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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador of Israel
 Mordechai Shalev, Minister, Embassy of Israel

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, July 3, 1973

PLACE: The Western White House
 San Clemente, California

SUBJECT: Report on Brezhnev Visit

Kissinger: The Middle East was a problem of the greatest difficulty at the summit. The Soviets raised it every day, but we avoided it until Wednesday. I had a meeting with Gromyko Wednesday to just discuss principles. I said what we wanted was something that each side could interpret differently -- but it was a way to get negotiations started. Gromyko said he thought we weren't serious, that they had decisions to make on deliveries, etc.

We had two problems: what would be in the communique, and that what would appear would be as a result of the summit, not at the summit. I think you are not too dissatisfied.

Dinitz: Only with one phase.

Kissinger: That was inserted as a result of Rogers discussion with Gromyko. I didn't feel I could overrule Rogers. [This is only for the Prime Minister.] I threatened to Gromyko not to have a communique.

Dinitz: Aside from this point, it was better than 1972. It left all options open; it didn't foreclose anything.

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Kissinger: The reason we managed to avoid specifics in the communique was by agreeing to substantive discussions on the Middle East, which took place on Saturday. My strategy on the communique was to get everything in reach

[Read different formulations.]

On Saturday morning they resumed on the formulation I read. They wanted a reference to the UN, and we just sat tight. On Saturday morning, we left the communique in abeyance and went to the principles. Gromyko rejected the principles of 72, modified as you insisted. Brezhnev requested a meeting with the President alone, to avoid this. I agreed to modify the principles for discussion.

Dinitz: It was a question of the free choice of the refugees still remaining.

Kissinger: No, all your points were taken account of. [He read the refugee point.] Through maneuvers I won't describe. They wanted a return to 1967, guarantees, international waterways, security zones. Gromyko and Dobrynin were present. We rejected it. Brezhnev said this agreement would never leave the room. We said making an agreement that no one knew about was hard to understand.

Dinitz: If we are expected to be asked to return to the 1967 borders, we have to be asked.

Kissinger: I wouldn't agree the first time.

Dinitz: Or the second.

Kissinger: The discussion got very nasty. Then Brezhnev said he would withdraw all of the points but the 1967 borders. The President asked what he disagreed with. Brezhnev said we had withdrawn from the 1972 proposals. We agreed to redo it and send it to him at Camp David.

Before you explode, let me describe the tactical situation. We wanted to avoid having something we would be trapped into agreeing to, and we sent this to them after they had left -- at Camp David. They have never even acknowledged it. [He hands Dinitz a copy of Tab A.]

Let me point out the differences. Paragraph one mentions a final peace and appropriate negotiations.

Paragraph two says, "in accordance with appropriate UN resolutions."

Paragraph four -- we have eliminated reference to Sharm el Sheikh and the word "temporary."

Paragraph five -- "Should lead to an end to a state of belligerency" rather than "end the state of belligerency."

The refugee clause is stated in the language of the communique.

I think there is no chance of an agreement.

Dinitz: I must read it through more carefully, but certain things come to mind.

Incorporation of the UN resolutions in paragraph 2. Resolution 242 is interpreted differently by the different parties. There are September 1971 and 1972 General Assembly resolutions that can be read as calling for a total withdrawal, and that is how they will be read, and in conjunction with withdrawal. If this is how it will be read.

Kissinger: They know we mean 242.

Dinitz: It depends on how it is read.

Demilitarized zones. "By agreement of the parties" should be included.

Kissinger: The whole thing must be negotiated. That's in paragraph one.

Dinitz: Paragraph five -- end to the state of belligerency without the state of peace. You can have the end of belligerency without having a state of peace. A state of peace in the mind of the Soviet Union is less than peace.

Paragraph seven -- International waterways. We don't want freedom of navigation at Sharm el Sheikh assured to us; we want to assure it ourselves.

Kissinger: They will never agree.

Dinitz: Paragraph eight is spoiled by the "legitimate interests of the Palestine people."

If this seems to kill the 1972 principles, it is preferable. If it is an agreed paper at the highest level, it has bad features.

Kissinger: If the document is subject to different interpretations, we could accept it with an understanding on our interpretation. On the UN resolutions, we would make clear that we mean 242. On the others, you could interpret it as the negotiations go on.

Dinitz: If they use this as a starting point for further moves, then this as a bad starting point would lead to bad future modifications.

Kissinger: You think this is a bad paper. The Arabs would not agree. Egypt wants an agreement that we understand that border changes apply only to Jordan and that with Israel it applies to total Israeli withdrawal.

Dinitz: The Soviet Union has hinted in many ways that they don't exclude changes, but on the Eastern front. They are playing politics. With Egypt they will interpret a withdrawal as total and the changes as on the Jordanian front.

We have a good chance in the negotiations, but not on the basis of a document which has had features. On the basis of 242, all options are open, and preferable to this which has some confining features. It is worse than 242 on security guarantees, secure boundaries, and international waterways.

Our reading was that the Summit produced positive results, because the Soviet Union now has to explain it to Egypt, there are troubles in Iraq, and differences between Egypt and Libya.

Kissinger: The tactical situation was -- take it or leave it. If all our people had been present, it would have agreed to go back to the 1967 borders. You must compare it with this, not with your maximum position. You got out of the summit with a minimum of damage.

Dinitz: This paper would be great if it removed the 1972 paper without substituting another.

Kissinger: But this is better.

Dinitz: But as a talking basis, not an agreed paper.

Kissinger: They won't accept it, so there is no agreed paper. If they propose changes, so will we. They either got from the Arabs an agreement that it should be vague -- like the Vietnam negotiations, where I produced a new paper each week. This is no basis for joint action until

there is agreement on a basis so vague that it can be interpreted differently by both sides and negotiations can go on. It must be so vague that it is not totally unacceptable to both. We can't move until Egypt agrees to principles that are so vague that they can be interpreted differently by both sides. Until that basic decision is made, we must give the illusion of movement and avoid a showdown with us, Egypt, the Soviet Union -- anything which keeps the process going.

Dinitz: That works in our favor. As long as it doesn't undermine our position.

Kissinger: An unsigned document of general principles can't be used to undermine your position. The points that give you trouble we can interpret our way. I am not asking you to accept this. We are informing you. We don't need a formal government position unless they come back to us; we won't press them for an answer. If they do, we will see if we need a formal answer from you.

Dinitz: Okay.

Kissinger: Let me discuss the proposed State Department initiative. The basic idea is to invite you and Egypt to begin private negotiations in Washington under U.S. auspices. [Read conditions.] Note that 242 neither explicitly accepts or rejects the 4 June boundary as final.

Dinitz: By private, you mean secret?

Kissinger: Yes, but with Egypt and the State Department, it can't be secret.

Dinitz: Have you discussed it yet with Egypt?

Kissinger: They say no, but don't bet on it.

Dinitz: Anything else?

Kissinger: Proximity probably -- in the same hotel on different floors, or in different hotels.

Dinitz: Sisco talked twice that he is preparing something for me, he talked generally on the Summit.

Kissinger: What was said was: They wanted total withdrawal; 242; the Jarring paper and the Secretary and Sisco. They didn't succeed in mentioning 242 and Jarring.

There are no agreements other than the communique. You shouldn't interpret it that the U.S. has withdrawn its interest in 242, and Jarring, etc., but since the Soviet Union wanted to make 242 more explicit, Rogers got it dropped. At the last minute, the Secretary called Sisco in to rescue the communique.

Dinitz: On the UN Secretary General's visit, here is our answer, in conjunction with State. [He read and handed over the note at Tab B.]

I will pass this to the Prime Minister on a close hold basis. Such a formula will never be agreeable. I can't accept a document which says a return to 1967 is not excluded. The new borders must be the result of negotiations. This would be a new change in policy which I don't think we will make. It is different when the U.S. says that than when we say it.

Kissinger: I don't think either side can accept this. Egypt will object that 242 can allow modification.

Dinitz: So why produce an initiative at all? It could be a move backward.

Kissinger: I can't promise. But if we can get an answer on this, I can discuss it with the President.

Don't show your foreign office.

Dinitz: Shalev has the Prime Minister's full backing.

I have a few more points:

The Prime Minister, subsequent to the Brandt visit said he sent a letter to Nixon and Brezhnev talking of his impression of Israel's desire for peace. She wanted the President to know this in light of the Heath letter. When these people come to Israel they talk differently. She expressed the hope the President would not take the Heath letter seriously. Talking to the British Deputy Foreign Minister, he said to someone that Israel was responsible for the Six-Day War.

Kissinger: I don't remember the contents, but Brandt is not noted for his precision of thought. He said he favored a Middle East settlement.

Dinitz: We have been active in Washington to get Jordanian MAP restored.

We will try to influence the German Government, if you don't object.

Kissinger: No, we will too.

On Ethiopia, the instructions were to be forthcoming, except where Congressional restrictions prevent it.

Dinitz: Anything new on the Saudi F-4? Will it go ahead?

Kissinger: I think so.


Dinitz: Is there anything we can do? Gave Rush a note.

Kissinger: Let me think about it. We haven't answered the last Egyptian note, but probably will. The more forums we keep open the better.

Dinitz: Yes, that is why we go along with the Secretary General.



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Sent to Brezhnev at
Camp David
June 24, 1973

General Working Principles

1. The political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict should be comprehensive, embracing all parties concerned and all issues. This means the elaboration and implementation of a set of agreements between Israel and each of the neighboring Arab countries directly involved in the conflict in order to achieve a final peace. The completion of the agreements should at some stage involve appropriate forms of negotiation between the parties acceptable to all parties concerned. In the process of working out agreement on the whole complex of questions relating to the settlement, the possibility is not precluded of this agreement being implemented by stages or that some questions may be resolved on a priority basis.
2. The settlement should contain provisions for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in 1967 in accordance with appropriate UN resolutions.
3. Any border changes, which may take place, should result from voluntary agreement between the parties concerned.
4. Arrangements for mutual security could include demilitarized zones; establishment of an international force; stationing of such a force at strategic points; and the most effective international guarantees which could include the Soviet Union and the United States.
5. The settlement should lead to an end of a state of belligerency and the establishment of peace.
6. Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all states in the Middle East, including Israel, is one of the basic principles on which the settlement must be based.
7. Freedom of navigation through the international waterways in the area should be assured to all nations including Israel. This is fully consistent with Egyptian sovereignty over the Suez Canal.
8. There must be a settlement of the refugee problem on a just basis through agreed procedures and taking into due account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people.

EXPLANATORY POINTS

Paragraph 1: This paragraph accepts the first paragraph from Foreign Minister Gromyko's paper presented at Zavidovo with the addition of the formulation on negotiation discussed June 23 in San Clemente.

Paragraph 2: The word "agreements" is changed to "settlement" in this and subsequent paragraphs in accordance with the discussion June 23 despite the fact that it was taken from Foreign Minister Gromyko's paper at Zavidovo. It then refers simply to "appropriate UN resolutions."

Paragraph 3: This remains unchanged from the draft of May, 1972.

Paragraph 4: This has been simplified in the light of the Gromyko-Kissinger conversation of June 23.

Paragraph 5: Again, the word "agreement" is replaced with "settlement." Otherwise this is unchanged from the May 1972 draft.

Paragraph 6: This is the same as the May 1972 draft.

Paragraph 7: This remains as accepted in discussions June 23.

Paragraph 8: The language of the communique is introduced.

The overall objective is to produce a set of working principles that would be sufficient to get talks started between Israel and its neighbors but not so specific as to produce a deadlock before they start. The question, as the President said, is whether we are to cooperate in launching talks in some form or to create issues between us now.

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U
The Government of Israel's attitude towards the visit proposed by you is positive and agreeable in principle.

2"3/1 H
The Government of Israel prefers to await the end of the debate at the Security Council before giving a definite answer in light of the situation at that time and including the result of the Security Council debate, since this could have beneficial or inhibiting effect on the Secretary General's efforts.

It is assumed that you will be visiting the capitals in your capacity as Secretary General of the United Nations. You will be welcomed and received with all the honors and hospitality reserved for the Secretary General of the U.N. coming to meet with Heads of Government.

We propose that an announcement be made by you early in July to the effect that the parties have agreed in principle to a visit by the Secretary General and that its exact date and details would be agreed on later.

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HK / Dinsley 3 July 73

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R. M.F. was policy of greatest flexibility at summit. S.U. would
very day, but we avoided it til Wed. We then
found it was going. That policy was based on
on principle. Said what we wanted was something
each could interpret differently - a way to
get negotiations started.

Chambers said he thought we weren't serious
That they had decisions to make on decisions, the
case. He had 2 problems: what would be
in Communiqué, & that ^{what} it would happen
would be a result of summit, not at a
summit.

I think you are not to be disappointed

D - Only one phrase

R That was inserted as result of Rogers' discussion
w/ G. I didn't feel I could discuss Rogers
(This only for P.M.) I threatened to G not to have
a communiqué

D Aside from this point, it was better than
'72. Left all options open, didn't force
anything.

R Reason we encouraged to avoid specifics
in Communiqué was to agree to substantive
discussion on 15, which took place on Sat.
My strategy on Communiqué was to get

^{the thing in reach}
~~(that's the point)~~
R On Sat morning they resumed our formulation
I said. They wanted ref to UK and we
just for Sat night. On Sat morning
we left Communiqué in abeyance & went
to principle. I perhaps repeated principles
of '72 modified as you wished.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/08, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State v. es 2/6/04

NY 100 NARA DATE 8/2/04



B requested mtg w/ P&O chm. To cancel
this, depend & modify a principle for
business

D - Was question of free choice of ^{uniqueness} people
still remaining

K - No, all your points were taken account of (head
& point)

Then movements I wasn't describe

Return to 67, Committee with university,
university gone, G & D were present. We
updated it. B said this had would mean
like a room. We said deal was an
element that was hard to understand

D - If we had ^{expected} to return to 67, have to
be open

K - I wouldn't agree, at times

D - on sound

K - Discussion got very nasty. Frank B
said he would w/ draw all but 6
leaves. P&O asked what he was going to do
B said we had w/ draw from 2 proposals
was agreed to rels & send to C.D

Before you explain, let me describe -

university, re tactical sit, we wanted to
avoid having something ^{we would be triggered with} agreed to & sent
this to them after they had left - at C.D.
They have more now after it.

(Needs to clarify)

K. Diggins. Para 1, ^{written} final peace & offering
negotiations

Para 2 - In accord w/ opp pop UK resolutions

Para 4 - E. bin Sharnad Shirk &
was "terang"

Para 5 - "Should end state of belligerency"
rather than "goal to end"

Refugee is stated in lang of
convergence

I think no chance of agreement

D. Don't read carefully but certain things
come to mind.

Description of UK resolutions in para 2

242 is integrated differently, Sept 21

+ 22 are ~~very different~~ ^{are on very different} & can be
used as total w/ channels, & that is

how they will be read, & in conjunction
w/ ~~with~~ ^{with} ~~and~~. If this is how it
will be read

K. They know me well on 242

D. Depends on how read

Demilitarized zone. By agreement of parties
should be included

K. Whole thing must be negotiated. Para 1

D. Para 5 states of belligerency, state of peace.

You can have end of belligerency w/o having

state of peace. State of peace in

mind of SC is less than para

para 7 would work. We don't want

function of negotiations at Sharn

assumed to be, an amount to ensure it
overwhelms

X
more again

D
Pan & are guided by "big it methods
of absolute people."

D
If the amount to bill 12 projects, it is
preferable. If an equal paper at
highest level, it has had failures

K-
I've subject to chief with instructions,
and could accept w/ but he thinks on
one instrument, ~~the~~. On UK resolution,
w/ would make clear that we were in 1972,
and the year could not be used as synthesis
year.

D.
If they use this as starting point for
further rounds then this as had starting
point would lead to bad future machinery

K
Think this is a bad paper. Arabs ~~cannot~~ cannot
agree. ~~It~~ E wants agreement that we would
find that the two apply only to Jordan & that
w/ channel applies to total available of channel

D
SU has been in many ways that they
don't expect well changes, but on Eastern front,
They are planning new practices, W/E Egypt they
will not support w/ channel as total + changes
as on Jordan front.)

D
As a 2nd year goal we are in negotiations but
not on basis of element which we had
for future. Our basis of 1972 all of options
and Syria, & preferable to this which has

~~There~~ ^{there} ^{was} ^{improving} ^{of} ^{the} ^{market},
~~was~~ ^{was} ^{not} ^{improving} ^{of} ^{the} ^{market},
there ^{was} ^{improvement}
with ^{improvement}

One thing is that Summit produced
positive results, even if I know how to
explain it. I expect, words in days, all but
E & H etc.

R That condition more - takes it a time. It is
all in people had been present would have
argued it to go back to 62 leaders - need
Europe all this, not upon more position
You get out of it, not of minimum damage,
D This paper would be good if it showed
72 papers of a satisfactory manner.

R But this is better.
D But no a better lesson, not an agreed
paper

R They would accept, so we agreed upon. It
then language changes, it will not.
They will get from Greek agreement to attend
in regard to similar to US etc. I produced some
papers each week. In view of the fact that a similar
agreement that there was more can be
interrelated objectives, to look & urge must
as to that not totally necessary to look.
Can't even visit E agrees to participate in
some of the other parts of the system & both
until that lower level is made, we must
give them more information & answer
themselves - in fact, E, S, D, anything

which helps process you

D- That much in our favor. As long as
doesn't become any position

K- An unqualified set of general principles could
be assessed. US can interpret general
treaty points our way.

Not asking you to accept this. We're informing
you. Don't need a formal govt position
unless they come back to us, and want
them for answers. If they do, we will send
in a formal answer from you

D- OK

K- Let me discuss proposal State initiative.

Basic idea is of to invite you & E to begin formal
negotiation which would be US auspices
(fixed conditions). Note that 242 neither accepts
nor rejects of final boundary as final

D- By private you mean secrets.

K- Yes, but w/ E & State can't be secret

D- Dismissed yet w/E?

K- They say no, but don't let us in

D- anything else

K- Very preliminary probably - some hotel dig floor,
dig hotel.

D - Sisco talked twice ~~that~~ he is preparing something
for me, talked just by endorsement

K - What said

Totall of demand 242, ~~January 1968~~ ~~Saig~~ + Saig
I got that it ~~is~~ but assessed in meeting
242 + financing

Two experiments either of us ~~mean~~ find notes made
Should but important that US has w/ Chinese interest
in 242, January, etc, but time S. is interested
to make 242 more ~~explicit~~, Rogers got it through
last minute, Saig called Saig in to receive
information

D - On UN Security Council there is one answer, in
component of State.

Govt of Brazil prefers to wait end of S.C. debate
Some could benefit or inhibit wait
Visiting as they go, I
arrange (same as you)

D - I gives to PM (Chas. Hill) State

Smith further with agencies.

Committee due any when \$ 61 not
expected, but has the result of
negotiations. This would be what

Change in policy which don't think or avoid make
present when US says that that when we say it.

K - Don't think either and I accept

Final of it that 242 can all our mid-point

D - So why prefer to our intention at all? Smith
is a hard to know

K - Commit promise. But if can get answer on
this I can do ours w/ plus.



Blank lined paper at the top of the page.

D- Yes, that's why you're getting out of the country
D- Yes, that's why you're getting out of the country
D- Yes, that's why you're getting out of the country

R- Don't know where you're going
D- Shakes her head in denial
D- Yes, that's why you're getting out of the country

R- Don't know where you're going
D- Shakes her head in denial
D- Yes, that's why you're getting out of the country

R- Don't know where you're going
D- Shakes her head in denial
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R- Don't know where you're going
D- Shakes her head in denial
D- Yes, that's why you're getting out of the country

R- Don't know where you're going
D- Shakes her head in denial
D- Yes, that's why you're getting out of the country