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Warsaw Pact Forces for Operations Against NATO

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
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


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Warsaw Pact Forces for Operations Against NATO

Summary

Ground Forces

The Pact ground forces use a system in which the peacetime structure nearly duplicates the wartime structure, but is manned at a reduced level. This provides a framework for rapid mobilization and movement. Universal conscription, contingency assignment of reservists to units and provision for mobilization of trucks, rail transport, and other services supports the peacetime posture.

Of some 60 Pact divisions in East Europe opposite the NATO Central Region, 33 do not require mobilization and could be immediately committed to combat. An additional 18 understrength divisions also could be committed immediately without mobilization if circumstances warranted but would only have limited offensive effectiveness and endurance. About 3 days (DIA believes less than a week), would be required to bring the entire force to full strength, with service support elements also fully manned.

The structure, equipment, and posture of Warsaw Pact ground forces accentuates initial combat and shock power. The divisions are heavily armored and have good tactical mobility, although logistic support is relatively austere.

Air Forces

Pact air forces in East Europe are composed of some 3800 aircraft, including those assigned to National Air Defense forces which would be used to

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provide defense of rear areas. About 2800 of these are located opposite the NATO Central Region. Performance limitations impair the capabilities of Pact tactical air forces for deep strikes. For this mission, the Pact relies mainly on the Soviet medium bombers based in the USSR, most of which are aging TU-16 Badgers.

Naval Forces

The western fleets of the Soviet Navy have a large force of attack submarines--some 210 units--with cruise missile strike systems on aircraft, surface ships, and submarines available for use in a conflict with NATO.

Soviet Navy general purpose forces employ defensive barriers with attack submarines, missile-equipped strike aircraft, and missile-equipped surface ships. The three fleets are widely separated geographically, which prevents rapid interfleet augmentation. Consequently, the Soviets rely on each fleet to perform its role autonomously.

Theater Nuclear Forces

Theater nuclear forces include a large tactical component stationed in the forward area with the bulk of the force--mainly MR/IRBMs and medium bombers--based inside the USSR. These forces are characterized by their reliance principally on missiles and secondarily on aircraft. We estimate a lack of tactical nuclear options at the low end of the spectrum, and absence of low yield systems with small CEP.

Trends in Forces and Doctrine

The Pact is increasing and modernizing tank forces and delivering new infantry combat vehicles. Divisional artillery has been strengthened in recent years, and there is evidence that self-propelled artillery

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may soon be introduced. Ground air defense systems are being increased and modernized, aircraft with better low-level attack and load-carrying capabilities are being introduced, and reconnaissance capabilities are being improved.

Some of these force trends are compatible with a continuation of long-standing concepts for theater nuclear war; others reflect acceptance of conventional warfare for an indefinite period. Soviet military theorists maintain that war with NATO would probably escalate to theater-wide nuclear warfare. Soviet doctrine, as reflected in Warsaw Pact exercises and outlined in the Soviet classified and open military press, rejects the concept of graduated nuclear warfare and indicates that any use of nuclear weapons by NATO would be met with a massive, theater-wide Pact nuclear response. Although there is a risk that the Soviets would in fact follow this doctrine, the Soviet political leadership would retain the authority to modify or tailor any Pact nuclear strike to less than massive or theater-wide proportions.

Issues in Assessing Pact Capabilities

The Standing Forces

The posture of the Pact forces and views expressed in Pact documents do not indicate serious contemplation of either side attacking without a period of tension sufficient to allow the forces in East Europe to complete mobilization and convert to a war footing. The normal posture of Pact forces does not provide them with a capability to undertake a large-scale offensive without a buildup of about three days (DIA believes less than a week). The forces stationed

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in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, however, could launch a conventional attack on short notice, but could achieve only limited objectives without reinforcement and more logistic support.

Strategic Redeployment

Analysis suggests that about 90 divisions could be deployed opposite the central region of NATO within 21 days. This estimate is based on an assumption of nearly ideal conditions for carrying out the redeployment. A key question is whether or not the Soviets would initiate a massive reinforcement prior to start of hostilities in view of the provocative nature of such an undertaking, and the concern they would have that such a move might invite a preemptive nuclear attack by NATO.

Operational Concepts

-- The Ground Campaign

The initial objective of the ground campaign is the rapid breakthrough of NATO's forward defenses. Massive preparatory fires would be followed by the massing of forces on chosen axes of advance. A breakthrough is to be followed by a high speed thrust of armor and mechanized infantry deep into NATO territory intended to isolate and neutralize major NATO force elements, delay NATO mobilization, and prevent reinforcement from the US.

The operation is seen as a two-punch campaign. The forward force is expected to achieve an objective deep in NATO territory--possibly the Rhine River. The second punch is to be delivered by the second echelon of the Pact, primarily by

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land armies brought forward from the western USSR. These armies are then expected to drive to the rapid conclusion of the European campaign.

-- The Air Campaign

In conventional war the air forces would be the principal means for destroying critical targets throughout the theater. The Pact has devised an elaborate air operation employing fighters and medium bombers to strike quickly before NATO air can fully respond or reinforce. Primary targets would be NATO air forces, nuclear systems, and command and control. This reflects the importance the Pact attaches to attaining air superiority in conventional warfare, and a desire to limit NATO's ability to escalate to nuclear war. It is also an attempt to compensate for the current limitations of Pact fighter and bomber aircraft.

In nuclear war, however, Pact tactical air forces would be of secondary importance to the tactical and strategic missile forces. The tactical air forces then would have the main function of providing air defense of the ground forces and delivering nuclear strikes on mobile targets in the more immediate combat zone.

-- The Naval Campaign

During a period of political tension which could lead to conflict with NATO we would expect to see the Soviet Navy curtail peacetime surface ship deployments. Combat-ready submarines and surface ships would get underway.

The principal objective of the Northern Fleet would be to defeat carriers and amphibious task forces in the Norwegian Sea, defend the sea

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approaches to the USSR and interdict logistics and reinforcements from the CONUS. The primary effort of the Baltic Fleet would be directed toward seizing control of the Baltic Sea and its approaches. It would also conduct amphibious operations in support of Pact ground forces. The Black Sea Fleet, augmented in the Mediterranean by submarines of the Northern Fleet, would attempt to neutralize NATO aircraft carriers and amphibious assault forces in the Mediterranean and would assist in operations aimed at seizing control of the Turkish Straits.

-- The Theater Nuclear Strike Plan

Pact planners proceed on the assumption that NATO, if confronted with the probability of defeat by conventional Pact forces, would resort to nuclear weapons. Furthermore, they presume that a limited nuclear response by the Pact to NATO's use of tactical nuclear weapons would offer the West the opportunity to deliver first a massive and decisive theater nuclear strike. The Soviets plan, therefore, that the initial Pact nuclear strike be theater-wide and include Soviet strategic nuclear forces based in the USSR as well as forward-based tactical systems. Some evidence is available which suggests that Pact planners feel that they would receive sufficient warning of NATO's preparations to use nuclear weapons in order to preempt.

Probably the overriding consideration in the Soviets' reluctance to entertain the notion of a graduated nuclear strategy is a fundamental skepticism that such a strategy is feasible. They may feel that once nuclear weapons are used, a psychological barrier is passed beyond which human behavior becomes unpredictable. They may also have doubts that the ability to discern between varying nuclear weapons yields and to determine what constitutes strategic or tactical targets exists outside a narrow group

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of specialists. Consequently, in the Soviet view the main distinction with respect to the employment of nuclear weapons appears to lie between use and nonuse.

Key Remaining Issues

The effectiveness of mobilized Pact divisions remains a key issue in assessing Pact forces. Present categorization systems are useful as a descriptive tool but are not suitable for assessing force combat effectiveness. Methodologies are under development in the intelligence community which will provide useful insights into the potential effectiveness of various Pact divisions. A question that has yet to be resolved, however, is what weight is to be attached to the findings of these methodologies in an overall assessment of the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance? Another question to be addressed is how are such difficult-to-measure factors as economic and psychological constraints, national objectives, political reliability, and threat perceptions to be weighed in assessing the balance?

Pact logistic capabilities appear comensurate with their doctrinal concepts of a short intensive campaign. The issues remain, however:

- Would logistics constrain the size and intensity of initial attack?
- Would logistics limit endurance of Pact forces in offensive operations?

Other key issues include:

- Capacity of the Pact to effectively employ masses of tanks and the effectiveness of NATO anti-tank systems.

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- Implications of success or failure of the initial Pact air operations for NATO and the Pact. Strengths and weaknesses of the Pact concept for air operations.
- Implications of nuclear war at sea.
- Capacity of the Soviet Navy to find and destroy carriers.
- Implications of Soviet sea lane interdiction.

All of these issues have been the subject of lengthy study, but the information or systems of analysis required for a commonly accepted resolution do not now exist.

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Warsaw Pact Forces for Operations Against NATO

I. Characteristics of the Warsaw Pact Forces Facing NATO

A. Thumbnail Overview of Forces

1. Ground Forces

The Warsaw Pact ground force structure is an adaptation of the continental European military system. Features are:

-- Universal conscription and large numbers of reservists with prior active-duty military training.

-- Large army force structure; most of structure active in peacetime but only a part fully manned.

-- Comprehensive mobilization system which, because of general Pact shortage of motor vehicles, includes trucks as well as men.

-- A transportation system designed to meet military requirements and a plan for rapid strategic deployment of mobilized forces to frontiers or combat zones.

The 26 Warsaw Pact divisions in East Germany do not require mobilization and could be immediately committed to combat operations, as could five Soviet divisions in Czechoslovakia and two in Poland.

Eight understrength divisions of the

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Czechoslovak first echelon and ten understrength divisions, including two small special purpose divisions, of the Polish first echelon also could be committed immediately without mobilization if the situation dictated. These ground force divisions would have limited effectiveness and endurance if so used. After about three days of mobilization (DIA believes less than a week), two additional East German reserve divisions would be activated, Czechoslovak forces would increase to 12 divisions and Polish forces to 15 divisions, all fully manned. Support forces also would be brought to wartime strength. These divisions would be at varying levels of initial combat effectiveness, depending mainly on the number of reservists in each division.

2. Air Forces

Pact air forces are composed of a large number of aircraft including those assigned to National Air Defense forces which would provide defense of rear areas.

Soviet tactical air units in East Europe are fully manned and equipped, and could be immediately committed to combat operations. East European air units also could be committed immediately, but initially would be missing some support personnel and would have limited capability for sustained operations.

3. Naval Forces

The Northern Fleet includes more than 130 general purpose submarines of varying age and capability, and a force of missile-equipped surface combatants and land-based strike aircraft. A principal objective would be to defend the sea approaches (Norwegian Sea) to the USSR, and to conduct submarine campaigns in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean. Amphibious assaults might also be conducted in support of operations in the NATO Northern Region.

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The Baltic Fleet submarine force consists of fewer than 30 medium- and short-range diesel submarines and a variety of missile-equipped and gun-armed surface combatants. Emphasis in this fleet is on a large force of cruise-missile equipped small combatants. The Baltic Fleet also has, with assistance from Polish and East German Navies, a modest amphibious assault capability. The primary mission of these forces would be to gain control of the Baltic and its approaches and to conduct operations in support of Pact ground forces in the NATO Northern and Central Regions. Additionally, submarine elements of the Baltic Fleet probably would contribute to any Northern Fleet interdiction campaign against the UK and the Low Countries.

The Black Sea Fleet has fewer than 30 submarines. It is the largest of all Soviet fleets in numbers of modern, major surface combatants, and has substantial numbers of missile equipped small combatants and land-based strike aircraft, and two brigades of naval infantry. The Black Sea Fleet provides almost all of the surface combatants in the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron. The primary mission of this force would be to neutralize NATO aircraft carriers and amphibious assault forces in the Mediterranean in order to establish naval supremacy along NATO's southern flank. Bulgarian forces would probably assist the USSR in attempting to gain control of the Turkish Straits.

Except in the Mediterranean, where the Soviets continuously maintain a large naval force, normal Soviet naval posture is typified by scattered deployments of two or three small task groups, seasonal exercises and training operations in local waters. The bulk of Soviet ships and submarines remain in port. Presumably most could get underway in a crisis. Ships previously idle for extended periods, including those in upkeep, would be of questionable effectiveness.

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4. Peripheral Strategic Attack Forces

The main theater nuclear strike force consists of the Soviet MRBM and IRBM forces based in the western USSR. This force of older SS-4 and SS-5 missiles has been declining in recent years. At the same time the Soviets have been deploying a new ICBM--the SS-11--some of which are believed to have a mission for strikes in the European theater. Soviet medium bombers have a primary responsibility for strikes in Eurasia.

Of the current Soviet SLBM force, at most five G-I and six G-II class diesel powered submarines are targeted for strikes in the European theater. Deployment patterns of the six nuclear powered H-class SSBNs indicate they are presently targeted against the United States. However, these submarines could be retargeted against NATO Europe with little impact on Soviet strategic capabilities against CONUS.

Soviet Peripheral Strategic Attack
Forces Operational Land-Based
Missile Launchers
1 July 1973

| | <u>Total Operational</u> | <u>Targeted Against Western Europe</u> |
|--------------------|------------------------------|--|
| Soft Multilauncher | | |
| SS-4 | 420 | 400 |
| SS-5 | 40 | 40 |
| Subtotal | <u>460</u> | <u>440</u> |
| Hard Multilauncher | | |
| SS-4 | 80 | 70 |
| SS-5 | 45 | 30 |
| Subtotal | <u>125</u> | <u>100</u> |
| Total | <u>585</u> | <u>540</u> |

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B. Salient Characteristics of Pact Forces

1. Ground Forces

The structure, equipment, and posture of Warsaw Pact ground forces accentuate initial combat and shock power and austere logistic support. Pact troop strength is concentrated mainly in heavily armored divisions* which are both smaller and more numerous than NATO divisions, while service support and logistic elements are relatively austere.

The divisional maneuver elements are comprised entirely of tanks and mechanized infantry elements. The divisions have high ratios of tanks to personnel, and when fully equipped have high tactical mobility. However, about one-third of the infantry in the Pact divisions--mainly those in the second echelon forces--would have to ride in trucks because of a shortage of APCs.

Pact ground forces also contain sizeable amounts of field artillery, including a considerable number of multiround rocket launchers (MRLs). Most of the field artillery, including all of the MRL units, is subordinated to line divisions rather than higher echelons.

Other than the MRL units and a small number of direct fire assault guns, Pact forces do not have self-propelled artillery. Development of fire control systems and techniques and munitions also lags behind NATO, and there is no evidence that Pact forces have been supplied with improved conventional munitions (ICMs).

* *Of the 20 divisions in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, for example, 10 are tank divisions. The 10 motorized rifle divisions of GSFG each have a tank regiment plus a tank battalion in each rifle regiment. In addition, GSFG has separate tank units subordinate to higher headquarters.*

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2. Air Forces

Most of the aircraft in Warsaw Pact tactical air forces were originally designed in the mid-Fifties as interceptors. They are generally characterized by short combat radius and small payload capacities--about 4,000 pounds or less. The primary emphasis in Pact air forces since the early Sixties has been on air defense capabilities.

With only a limited number of light bombers, Pact tactical air forces have no significant capabilities for deep strikes. For heavy payload strikes against targets as far west as the Rhine, for example, the Pact would have to rely mainly on the medium bombers based in the USSR, most of which are older model TU-16 Badgers.

Much the same is true of Pact capabilities for aerial reconnaissance, although during the past few years there have been considerable improvements in the capabilities for reconnaissance in the immediate battlefield area. Target acquisition capabilities for deep strikes are limited and rely mainly on subsonic aircraft based in the USSR.

3. Naval Forces

The most prominent characteristics of the Soviet Navy are the large force of attack submarines--some 210 units--and the cruise missile strike systems for use on aircraft, surface ships, and submarines.

New Soviet ships and submarines with high weapons density are continually being introduced into the fleet to offset the anticipated retirement of a large number of older, less capable units.

Soviet Naval Aviation is almost exclusively land based, thus air support to the fleet is sharply reduced beyond range of these aircraft. The deployment of the USSR's first aircraft carrier by 1976 will be a step towards alleviating this limitation.

Soviet amphibious units are designed for short range raids and are not suitable for major amphibious operations.

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The three western fleets are hampered by their division among three widely separated locations, two of which--the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets--are susceptible to blocked straits.

Soviet ASW forces have no significant capability for defending an area or a sea lane from submarines and would even be hard pressed to defend themselves from submarine attack on the high seas.

4. Theater Nuclear Forces

Theater nuclear forces include a large tactical component stationed in the forward area with the bulk of the force--mainly MR/IRBMs and medium bombers--based inside the USSR. These forces are characterized by a lack of tactical nuclear options at the low end of limited nuclear war spectrum and absence of low yield systems with small CEP. The Pact, for example, has not deployed nuclear artillery, and the FROG, which has the lowest yield and smallest CEP of any nuclear delivery system in the ground forces, has warheads with yields estimated as low as [redacted] and an estimated CEP of [redacted] meters.

C. Trends in Forces and Doctrine

There are some indications that the Pact is currently altering its force structure and perhaps re-evaluating some aspects of its doctrine. It is too early to draw conclusions from observed changes. The following trends, however, are noted:

1. Force Trends

The Soviets are increasing the number of tanks in motorized rifle divisions and are delivering new Infantry Combat Vehicles, the latest of which, the BMP, is a tracked amphibious vehicle armed with anti-tank guided missiles and a 73 mm gun firing a rocket assisted round.

Since about 1967 the Pact has increased the artillery firepower of its divisions by as much as 50 percent and there is evidence that

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self-propelled artillery may soon be introduced.

The Soviets are increasing and modernizing their ground force air defense systems. The most notable developments have been the deployment of the ZSU-23/4 rapid fire antiaircraft gun and the introduction of mobile SAM systems at army and division level for defense against low, medium, and high altitude attack. In addition, a small, man-portable SAM designed for use against aircraft flying at low altitude has been in production since at least 1967. The system has been used in Vietnam and Egypt and is probably with Soviet forces in the USSR or Eastern Europe.

Soviet tactical air units are now being equipped with the new MIG-23 Flogger, a relatively light swing-wing fighter which has a good low altitude performance capability and can be used for both air defense and ground attack. A new longer-range tactical strike aircraft similar in size and configuration to the US F-111 also is being produced and should enter service soon.

In recent years, Soviet reconnaissance units have received late model aircraft. These are equipped with more advanced sensor devices than are the older models and some are capable of attack as well as reconnaissance. A small number of Mach 3 Foxbat reconnaissance aircraft also have been introduced.

Introduction of the Backfire, a swing-wing bomber capable of supersonic speeds at low altitude, will improve the medium bomber force's ability to penetrate NATO air defenses and extend the strike range of the force at lower altitudes.

Soviet logistical transport has been

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improved at tactical levels with the replacement of older vehicles with newer vehicles with greater lift capacities. In addition, the number of vehicles assigned to motor transport units has increased.

2. Doctrinal Trends

Implications of Force Trends for Doctrine

-- Some force trends, such as those in the tank and motorized infantry force, indicate continuation of long-standing concepts for blitzkrieg.

-- Others, such as the increased field artillery and better ground attack aircraft, reflect trend toward acceptance of a conventional war phase, possibly as a result of NATO's declared doctrine of flexible response.

-- Logistic transport improvements are partly a reflection of artillery and armor increases, which entail a greater ammunition requirement but may also reflect requirement for greater logistical endurance.

-- Air defense improvements, including the construction of shelters, mainly reflect sensitivity to the Western air threat and reaction to the demonstrated effectiveness of conventional air power in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

-- The peripheral strike force is being provided greater flexibility in targeting and reduced vulnerability by the deployment of the SS-11 and the expected introduction of the Backfire.

Soviet doctrinal developments indicate:

-- The declared doctrinal concept that

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war with NATO is likely to escalate to theater nuclear war is still in effect and the forces continue to be configured for optimum efficiency in the nuclear environment, but,

-- The contingency of conventional war appears to be gaining in importance and the force is being modified accordingly. Further, if a conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact begins without the use of nuclear weapons, the Soviets would probably attempt to bring it to a conclusion using conventional means only.

II. Issues in Assessing Pact Capabilities

A. Capabilities of the Standing Forces

The likelihood of Pact initiation of hostilities without prior buildup, and the capabilities of the standing forces should such an event occur, constitute major issues in the overall assessment of Pact military capabilities. Because of their normal day-to-day readiness and posture, Pact forces would require some period of mobilization prior to undertaking a sustained offensive. The forces in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, however, could launch a conventional attack on short notice but probably could not achieve more than limited objectives.

The overall military posture of the Pact forces and the plans and views expressed in Pact military documents do not indicate serious contemplation of either side attacking without at least some buildup. Pact documents and exercise scenarios during the past several years usually assume a period of tension sufficient to allow the Pact forces in East Europe to complete mobilization

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and convert to a war footing. Pact planners appear to deal with surprise attack only from the standpoint of NATO nuclear strike, and even then it is addressed mainly as a "worst case" planning hypothesis.

B. Pact Mobilization Capability

The goal of Pact mobilization is the conversion of military and economic resources required by the armed forces to a war footing in the shortest possible time.

A study of Pact mobilization procedures indicates that Pact forces requiring mobilization are expected to be fully expanded within 24 hours. Evidence available on practice mobilizations of Soviet divisions, including some in cadre status, suggests that within about three days after start of mobilization most Soviet forces in the western USSR would be available for movement. Pact ground forces have been specifically structured for rapid expansion. The required stocks of combat equipment and supplies and the additional trained manpower are available.

Although designed primarily for amassing and concentrating forces in the shortest possible time, the Pact mobilization system can also handle a wide range of other options short of full mobilization.

According to Pact documents   the Pact has mobilization plans for both overt and covert contingencies. Covert mobilization of selected elements of the armed forces can be carried out through use of the armed-forces-wide communications networks belonging to each country's Ministry of National Defense and tested courier systems.

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The mobilization of air forces can be carried out in a similar fashion using the same mobilization system. Tactical air units, which are generally manned and equipped at higher levels than are ground forces units and have lesser mobilization requirements, could probably mobilize a greater proportion of their units secretly.

The Soviet Navy probably does not rely on mobilization to achieve required force levels for the initial period of war or any period of tension preceding it. The Soviets do, however, have some ships laid up in some form of preservation for which crews might be mobilized. The ships, however, are of older classes and would probably require several months before they could be usefully committed to combat.

Little information is available on Pact intentions to generate forces over and above those of the identified force structure. The Warsaw Pact countries have enough reservists to mobilize additional combat divisions. If, during an unhindered general mobilization, the Pact perceived a requirement to prepare for protracted conflict, their ground force generation capabilities (especially in the Soviet Union) would be constrained principally by the availability of major items of combat and logistic equipment. Some Pact countries are known to have some combat equipment in depot storage, much of it obsolete. Production estimates indicate that no Pact country could equip many additional divisions over the short term. Additional forces, therefore, would probably be lightly equipped, primarily infantry-type units. Although the Pact maintains a large number of training aircraft and old aircraft in storage, there is no evidence of a supply of reserve pilots and technicians to generate new units.

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Issue:

-- The principal issue in examining Pact mobilization capabilities centers not on the Pact's capacity to expand and assemble existing under-strength units, or to generate additional units, but on the effectiveness of the forces mobilized. The emphasis in Pact mobilization planning is on the rapidity with which units can be assembled and made ready for either movement or commitment to battle. Pact planners do not contemplate large-scale retraining to improve the combat proficiency of reservists once mobilization is initiated. The qualitative status of individual elements or of entire units, therefore, is not a consideration in Pact standards for determining a unit's readiness for deployment. Units are intended to be committed to combat according to a schedule or as operational need dictates--regardless of qualitative shortcomings that would detract from their effectiveness.

C. Strategic Redeployment

Assessments of Pact reinforcement capabilities are mainly movement calculations based on estimated capabilities of transport systems and are dependent on assumptions.



Analysis to date suggests that approximately 90 divisions could be deployed opposite the NATO Central Region within 21 days. This estimate is based on a number of critical assumptions, including:

- The completion of mobilization and reinforcement prior to the initiation of hostilities
- mobilization and reinforcement planned

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[REDACTED]

at maximum speed, and with maximum reasonable utilization of capacity of facilities

- no efforts toward concealment attempted
- use of the most appropriate means and route of movement
- route capacity not limited by nonmilitary traffic, outages, or by the extent of the military requirement
- ideal operating conditions with no interference by NATO forces

The timing of strategic redeployment of Soviet forces from the western USSR is dependent on three factors: warning, the rapidity of mobilization, and the schedule for their commitment.

Pact documents, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] indicate that Pact planners expect that a period of tension would precede any outbreak of hostilities. Pact planners appear to rely heavily on a period of tension to provide them with the necessary time to mobilize their forces and put their nations on a war footing.

Most units in the western USSR would be ready for movement within about three days of the start of mobilization. Where the forces would be deployed once they were brought forward is unknown. Additional time would be required to complete the organization of the units into armies and fronts in the forward area and to prepare for coordinated offensive operations.

The manner in which large scale redeployments are to be carried out has been the subject of much

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debate among Soviet military strategists. Their chief concern has been to be able to do so while minimizing potential losses from NATO preemptive strikes.



Issues:

-- A key issue with respect to strategic re-deployment is how long it would take to accomplish such a movement under less than optimum conditions such as transportation bottlenecks and NATO interdiction strikes.

-- Another issue of major concern is whether or not the Soviets would initiate a massive reinforcement prior to start of hostilities in view of the provocative nature of such an undertaking, and the concern they would have that such a move might invite a preemptive nuclear attack by NATO.

D. The Pattern and Sequence of the Buildup of Naval Forces at Sea

Norwegian Sea


  we would expect to see the deployment of intelligence collection vessels into the southern Norwegian Sea and the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap area at the beginning of a period of political tension. At about the same time submarine reconnaissance patrols would be established in the same regions, as well as the central and northern part of the Norwegian Sea. Soviet naval aircraft would begin daylight reconnaissance flights over the Norwegian Sea and Gap areas.

If the tension continued to build, the Soviets would position more submarines and surface ships in the Norwegian Sea--and probably a few to the

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south--to establish an echeloned reconnaissance and strike network, as seen in major fleet exercises.

Baltic Sea

The Soviets would probably sortie some of their major combatants from the Baltic Sea. With the smaller cruise missile and ASW ships, they would prepare to neutralize West European submarine and destroyer forces.

Mediterranean Sea

The Soviets apparently maintain a minimum war-fighting naval force in the Mediterranean during peacetime. With the onset of tension, reinforcement for surface ships and auxiliaries would come from the Black Sea Fleet and for submarines from the Northern Fleet.



North Atlantic

Early warning forces consisting of intelligence ships and submarines would probably be positioned off Gibraltar, west of the UK, and in the vicinity of the Azores. Long range reconnaissance flights would extend into the northern North Atlantic, and probably along the eastern US coast, with Cuba as the turn-around point.

Soviet naval units based in the Pacific probably would be held there in the event of NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional war in Europe. The Soviets would increase surveillance operations in the Pacific maritime approaches and establish barriers in the three major straits leading into the Sea of Japan. Soviet attack submarines would take up surveillance patrols off the Soviet coast and along the major Pacific sea lanes. A few of the

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some 80 naval strike aircraft based in the Far East could be moved to the European area, but Moscow would want to retain most of these aircraft as well as the reconnaissance and ASW units in the Pacific. Moscow probably would also improve its strategic posture by deploying additional ballistic missile submarines off the US coast.

E. Logistics Capabilities

Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Stocks in the Forward Area

Estimates of levels of ammunition stocks in the forward area when measured against estimated Pact requirements suggest there are sufficient stocks on hand for about 20 days (DIA believes 30 days), of combat during a high-intensity, i.e., full scale conventional campaign with NATO. During a less intensive campaign these stocks would be sufficient for about 50 days of combat.


Because of major uncertainties inherent in such analysis, however, this judgment--based on a comparison of estimated stocks with estimated requirements--should be viewed only as a rough approximation. Estimates of logistic requirements and consumption rates are heavily dependent on assumptions regarding the different types of operations that could be undertaken, and the different intensities of combat that would be encountered.

Logistic Transport

Warsaw Pact logistic doctrine describes a modern logistic system as consisting of truck-borne stores and vehicular transport to serve force needs from the army level down. To the rear of the

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army level stores, Pact planners see the combined use of road and rail to serve logistic transport links.

Pact motor transport elements are not sufficient to support the all-mobile stock and transport system stated as a goal in Soviet doctrine. Pact logistic writings reflect recognition of the inadequacy of the military vehicular inventory alone to satisfy their potential needs in a war with NATO. They indicate that until such time as the goal of an all vehicular logistic transport system is met, measures would be taken to incorporate railroad, barge transport, and forward storage into various parts of the system.

Stocks for Pact Air Forces in East Germany

Most Soviet air supplies in East Germany are stored in depots located either on the airfields or nearby. Calculations of the capacity of these facilities indicate that there probably are sufficient stocks of ordnance and POL available to support the intensive air campaign Pact planners envision for a war against NATO. This includes allowance for a sizeable augmentation of the air forces now in East Germany by deploying tactical aircraft forward from Poland and the western USSR.

Issues:

-- To what extent would logistics constrain the size and intensity of initial attack without logistical buildup?

-- What is the functional relationship between logistics endurance time and logistical buildup? How many months buildup, for example, is required per week of additional endurance?

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-- Would logistics limit endurance of Pact forces in offensive operations?

F. Combat Effectiveness

The approximately 90 divisions the Soviets and their allies plan to have ready for deployment opposite the NATO Center Region will vary considerably in their potential combat effectiveness immediately after mobilization. Less than half of these divisions, for example, are maintained at full combat strength during peacetime. Most would be manned by a high proportion of reservists and while many of these would have served recently, some would not have seen active duty in 20 to 30 years and would have had no recent refresher training.

Categorization systems currently in use in the intelligence community reflect differences only in the peacetime status of Pact divisions and do not serve as useful indicators of potential combat effectiveness. Both CIA and DIA, therefore, have sought to develop methodologies for rating the potential effectiveness of Warsaw Pact divisions. The methodologies of both agencies are designed to measure the relative, rather than absolute, combat effectiveness of various Pact divisions by comparing them against a single standard--a Soviet division judged to be fully trained and at full strength.

Issues:

-- Although these methodologies will provide useful insights into aspects of force effectiveness measurement, means are not yet available to determine the weight to be attached to their findings as well as to such less measurable factors as economic and psychological constraints, national objectives, political reliability, and threat perceptions in overall assessments of the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance.

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G. Operational Concepts

1. The Ground Campaign

Soviet operational concepts for the postulated ground campaign in Europe are the product of an evolutionary process. Combining the lessons of their World War II experience with their perceptions of current Western forces and doctrine, the Soviets have designed a Warsaw Pact ground campaign concept which may be characterized as follows:


The initial Pact objective--regardless of how the war may start or of the opening scenario--is the rapid breakthrough of whatever initial defenses NATO may have erected. In classic Soviet fashion, leaning heavily on the experiences and successes of WW II, the breakthrough effort will be preceded by massive preparatory fires delivered throughout the depths of NATO defenses and by the massing of overwhelming force and shockpower on the chosen axes of advance. All of these efforts are directed toward accomplishing the breakthrough of NATO forward defenses and the neutralization of forces most detrimental to the campaign.

The breakthrough in the Pact ground campaign constitutes the vital first step. It is preliminary to a high speed thrust of armor and mechanized infantry forces to achieve key objectives deep in NATO territory; to isolate and neutralize major NATO force elements; and to delay mobilization if possible and to prevent reinforcement of NATO by forces from the continental US. The ground campaign, whether nuclear or conventional, is seen by the Soviets as being of short duration and not a prolonged grinding battle. The speed and tempo of the campaign and the weight and shockpower of the force committed are the key considerations. Armored columns accompanied and supported by massed artillery and mobile logistics

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are expected to drive to objectives rapidly.

Forces initially in the forward area opposite NATO's central region make up the initial punch of what is seen to be an essentially two-punch campaign. This forward force is expected to rapidly achieve an initial objective deep in NATO territory. Some evidence suggests that this objective may be a line generally defined by the Rhine River.

The second punch is to be provided by the second echelon of the Warsaw Pact, primarily the land armies mobilized and brought forward from the western USSR. These armies with or without the remnants of the forward echelon are expected by the Soviets to drive to the rapid conclusion of the European campaign.

The conclusion of the European campaign has never been discussed or defined by Pact sources. It could be expressed geographically as the English Channel. It may simply be seen to conclude at that point in time when hostilities end and negotiations begin. Possibly, the campaign end is perceived in Soviet planning as that point in war at which the theater campaign is overshadowed by escalation of the conflict to intercontinental nuclear war.

2. The Air Campaign

Under conventional war planning the air forces become the principal means for destroying critical targets throughout the theater. Primary objectives of the Pact air forces during conventional warfare in Europe would be to destroy the NATO air forces, NATO nuclear delivery systems and stockpiles, and disrupt NATO command and control. This is partly a reflection of Pact sensitivity to the threat posed by NATO's tactical strike aircraft, and the importance the Pact attaches to air superiority in conventional warfare, as well as a desire to limit NATO's capability to

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escalate the conflict to nuclear war. Suppression of NATO air defenses by tactical aircraft is considered to be a prerequisite, because--due to the limited range and payload capabilities of current Frontal Aviation aircraft--the Pact is forced to rely on conventionally armed medium bombers for the major strike on NATO air bases.

About one third of the LRA medium bombers and one fourth of the tactical attack aircraft would be withheld from the conventional attacks in readiness to deliver nuclear strikes should the conflict escalate.

In nuclear war, however, the offensive role of Pact tactical air forces is of distinctly secondary importance to the strategic and tactical missile forces. In nuclear war, the main functions of the tactical air forces are to provide air defense of the ground forces, and deliver nuclear strikes on mobile targets in the more immediate combat zone. Pact planning calls for the air forces to disperse to numerous auxiliary bases to limit the destruction of air units from NATO nuclear attack.

3. Naval Campaigns

Norwegian Sea-Barents Sea Operations

The objective of forces deployed to the Norwegian Sea is to protect the open path to the Barents Sea. Cruise missile equipped forces arrayed from the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap to North Cape would strike intruding task forces simultaneously with strikes in the Baltic and Mediterranean and with the air strikes by Warsaw Pact tactical air forces. Antisubmarine surveillance will probably be the responsibility of submarine barriers north and south of the Gap while aircraft, surface ships, and other submarines constitute the weapons delivery forces.

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After the initiation of hostilities some of these forces would move south to attack carrier task forces in the eastern Atlantic. Once the immediate carrier threat was eliminated, submarines from the Northern Fleet would be assigned interdiction roles.

The Northern Fleet amphibious forces would conduct small raids against key targets in Norway in support of Warsaw Pact ground forces in the NATO northern region.

Baltic Sea Operations

After strikes against the West European Navies, Soviet, Polish, and East German amphibious forces would combine in an effort to capture strategic points in the Danish Straits.

North Atlantic Operations


After the carrier strike phase, surveillance and interdiction forces would move from the Norwegian and Mediterranean Seas into the North Atlantic to interdict resupply and fleet reinforcement movements. Some of the force would soon be affected by limitations of ordnance, with individual units returning to base for resupply.

Mediterranean-Black Sea Operations

As tension builds prior to hostilities, the concern of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean will be location of all Sixth Fleet major combatants-- particularly aircraft carriers. Soviet submarines would probably take barrier stations for early warning against both submarine and surface ships moving to the eastern Mediterranean. Surface ships would stalk NATO carriers, and other heavy surface ships, to relay current tactical information to command authorities.

With the initiation of hostilities, surface ships, submarines, and possibly aircraft, would attack the carrier forces with cruise missiles. The attack force would select other major surface combatants and amphibious units for secondary strikes. Soviet and Bulgarian amphibious forces would assist the ground forces in attempting to take the Turkish Straits.

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4. The Theater Nuclear Strike Plan

The Soviets apparently do not plan to follow a series of controlled transitional steps from conventional warfare through strikes with nuclear weapons of increasingly greater numbers or yield to general nuclear war. They believe that nuclear warfare in Europe could not be restricted to the use of tactical nuclear weapons only and that a limited nuclear response by the Pact to NATO's use of tactical nuclear weapons would offer the West the opportunity to deliver first a massive and decisive strategic nuclear strike. The evidence available suggests, therefore, that the initial Pact nuclear strike would be theater-wide and include Soviet strategic nuclear forces based in the USSR as well as forward-based tactical systems. The Soviets do not now have a good capability for graduated or flexible response to any NATO nuclear initiative at a low level--for example, with the use of atomic demolition munitions or low-yield nuclear artillery projectiles.

Soviet and Pact strategists foresee the shift to nuclear weapons as most likely if:

- NATO has lost the initiative and lost important areas.
- NATO's main groupings have been destroyed.
- NATO counteroperations are weak.
- NATO perceives that conditions are favorable for rapid attacks by Pact troops deep into its own territory.

In sum, Pact strategists apparently plan on the basis that NATO, if confronted with the probability of defeat by conventional Pact forces,

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would resort to nuclear weapons. They have undoubtedly been encouraged in this view by the continued stress on nuclear escalation in NATO doctrine and exercises. Beating NATO to the nuclear punch, therefore, is not only regarded as militarily advantageous but also as potentially decisive. On the other hand, they may also consider that the initial use by NATO of tactical nuclear weapons may be constrained by political considerations. DIA believes that with the present imbalance of conventional forces in Europe the Soviets almost certainly would not initiate the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict between NATO and the Pact except possibly for preemption if they are convinced that NATO intends to employ such weapons. They would prefer to bring such a conflict to a successful conclusion by conventional means alone. Nevertheless, they will maintain and perhaps improve their theater nuclear capabilities as a deterrent to the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons by NATO.

Issues:

Soviet Response to NATO Use of Nuclear Weapons -- If NATO uses tactical nuclear weapons against Warsaw Pact forces in Europe there is a risk that the Soviets would, in fact, follow the doctrine outlined in their exercises and respond with a massive theater-wide nuclear strike. It must be remembered, however, that this doctrine, whatever its military value, is subject to review and approval by the political leadership. In fact, only the leadership can make the decision to launch such a strike. Nevertheless, Soviet military doctrine, as perceived from analysis of classified documents and military exercises, and public declaratory policy continue to reject the concept of graduated nuclear warfare.

The public stance of Soviet officials on such a strategy is well known and may be intended at least partially for political effect. It can reasonably be argued, however, that the Soviet reluctance to entertain the notion of graduated nuclear warfare reflects a deep-seated skepticism that such a strategy would produce the restrained response it is designed to elicit.

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Among possible Soviet political motives for rejecting the concept of a graduated nuclear strategy may simply be a reluctance to ascribe any validity to what is widely known to be NATO's strategy for war in Europe. By the same token, rejecting the concept of even the limited use of nuclear weapons may be intended to reinforce the "unthinkability" of nuclear warfare. Beyond these considerations may be a calculated effort to make a decision by NATO to introduce nuclear weapons into a conflict all the more onerous.

Fear of raising doubts about the credibility of the Soviet nuclear umbrella for Eastern Europe may also account for the Soviet reluctance to entertain the notion of gradual nuclear escalation. Soviet endorsement of such a policy could raise suspicions in Warsaw Pact councils that the USSR was opting for a strategy that would avoid devastation of its own territory if war broke out in Europe. Similar considerations were a factor in France's decision to reexamine its role within NATO and develop its own nuclear deterrent.

Another possible explanation for the Soviet attitude toward a graduated nuclear strategy may hinge on the difficulty of reconciling the notion of restraint, which is implicit in such a strategy, with the destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Discourses by Soviet military theorists on the nature of nuclear wars generally stress the uncompromising manner in which they will be fought and suggest that their outcomes will not be decided short of the destruction of one of the opposing sides. Furthermore, the Soviet definition of what would constitute targets in a nuclear war contains little indication that restraint would be practiced. Targets are said to be any installation that would contribute to an enemy's ability to fight, a definition which could include nearly all significant population centers since their destruction would have a serious demoralizing effect.

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Probably the overriding consideration in the Soviet stand on nuclear escalation is a fundamental skepticism that a graduated nuclear strategy is feasible. Given the general lack of experience among nations in nuclear warfare, the Soviets may feel that once nuclear weapons are used, even on a limited scale, a psychological barrier is crossed beyond which human behavior becomes unpredictable. The Soviets may feel that the pressures on political leaders from the military and possibly the general public to respond forcefully and without restraint would likely be the same regardless of the weight of an aggressor's attack or the targeting concepts he employed.

The Soviets apparently also believe that the requisites for implementing a graduated nuclear strategy--the ability to discern between varying nuclear weapons yields and to determine what constitutes a strategic or tactical target--are too esoteric to be appreciated outside a narrow group of specialists. In a commentary on nuclear escalation in the July 1969 issue of the Soviet classified journal Military Thought, Major General Zemskov, its editor in chief, cited various Western testimony which he said "convincingly" demonstrated the unreality of such a strategy. In one instance Zemskov referred specifically to a British press article of early 1969 which argued that the only valid distinction with respect to nuclear weapons was between their use and nonuse. Targeting Warsaw with a tactical rather than strategic nuclear weapon, the article contended, is a distinction that would be lost on the Poles.

Finally, there is probably a belief in Moscow that a graduated, or limited, nuclear strategy does not have any validity in the European context. In another commentary on nuclear escalation in an earlier issue of Military Thought, Army General S. Ivanov professed that for the thickly populated

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regions of Europe, the employment of only tactical nuclear weapons will also spell complete catastrophe. Ivanov, who is commandant of the Soviet general staff academy, also characterized another aspect of graduated nuclear strategy--use of selected nuclear strikes to demonstrate resolve--as a concept that is valid only in a theoretical sense.

Feasibility of Soviet Preemptive Strike --

Some evidence is available which suggests that Pact planners feel they would receive timely warning of NATO's preparations to use nuclear weapons. During NATO exercises, the Pact has intercepted requests by NATO commanders for permission to use nuclear weapons, has monitored authorizations releasing them for use, and has identified the delivery systems to be used. These intelligence capabilities may attest to Pact confidence in the ability to preempt NATO since such indicators would be essential to any calculation of the odds for successfully executing a preemptive strategy.

The Questions of the Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea --

The issue is whether the Soviets would restrict the use of tactical nuclear weapons to the sea war without introducing them into the ground war. The Soviets could introduce tactical nuclear weapons into naval combat at almost any stage. Information on Soviet planning in this contingency is lacking.

Soviet Response to Advanced Buildup of Western Europe --

Western nations might commence the buildup of NATO forces faster and earlier than anticipated by the Soviets. The Soviets, under these circumstances, might question their plans for a quick and decisive thrust against NATO. The Soviets could respond with a blockade or an interdiction campaign to prevent materiel from reaching Europe, to preserve the pre-crisis Soviet advantage. Alternatively, the Soviets could seize the initiative by beginning ground, air, and naval operations simultaneously, before the advantage shifted.

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The Interdiction of Oil Shipping from the Persian Gulf -- During NATO-Warsaw Pact hostilities, supplies for Western Europe would be threatened by Soviet submarines. The issue is whether the Soviets would allocate a part of their force to undertake a major effort to interdict the flow of crude oil from the Persian Gulf.

Other Issues:


-- Capacity of Pact to effectively employ masses of tanks and the vulnerability of Pact tanks to NATO anti-tank systems. If NATO succeeded in blunting Pact armored thrusts, would the Pact resort to first use of nuclear weapons to achieve breakthroughs or maintain the tempo and momentum of the campaign?

-- Implications of success or failure of the initial Pact air operations for NATO. If the air operation failed, would the Pact escalate immediately to theater wide nuclear warfare?


-- To what extent is the vulnerability of NATO nuclear forces a consideration in Pact doctrine for theater nuclear warfare? What would be the effect on this doctrine if NATO reduced the vulnerability of its tactical nuclear forces?

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V. TABLES

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A. Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Divisions

| <u>Opposite NATO Center Region</u> | <u>Divisions</u> | | | | | <u>Brigades</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|------------|------------|-------------|-----------------|----------------|
| | <u>In Eastern Europe</u> | <u>Tank</u> | <u>MRD</u> | <u>ABN</u> | <u>ASLD</u> | <u>RES</u> | <u>Div/Bde</u> |
| <u>Stationed Soviet</u> | | | | | | | |
| East Germany | 10 | 10 | | | | | 20 |
| Poland | 2 | | | | | | 2 |
| Czechoslovakia | 2 | 3 | | | | | 5 |
| Subtotal | 14 | 13 | | | | | 27 |
| <u>Indigenous</u> | | | | | | | |
| East Germany | 2 | 4 | | | 2 | | 8 |
| Poland | 5 | 8 | 1 | 1 | | | 15 |
| Czechoslovakia | 5 | 5 | | | 2 | | 12 |
| Subtotal | 12 | 17 | 1 | 1 | 4 | | 35 |
| Total in Eastern Europe | 26 | 30 | 1 | 1 | 4 | | 62 |
| <u>In Western USSR</u> | | | | | | | |
| Baltic MD | 3 | 3 | 1 | | | | 7 |
| Belorussian MD | 8 | 2 | | | | | 10 |
| Carpathian MD | 3 | 8 | 1 | | | | 12 |
| Subtotal | 14 | 13 | 2 | | | | 29 |
| Total Opposite Center Region | 40 | 43 | 3 | 1 | 4 | | 91 |
| <u>Opposite NATO Northern Flank</u> | | | | | | | |
| Leningrad MD | 2 | 6 | 1 | | | | 9 |
| Total Opposite Northern Flank | 2 | 6 | 1 | | | | 9 |
| <u>Opposite NATO Southern Flank</u> | | | | | | | |
| <u>In Eastern Europe</u> | | | | | | | |
| <u>Stationed Soviet</u> | | | | | | | |
| Hungary | (1)2 | 2 | | | | | (3)4 |
| Bulgaria | | | | | | | |
| Romania | | | | | | | |
| Subtotal | (1)2 | 2 | | | | | (3)4 |
| <u>Indigenous</u> | | | | | | | |
| Hungary | 2 | 4 | | | | | 6 |
| Bulgaria | | (8)6 | | | (3)5 | 5 | 11/5 |
| Romania | 2 | 8 | | | | | 10 |
| Subtotal | 4 | (20)18 | | | (3)5 | 5 | 27/5 |
| <u>In Southwestern USSR</u> | | | | | | | |
| Odessa MD | 1 | 5 | 1 | | | | 7 |
| Transcaucasus MD | (1) | (10)11 | 1 | | | | 12 |
| North Caucasus MD | (1) | (5)6 | | | | | 6 |
| Subtotal | (3)1 | (20)22 | 2 | | | | 25 |
| Total Opposite Southern Flank | (8)7 | 42 | 2 | | (3)5 | 5 | (55/5)56/5 |
| <u>Soviet Strategic Reserves</u> | | | | | | | |
| Kiev MD | 6 | 4 | | | | | 10 |
| Moscow MD | 2 | 3 | 1 | | | | 6 |
| Ural MD | 1 | 2 | | | | | 3 |
| Volga MD | | 3 | | | | | 3 |
| Total Strategic Reserves | 9 | 12 | 1 | | | | 22 |

Key: TD - Tank Division
 MRD - Motorized Rifle Division
 ABND - Airborne Division (all Airborne divisions are strategic reserve subordinate to Ministry of Defense)

RES - Reserve Division
 Activated on M-Day
 BDE - Brigade
 MD - Military District
 ASLD - Assault Landing Division

Data in parentheses indicate DIA's differences with current CIA estimates.

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6. WARSAW PACT AIR FORCES IN EAST EUROPE

| | <u>East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia</u> | | <u>Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania</u> | | <u>Total</u> |
|-----------------------------|---|-------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------|--------------|
| | <u>Soviet</u> | <u>Indigenous</u> | <u>Soviet</u> | <u>Indigenous</u> | |
| <u>Tactical Air Forces</u> | | | | | |
| Fighter | 504(600) | 216(220) | 108(120) | 72(80) | 900(1020) |
| Ftr./Bmr. | 324(400) | 324(360) | 36(40) | 72(80) | 756(880) |
| Lt. Bmr. | 0 | 30(30) | 60(65) | 0 | 90(95) |
| Recco. | 158(240) | 111(150) | 12(15) | 30(50) | 311(455) |
| TOTAL TAC | 986(1240) | 681(760) | 216(240) | 174(210) | 2057(2450) |
| <u>National Air Defense</u> | | | | | |
| <u>Interceptors</u> | | 724(810) | | 408(490) | 1132(1300) |
| TOTAL AIRCRAFT | 986(1240) | 1402(1570) | 210(240) | 582(700) | 3163(3750) |

* Numbers in parentheses indicate total combat aircraft estimated to be operationally available (OA) with Pact combat air units. They include aircraft with these units in excess of the estimated standard unit equipment (UE) aircraft shown by the numbers not in parentheses. The extra aircraft are believed to be intended to provide ready replacements for wartime losses as well as serving to replace aircraft temporarily inactive due to maintenance or repair.

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C, SOVIET TACTICAL AND LONG RANGE AIR FORCES WEST OF THE URALS

| | <u>Baltic</u> | <u>Belorussia</u> | <u>Carpathia</u> | <u>Odessa</u> | <u>Transcaucasus</u> | <u>Kiev</u> | <u>Leningrad</u> | <u>Moscow</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|----------------------------|---------------|-------------------|------------------|---------------|----------------------|-------------|------------------|---------------|--------------|
| <u>Tactical Air Forces</u> | | | | | | | | | |
| Fighter | 72(80) | 120(140) | 72(80) | 108(120) | 108(120) | 72(80) | 0(0) | 108(150) | 660(735) |
| Ftr./Bmr. | 36(40) | 108(120) | 108(120) | 36(40) | 36(40) | 0(0) | 72(80) | 36(40) | 432(480) |
| Lt. Bmr. | 90(100) | 0(0) | 60(70) | 0(0) | 30(30) | 0(0) | 10(10) | 0(0) | 190(210) |
| Pece. | 30(45) | 30(30) | 46(50) | 63(65) | 62(70) | 0(0) | 46(50) | 62(65) | 339(375) |
| TOTAL TAP | 228(265) | 258(290) | 286(320) | 207(225) | 236(260) | 72(80) | 128(140) | 206(220) | 1621(1800) |

| <u>Long Range Air Force</u> | <u>Northwest Bomber Command</u> | <u>Southwest Bomber Command</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------|
| Medium Bombers | 350 | 200 | 550 |

* Numbers in parentheses indicate total combat aircraft estimated to be operationally available (OA) with Pact combat air units. They include aircraft with these units in excess of the estimated standard unit equipment (UE) aircraft shown by the numbers not in parentheses. The extra aircraft are believed to be intended to provide ready replacements for wartime losses as well as serving to replace aircraft temporarily inactive due to maintenance or repair.

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D. Current Disposition of Naval Forces

| <u>Submarines</u> | <u>Fleet</u> | | |
|----------------------------|-----------------|---------------|--------------|
| | <u>Northern</u> | <u>Baltic</u> | <u>Black</u> |
| Peripheral Strike Nuclear | 7 | 0 | 0 |
| Peripheral Strike Diesel | 13 | 0 | 0 |
| Cruise Missile Nuclear | 26 | 0 | 0 |
| Cruise Missile Diesel | 12 | 2 | 5 |
| Nuclear Attack | 21 | 0 | 0 |
| Long Range Diesel Attack | 45 | 4 | 1 |
| Medium Range Diesel Attack | 30 | 19 | 17 |
| Short Range Diesel | <u>0</u> | <u>4</u> | <u>5</u> |
| Grand Total Submarines | 154 | 29 | 28 |

| <u>Surface Ships</u> | | | |
|---------------------------------|----|----|----|
| Guided Missile Helicopter Ships | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Missile Cruisers | 5 | 2 | 4 |
| Cruisers | 1 | 4 | 6 |
| Missile Destroyers | 6 | 10 | 16 |
| Destroyers | 5 | 9 | 11 |
| Destroyer Escorts | 28 | 25 | 24 |
| Amphibious | 18 | 28 | 20 |

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E. Surface Ship and Submarine Availability*


| | <u>Northern Fleet</u> | <u>Baltic Fleet</u> | <u>Black Sea Fleet</u> |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|
| Helicopter Carriers | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Missile Cruisers | 4- 5 | 0- 1 | 1-3 |
| Cruisers | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| Missile Destroyers | 5 | 5- 6 | 13 |
| Destroyers | 2 | 6 | 5-6 |
| Escorts | 14-15 | 13-15 | 13 |
| Submarines | | | |
| Nuclear Cruise Missile | 15-17 | 0 | 0 |
| Nuclear Torpedo Attack | 10-14 | 0 | 0 |
| Diesel Cruise Missile | 6- 7 | 0 | 0 |
| Diesel** Torpedo Attack | 25-27 | 1- 2 | 0 |

Relevant Transit Times

| | <u>Surface Ships and Nuclear Submarines-25 kts</u> | <u>Diesel Submarines-12 kts</u> |
|-----------------------------------|--|---------------------------------|
| Barents to Southern Norwegian Sea | 1-1/2 D | 3 D |
| Barents to West Irish Coast | 3 D | 6 D |
| Sevastople to Kithira | 1 D | 2 D |

* Forces designed for distant operations capable of getting underway within three days.
 ** Long range only.

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F. Soviet Major Surface Ships and Submarines
Typically Available by Area Over Time*

| | Atlantic Ocean | | Norwegian Sea | | Mediterranean Sea | | |
|----------------------------------|------------------|---------------------|------------------|---------------------|-------------------|------------------|---------------------|
| | Within 3 Days | Within 7-10 Days | Within 3 Days | Within 7-10 Days | On 0 Days | Within 3 Days | Within 7-10 Days |
| Surface Combatants | | | | | | | |
| Large (In excess of 10,000 tons) | | | 1 | | 1-2 | 3-5 | 3-5 |
| Medium (2,000-10,000 tons) | 1 | 1 | 10-12 | 10-12 | 5-6 | 12-15 | 17-20 |
| Escorts | | | 6-8 | 6-8 | 4-5 | 4-8 | 10-14 |
| Submarines | | | | | | | |
| Nuclear | | | | | | | |
| Cruise Missile | 7-8 | 9-10 | 2-5 | 5-7 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Torpedo | 9-11 | 11-15 | 0-4 | 0-4 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Diesel | | | | | | | |
| Cruise Missile | | | 2-4 | 4-5 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Torpedo | 2 | 15-25 | 15-40 | 10-20 | 8 | 8 | 8 |

* This table has not been coordinated with the Defense Intelligence Agency.

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G. Naval Aviation

| | <u>Fleet</u> | | |
|------------------------|-----------------|---------------|------------------|
| | <u>Northern</u> | <u>Baltic</u> | <u>Black Sea</u> |
| Light Bombers | | 34 | |
| Medium Bombers w/asm | 66 | 61 | 64 |
| Medium Bombers w/o asm | 0 | 49 | 28 |
| Tankers | 21 | 13 | 13 |
| Reconnaissance | 50 | 10 | 13 |
| ASW-Fixed Wing | 52 | 10 | 28 |
| ASW-Helicopters | 60 | 40 | 90 |

Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Navies

| | <u>Bulgaria</u> | <u>E. Germany</u> | <u>Poland</u> | <u>Romania</u> |
|------------|-----------------|-------------------|---------------|----------------|
| Submarines | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 |
| Destroyer | 2 | 2 | 4 | 0 |
| Amphibious | 0 | 6 | 22 | 0 |

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