st that use of oil as a political weapon against imperialism had become an increasingly important trend in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and he found it not surprising that in conditions of a new military outbreak in the Middle East the Arabs had decided to use oil as a weapon against "open and secret" supporters of Israel, putting oil at the service of their economic interests and "quite justifiably" using it for political purposes.

CONFIDENTIAL