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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Report

The Changing Shape and Mission of the Warsaw Pact

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

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
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INTELLIGENCE REPORT

The Changing Shape and Mission of the Warsaw Pact

Memorandum to Recipients:

The military organizational structure of the Warsaw Pact has been in the process of change for some time, particularly since the March 1969 meeting in Budapest of the Pact's highest policy making body, the Political Consultative Committee. There are major differences of interpretation, inside and outside the intelligence community, regarding the nature of this change.

One interpretation holds that the Soviets are seeking to establish direct command links to all significant components of the East European armed forces. The prime purpose would be to underwrite and in some cases (as in Romania) to expand Soviet political authority in Eastern Europe by controlling the military establishments. In crisis situations the Soviets could more effectively employ these military establishments against NATO, outside Europe, or against a dissident Communist regime in Eastern Europe. According to this interpretation, however, the main purpose is probably not so much to build Pact capabilities against NATO as to maintain internal control in Eastern Europe. Indeed the changes in Pact structure might constitute a first step in the gradual integration of some East European

Note: This report was produced solely by CIA in the Office of Strategic Research.

military establishments into that of the USSR, and the elimination of East European sovereignty entirely.

A second interpretation maintains that the increased number of East European officers at Pact headquarters is one of several indications that the East European voice in Pact decision making has been strengthened. The broad Soviet motivation, according to this view, is to preclude future Czechoslovak deviations and possibly to overcome Romania's present intransigence through a process of accommodation, even reconciliation. One significant end result would be a more streamlined, genuinely multinational command system similar to NATO's. This would tend to increase Pact capabilities against NATO, but at no significant cost to East European sovereignty.

A third interpretation holds that the Soviets--particularly the military--seek through institutional change in the Warsaw Pact to give the East Europeans the appearance of greater authority while denying them the substance, but that most of the East European regimes are aware of this possible Soviet design and in varying degrees are resisting it. According to this interpretation, the Soviet political leadership, partly because it is deeply engrossed in other problems, does not wish to create further contention with the East European regimes by imposing change in the Warsaw Pact. The result has been and is likely to remain for some time a standoff in the Pact, with much discussion, little action, and little effect on overall Pact military capabilities against NATO or any other adversary.

The author of this report generally supports the first interpretation--the expansion of Soviet political authority in East Europe--and offers a set of hypothetical future events to test its validity as further evidence becomes available over the next year or so.

Although the report was discussed with analysts outside the Office of Strategic Research, it was not formally coordinated with other CIA components. Other analysts in OSR familiar with the evidence of changes in the Warsaw Pact agree that the indications are too pointed to be ignored and that the effects of changes

are potentially far reaching. At the same time, they prefer to reserve judgment on the author's interpretation. Comments on the data and their interpretation are invited and should be addressed to Director of Strategic Research.

The report discusses the pertinent evidence acquired from open sources Key items of evidence are cited in footnotes. Considerable space is devoted to the period 1955-68, inasmuch as the controversy extends back into the period before the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968.

A summary of the author's views begins on page 68.

Contents

Charts

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The Original Military Structure

The military command arrangements established within the Warsaw Pact at its formation in May 1955 and at the first meeting of the Pact's Political Consultative Committee in January 1956 were imprecise--almost casual. The PCC, at the top of the chain of command, was given a vague mandate to examine "general questions" relating to the "defensive power and organization of the Combined Armed Forces" and to adopt "necessary" decisions. The PCC was to consist of a member of the "government" or other appointed representative of each Pact member, but not necessarily the party first secretaries or the defense ministers. Indeed, party first secretaries as such did not begin to sign PCC documents until 1960. The PCC was supposed to meet at least twice a year, but in fact has not always met once a year. Evidently the PCC has no fixed procedures for settling disputed questions.

Below the PCC, the Pact established a Command and Staff of the Combined Armed Forces. The Pact commander in chief has in fact--though not in law--been a Soviet first deputy defense minister (Marshals of the Soviet Union Ivan Konev, 1955-60; Andrey Grechko, 1960-67; and Ivan Yakubovskiy, 1967-present). The deputy commanders in chief were to be the defense ministers of the member nations--except obviously for the USSR defense minister--and these deputies were to "command the armed forces allocated by their respective states to the Combined Armed Forces."

There has been considerable discussion in the intelligence community about the portion of each Pact member's military establishment which was "allocated" to the combined forces. For some countries the portion was believed to be quite large. The communique issued by the 1956 PCC meeting seemed to indicate that all East German armed forces under the defense minister were allocated to the Combined Command.

On the other hand, it is generally agreed that the bulk of Soviet armed forces, particularly strategic attack forces, has never been "allocated" to the Combined Command, but has remained under exclusive Soviet control.

Concerning the other Pact armed forces, there has been a consensus among Western analysts, at least until recently, that a dividing line existed in each country between a large body of "allocated" and a large body of "nonallocated" forces. Militarized security forces appeared to be part of the "nonallocated" category under the original Pact structure.

The early Pact documents also provided for a Combined Staff, to be headed by a chief of staff and representatives from the other Pact members. The staff has been largely a fiction.

There have been four Pact chiefs of staff: Generals Aleksey Antonov, 1955-62; Pavel Batov, 1962-66; Mikhail Kazakov, 1966-68; and the incumbent, Sergey Shtemenko, since 4 August 1968. The first three were simultaneously either deputy or first deputy chiefs of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, and Shtemenko held the first deputy position even prior to assuming his Pact responsibilities.

The East European representatives to Pact headquarters never functioned as members of a staff. In November 1969 the Czechoslovak military newspaper *Obrana Lidu* stated that until mid-1968--that is, up to Shtemenko's appointment--the Pact staff consisted of a chief plus ad hoc staffs selected for Pact maneuvers and controlled by their respective defense ministers.

Even high ranking Soviet officers presumably familiar with the Pact military organizational struc-

ture did not seem certain how this structure would function in crisis or wartime situations. For example, all three editions of the authoritative study edited by the late Marshal Vasiliy Sokolovskiy, *Military Strategy* (1962, 1963, and 1968), prescribe that the highest political agency for coordinating the wartime efforts of "socialist" countries "can be" the PCC. Military leadership "can be" achieved--somehow--by "coordinating the activity of the higher military agencies of the allied countries." Leadership of Pact forces "can be" entrusted to the "Supreme High Command of the Soviet Armed Forces," under which there "can be representatives" of the other "supreme high commands."

In certain areas of operations, however, Pact units of a given nationality would be "subordinated" at some undetermined echelon to national command. Sokolovskiy's book does not specifically mention the Pact command and staff in this context.

Warsaw Pact Organization Until 1968



Under this former Warsaw Pact organization, the East European defense ministers retained operational control over most of their forces, air defense being the only exception.

In 1965 Romania declared (in secret) its independence from all Soviet operational control. Albania, an inactive member from 1961 to 1968, formally renounced membership in September 1968.

The Soviet Politburo was represented in the Pact's Political Consultative Committee by either the premier or the party first secretary, and the East European countries were similarly represented.

The Role of the East European Defense Minister

In retrospect, the position of the East European defense minister in the 1955-69 Pact military structure (see chart on opposite page) appears to have been especially significant. Legally each of these officers was under dual subordination, to a Soviet marshal in the post of Pact commander in chief on the one hand, and to his own government on the other. His behavior in periods of tension--not so much tension between NATO and the Pact but rather within the Pact itself--probably determined the portion of his armed forces "allocated" to the Pact. To the extent he was willing to accept Soviet dictation at such times, all armed forces under his authority, in a practical sense, were "allocated" to the Pact. To the extent he obeyed only his own regime's orders, none of them were.

In 1955 and early 1956 Stalin's successors in Moscow probably did not anticipate that the East European defense ministers would ever feel divided loyalties, or that in such circumstances they would fail to heed Moscow's wishes. In fact, three of the seven East European defense ministers--Marshal Konstantin Rokossovskiy in Poland and Generals Istvan Bata of Hungary and Petur Panchevski of Bulgaria--were career Soviet officers. However, nothing in the Warsaw Treaty dictated the prerequisites of the East European defense ministers, which meant that sooner or later the East European regimes would establish their own criteria for appointees.

Moreover, the placing of each East European defense minister immediately below the Pact commander in chief gave the defense minister a certain immunity from orders issued by other Soviet officers--notably the Pact chief of staff, the commander of Soviet forces stationed in the East European country (in 1955 only Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria quartered no Soviet combat units), and the chief Warsaw Pact

representative stationed in each East European capital.*

There was one exception to this command relationship in the pre-1968 period. Sometime prior to the mid-Sixties the commander in chief of Soviet air defense forces (PVO) apparently assumed some form of operational control over East European PVOs as well; in July 1964 a Czechoslovak military newspaper explicitly identified the incumbent Soviet PVO commander in chief as commander in chief of "Warsaw Pact" PVO. This exceptional measure probably was intended by the Soviets primarily to improve Warsaw Pact early warning capabilities against NATO.

Soviet control of East European air defenses conferred other potential benefits for Moscow in the event of a military crisis between Moscow and an East European state by facilitating the incursion of Soviet troops by air. But it is not clear Moscow anticipated such benefits in the mid-Sixties. In any case the East European defense ministers retained operational control of the bulk of their respective military establishments. (The chart on page 8 shows the Warsaw Pact organization as of mid-1968, just before the invasion of Czechoslovakia.)

** The incumbent senior Pact representatives are: Colonel General Aleksey S. Burdeynyy (East Germany); Colonel General Konstantin G. Kozanov (Czechoslovakia); Lieutenant General Aleksandr I. Koz'min (Poland); Colonel General Ivan V. Tutarinov (Hungary); Colonel General Aleksey I. Baksov (Bulgaria); and Colonel General Georgiy P. Romanov (Romania). Even today none of these Soviet officers holds higher military rank than the local East European defense minister. Nor do the commanders of Soviet forces stationed in Poland (NGF), East Germany (GSFG), Czechoslovakia (CGF), and Hungary (SGF), although in the past the commander in chief of the GSFG occasionally has outranked the East German defense minister.*

The Pact in Internal Crises, 1955-1969

By the end of 1968 the Soviets had cause to view the Warsaw Pact with mixed feelings. As a countervailing military force against NATO it had served Moscow well, particularly as a framework for upgrading standards of military equipment and combat readiness in Soviet and East European armed forces. But the Soviets had also resorted to Pact-associated military arrangements in order to help maintain their authority in Eastern Europe. In this respect the Pact's performance in its first thirteen and a half years, from Moscow's standpoint, was extremely spotty.

Poland

At one stage during the October 1956 confrontation between Khrushchev and the pro-Gomulka forces in the Polish Communist Party, the Soviets tried to take advantage of Soviet Marshal Rokossovskiy's position as Polish defense minister in order to throw the Polish armed forces into the balance. The Polish army was given orders to arrest Gomulka and some 700 of his associates, and Polish (not merely Soviet) ground forces began to march on Warsaw. One major reason for the failure of this power play was that Rokossovskiy's legal authority within the Polish regime did not extend to Polish internal security troops and paramilitary forces. These elements stopped the Polish army advance and prepared themselves to lead popular resistance against the Soviets.

Had the Warsaw Treaty explicitly provided that all armed forces of all member states be subordinate to the Pact commander in chief, the "Polish October" might have ended differently. As it was, Rokossovskiy and most of his high ranking Soviet associates in the Polish armed forces were sent back to Moscow. Soviet influence over the Polish military establishment suffered a setback which, despite substantial Polish participation in the Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, had not been fully overcome by the end of 1968. From

all available evidence Gomulka, not Marshal Yakubovskiy, made the essential decision that Polish forces would participate, and Gomulka assumed responsibility--and blame--for that decision within the Polish Party.

Hungary

The Hungarian revolution of October-November 1956 was more directly connected with the Warsaw Pact than were the Polish events. Prior to May 1955, when the Austrian State Treaty and the Warsaw Treaty were both signed, about five Soviet divisions--then called the Central Group of Forces--were stationed on Austrian and Hungarian territory. As a result of the Austrian treaty Soviet forces were withdrawn from Austria, but about two Soviet divisions remained in Hungary, by virtue (according to the Soviets) of the Warsaw Treaty.

During the first days of the Hungarian revolt these Soviet forces, together with Hungarian army units under Defense Minister Bata, the ex-Soviet officer, attempted on Moscow's orders to suppress popular demonstrations. A Hungarian colonel who was not a former Soviet officer, Pal Maleter, defected with his forces to the insurgents, and within a few days he became the new defense minister under Imre Nagy.

Meanwhile the Nagy regime, apparently regarding the Soviet presence in particular and the Warsaw Pact in general as an infringement of Hungarian sovereignty, demanded of the Soviets the immediate withdrawal of their forces from Hungary, and informed Moscow that Hungary would repudiate its membership in the Warsaw Pact. Soviet negotiators claimed that the withdrawal of Soviet troops would have to be approved by other Pact members. The other point raised by the Nagy regime--leaving the Warsaw Pact--probably triggered Moscow's decision to crush Hungarian resistance by force.

This action required sending additional Soviet troops to Hungary, raising the total Soviet strength to about seven divisions. Soviet advisers were partly successful in obstructing pro-Revolution Hungarian officers from rallying the Hungarian ground forces to the anti-Soviet side, which was crushed by the Soviet troops within a few days.

After the fighting subsided the Soviets reduced their garrison to five and, in 1958, to four divisions--the present strength of what now is known as the Southern Group of Forces. Meanwhile, Hungarian armed forces, 11 divisions strong before the revolution, were drastically cut, and placed under another ex-Soviet officer as defense minister, Geza Revesz. Maleter was executed along with Nagy. Gradually the Hungarian armed forces were reshaped into their present six division force. Thus one effect of the 1956 revolt was that the Soviet occupation force was doubled, and the indigenous force cut roughly in half. Soviet propagandists have claimed that the 1956 events in Hungary were a triumph for the Pact, and were legal under the Pact. Polish spokesmen, in particular, publicly disputed this latter Soviet claim as late as 1958.

By the end of 1968 the Soviets probably wondered whether Hungary's position in the Pact was beginning to waver once again. In 1960 Revesz was succeeded as defense minister by the incumbent, now Colonel General Lajos Czinege. Czinege is not an ex-Soviet officer. He served a three-year tour as a political officer prior to becoming defense minister, but otherwise seems to have had no significant military experience.

Czinege, as compared with his colleagues in the Hungarian leadership, was unusually sympathetic toward the rebels of 1956,

During the fall of 1968 Czinege stated [redacted] that he had strongly opposed the Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August. If Czinege, as Pact deputy commander in charge of Hungarian forces allocated to the Pact, made his feelings known to the Soviets at the time Moscow decided to invade, this must have complicated Pact Commander Yakubovskiy's plans. Possibly Hungarian party leader Janos Kadar--who was himself anything but enthusiastic about the invasion--had to issue the necessary orders to the Hungarian ground force elements, amounting to about a division, which participated in the invasion.

Albania

Political differences between the Soviets and the regime of Enver Hoxha resulted in Albania's transition in 1960-61 to inactive status within the Warsaw Pact and the rupture of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Tirana. Albania's small size and geographic separation from the rest of the Warsaw Pact probably convinced Moscow that a major military action at that time against the dissident regime would not be worth the trouble.

In the fall of 1960, however, there was a Soviet-inspired military plot against the Hoxha regime. Its principal figure was Albanian Rear Admiral Teme Sejko, and its principal resource was the Soviet naval presence at the Albanian port of Valona. The plotters failed to enlist the support of Beqir Balluku who was, and remains, Albanian defense minister. Balluku received military instruction in the USSR in the early Fifties but never served in the Soviet armed forces.

In September 1968, in the wake of the Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, Albania formally repudiated its membership in the Pact, thereby succeeding--at least temporarily--where the Nagy regime in Hungary failed.

Bulgaria

From the Soviet point of view, it would appear that the most significant aspect of the anti-Soviet

plot to overthrow the Todor Zhivkov regime in Bulgaria in April 1965 was not that it was so easily foiled, but that it was even tried. The Soviets probably considered Bulgaria their most loyal ally. This consideration seemingly applied especially to the Bulgarian military establishment and, within the ranks of the military, to officers of the Political Directorate. Yet six of the nine ringleaders of the plot were either military officers or closely connected with the military establishment. One of the six, Micho Michev, was a deputy chief of the armed forces Political Directorate at the time of the plot. Another, Lyuben Dinov, had served briefly as chief of the Political Directorate about ten years previously.

No evidence has come to light that the present Bulgarian defense minister, Dobri Dzhurov, was involved on the side of the plotters. Nevertheless, the plot occurred only three years after Dzhurov became defense minister--the first man in that post since World War II who had not been a former Soviet officer. Also, Dzhurov had, like most of the plotters, fought with Bulgarian partisans during the war. There was one crucial Soviet advantage in Bulgaria which was not typical of the other Pact states. Dzhurov's immediate predecessor, Ivan Mikhaylov, with the rank of army general, retained his positions as member of the Bulgarian party Politburo and deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers after leaving the defense minister's post. In all three respects this ex-Soviet officer outranked the Bulgarian defense minister at the time of the plot. Dzhurov has since been promoted to army general, but Mikhaylov still holds higher party and government posts. It can only be speculated, in Moscow as well as the West, how the plot might have ended if someone like Mikhaylov had not been on the scene.

Romania

Romania's efforts to achieve greater independence from the USSR have been under way for more than a decade, and have significantly altered its position within the Warsaw Pact.

A precondition for Romania's initial efforts was the May 1958 resolution of the Pact PCC approving, as part of an announced reduction of Pact forces by 419,000, the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Romania. During the summer of 1958 these forces--the Independent Mechanized Army, consisting at that time of two regular ground force divisions, an antiaircraft artillery division, and tactical air units--returned to the USSR. It is not clear whether the withdrawal stemmed basically from Soviet or Romanian initiative. Presumably the Soviets have had second thoughts about the move in recent years.

the deterioriation of Romanian-Soviet relations as reflected in the Romanian armed forces dates from the 1957-58 period.

From about 1963 through 1968 Romania progressively reached a point where it could no longer be considered an active member of the Pact. Romania made unilateral changes in its force structure, such as cutting the basic conscription term in 1964, and establishing a large paramilitary organization, the Patriotic Guards, during the first week of the Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. Romania also reduced its military intelligence collaboration with other Pact members, occasionally refused to attend Pact meetings or sign Pact documents, hosted no Pact exercises on its territory, and made only token contributions to those held elsewhere.

During the Czechoslovak crisis the Soviets conspicuously avoided consulting Bucharest, in the plausible expectation that the Romanians would not support the Soviet position. The Romanian leaders condemned the

Pact invasion, and they have not retracted that condemnation.

Probably the most decisive point in Romania's estrangement from the Pact occurred in the spring of 1965 when Marshal Andrey Grechko, then Pact commander in chief, visited Bucharest twice in order to confer with Romanian party and government leaders. Nicolae Ceausescu had just succeeded to the post of general secretary of the Romanian party following the death of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. The Romanian minister of armed forces (equivalent to defense minister) was General Leontin Salajan. At one point, Grechko complained that Romanian representatives at Pact headquarters had been insubordinate. The Romanian leaders replied that Bucharest was the proper judge of what Pact orders would be obeyed by the Romanian armed forces. The exchange was tantamount to a Romanian rejection of the Pact chain of command as applied to the Romanian armed forces. Salajan no longer considered himself subject to direct orders from the Pact commander in chief. Romania's view of Pact authority has not changed essentially since that time; it is just that in recent months the Romanians have begun to express their view publicly.

Czechoslovakia

During Alexander Dubcek's tenure as first secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, January 1968 - April 1969, Prague and Moscow were ranged on opposite sides of many issues, including Czechoslovakia's responsibilities as a member of the Warsaw Pact. Throughout this period of crises and near crises the Soviets counted on potential collaborators within the upper ranks of the Czechoslovak military establishment, only to find these officers unable or unwilling to run the required errands.

The two most vivid symbols of this Soviet frustration were Colonel General Vladimir Janko, identified as

Moscow's choice to command the Warsaw Pact's Czechoslovak front* in time of war, and Army General Bohumil Lomsky, Czechoslovak defense minister until replaced by the Dubcek regime in April 1968. In December 1967, [redacted] Janko warned the senior Soviet Warsaw Pact representative in Prague that the impending changes in the Czechoslovak party leadership would, and should, cause the Soviets to intervene. But instead of waiting for the opportunity to assist the Soviets, Janko committed suicide in March 1968. Lomsky, though basically pro-Soviet and anti-West, and with obvious cause for personal grievance against the Dubcek regime, apparently refused to assist the Pact invasion forces in August 1968.

It was also sobering for Moscow to discover what little influence Pact Commander in Chief Yakubovskiy exerted on Prague when he had no troops behind him. Apparently he tried on several occasions during the spring and summer of 1968 to persuade Prague to accept the stationing of Soviet or other non-Czechoslovak troops on Czechoslovak territory, and used to no avail all kinds of pretexts--secret Pact agreements, poor performance of Czechoslovak forces during Pact exercises, even President Ludvik Svoboda's Soviet awards. He may even have tried to engineer a coup

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* *Front, a term generally reserved for wartime situations, has a special meaning in the Soviet military lexicon. A wartime front would consist of at least three ground armies (and/or corps) and a tactical air army, and possibly one or more airborne divisions. A front would contain such nondivisional support as artillery divisions or brigades, tactical missile units, air defense missile units, engineer units, and rear services. For examples of the term applied to peacetime contingencies, see pages 47 and 52.*

against the Dubcek regime in early May 1968. If so, it was another failure on his record. The Pact's weakness as a political instrument was further illustrated in the aftermath of the "hockey riots" in March 1969--in which celebration of the Czech victories over the Soviets in two matches led to widespread attacks on Soviet installations in Czechoslovakia. At that time the Soviets sent as their military representative to Prague, not Warsaw Pact Commander in Chief Yakubovskiy, but USSR Defense Minister Grechko.

The Soviets and pro-Soviet elements in the Pact were particularly offended by the presence of high-ranking Czechoslovak political officers in the forefront of the "revisionist" forces. The chief of the Polish Armed Forces Main Political Directorate, Major General Josef Urbanowicz, called attention to this tendency in a secret report on his April 1968 meeting with his Czechoslovak counterparts. He described Lieutenant General Jaroslav Hejna, then first deputy chief of the Czechoslovak Main Political Directorate, as "clearly fascinated with the process of democratization" and able to see "only its brighter sides." The Soviet party leadership pressed hard on the issue during the confrontation with the Czechoslovak party leadership in Moscow at the end of August 1968, and again in the Soviet-Czechoslovak meeting in Kiyev in December 1968. Within a few weeks of Dubcek's replacement as party leader by Gustav Husak, the Czechoslovak Military Political Academy was abolished, presumably at Moscow's insistence. In a public lecture delivered in Moscow in June 1970, a political worker in the Soviet armed forces described the now defunct academy as a "hotbed of pro-Western provocations."

Two examples demonstrate the behavior of the Military Political Academy prior to the August invasion. The better known example consists of the preparation by an academy team of new draft statutes for the entire Czechoslovak Communist Party. If adopted, these statutes would have transformed the party into something strongly resembling a West European socialist or social democratic party. They were published on 10 August 1968 and, in the opinion of some intelligence analysts, triggered the final Soviet decision to proceed with the invasion.

The second example consists of two papers prepared by the academy in May-June 1968, entitled "Notes on the Action Program of the Czechoslovak People's Army" and "Memorandum: How Czechoslovak State Interests in the Military Sphere Are to Be Formulated." The papers reject Soviet doctrine for the Warsaw Pact as an infallible guide for Czechoslovakia. In particular, they argue that the aggressiveness of the West has been deliberately overrated in the Pact and, on the other hand, that the consequences of nuclear war in Europe have been seriously underrated. The "Memorandum" states that the alleged threat from the West

> has played an ever increasing part as an additional factor in strengthening the cohesion of the socialist community. The military factor is designed to compensate for the inadequate economic cooperation and failure to develop other bonds between the socialist countries....

In other words, the "Memorandum" claims that the West has been used by Soviet and pro-Soviet spokesmen to instill a sham unity in the Pact. At the same time the "Memorandum" disputes the assumption [redacted] that the Pact can win a nuclear war in Europe. Such a war, the "Memorandum" states, would mean "national liquidation and the destruction of all the states involved." Consequently the basic goal of Czechoslovak military strategy and foreign policy is to ensure the prevention of such a war at all costs.

Both papers discuss, in favorable terms, the prospect that Czechoslovakia might become a neutral state in the fairly near term. The "Notes" explains:

> At the present time it is possible to reflect on other alternatives for the development of the security systems in the coming 10 to 15 years, not only from the viewpoint of the continued existence of the Warsaw Pact organization, but also from that of its possible abolition. The other alternatives include studies of possible solutions for a coordinated defense in Central Europe without the military potential of the USSR, and of new types of alliances.

The "Memorandum" attacks the notion that Czechoslovakia has to divide the world permanently into "friends"--the Warsaw Pact, Communists--and "enemies"--NATO, capitalists. At a minimum Czechoslovakia should classify other states as "existing allies and potential allies, neutrals, potential adversaries and actual adversaries, and military enemies."

After the invasion, political officers in and out of the Military Political Academy acted as though Czechoslovakia's "existing allies" in the Pact had become her "actual adversaries." The political officers continued to support Dubcek and to resist pro-Soviet influences even after many professional officers had begun to accommodate themselves to the new realities. A classified Polish Foreign Ministry report distributed in mid-October 1968 noted that while certain Czechoslovak commanders were now anti-Dubcek and collaborating with the occupation forces, political officers were "exerting a negative influence on discipline" and were "active in stirring up and maintaining ill-feeling."

The man chiefly responsible for shaping the attitudes of Czechoslovak political officers prior to the invasion and for several weeks thereafter was Lieutenant General Vaclav Prchlik. Prchlik was chief of the Main Political

Directorate (MPD) from April 1956 until early 1968, when Dubcek placed him in charge of the Party Central Committee's Eighth Department, responsible for defense and security.

Prchlik evidently knew Dubcek long before January 1968 Moreover, the two men seemed to share many of the same political attitudes and experiences. Dubcek during the mid-Sixties made Slovakia a haven for many "revisionist" writers and journalists, and Prchlik, had been using the MPD for the same purpose since the late Fifties. At the same time, both men prior to January 1968 had numerous contacts with Communist officials throughout Eastern Europe and the USSR, but virtually no direct contact with the West.

In the eight months prior to the invasion, Prchlik engaged in at least three activities which in Soviet eyes would mark him as an enemy. First, he was partly responsible for the failure of pro-Soviet elements to use the Czechoslovak armed forces to keep the pre-Dubcek regime in power. Second, as head of the Eighth Department, he incurred responsibility, along with Interior Minister Josef Pavel, for severing cooperation between the Czechoslovak secret police and the Soviets. At one point during the pre-invasion period, the Interior Ministry apparently was monitoring the activities of Pact Commander in Chief Yakubovskiy in Czechoslovakia, a mission obviously cleared by Prchlik. Third, Prchlik held a news conference in mid-July 1968 to protest the continued presence of Soviet troops on Czechoslovak territory after the June 1968 Warsaw Pact exercise. He accused the Pact commander in chief of falsely pledging the prompt removal of these Soviet troops, and said he personally had researched all Warsaw Pact agreements to support his claim that Yakubovskiy was misusing his Pact authority. In any case, concluded Prchlik, the whole episode demonstrated the need for extensive revision

of the Pact structure in order to protect the sovereignty of the East European states.



Lessons for the Soviets

Between May 1955 and the end of 1968, there was a significant challenge to Soviet authority in every Pact member state except East Germany. In every one of these crises the existing Pact organizational structure failed the Soviets in one or more ways. Indeed East Germany was the exception that proved the rule. There the Soviet military presence since World War II had been so massive that the special role of the Warsaw Pact in ensuring East German allegiance to Moscow was relatively slight. The 1953 revolt in East Germany had been crushed easily by Soviet forces stationed there.

Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, where the Soviets had counted on the Pact to secure a more voluntary, less enforced East European allegiance to Soviet goals, the Pact had faltered. The behavior of the political officers in Czechoslovakia during 1968 represented a serious problem for the entire Pact. To a lesser degree, so did the behavior of the ex-political officer, Defense Minister Czinege, in Hungary and dissident political officers in Bulgaria in 1965. If the political cadre could prove so unreliable, then Moscow really could not confidently depend on any part of any East European military establishment to take the Soviet side in a dispute between the USSR and that particular country.





From the Soviet point of view, therefore, there seemed to be compelling reasons by the end of 1968 for making fundamental changes in the Pact structure, so that the Pact would serve rather than obstruct Soviet policy objectives. If action was to be taken, there were two basic alternatives for the Soviets. The first would be an accommodation to the basic demands made by the Romanians, Czech General Prchlik, and other East Europeans for a genuine East European voice in Pact decision making, in order to preclude Soviet abuse of the Pact structure for political ends. But that alternative would require a change in broad Soviet foreign policy objectives, since the latter have, in various ways, infringed upon East European sovereignty. The recurring crises in Soviet-East European relations have illustrated that tendency.

The second alternative would involve reshaping the Warsaw Pact so that the command channels from Pact headquarters in Moscow to an East European military unit would operate in much the same way as those from the USSR defense minister to a Soviet division stationed in, for example, the Kiyev or Belorussian military districts. An East European or Soviet officer--the nationality should not matter--would function as the equivalent of the Kiyev or Belorussian military district commander, obeying without question the orders issued from Pact headquarters. With that type of procedure the Soviets could bypass potentially obstreperous defense ministers, chiefs of political directorates, civilian party leaderships, and the like. The East European armed forces, together with the Soviet forces stationed in East Europe, could function as supermobile armored policemen, as well as a counterweight to NATO.

If the second alternative were adopted, it would require some window dressing. The East Europeans would have to be given the appearance of authority even while they were denied the substance. The East European officials to be bypassed in crisis situations would have to be compensated somehow, at least temporarily.

Ultimately, however, the process would be one of regression to the rather primitive arrangements between the Soviet forces and East European allied forces which obtained during the closing years of World War II. The chief differences would be that these rather Stalinist arrangements would apply in crises short of war, and that the East European forces to be so commanded would be much larger than their World War II counterparts. Since these new military arrangements would involve the reduction of East European political sovereignty in peacetime, they imply institutional changes extending far beyond the military sphere. These changes would lead in the direction of integrating Eastern Europe both economically and politically into the USSR.

The Arrival of General Shtemenko

On 4 August 1968 TASS announced the appointment of Army General Sergey Shtemenko to the post of Warsaw Pact chief of staff. He is probably better qualified and certainly more controversial than any of his predecessors. He was chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff during World War II and chief of the General Staff itself until just before Stalin's death. At Stalin's death he was demoted two ranks, from army general to lieutenant general. Gradually he worked his way back to the General Staff, becoming chief of the Operations Directorate once again, and also a first deputy chief of the General Staff. Prior to August 1968 he had accumulated a total of more than two decades on the General Staff.

Shtemenko has never had a field command, although he did spend several months in charge of a tank training battalion. A career devoted almost entirely to staff work is abnormal in the Soviet armed forces or, for that matter, in any military establishment, but Shtemenko does not seem to regard his specialization as a liability. On the contrary, his writings--for example, his memoirs of World War II, published in 1968--indicate that he believes staff officers at senior headquarters level can and should assume command responsibility in critical situations in the field. He seems to disparage the authority of front and field army commanders. At a May 1970 meeting of Soviet and foreign military officers commemorating the 25th anniversary of V-E Day, Shtemenko joked about the inability of Soviet field commanders in World War II to function without constant direction from the Stavka--Supreme Headquarters--in Moscow

Another relevant aspect of Shtemenko's background is his particular experience in planning military operations with, and against, East European armed forces. Not every Soviet officer would relish the task of planning military operations against a small state formally allied with the USSR. Indeed Shtemenko's predecessor as Pact chief of staff, Army General M. I. Kazakov, had resigned his post in protest over the impending invasion. Shtemenko apparently had no such scruples. On the contrary, he implies in articles published since the invasion that the use of Soviet military forces to resolve political problems in Eastern Europe reflects the noblest traditions of "proletarian internationalism."

For example, Shtemenko's article in the May 1970 issue of the Soviet *Military Historical Journal* is devoted to the "liberating mission of the Soviet armed forces" outside the USSR at the end of World War II. He stresses that the mission involved "an entire complex of measures of a political, economic, diplomatic and cultural nature," not just "the conduct of combat operations." But he claims that these problems were properly anticipated in conferences involving himself, his superior at that time on the General Staff, General Aleksey Antonov, and Stalin. He implies that he, as the only living member of that group, is the ranking Soviet expert on the planning of such "liberating" missions. (See also illustration on facing page.)

Moveover, some of Shtemenko's "historical" analysis seems to take on a contemporary ring, particularly when he discusses the campaign in Romania. He records, for example, how he and his superior, General Antonov, in their report to Stalin on the military situation "repeatedly remarked that the Romanian court would inevitably become a center for anti-Soviet elements."

Army General Sergey M. Shtemenko
Chief of Staff and
First Deputy Commander in Chief,
Warsaw Pact

On dealing with commanders in the field...

...The front commanders... did not tend particularly to take into consideration their neighbors.... In such cases it was the duty of the Headquarters representative immediately to correct the front commander...to lead the forces at the fronts.

...and East European opponents

...The liberation of Romania was...a very complex problem.... The bitter smoke of fires left by the uninvited strangers, including the Romanian troops, still hung over our land.... The Romanian government was doing everything possible to frighten the population with slander about the 'horrors of Soviet occupation,' Siberian exile, etc.... Most of the Romanian forces preferred to surrender to the Soviet troops rather than fight....

"On the Road to Victory," in May and June 1970 issues of *Znamya*

A third aspect of Shtemenko's background is his unusual contempt for the offensive capabilities and spirit of the American military establishment. In his World War II memoirs, he claims that US offensive operations against the Japanese army were, "as a rule," "too careful and methodical," and that the Japanese army "had grown accustomed to this timidity and methodicalness in its adversaries' behavior." Thus made complacent, the Japanese were caught by "strategic surprise" by the Soviet forces, and were unable to resist the "audacity and speed of the Soviet offensive."

Shtemenko is not the first high ranking Soviet officer to disparage American combat capabilities. Such comments are in part intended to divert attention from the dubious combat performance of many Soviet units at various stages of the war. But Shtemenko's remarks seem particularly strong, coming from a General Staff officer who might be expected to express his military judgments with greater care than other Soviet officers. In present context, his words would be compatible with the view that NATO, as an American-led alliance, probably is "too careful and methodical" to initiate military aggression against the Pact or, in other words, to seek to achieve "strategic surprise."

General Shtemenko's writings are remarkably pro-Stalin in tone, even by contemporary Soviet standards. The memoirs he published in 1968 contain much praise and no criticism of Stalin. In contrast, the revised official history of the Soviet Communist Party, published in 1969, at least admits that Stalin made "mistakes." Shtemenko occasionally criticizes the World War II performance of the Soviet secret police apparatus (then called the NKVD) for inefficiency in military matters. Like the 1969 party history, which ascribes political crimes to Beriya and the NKVD and thereby diminishes Stalin's culpability in domestic affairs, Shtemenko's harsh words for various NKVD officials seem designed to deflect criticism away from Stalin's role as wartime leader.

In sum, Shtemenko's background would appear to predispose him toward a solution to the Pact's defects by centralizing authority in Moscow, at the expense of command centers in Eastern Europe. Moreover, he could be expected to believe that such a centralized authority, while ostensibly military in character, should also concern itself with sensitive political matters in Eastern Europe. In addition, he probably would resist the argument that NATO might try to take military advantage of temporary disarray in the Pact caused by an extensive reorganization of the Pact's military structure. Finally, his political preferences are clearly Stalinist.

The First Signs of Change

The Dubcek regime appears to have sensed the likelihood of change in the Pact structure before the other East Europeans. [redacted] in the fall of 1968 the party leadership was concerned about a "new treaty" among the Warsaw Pact states which would include "a very far-reaching integration of the Warsaw Pact armies." This integration "could mean, for example, that Czechoslovak troops would participate with others in the 'defense' of socialist borders in Asia, where the principal danger is China." However, to the Czechoslovaks' relief, the Soviets did not broach the subject at the aforementioned (see page 19) meeting in Kiyev in early December. The Czechoslovaks' concern probably was based on their interpretation of one or more intra-Pact discussions held just prior to the Kiyev meeting--such as Marshal Yakubovskiy's visit to the capitals of Pact member states in September 1968, or the meeting of Pact defense ministers held in October, or the annual conference of "leading cadres" held in Bucharest in late November 1968.

In early 1969 the Soviet military press produced a number of works comparing the Warsaw Pact, as it should exist, with the Soviet armed forces, composed of many ethnic groups yet united under a single command. By their nature these writings did not necessarily represent any formal decrees of the present Soviet party Politburo, but they did imply a degree of official approval. They also seemed consistent, in spirit, with the published views of General Shtemenko.

The most significant of these writings was the lead article in the January 1969 issue of the *Military-*

Historical Journal devoted to Lenin's activity in "strengthening the military-political unity of the Soviet republics" from 1917 to 1920. The author, a Colonel S. Lipitskiy, begins by complaining that the subject had been overlooked in previous studies--that is, those published prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Lipitskiy promises not only to remedy this deficiency, but to demonstrate that the USSR's current policy toward its Warsaw Pact allies represents a logical continuation of Lenin's efforts.

According to Lipitskiy, the creation in 1918 of Soviet republics in the Baltic area, the Ukraine, and Belorussia, even though approved by the government of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), posed a serious danger of separatism--specifically, that certain republics would seek "autonomy in questions of waging war." In May 1919, therefore, the party Central Committee called on "friendly Soviet republics" to regard their territories as military districts subordinate to the RSFSR Supreme Command, and to be guided by RSFSR laws in matters involving the mobilization, organization, and supply of troops.

In these directives, Lipitskiy maintains "it was especially emphasized that the friendly Soviet republics were obliged to send military manpower and materiel wherever the RSFSR Supreme Command instructed them to do so, and that the grouping of forces had to be dictated exclusively by military, not national, considerations." Moscow subsequently divided the Ukraine into several military districts, Lipitskiy records, and reorganized the other Soviet republics' national military formations into fronts of the Red Army.

Lipitskiy concludes by stressing that this experience in "welding together" the peoples of the USSR "is acquiring particular validity" for the countries of the "socialist community." It should prove an effective antidote for "the poisonous ideas of nationalism."

Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces, a book published under the direction of the commandant of the Lenin Military Political Academy, stresses in a style similar to Lipitskiy's article that Lenin recognized that "a necessary condition of the victorious waging of war against imperialist aggressors is the establishment of a single command of the armies of socialist governments." Unlike Lipitskiy's article, however, the book goes on to claim that "a single military command of the armed forces of the socialist countries is now embodied in the system of the Warsaw Pact." One relevant consideration here is that the book, although apparently drafted during the first three months of 1969, was not published until October. It mentions the PCC meeting at Budapest, and the decisions taken there for "further perfecting the structure and organs of control of the defensive organization of the Warsaw Pact." It adds that the Pact commander in chief is ensuring that these decisions are being "put into practice."

Moreover, the book endorses the USSR's World War II experience as a proper model for the Warsaw Pact. It describes how East European and Mongolian field armies and divisions were subordinated to Soviet fronts, with Soviet "representatives" down at the allied field army and division levels, and with East European and Mongolian "representatives" at the headquarters of Soviet fronts. This system "ensured unity and effective leadership for the front commander" and yet, in the authors' view, took proper "account" of the national distinctions of the military allies. Actually this system ensured the absolute subordination of the non-Soviet forces to Soviet authority.

The Budapest Meeting

The Pact PCC meeting held in mid-March 1969 at Budapest was preceded by a flurry of diplomatic activity by the Soviets, probably more than is usual in connection with such meetings. Moscow hosted East German, Hungarian, Polish, and Bulgarian party delegations, all but the last-named under the respective party first secretary. Pact Commander in Chief Yakubovskiy and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Kuznetsov visited Romania.* The East German and Bulgarian defense ministers left their capitals for several weeks, reportedly in order to receive special military instruction in the USSR. Later in the year the Polish defense minister and other high ranking officers from East European Pact member states--except, apparently, Romania--spent similar periods of time in the USSR, presumably for the same purpose.

Soviet leaders indicated to the Polish foreign minister in February that the main purpose of the upcoming PCC meeting was to deal with the problems of strengthening the Pact militarily. The Soviets discussed the formation within the Pact of a Committee of Defense Ministers, a Military Council, and a Technical Committee as well as expansion of the headquarters--that is, the Combined Command and Staff.

Other subjects connected with the Pact were also reflected in the minutes of the Polish-Soviet discussions. In connection with improvements in

* *Yakubovskiy proposed a fresh allocation of East European forces under a strengthened Warsaw Pact command during this period,*

the military structure, the two sides spoke of a "controversial Article 12" which would apply to "wartime" whereas the "other articles" applied to "peacetime." The Soviets and Poles agreed that if the Romanians objected to Article 12, the matter could be deferred until sometime after the PCC meeting; it was important that the meeting itself project the appearance of unanimity. In all likelihood the Poles and Soviets were referring to an amendment to the basic text of the 1955 Warsaw Treaty, which has 11 articles. Presumably the Romanians were expected to resist any expansion of supranational authority in the Pact, or any extension of the Pact's military responsibilities outside Europe. The use of the word "controversial" in the Polish account leaves unanswered the question of whether the Romanians were the only East Europeans who objected to Article 12.

The Poles also noted Soviet party First Secretary Brezhnev's suggestion for organizing regular monthly meetings of the foreign ministers or deputy foreign ministers of the Pact members, particularly in order to facilitate the exchange of secret information. In September 1965 Brezhnev had made similar recommendations in public. When the Poles sent another foreign ministry delegation to Moscow in April 1970, they found the Soviets still considering ways of "institutionalizing the political organs" of the Pact. In both recent meetings, February 1969 and April 1970, the Poles were noncommittal, and evidently not enthusiastic at all regarding these Soviet proposals.

The Poles were impressed, during the February 1969 encounters, with the strong Soviet condemnation of Yugoslav policy--stronger than the Soviet disapproval of Romania's independent stance. For example, Politburo member Nikolay Podgornyy complained that Yugoslavia opposed the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean but welcomed the American crews in Yugoslav ports. The Poles concluded that the Soviets "are of the opinion that the socialist countries should not take a passive attitude toward the development of the situation in Yugoslavia, because there are possibilities of responding to this country;

however, the methods and means of this response have not been worked out."

Assuming the Soviets communicated these anti-Yugoslav sentiments to the Bulgarians at about the same time, it is likely the Bulgarians read the Soviet position as endorsement for their own anti-Yugoslav polemics, focused on Yugoslav-held Macedonia. In any case, at least one Bulgarian statement since February 1969 made privately is far more extreme than anything Sofia has said publicly. In December 1969, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Ivan Bashev reportedly told the Yugoslavs that Sofia was willing to concede Belgrade's sovereignty over Macedonia in time of peace, but that in time of "crisis" the Macedonians should have Warsaw Pact protection, since the Yugoslav government was not capable of protecting them from an "imperialist" threat.

In retrospect, it seems clear that by the time the Budapest conference actually convened, the Soviets had signaled their intent to reshape the Warsaw Pact structure in order to bring the East European military establishments under tighter Soviet control. Moreover, Lipitskiy's article and Czechoslovak apprehensions suggested a Soviet intent to deploy some East European forces against China under Warsaw Pact auspices. The Soviets also seemed to sanction an intensification of political, if not military, pressure by Warsaw Pact member states against Yugoslavia. They anticipated Romanian opposition to the new arrangements in the Pact. On the other hand, there does not seem to have been much evidence of genuine Soviet concern to upgrade Pact military capabilities against NATO, although NATO's allegedly aggressive intentions were cited as justifying the changes in the Pact.

Realignment of the Pact Command Structure

Initial Soviet and East European publicity on the PCC meeting was misleading. The documents published at the meeting itself and articles in the Soviet and East European press marking the Pact's 14th anniversary did not convey a sense of major reorganization in the Pact. Moreover, the media implied that the modest changes adopted were designed to give the East European states a somewhat *stronger* voice in the conduct of Pact affairs. Also, Pact media initially gave more space to the appeal by the PCC for a European security conference, and this factor put the Pact organizational changes, at least temporarily, in the background.

Moscow evidently wanted the West to concentrate on the European security conference proposal as a distraction from other matters; the aforementioned (see page 37) Polish account of the February 1969 Polish-Soviet discussions notes that "a communique resulting from the meeting and raising the questions of peace and European security will have a suitable effect on the West, especially in view of the Czechoslovak events."

The Military Council

One of the key new elements in the Pact organizational structure, the Military Council, was not mentioned in the Budapest communique. The council held its first meeting in Moscow in December 1969 and its second in Budapest in April 1970. Both meetings were chaired by Pact Commander in Chief Yakubovskiy, the only person so far clearly identified as a member. The importance which the Soviets attach to the Military Council is reflected in two recent articles, one by Yakubovskiy himself in the Soviet party journal *Kommunist* (Number 5, March 1970), and the other by Lieutenant General I. V. Stepanyuk in *Red Star* (14 May 1970), commemorating the 15th anniversary of the Pact. Yakubovskiy states that the Pact "Combined

Command, Military Council, Staff" and other "control" organs are in charge of "directing and coordinating the activities of the Combined Armed Forces." Stepanyuk's description is essentially the same, but more carefully worded:

> Direct leadership of the Combined Armed Forces and the coordination of their activities is exercised by the Combined Command and Military Council, which in their work rely upon* the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces and other control organs.

Perhaps the most important feature of the Pact Military Council is that it makes the Pact more nearly resemble components of the Soviet armed forces. According to the Soviet *Glossary of Military Terms* (Moscow, 1966), a military council is a "collective organ" found in the five services of the Soviet armed forces and, below that level, in every military district, group of Soviet forces stationed abroad, fleet, field army, and flotilla. The commander is the chairman. The military council "directs military and political preparedness, troop education, administrative, and mobilization activity." That description implies wide-ranging authority for the council, authority extending beyond the military establishment. Indeed the *Glossary of Military Terms* stresses that the military council conducts its work in close contact with local party and government organs.

During World War II, according to Soviet historical accounts, there was a military council at every front level. This council regularly included the front commander, who acted as chairman, his deputies, the chief of staff, and the senior political officer. It did not include deputy chiefs of staff, and the political voice in decision making was normally inferior to the military voice, represented by the

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* *The Russian for "rely upon" (opirayutsya na) can also mean "are guided by."*

commander. In the Pact Military Council, if the analogy holds, Shtemenko should participate, but none of his deputies. If, as seems to be the case, most East European officers assigned or being assigned to Pact Headquarters will hold positions no higher than deputy chief of staff, the Military Council will be greatly overbalanced with Soviet officers. Finally, the ranking member of the Military Council will always be a military officer, whether or not a political officer or civilian offical attends council meetings.

In this last respect the Military Council appears distinct from the Defense Councils (or Defense Committees) in the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and evidently the other Pact member states, where the chairman is a civilian. Moreover, the establishment of the supranational Military Council raises a serious question about the future role of the national Defense Councils in Eastern Europe (see page 55).

Committee of Defense Ministers

The Committee of Defense Ministers, another new military organ, was specifically mentioned in the Budapest communique. It has met twice--at Moscow in December 1969 and Sofia the following May--both times shortly after Military Council meetings. As the name implies, the committee is composed of the Soviet and six East European defense ministers. However, membership and attendance are not limited to them. Deputies have substituted for the Hungarian and Romanian defense ministers. Pact Commander in Chief Yakubovskiy apparently chaired the Moscow meeting (see photographs on pages 42 and 43), and Bulgarian Defense Minister Dzhurov was identified as chairman at Sofia. In reporting on the latter meeting, the Bulgarian press identified Shtemenko as a member of the committee.

The Committee of Defense Ministers has no obvious counterpart in the Soviet military establishment, and it is difficult to justify its existence in strictly military terms. For the first several months after the Budapest PCC meeting, it seemed plausible that the committee was intended by the collective

judgment of the Pact members to give added prestige and institutional shape to meetings which had been held at regular intervals for several years. If that were the purpose, then the establishment of the committee, plus the assignment of additional East European officers to Pact headquarters in the summer and fall of 1969, would represent a net increase in East European authority in Pact military decision making.

One of the resolutions adopted at Budapest stipulated that each member state would appoint a deputy to the Pact commander in chief, and that these deputies would be in charge of the forces which their countries had allocated--or would allocate--to the Pact. Initially, it could be argued that this resolution, by placing other East European officers directly under the Pact commander in chief, had made the East European defense ministers *less* subject to Soviet control than before the reorganization. At the same time it appeared that the East European defense ministers retained all their former authority over their respective armed forces, including those officers who were to be assigned to Pact headquarters.

But these first impressions have proved misleading. Recent commentaries by Soviet military officers have emphasized that the Committee of Defense Ministers is entirely separate from the operational chain of command in the Pact, that it has no real authority, and that other military organs of the Pact--each one clearly dominated by the Soviets--claim substantial operational control over all major elements of the East European military establishments. Also there is a possibility, in view of Yakubovskiy's chairmanship of the committee's first meeting and Shtemenko's presence as a "member" at the second, that the East European defense ministers themselves are not as free from Soviet authority as it first seemed. In terms of military grade, Marshal Yakubovskiy outranks all of them, except his superior in the Soviet hierarchy, Marshal Grechko, and Army General Shtemenko outranks three.

The most concise indication in open sources that the Soviets regard the committee as entirely distinct

Warsaw Pact Committee of Defense Ministers

Moscow, December 1969

Marshal Yakubovskiy, at far end, center, is apparently chairing the meeting.

Soviet domination of this body is suggested by the presence of four Soviet officers: Defense Minister Grechko, Pact Commander in Chief Yakubovskiy, Pact Chief of Staff Shtemenko, and even Soviet Chief of Staff Zakharov. Defense ministers of the East European member states, except Hungary, are present; Hungary is represented by Chief of Staff Csemi.

Warsaw Pact Committee of Defense Ministers

Sofia, May 1970

Shown above, from left to right:

Romanian Deputy Minister of Armed Forces Gheorghe
Soviet Navy Commander in Chief Gorshkov
Pact Air Defense Commander Batitskiy
Pact Commander in Chief Yakubovskiy
Hungarian Defense Minister Czinege
Bulgarian Defense Minister Dzhurov
Soviet Defense Minister Grechko
East German Defense Minister Hoffman
Polish Defense Minister Jaruzelski
Czechoslovak Defense Minister Dzur
Pact Chief of Staff Shtemenko

from the operational chain of command is the formulation first used by Shtemenko in a 24 January 1970 *Red Star* article. Shtemenko noted that the Budapest meeting of the PCC approved "the provision on the Committee of Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact member states, the new provision on the Combined Armed Forces and the Combined Command, and other important documents." Shtemenko's distinction indicated that Moscow regarded the Combined Command as directly responsible for the Combined Armed Forces, and for that reason grouped them in a single provision. The Committee of Defense Ministers was not part of the Combined Command, and not directly connected to the Combined Armed Forces, and therefore the subject of a separate statute.

The aforementioned articles (pages 38 and 39) by Marshal Yakubovskiy and Lieutenant General Stepanyuk reaffirmed the distinction made by Shtemenko, and underscored the committee's lack of operational authority. The committee was to make "recommendations and suggestions"--Yakubovskiy's term--for strengthening Pact defensive capabilities and upgrading combat readiness. It was in no sense a "control" organ. Implicit in these Soviet remarks was the essentially political role of the committee--that is, it is intended by the Soviets to give the East Europeans the appearance of authority while denying them the substance.

Combined Staff

The Combined Staff of the Warsaw Pact has existed in theory since 1955, but has become a reality only in recent months. The first sign of an expansion of the staff was a mid-September 1969 report

the Combined Staff of the Pact would begin to function at the end of 1969. A building to house the staff (or headquarters) was said to be under construction near Central Airfield in Moscow. An "operational planning unit" and a "unit for the coordination of technical equipment" were being created. Formation of other elements was being temporarily deferred for lack of space.

the Combined Staff (headquarters) would be a "mere formality," in the sense that the East Europeans appointed "at the head of their respective national forces" would have "no voice or authority" in Pact-related matters. Vice Admiral Zdizislaw Studzinski, commander of the Polish navy, as the Polish appointee and as the only one--presumably the only East European--selected up to that point. whether Studzinski relinquished his authority over the Polish navy. Subsequently another Pole was identified publicly as commander of the Polish navy, but Studzinski outranks him.

Most of the details in this September 1969 report have since been confirmed. Shtemenko referred to the Pact headquarters building in the opening paragraph of his 24 January 1970 *Red Star* article. Studzinski was publicly identified as a deputy chief of staff of the Pact. At least two other East Europeans may have joined Studzinski as deputy chiefs of staff: Major General Laszlo Szilagyi, commander of Hungarian air and air defense forces, and Major General Edward Kosmel, formerly of the Main Staff of the Czechoslovak armed forces. .

In addition, a Soviet officer, Major General (now Lieutenant General) I. S. Pashuk, former chief of staff of the Siberian Military District, was identified by *Red Star* in November 1969 as "first deputy chief of staff" of the Warsaw Pact. This identification conveyed two messages. The first was that Shtemenko now had a genuine staff of his own. Second, the East Europeans on it were relegated to a "figurehead"

status. In certain circumstances, presumably, East European officers could transmit orders not only to other East European officers, but to Soviet officers. Studzinski, for instance, has been identified as commander of the "Warsaw Pact Baltic Sea Zone." Such a term could embrace naval, amphibious, and even some air forces in the Baltic area. But even in those circumstances the East Europeans on the Combined Staff remain subject to at least three Soviet officers: Pashuk, Shtemenko, and, of course, Pact Commander in Chief Yakubovskiy.

Combined Command

The Combined Command, headed by Marshal Yakubovskiy, has been radically transformed in the aftermath of the Budapest PCC meeting. Lieutenant General Stepanyuk, the author of the Pact 15th anniversary article, was identified in that article as a deputy commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact. Materials supplied by Colonel Penkovskiy and other evidence identify Stepanyuk as a specialist in artillery and tactical missiles, particularly nuclear delivery systems. Classified Pact documents indicate that Pact deputy commanders (or deputy commanders in chief) for "armament," "aviation engineering," and probably other functions have been established since late 1968. Stepanyuk's background seems to fit him for the "armament" post. In that capacity, among other functions, he probably controls the distribution of ground force tactical missile systems to the forward area and, in time of war, would direct the transmission of nuclear and chemical warheads for these systems. If an East European held the post, that would represent a genuine, not sham, increase in East European influence in Pact military affairs.

The May 1970 issue of the Soviet military journal *Rear Services and Supply* carries an article by Lieutenant General Yefim Pashtushenko concerning logistics problems in the Warsaw Pact. Pashtushenko, who had been deputy commander for rear services in the Turkestan Military District until at least August 1968, is now identified as "inspector general" of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact. This probably places him in the status of a deputy commander in chief of the Pact. Pashuk and Pashtushenko bring to the Pact recent experience acquired near the Sino-Soviet border. If the Warsaw Pact were to transfer some of its forces to the Sino-Soviet border area, that experience would presumably be useful to the two officers in their current assignments.

In May 1970 Lieutenant General Tadeusz Tuczapski was identified in the Polish press as deputy commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces--a new title--and as a Polish vice minister of defense and chief of the Training Inspectorate, his former titles. [redacted] as of this time Tuczapski also held the post of commander of a front. [redacted] These identifications, if all are correct, mean that an operational chain of command exists from Yakubovskiy through Tuczapski to all Polish ground and tactical air forces, since they would be included in Tuczapski's front. With the Polish navy under Shtemenko's de facto command (through Studzinski) and the Polish air defense forces more clearly than before under a Pact commander, the Poles would retain direct operational control over, at most, their territorial and internal security forces--about 75,000 men out of a total military

[redacted]

establishment of about 320,000. Whether Tuczapski would respond to orders from Polish Defense Minister Jaruzelski probably remains an unsettled question between Warsaw and Moscow. The precedents being established by the Polish case for other East European member states in the Pact are potentially far reaching.

According to a classified Pact document issued in August 1969, the "commander of the Warsaw Pact air defense forces (PVO)" is "also a deputy commander in chief of the Combined Armed Forces."* Marshal Pavel Batitskiy, who has been commander in chief of Soviet PVO since 1966, and was identified in that position as recently as 15 May 1970, has also been twice identified as commander of Pact PVO, most recently in July 1970. It is unusual in Soviet military practice for one commander in chief to be subordinate to another commander in chief and, as mentioned earlier, Batitskiy's predecessor in both the Soviet and Pact PVO posts was never identified as a deputy to the Pact commander in chief. There probably will be some further evolution of the Pact PVO position. In the meantime Pact PVO has achieved a more formal status of its own; it is now, administratively at any rate, more than a simple extension of Soviet PVO. It is, however, under firm Soviet control at the top level.

In any case Pact PVO has apparently been consolidated into the Combined Command since, as mentioned earlier, the commander in chief of Pact PVO was never before identified as a deputy commander in chief of the Pact. This in turn raises a question about other services of the East European armed forces--ground, air, and naval--inasmuch as East European national PVO forces (Romania and Albania excepted) have long been considered subject to special Pact (Soviet) control (see page 10). General Shtemenko uses an uncommon formulation in his 24 January 1970 *Red Star* article. In the context of discussing

Apparent Warsaw Pact Organization After 1968



**East European officers with assignments at Pact headquarters, not merely liaison officers. Four other East European generals—two Bulgarians, an East German, and a Romanian—have been identified in the Pact command or staff, but the identifications are tentative and in the case of the Romanian, doubtful.*

A "Technical Committee," probably concerned with weapons standardization, has been identified and may include certain Pact deputy commanders and deputy chiefs of staff.

East European defense ministers retain control over low-level training in their own armed forces and some other functions, mainly administrative. The Ceausescu regime does not acknowledge supranational control over any Romanian armed forces.

Moscow probably will seek to extend Pact control to East European internal security and other militarized forces remaining under the jurisdiction of East European defense or interior ministers.

results of the Budapest PCC meeting, Shtemenko states that the "Combined Armed Forces now include ground forces, air and naval forces, and also air defense forces." This in itself suggests that the Pact commander in chief must have other functional deputies besides the deputy for air defense.

On 10 July 1970 the Hungarian trade union daily *Nepszava* identified General Shtemenko as both Pact chief of staff and "first deputy commander in chief" of the Pact. Shtemenko's predecessors as Pact chief of staff had worn the other hat of deputy or first deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff, but never that of deputy or first deputy commander in chief. The post of first deputy commander in chief is evidently new. All this underscores Shtemenko's personal authority in running the Pact. More important, it confirms that the number one and number two positions in the three major Pact control organs are held by Soviet officers.

In sum, the Pact commander in chief now appears to have deputies filling primarily functional, rather than national, roles. It is the general type of command relationship that prevails in the various branches or military districts of the Soviet armed forces themselves. It is a framework for issuing orders to all major units of all Warsaw Pact forces. (See chart on page 49.)

Other Changes in the Pact Structure

The entire August 1969 issue of a classified military journal, the *Information Bulletin* published by the Polish General Staff, is devoted to elaborating principles of coordination of Warsaw Pact forces. There are strong indications that the series of articles represents the official Pact position on the subject, rather than merely a particular Polish view. It is apparent from other classified documents that the study was assigned at the end of 1968--during or shortly after the annual Pact military conference which met in Bucharest in November. It is the first time a systematic treatment of the subject has appeared in available classified Pact documents.

There are certain textual parallels between this classified document and General Shtemenko's 24 January 1970 *Red Star* article--in particular, the manner in which each discusses Soviet and East European combined operations during World War II, and the stress each places on the need to establish common Pact "views" on combined operations. Also, the emphasis placed in the Polish document on expanding the use of the Russian language seems far greater than the Poles would recommend on their own initiative.

Considered as a set of instructions for the entire Pact, the document is

significant not only for corroborating organizational changes noted in other sources, but for anticipating further changes. The document refers not only to the headquarters of the forces in Moscow, but also to the "air force headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces" and the "headquarters of the Combined Allied Fleet." Separate naval and air force headquarters have not yet been confirmed by other sources.

One passage in the document indicates that the Soviets for the first time are establishing fronts as a permanent echelon in peacetime:

> On the front level, it is possible and, at the same time necessary, to establish coordinated action between operational formations of this command level, especially between allied fronts, during peacetime. Coordinated action is conducted, within the framework of the Combined Armed Forces organization of interallied coordination, under the direct control of the command of these forces and with the participation of national general staffs of the Warsaw Pact countries. Coordinated action conducted during peacetime is expressed by the operation orders; fragments of these orders are available to various general staffs.

Subsequent information identifying a Polish officer as now holding the post of front commander--not just as a wartime contingency measure or for special exercises--reinforces the point in the above passage (see page 47). But questions remain regarding the meaning of "coordinated action" and the personnel to be used for that purpose. Part of the answer lies elsewhere in this issue of the *Bulletin*; General Shtemenko himself seems to have supplied the remainder.

The document indicates that coordinated action should be organized during peacetime according to one basic method with several generally consistent variations. The document illustrates the method and indicates that it was tested in a recent maneuver. The Combined Armed Forces, in charge of the entire operation, assigned an "operations directing staff (command)" [sic] to exercise direct command of troops. The staff consisted of "operations groups of the general staffs of the allied nations" whose troops took part in the operations.

As for the respective defense ministers, they were given the "opportunity" to direct their own forces involved in the exercise, but only by going through "the operations group in the operations directing staff and the national general staff." Apparently the East European defense ministers thereby have lost significant control over their own forces even during a peacetime maneuver. This scheme contrasts with the situation before mid-1968 described in the 22 November 1969 issue of *Obrana Lidu* (discussed on page 6).

The point emerges more clearly from Shtemenko's explanation of the process of coordination. In a recent article in the Soviet journal *Znamya* (May-June 1970), Shtemenko recalls how during World War II representatives of the Supreme Command sent from Moscow to coordinate operations involving more than one front were given the right to assume command of the forces of the fronts. Shtemenko in all likelihood expects what the *Bulletin* calls the "operations directing staff (command)" to have similar powers under the new Pact arrangements.

In addition, the *Bulletin* indicates that Pact exercises should afford commands and staffs at various levels in the Pact experience in leading

units of other nationalities. This concept evidently was tested in a large Soviet-Czechoslovak exercise held in February 1970. According to Soviet and Czechoslovak press coverage, the exercise featured the exchange of Soviet and Czechoslovak commanders down to battalion level.

An obvious prerequisite for this type of exchange is the overcoming of language barriers. The Polish document strongly urges expanded use of Russian. Here, too, the Czechoslovak military establishment, however reluctantly, is apparently setting the pace for the rest of the Pact.

Finally, the *Bulletin* lays the groundwork for Pact encroachment on the East European militarized security forces, heretofore considered one element of the East European military establishments clearly not subject to supranational authority. The document declares that the "area of operations" must be prepared in peacetime, through "mutual interallied agreements."

Part of this might involve the "sharing of appropriations for defense purposes." A "unified system of communications" should be provided for in advance,

as well as the organization of ammunition depots and matters concerning maintenance and construction of roads, bridges, and airfields. Moreover, "territorial defense units and militarized units of the Transportation Ministry" must be designated to perform "works related to transportation maintenance." Supranational control over Polish territorial defense units would effectively remove the remainder of the Polish military establishment from the Polish defense minister's authority. The effect of having all East European armed forces under Pact control would be that in a crisis between Moscow and an East European regime, there might be no military forces whatever to respond to a direct order from the East European regime.

Indeed, the abovementioned section of the document implies supranational control over virtually all military movement on Polish territory in time of crisis or war. According to a classified Polish critique of the Pact exercise "Lato-67," held in May-June 1967, such military movement should fall under the general jurisdiction of the Polish National Defense Committee (KOK), and specifically, under the Polish National Defense Ministry functioning as the Military Department of the KOK. But this August 1969 document does not mention the Defense Ministry in this connection, nor does it contain any reference whatsoever to the KOK. It therefore appears that the powers of the KOK and of its counterparts in other East European countries--except Romania--have been drastically curtailed, at least in theory.

The role of the various Soviet Warsaw Pact representatives to the various East European member states may be expanding. In Czechoslovakia a political officer, Lieutenant General P. F. Tyurnev, has been identified as part of the Soviet Warsaw Pact mission.

Possibly other Soviet political officers were posted to Pact missions prior to the current reorganization, but none had been identified. It is more likely that only in the wake of the Czechoslovak crisis have the Soviets realized the need to have closer Soviet supervision of the East European armed forces political administrations. In contrast to the expanding Soviet military presence in the East European capitals, the status of the East European liaison officers at Pact headquarters (not to be confused with the new East European appointees to the Pact Combined Command and Combined Staff) has undergone no evident change. They seem to have no power whatsoever to influence important decisions taken by the Pact.

Future Missions for Pact Forces

Comments in the Soviet media marking the Pact's 15th anniversary credited the Pact either directly or indirectly with an extraordinary range of successes. The list enumerated by Yakubovskiy in the May 1970 issue of the *Military-Historical Journal* includes the Berlin crisis of 1961, Middle Eastern crises in 1956, 1958 (Syria and Iraq), and 1967, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Cuba in 1962, and Vietnam. With the rhetoric sufficiently discounted, it appears that the Soviets have signaled the downgrading, in relative importance, of the central region of NATO as a focal point of Warsaw Pact concern. Stated in another way, this means that Moscow's concerns with developments in other geographic areas have crowded onto the same stage formerly dominated by "aggressive NATO circles," "West German revanchists," and the like.

China is apparently one of these growing concerns for the Pact. This particular article by Yakubovskiy does not mention China. Yakubovskiy has attacked China on other occasions, however.

Since the Budapest meeting, reports have indicated that certain East European contingents--Polish and Czechoslovak were specifically mentioned--have already been sent to the Chinese border. None of these reports has been confirmed by hard evidence. It would be difficult, however, to distinguish East European from Soviet along the more remote portions of the border, The presence of small East European contingents would serve as a gesture of Pact solidarity--the kind of gesture Moscow wanted during the Czechoslovak crisis. Larger East European contingents--for example, more than one division from each East European state--might create various problems for Moscow in Eastern Europe. On the other hand it is difficult to imagine an East European unit stationed along the Sino-Soviet border or in Mongolia attempting to defect to the Chinese.

The USSR-Czechoslovak and USSR-Romanian treaties signed this year, like the treaties signed between Moscow and both Hungary and Bulgaria in 1967, all contain a provision which implicitly commits the East European signatory to assist the USSR militarily if the latter becomes involved in conflicts outside Europe. That provision applies to China, and it might also apply to the Middle East.

Poland and East Germany are not directly committed by either bilateral treaties with the USSR or by the published text of the Warsaw Treaty to extra-European conflicts. Nevertheless the Poles at least are conscious of Moscow's desire for East European help against China. Shortly before May 1970, "representatives from the Soviet General Staff" urged the Polish Defense Ministry and Gomulka to upgrade Polish defense spending sharply. The Poles acceded to some Soviet requests but, significantly, refused others. "there is mounting pressure to increase the combat effectiveness of the Warsaw Pact countries. The basic reason for this change in policy is the Chinese situation." Presumably the increased combat readiness of Polish and other East European forces would give Moscow the option either of withdrawing some Soviet forces from opposite NATO or of committing certain East European units to the Chinese border.

Another apparent new responsibility for the Pact--but also not specifically mentioned in the Yakubovskiy *Military-Historical Journal* article--is to serve as an antidote to dissident Communist states in the Balkans, particularly Romania, and possibly Yugoslavia and Albania. General Shtemenko's more than historical interest in reminiscing about Soviet World War II

operations in Romania has already been cited. The only activity in which Lieutenant General Pashuk has been noted since he became Shtemenko's first deputy was a lecture he delivered to a military conference on the lessons of World War II combat operations in southeastern Europe.

Shtemenko has repeatedly attempted to use his Pact authority to influence Romanian officers. At the first gathering of chiefs of staff of Pact members which he chaired in May 1969 he evidently tried to have the Romanians agree to host Pact maneuvers on Romanian territory. What troubles and angers the Romanians, apparently, is that Shtemenko or a Soviet officer acting on his behalf repeatedly tries to bypass not only Ceausescu, who is Romania's commander in chief, but also Romanian Armed Forces Minister Ion Ionita. The Romanians have reason to fear that Shtemenko is trying in this way to subvert the Ceausescu regime.

Shtemenko's article on the Warsaw Pact in the 24 January 1970 *Red Star* probably was intended, among other purposes, as a polemic against the Romanians on the proper role of an East European armed force within the Pact. A major article by Romanian Armed Forces Minister Ionita was printed in *Red Star* the following day. It is likely that the editors of *Red Star* had Ionita's article in hand several days in advance, and that Moscow was willing to print heresy, but only after orthodoxy was proclaimed.

The contrast between the two articles is extreme in what is said and not said about the Pact. Whereas Shtemenko cites the "very important decisions" taken at the Budapest PCC meeting, Ionita mentions neither Budapest, nor any Pact organs, nor any recent changes in the Pact. Shtemenko claims that the Pact Combined Command directs the major activities of the "ground forces, air and naval forces, and also air defense forces" which are "allocated" to the Combined Armed

Forces. Ionita on the other hand does not refer to any such allocation but rather asserts that the Romanian party and state organs control the major activities, in war and peace, of the Romanian armed forces.

Finally, for Shtemenko, "socialist" military collaboration is "embodied in the Warsaw Pact." For Ionita, Romania has not only an "obligation within the framework of the Pact" but an "international duty of military collaboration with *all* socialist countries." Ionita was implying, as did Ceausescu in an address on 5 February 1970, that Romania reserved the right to seek military alliances with Yugoslavia, Albania, or China.

Romania does not yet have, in any meaningful sense, military collaboration with any state outside the Warsaw Pact. It does have, as measured by press comments in Yugoslavia, Albania, and Communist China, strong sympathy from these states in resisting encroachments on Romanian sovereignty by the reorganized Warsaw Pact. The other Communist states appear to recognize that Romania's predicament is in great part their predicament as well. They claim publicly that the Pact reorganization is aimed rather at their sovereignty than at NATO.

This claim has considerable merit. Nevertheless the proposition that the reorganization of the Warsaw Pact would not alter Pact capabilities against NATO must be examined more closely. On the one hand, the full unification of Soviet and East European military capabilities would enhance capabilities against NATO in particular and the West in general. The expanded Pact headquarters, for example, could facilitate coordination between both Soviet and East European theater forces opposite NATO and Soviet forces not formally in the Pact but able to support it--Soviet PVO, navy, long range air force, and strategic rocket forces. Also, Moscow might feel more willing to furnish the latest military equipment to East European units if an adequate number of Soviet officers were regularly posted to those units. In time of crisis or war, nuclear and chemical warhead

distribution could be effected with greater smoothness and security from Moscow's standpoint. In disarmament negotiations Moscow's range of options would be broader if the distinctions between Soviet and non-Soviet forces were substantially erased. Moreover, the psychological impact on the West of what in effect would be one huge Soviet army would be demoralizing.

But over the near term, the attempt at such unification would tend to produce virtually the opposite result. For example, in order to adapt themselves to unfamiliar Soviet procedures, including the use of the Russian language, experienced East European military personnel would have to "unlearn" a portion of their military skills. Certain useful items of military equipment in East European inventories might achieve instant obsolescence. On the political side, the encroachment on East European sovereignty would crystallize anti-Soviet sentiment among normally pro-Soviet officers and civilian officials in Eastern Europe. The unifying of the Pact would slow centrifugal currents in NATO and possibly prompt the submission of new applications for membership in NATO from nonaligned states on the periphery of the Pact.

The Soviets probably realize that the short term effects of the Pact reorganization could be counterproductive as regards NATO, and would lose them more friends in Eastern Europe. But Moscow seems to fear the unification of NATO far less than it fears the continual erosion of Soviet authority in Eastern Europe. In order to maintain that authority in Eastern Europe and in the Communist world generally, Moscow appears to seek not friends or allies, but docile subjects whose behavior would not differ greatly from that of the majority of Soviet citizens today. Presumably the stages of acquisition of these subjects would on appropriate anniversaries be celebrated by Shtemenko, Yakubovskiy, and their cohorts, with appropriate citations from Lenin and perhaps Stalin, as further "successes" for the Warsaw Pact and the "socialist community."

Prospects for the Future of the Warsaw Pact: Some Hypotheses

If the foregoing analysis of trends in the Warsaw Pact is generally accurate, most or all of the following indicators should appear over the next year or so.

The Warsaw Pact military structure will continue to expand. Additional East Europeans and Soviets probably will be identified at the apex of the Pact structure, that is, on the Pact Combined Command, Military Council, Staff, and Technical Committee. The Military Council will have a majority or at least a strong plurality of Soviet officers. Air force headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces, and one or more combined fleet command headquarters--probably one for the Baltic and another for the Black Sea--will be established.

Political deputies to the Soviet Warsaw Pact representatives will be identified in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria.

[redacted] whether Marshal Batitskiy will retain the title of commander of Warsaw Pact PVO is an open question. Batitskiy may appoint a deputy to administer those responsibilities, or another Soviet officer may assume command of the Soviet PVO, allowing the Warsaw Pact PVO commander--whether Batitskiy or someone else--to concentrate his energies on Pact matters.

General Shtemenko will become more prominent. An exceedingly ambitious man, Shtemenko seems to be a prime candidate for promotion to marshal and,

depending on geriatric factors, to the posts now occupied by Marshal Zakharov (chief of the Soviet General Staff) or Marshal Yakubovskiy, or even Marshal Grechko. Shtemenko is believed to have enemies in the Soviet high command, however, particularly among officers closely associated with former party leader Khrushchev. Shtemenko's friends in the military establishment are, by and large, Stalinists. His career in a sense is a barometer of the prevailing political climate in the Soviet Union. If Shtemenko were suddenly demoted, as he was shortly after the death of Stalin, it would signify a significant reversal of basic political trends in the USSR, and therefore in the Warsaw Pact as well.

There probably will be a significant increase in the number of military exercises held under Pact auspices. At national exercises of division level or above there will be, as a rule, some high ranking Pact representative as a participant. Moreover, an increasing number of Pact exercises will include East European territorial defense forces and other types of internal security units, as the Pact extends its authority over the entire military establishments of each East European member state--Romania for the present excepted. East European forces will increasingly use the Russian language in internal communications. There will be more exercises and other forms of direct military collaboration between Soviet and East European forces, particularly in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.

East European combat forces will appear along the Sino-Soviet border, although there may be a considerable time lag in detecting their presence. In addition to Polish and Czechoslovak units, already rumored to be present, there will be Bulgarian, Hungarian, and East German units, but no Romanian units as long as Ceausescu is in power. The heaviest concentrations of such East European units probably will be in the areas of Chita and Alma-Ata where, according to unconfirmed reports, some East European military personnel have already been sent.

Mongolia's association with the Warsaw Pact will become more apparent. Mongolian representatives probably will attend formal Pact meetings. As far as Mongolia itself is concerned, this will not signify a very great change; in effect, Mongolia already is approaching the status of a Union Republic of the USSR. The significance will lie in the formal extension of Warsaw Pact responsibilities to northeast Asia.

There will be an increased emphasis on the adoption of uniform standards for the production and use of military equipment. There could be a proliferation of military equipment items, such as special personnel carriers, more suitable for handling riots or conventional wars in Eastern Europe than for nuclear war against NATO. Western observers may see new uniforms, decorations, and unit symbols, expressing the solidarity of Warsaw Pact member states.

There probably will be a token extension of the Pact's aegis to the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Bulgarian warships increasingly will appear alongside the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron. Selected East European Pact military personnel--Romanians excepted--may turn up at SAM sites or in the skies of the UAR or Syria. The value added to Arab military capabilities by the East European presence--for instance, by Hungarian pilots instructing Syrian trainees in Russian--would probably be quite limited. The formal inclusion of an Arab state in the Pact does not seem likely, despite the Pact commander in chief's occasional verbal efforts to spur the Arabs on against the Israelis.

The Hungarian and Czechoslovak defense ministers, both potential troublemakers from the Soviet point of view, will become conspicuously less active in Pact affairs and even in the running of their respective armed forces.

Poland will show itself in the next several months as a major dissenter to the process of change in the Warsaw Pact. Care must be taken in distinguishing Polish arguments with Moscow about the *means* of the Pact (such as the price of tactical missile systems) from arguments about the *ends* of the Pact (for instance, whether Polish internal security forces, which helped to keep Gomulka in power in 1956 in his confrontation with the Soviets, should now be surrendered to supranational authority).

The symptoms of Polish discontent with the changes in the Pact are already present. The Polish military press, perhaps to assuage the fears of its readers, censored the controversial parts of the 24 January 1970 article by General Shtemenko. When the Polish version of the article finally appeared in mid-May, the Poles had altered Shtemenko's original text. For example, the original description of the Warsaw Pact as "a single combat family" had been changed to read "a military family of equals."

Other signs of Polish dissidence should appear, such as mass transfers of high ranking Polish officers, and a struggle within the Polish party leadership itself. Concerted Polish opposition to the Pact changes could slow or halt them, whereas Romanian, Yugoslav, and Albanian objections may already have been discounted by the Soviets.

Soviet difficulties with Romania will nevertheless become more acute. Romania will be under increasing pressure to host a Warsaw Pact exercise on its territory. If Ceausescu yields, it will constitute a significant first step toward a reversal of Romania's position of autonomy within the Warsaw Pact. In such a posture of capitulation, Ceausescu and Armed Forces Minister Ionita would be more vulnerable to Soviet pressures for their removal. If, on the other hand, Ceausescu and Ionita continue to refuse to host a Pact exercise on Romanian territory, Yakubovskiy

and Shtemenko can be expected to recommend a Pact invasion. The Brezhnev regime probably would accept this recommendation. Whatever the scenario, a major Soviet pressure play to bring the Romanians back into line is a near term prospect.

In the meantime, there probably will be a number of signs of genuine collaboration among Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania, and China. In particular, Yugoslavia and Albania will draw perceptibly closer together. The Yugoslavs have already told the Soviets that they regard Albania's independence as vital to their own. Albanian and Yugoslav military communications should reflect the new political relationship. There are already signs of Romanian interest in the purchase of Yugoslav arms. Beyond this, China may begin to supply military equipment and spare parts to Romania and Yugoslavia, not just to Albania. If Romania is invaded by the Pact within the next year or so, however, the other three Communist states will lend little more than moral encouragement.

The rationale for the Warsaw Pact changes will condition the Soviet response to NATO's initiatives on Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in various ways. The Soviets probably will show great interest in reducing their European commitments so that they can augment their overall military capabilities against China. On the other hand, the Soviets may prove unwilling to agree on a reduction of their own forces in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. This would indicate a Soviet preference for keeping Soviet forces dispersed as widely as possible throughout East Europe to act as a reliable police force--more reliable than any East European military establishment at present.

The alleged threat from the West and from "imperialism" in general will be used by the Soviets to justify further compromises of East European sovereignty. A formula, reported to have been forced by the Soviet party Politburo upon the Dubcek regime in the Moscow confrontation in late August 1968,

states that the "aggressive intrigues of imperialism" demand the "strengthening and increased efficiency of the defensive systems of the Warsaw Pact and of other organs, as well as forms of cooperation among socialist countries."

At the Polish Party Congress in November 1968 Brezhnev expressed the doctrine of the limited sovereignty of "socialist states." Since that time, Soviet propagandists* have developed the theme by drawing explicit analogies between the formation of the Soviet Union from diverse ethnic groups and the desired evolution of the "socialist community." Over the next year or so this message probably will be stated with greater frequency, and endorsed by the Politburo.

It probably will be accompanied by a tightening of Soviet control over the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the establishment of a Soviet-dominated committee or council of Pact foreign ministers, and Soviet promotion of closer working relationships between Soviet mass organizations--labor unions, youth, and cultural groups--and their counterparts in every Pact member state. Thus it will become clear that the Soviets view the changes in the Warsaw Pact as part of a broad trend toward the full scale military, economic, and political integration of the USSR's "socialist" allies under Moscow's control. In other words, the Soviets envision the Warsaw Pact as the foundation for a larger USSR.

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* *Sh. Sanakoyev, "The Leninist Theory and Practice of Proletarian Internationalism,"* International Life, *No. 4, April 1969; K. Ivanov, "A Problem Raised by the Epoch,"* Znamya, *No. 6, June 1970. The "problem" for Communists, according to Ivanov, is to establish "a new sociohistorical community of people (the socialist commonwealth of states), which is higher than a nation or even one multinational socialist state."*

Summary

A study of recent evidence suggests, as one interpretation, that the Soviets have embarked on a reorganization of the Warsaw Pact designed to subject East European armed forces to the same Soviet control as exists in the Soviet armed forces. Other interpretations include the view that the East Europeans may gain a greater voice in Pact decision making, and another view which holds that the combination of Soviet pressure and East European counterpressure will lead to a stand-off, with no real change at all.

The Warsaw Pact structure which prevailed from 1955 through 1968 failed from the Soviet point of view to ensure in times of crisis the voluntary compliance of key elements of the East European military establishments. The East European defense ministers were among those key elements. As deputy commanders in chief of the Pact they controlled all their regular combat forces, even if part or all of these forces were formally "allocated" to the Pact. Officials in charge of militarized security and paramilitary forces were apt to be responsive to nationalistic currents in the East European Communist parties.

The Czechoslovak crisis was one in a series of events which demonstrated to the Soviets that even East European political officers could not be counted on by Moscow to influence the defense minister or act as counterweights to "revisionist" or anti-Soviet elements in the party. On the contrary, the political officers demonstrated that they were capable of spearheading opposition to Moscow.

Recent events indicate that the remedy the Soviets have devised provides for a restructuring of the Pact in order to place it under the firm control of Soviet military officers. The military structure of the Pact is to become in effect part of the structure of the Soviet armed forces. The Soviet officer best suited to administer this transformation in collaboration

with the Pact commander in chief is the new chief of the Pact General Staff, General Sergey Shtemenko.

The major changes in the Pact structure formally ratified at the Budapest conference of the Political Consultative Committee give the East European states the appearance of authority while denying them the substance. The Committee of Defense Ministers effectively removes the East European defense ministers from direct operational control over their own forces. Direct operational control will henceforth be entrusted to the Pact Combined Command, Military Council, and Staff. From evidence and inference it appears that these three bodies are multinational but overwhelmingly dominated by the Soviets.

Classified Pact documents indicate that compatible if not similar changes--from front level down to East European tactical units--are to be anticipated. East European internal security units seem destined to fall under some form of Pact--and therefore Soviet--control, with all the political consequences that implies for the East European regimes.

As a symptom of the new order, the Russian language will probably become widely adopted for military communication, even when East Europeans talk to one another. In general, the command procedures which the Soviets employed to control East European units on their side in World War II are likely to serve as a model for the future. All this implies a reversal of the trend of the early and middle Sixties which favored the development of indigenous forces under indigenous commands.

Dissent against the new procedures in the Pact has appeared in various East European countries (not to mention China). The Soviets almost certainly expected the Romanians to be uncooperative. There is very little evidence, however, that the Soviets intend to adjust the Pact structure to accommodate Romanian objections. On the contrary, the Soviets seem determined to end these objections, either by pressure, subversion, or possibly outright force.

Support for Romania's stance from Yugoslavia, Albania, and China reflects their awareness that Bucharest's present problems may be their future problems. The most significant impediment to the changes Moscow seeks could be reluctance on the part of the Poles, whose full participation seems essential if the changes are to have any meaning at all.

Ultimately Moscow probably will override the dissenters, one way or another, and the dominant currents in the Pact will be centripetal. The Pact may acquire at least one new member, Mongolia. Apparently the Pact will shoulder new responsibilities, such as strengthening the Soviet position along the Chinese border and perhaps in the eastern Mediterranean - Middle East area. The central region of NATO will have to share the limelight with these new Pact concerns. Over the long term, the successful unification of Soviet and East European military capabilities would significantly enhance the Pact threat to NATO in particular and the West in general. For the near term, however, the attempt to achieve such unification would degrade the threat.

Beyond the purely military sphere, the changes in the Pact may be only one aspect of a broad Soviet effort to fuse the economic and political institutions of Eastern Europe into a far closer relationship with the USSR than now exists. The doctrine reflected by recent changes may prove to have laid the groundwork for some type of formal structure for the "socialist community."

[redacted]