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Intelligence Report

THE SOVIET-ROMANIAN ASSISTANCE PACT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
15 September 1970

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

The Soviet-Romanian Assistance Pact

Summary

In July 1970 the Soviets and Romanians signed a new 20-year friendship and mutual assistance treaty in a spirit of grudging recognition of political realities. Its importance to the Soviet Union stems largely from the fact that it confirms wayward Romania's membership in a legal pact of mutual defense with the USSR, in a way that buttresses the Warsaw Pact. Romania, on the other hand, has chosen to interpret the treaty as implicit Soviet recognition of Bucharest's independent policies. The Romanian treaty was the last to be renewed of the bilateral defense pacts concluded between Moscow and its East European allies after World War II. Its signing permits the Soviets to present a nominally solid front to the West and, if need be, to the East.

The six treaties that the Soviets have now signed--with Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania--are not uniform in content, tone, or outlook. Examined separately, each appears to reflect the state of relations with the USSR at the time of signing. Taken together, the treaties suggest the Soviet Union's changing requirements of its allies, as individual states and as members of an alliance. But, particularly in the case of Romania, the treaties illustrate that, contrary to the situation 20 years ago, some of the East Europeans are able successfully to counter Soviet demands and to write in some protection for their own interests.

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The content of the Romanian-Soviet treaty differs strikingly from that of the treaties with East Germany and Poland. When these latter treaties were renewed, in 1964 and 1965 respectively, they were drafted in a modified form of the cold-war language used in the old treaties that were aimed essentially at West Germany. In form and philosophical approach, the Romanian treaty resembles the Hungarian and Bulgarian treaties signed in 1967, which were drawn up on a new model sidestepping or toning down the anti-German focus of the older texts. Changes in East-West relations and growing Soviet apprehensions over Communist China played a role in reshaping these later treaties.

The sharpest contrast is between the Czechoslovak and Romanian treaties, both of which were signed in 1970. The Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty, first renewed in 1963, was rewritten following the 1968 invasion to incorporate the so-called Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty. The Romanian treaty was signed as it was drafted prior to the invasion and contains no such language. From the Soviet standpoint, this deficiency in the Romanian treaty renders it less useful in reinforcing Moscow's aim of dominating the other Communist states. Probably nothing short of a direct threat of intervention, however, could have forced the Romanians to acquiesce in the kind of limitations on their sovereignty accepted by Czechoslovakia.

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Background

1. The old Romanian-Soviet treaty, concluded in 1948 ran out its official term on 4 February 1968, when an automatic five-year extension clause came into effect. The two sides had already begun to negotiate a new treaty in 1967, and, after several months of hard bargaining, initials were affixed to an agreed draft in the spring of 1968. Final signature by the chiefs of government and party was delayed by the rapid development of the Czechoslovak crisis in the spring and summer of that year and the consequent increased strains in Romanian-Soviet relations. After the Romanian party leader's outraged denunciation of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, signature of the treaty was out of the question for the time being.

2. The politically symbolic signing was subsequently set for the summer of 1969, and both party Secretary General Brezhnev and Premier Kosygin were slated to go to Bucharest for the ceremony. They canceled the trip abruptly, however, when the Romanians, seizing a rare opportunity to display their independence in foreign policy, agreed to a



Soviet Premier Kosygin (seated at left) and Romanian Premier Maurer (seated on right) sign the new bilateral treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance on 7 July 1970. Standing directly behind Kosygin are CPSU Politburo member Suslov and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko; Romanian Foreign Minister Manescu is to the far right.

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visit by President Nixon just prior to the scheduled Soviet visit. After another cooling-off period, Secretary Brezhnev publicly announced that he intended to go to Bucharest early in July 1970 to sign the treaty. At the last minute, pleading illness, he reneged and sent Premier Kosygin in his stead. Kosygin and Romanian Premier Maurer signed the treaty on 7 July; it was the first such bilateral treaty to lack the signatures of the chiefs of the respective parties.

3. The Romanians, with justification, took Brezhnev's absence as a deliberate affront. Party first secretary Ceausescu, who is also head of state, was deeply angered by Brezhnev's slight, and he stuck strictly to minimum requirements of protocol during Kosygin's three-day stay. The Romanian leader was not present for the arrival of the Soviet delegation, nor even for the treaty signing, and he received the delegation only once.

4. The Soviets further annoyed the Romanians by publishing a TASS summary of the treaty's contents on the same day it was signed, in violation of a reported understanding that the treaty text would be published simultaneously by both countries on the following day. The TASS summary stressed only those parts of the treaty--especially the provision for mutual military defense in the case of attack from any quarter--that most clearly underlined Soviet interests. On the day after Kosygin's departure, Ceausescu presented the Romanian interpretation of the treaty and did not once mention the controversial mutual defense clause.

The Preamble

5. The preamble of the new Soviet-Romanian treaty sets the tone for the rest of the text in a much more thorough and exact manner than did the earlier one. The old treaty said merely that an affinity of views and a desire to cooperate, especially in the economic sphere, formed the basis for concluding the alliance. The net effect of the Romanian influence in recasting the preamble of the new treaty was to narrow somewhat the limits of Romania's relations with the USSR.

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PREAMBLES: EXCERPTS ON THE WARSAW PACT

Romania - USSR: ...Realizing that the international solidarity of the socialist states rests on the socialist community, on the unity of fundamental aims and aspirations, on the common interests of struggle against imperialism and reaction, Romania and the USSR are fully determined to tirelessly strengthen the unity and cohesion of the socialist countries and *steadfastly* observe the obligations envisaged in...the Warsaw Pact...*during the period of the validity of the pact concluded in response to the NATO threat...* (July 1970)

Czechoslovakia - USSR: ...Confirming that *the support, consolidation and protection of socialist gains, achieved at the price of the heroic efforts and selfless labor of each people, are a common internationalist duty of socialist countries*, consistently and undeviatingly coming out for the strengthening of the unity and cohesion of all countries of the socialist commonwealth, based on the community of the social systems... (the CSSR and the USSR)...(are)...fully resolved to *strictly* observe the obligations stemming from the...Warsaw Treaty.... (May 1970)

Hungary - USSR: ...Guided by the intention to incessantly strengthen the unity and cohesion of all the countries of the socialist community, *complying consistently* with the obligations arising out of the Warsaw Treaty.... (September 1967)

Bulgaria - USSR: ...Filled with resolve tirelessly to strengthen the unity and cohesion of the countries of the socialist community and *unswervingly* to observe the obligations envisaged in the Warsaw Pact.... (May 1967)

Poland - USSR: ...West German militarism threatens security in Europe...(Poland and the USSR are) determined to observe the obligations of the Warsaw Pact.... (April 1965)

East Germany - USSR: ...Fully determined to unite their efforts in order to counteract effectively, on the basis of the Warsaw Treaty...the threat to international security and peace created by the *revanchist and militarist forces* which are striving for a revision of the results of World War II... (June 1964)

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6. In this respect it differs from the other treaties. The Bulgarian preamble, for instance, takes special note of the economic cooperation between the USSR and Bulgaria "characterized by close ties between the basic branches of the national economy," but the Romanian treaty expresses only a desire for strengthening relations. The Bulgarian preamble, like the recent Czechoslovak treaty, pays homage to the "international socialist division of labor" within the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA); neither the Romanian nor the Hungarian preamble even mentions CEMA.

7. Most significantly, and also unlike the other treaties, the Romanian document limits its obligation within the Warsaw Pact to "the period of the validity of the pact concluded in response to the NATO threat." This phrasing refers to a provision in the Warsaw Pact treaty that would dissolve the Pact in the event that a system of European security is established. For Romanian purposes this is a highly significant and potentially useful clause because it confines the applicability of the Warsaw Pact to Europe and envisions a day when the Warsaw Pact and NATO will both be unneeded.

8. The Romanian preamble expands on a section in the Bulgarian preamble dealing with what might best be called coexistence. The Bulgarian treaty simply calls for "strengthening of peace and security in Europe and throughout the world," but the Romanian preamble goes on to specify that this means the development of cooperation with any state "irrespective of its social order." This particular wording has been interpreted by Bucharest as sanctioning Romania's independent foreign policy and its ties with Western governments.

9. The Romanian treaty differs from the Czechoslovak in a major respect: it is devoid of language that gives the Soviet Union the right to intervene in the internal affairs of other socialist countries. The "support, consolidation, and protection of socialist gains" is stated both in the preamble and in Article 5 of the Czechoslovak treaty as "the common

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internationalist duty of socialist countries." This is the essence of the so-called Brezhnev doctrine, ~~the Soviet theorem that has been advanced as ex post facto justification for the invasion of Czechoslovakia.~~ The Romanian treaty contains not even the hint of such an idea.

The Treaty Text

10. The body of the treaty includes 11 articles, which cover all aspects of bilateral relations. In format, there seems to be no set formula for the Eastern Europe - Soviet bilateral treaties, but the Romanian treaty is most similar to the Bulgarian treaty.*

11. Article 1 of the Romanian, Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Czechoslovak treaties enshrines the principles of mutual friendship and aid on the basis of respect for sovereignty, equal rights, and non-interference in internal affairs--the cardinal rules of Romanian foreign policy--in basically the same words. The Romanians, however, were successful in adding "respect for national independence" to the standard formula. In addition, Romania's Article 1 tempers a promise in the Bulgarian first article that the contracting parties will act in the spirit of strengthening socialist unity. In the Romanian document, it has become a promise only to "increase the exchange of experience in building socialism."

12. Article 2, dealing with economic cooperation, is basically the same as Article 2 in the Hungarian and Bulgarian treaties. All duly note the need to develop cooperation within CEMA, but none goes so far as the Czechoslovak Article 2 in calling for "socialist economic integration" within CEMA.

13. Article 3 in all four treaties deals with cultural and social cooperation in almost exactly the same language.

**For purposes of this comparison, the Polish and East German treaties--both drafted on the older anti-West German model--will be largely disregarded.*

ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Romania - USSR, Article 2: The high contracting parties will continue proceeding from the principles of relations between the socialist states and the principles of mutual aid and the international socialist division of labor, to develop and deepen mutually advantageous economic cooperation, and also will *facilitate* the development of economic relations and cooperation within the framework of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance and with other countries of the socialist community. (1970)

Czechoslovakia - USSR, Article 2: The high contracting parties, proceeding from the principles of friendly mutual assistance and the international socialist division of labour, shall further develop and deepen the mutually advantageous bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation. The sides will contribute to the further development of economic ties and cooperation, to the *socialist economic integration* of member states of CEMA. (1970)

Hungary - USSR, Article 2: On the basis of mutual fraternal assistance and in conformity with the principles of the international socialist division of work, the high contracting parties will develop and deepen by all means at their disposal their mutually advantageous bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation; in addition they will *contribute* to the continued development of economic relations and cooperation within the framework of CEMA. (1967)

Bulgaria - USSR, Article 2: The high contracting parties will continue, proceeding from the principles of mutual aid and the international socialist division of labor, to develop and deepen mutually advantageous economic cooperation, and will *link even more closely the most important branches of the national economy*, with the aim of further rapprochement of the economy of the two countries. The parties will also *promote* the future development of economic relations and cooperation within the framework of CEMA. (1967)

Poland - USSR, Article 2: The contracting parties will develop and deepen economic and scientific-technological cooperation based on the principle of mutual advantage and friendly assistance, and will *participate in the realization of multi-sided cooperation* within the framework of CEMA. (1965)

East Germany - USSR, Article 8: On the basis of mutual advantage and unselfish fraternal cooperation, in accordance with the principles of CEMA, the high contracting parties will develop and consolidate in every way the economic relations between both states, to carry out, in accordance with the principles of international socialist division of labor, the *coordination of national economic plans*, specialization and cooperation of production and to *ensure the highest productivity through a rapprochement and coordination of the national economies of both states*. (1964)

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14. Article 4 is a softened version of that part of the same article in the Bulgarian and Hungarian treaties calling for strengthening world socialist unity. The Romanian version states mildly that the contracting parties will "steadfastly come forth for the development of friendship and cooperation among socialist states..."

15. Article 5, like the same article in the Hungarian and Bulgarian treaties, commits the signatories to a policy of "peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems." It also includes that part of Article 4 in the Hungarian and Bulgarian treaty calling for defense against imperialism and reaction, general and complete disarmament, the liquidation of colonialism, and support for national liberation movements.

16. Article 6 takes up European security. Here again, as in Article 1, the Romanians have managed to get in their pet formulation on "the principles of sovereignty and national independence, equality, mutual advantage and noninterference in internal affairs." Article 6 also sanctions Balkan cooperation, which appears under Article 5 in the Bulgarian treaty.

17. Article 7, comparable to Article 6 in the Bulgarian treaty and Article 5 in the Hungarian treaty, commits the subscribing parties to defend established state boundaries in Europe. More specifically, Romania, along with other members of the Warsaw Pact, is enjoined "to prevent aggression by any forces of imperialism, militarism and revanchism," a formulation that also appears in the Romanian preamble. In the other treaties the phrase is simply "militarism and revanchism," which in Communist jargon has a strictly anti-West German connotation. By adding the word "imperialism," the Romanians probably intended originally to give the treaty a broad anti-Western rather than a purely anti-German focus. The Romanians may also use the broader formulation as an argument that their defense obligation, as defined in Article 8, applies only to non-Communist states. The Romanians have already made

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it clear that they consider the meaning and applicability of Article 8 dependent on the content of Article 7.

18. Article 8 requires each contracting party to come to the other's aid in the event of an "armed attack by any state or group of states" with all assistance at its disposal, including military, "essential to repulse armed attack." The latter phrase is unique to the Romanian document, which suggests that the Romanians may view it as a possible escape clause if they were ever called upon to aid the Soviets. It would not be unlike the Romanians to argue in such circumstances that the Soviets already have all the power "essential to repulse armed attack."

19. Ironically, the long gestation period of the treaty has today put Article 8 in a different light. When the treaty was drafted two years ago, the Romanians sought to broaden the clause on mutual military assistance in order that it would no longer be aimed primarily at West Germany, with which Romania had just established diplomatic relations. Today, in the wake of bitter Sino-Soviet border clashes--something the Romanians obviously did not foresee--Article 8 suddenly looks threatening to Romania's so-called neutralist position. It broadens the Romanian commitment to mutual defense in line with other Soviet bilateral treaties with East European states. The counterpart article in the 1948 Soviet-Romanian treaty had committed the contracting parties only to mutual military assistance in the event that either should "be involved in hostilities with a Germany which might seek to renew its policy of aggression, or with any other state which might have been associated with Germany in a policy of aggression...."

20. Article 8 thus brings Romania into line with the new commitment Moscow has insisted on in drawing up new pacts with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Since the Warsaw Pact commits members to military involvement only in the event of an armed attack "in Europe," Moscow has been revising its bilateral treaties, removing geographic confines, and referring simply to "an armed attack by any state or group of states."

MUTUAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Romania-USSR Article 8: In case one of the high contracting parties is subjected to an armed attack *by any state or group of states*, the other party will immediately render it all-round assistance with all the means at its disposal, including military *essential to repulse armed attack*. (1970)

Czechoslovakia-USSR Article 10: If one of the high contracting parties is subjected to armed attack *by some state or group of states*, the other contracting side, *viewing this as an attack against itself*, shall immediately afford it every assistance, including armed assistance, and shall also support it by all means at its disposal. (1970)

Hungary-USSR Article 6: In the event of an armed attack *on the part of some other state or group of states*, against one of the high contracting parties, the other party will immediately render every assistance to it, including military aid, as well, and will support it by all available means. (1967)

Bulgaria-USSR Article 7: In the event of one of the distinguished parties to the agreement being subjected to armed attack *on the part of any state or group of states*, the other party to the agreement, viewing this as an attack on itself, will immediately render it every aid, including military aid, and will also give support with all means at its disposal. (1967)

Poland-USSR Article 6: The contracting parties will jointly apply all available methods in order to remove *the threat of aggression on the part of West German militarist and revanchist forces or on the part of any other country which would join them*.

Article 7: In the event of an armed attack on one of the contracting parties *by any country or group of countries mentioned in Article 6*, the other contracting party will immediately give all assistance, including military assistance. (1965)

East Germany-USSR Article 5: In the case if one of the high contracting parties becomes an object of an armed attack *in Europe* by some state or a group of states, the other high contracting party will render it immediate assistance *in accordance with the provisions of the Warsaw Treaty*. (1964)

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Radio Moscow was unusually explicit on 9 July in commenting that the treaty is a "supplement" to the Warsaw Pact, and the proviso on mutual assistance (Article 8) was paraphrased and emphasized in Soviet broadcasts beamed at China. One such commentary took pains to stress that in the event of "a military invasion from a certain country or group of countries, the two sides will provide one another with all the means of assistance, including military assistance."

21. Article 9, holding both parties responsible for consulting on all important international topics of mutual interest "in order to agree about their positions," is a significant weakening of the corresponding clauses in the other treaties. It implicitly recognizes that Soviet-Romanian relations rest on a more flexible base than those between Moscow and the other Pact states.

CONSULTATION ON FOREIGN POLICY

Romania-USSR: Article 9. The high contracting parties will consult one another on all important international problems affecting the interests of both countries in order to agree about their positions. (1970)

Czechoslovakia-USSR: Article 11. The high contracting parties shall inform each other and consult with each other on all important international questions involving their interests and shall act proceeding from their common position agreed upon in conformity with the interests of both states. (1970)

Hungary-USSR: Article 7. The high contracting parties will consult one another on all important international questions affecting the interests of both countries and will act according to a common stand agreed in conformity with their mutual interests. (1967)

Bulgaria-USSR: Article 8. The distinguished parties to the agreement will consult each other on all important international questions affecting the interests of both countries and will come to an agreement on their positions. (1967)

Poland-USSR: Article 6. The contracting parties will discuss and consult on all important international problems of concern to them. (1965)

East Germany-USSR: (no corresponding clause)

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22. Articles 10 and 11 in the Soviet-Romanian treaty guarantee the validity of the present treaty regardless of other international commitments and provide for ratification procedures, date of operation, and renewal. They are exactly the same as the final clauses of the other treaties, although the automatic renewal clause is stated more precisely in the new Romanian treaty. Whereas the old treaty provided that upon expiration the treaty would remain in force "for a further five years," the new version stipulates that after its 20-year duration the treaty "will be automatically extended each time for the next five years..." In this case it must have been the Soviets who, wiser from their past experiences with the wily Romanians, wanted to make certain there would be less room for misinterpretation or maneuvering. The Bulgarian and Hungarian treaties are to be renewed for "periods of five years." The 20-year East German treaty, however, unlike the other treaties, provides for a 10-year renewal period.

One Treaty But Two Interpretations

23. From the textual analysis it is evident that the Soviet-Romanian treaty is essentially a compromise wholly satisfactory to neither party, especially in the changed international atmosphere which has emerged since it was drafted. Each side has stressed those parts of the compromise supporting its views and favorable to its interests. The Romanians and the Soviets lost no time in telling the world what was important in the treaty but, to an outside observer, their interpretations could be based on two separate documents.

24. On balance, the Romanians seem to be more comfortable with the treaty than are the Soviets. With the exception of Article 8, the language of the treaty is compatible with Romania's established principles and views, and, for the time being at least, Article 8 can be--and is being--pointedly ignored. The Romanians have made no clear public reference to Article 8 since the treaty was published. Moscow, on the other hand, highlighted Article 8 in its initial commentary. Having made their point, however, Soviet propagandists have eased off on this issue.

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25. Premiers Maurer and Kosygin amplified the differences in meaning their governments ascribe to the treaty in lengthy speeches at a friendship meeting in honor of the signing on 7 July. Although Maurer paid appropriate lip-service to Romanian-Soviet friendship and cooperation, at times he became almost defiant in speaking of Romania's determination to pursue its independent course. "Nothing and no one can divert the Romanian people from the road along which its Communist party guides it," he asserted; "nothing and no one can prevent it from building the new society on Romania's soil."

26. Maurer quoted extensively those segments of the treaty that serve to underwrite Romania's foreign policies, but on the subject of the Warsaw Pact, he said only that Romania would "respect" its duties within the alliance. This, he quickly added, was part of Romania's "general policy" of improving relations with all countries of the world socialist system, which he defined as "a system of free and independent states." Thus Maurer informed his guests that Romania had no intention of abandoning its effort to strengthen ties with Moscow's implacable rival--Communist China.

27. In his rejoinder, Kosygin noted first the need for struggle against "bourgeois-nationalist" policies--a reminder to the Romanians that from Moscow's viewpoint they have themselves come dangerously close to following the Yugoslav heretics. Then he dwelt at length on the feats of the Soviet economy, already well known to his audience, implying that the Soviet Union's economic clout gives it legitimate claim as their guiding ideological light.

28. Kosygin, however, did not take up the gauntlet on the issue of the Warsaw Pact; he merely stressed the treaty's reaffirmation of Romania's "unbreakable loyalty" to the obligations of the Pact. On the subject of CEMA, he was even more conciliatory. He insisted that the process of socialist economic integration--a favorite Soviet phrase that is anathema to the Romanians and that does not appear in the treaty--takes into account the interests

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of all socialist countries. The Romanians have consistently tried to block the integration of CEMA on the grounds that any supranational control of policy would prejudice their economic development and their national sovereignty. Perhaps in an attempt to overcome Romania's objections to the recently established CEMA investment bank, which Romania so far has refused to join, Kosygin advised that decisions advantageous to only some countries within CEMA could not be imposed on others.

29. In a somewhat ominous tone, Kosygin discussed the meaning of "socialist international solidarity" in terms clearly signifying that the absence of stronger language on this score in the Romanian treaty did not alter the Soviet Communist Party's self-proclaimed prerogatives. Citing the 1969 international Communist conference in Moscow as the authority, he stated flatly that "the defense of socialism is the internationalist duty of all Communists." His remarks were a clear reminder that Moscow insists that Bucharest live up to its international obligations--those incurred both by the Warsaw Pact and by Article 8 of the new Soviet-Romanian treaty.

30. In another slap at the Romanians' well-known views on this issue, Kosygin labeled as "slander" any allegations that relations among socialist countries are subject to "interference, subordination, limitation of sovereignty, and other such foolishness." By reasserting the substantive validity of the "Brezhnev doctrine," while denying its existence, the Soviet premier was following a standard Soviet line that the "Brezhnev doctrine" is an invention of Western media. For their part, Romanian officials also will not acknowledge the "doctrine," but for opposite reasons. They leave no doubt of their fear that the Soviets might use this rationale to interfere in Bucharest's internal affairs.

31. Despite the fact that the controversial mutual defense clause was sidestepped by Maurer and Kosygin and also by Ceausescu in his major speech to a party plenum on 8 July, the Romanians clearly were concerned over the furor it aroused, particularly in Western media. In the best effort Bucharest

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could muster under the circumstances to neutralize speculation that Romania might eventually become involved in a Sino-Soviet confrontation, and to reassure the Romanian people that this could not happen, the Romanian leadership sent Defense Minister Ionita on an extended tour of North Korea and Communist China. This dramatic gesture was designed both to elicit Chinese support for the Romanian contention that Article 8 has no application outside Europe and to reassure Peking that Bucharest rejects any contrary interpretation.

32. Ionita arrived in Peking on 23 July for a 10-day stay. He toured two provinces, and everywhere was greeted by the sound of beating drums and crowds shouting slogans in support of "heroic Romania's struggle for independence," according to the official Chinese news agency. Ionita's hosts seized the occasion publicly to denounce the "hegemonistic overlords" who interfere in other states' affairs--clearly a reference to the Soviets.

33. The response of the USSR to Romania's provocative diplomatic activity has been minimal, partly because the Soviets want to maintain the atmosphere of moderate cordiality engendered by the treaty signing and partly because they have been involved in higher priority matters such as the SALT talks, the Middle East crisis, and the German negotiations. The Romanians themselves, in their public pronouncements, have seemed anxious to focus on areas of agreement with the Soviets, particularly in economics.

Outlook

34. Romania can be expected to take maximum advantage of this hiatus in pressure from Moscow to consolidate its position politically and economically. In particular, the Romanians will continue to build stronger ties with Communist China, Yugoslavia, Western Europe and the US, as insurance against future pressures. Ideally, the Romanians would like to maneuver themselves into a position of quasi-neutrality within the Communist world, and especially within the Warsaw Pact, that would resemble France's position in the Atlantic Alliance. Romania

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would thus be able to cooperate in projects or policies that are in its interest and reject those that are not-- especially those involving military cooperation. Most Romanian leaders probably view their policies and political maneuvers as aids to the country's day-to-day survival, others may believe that Romania can anticipate that it will one day leave the Warsaw Pact and assume a nonaligned posture like Yugoslavia's.

35. Pretending that a desired objective has already been achieved appears to be part of Bucharest's modus operandi. Romanian authorities have argued in private that the new Soviet-Romanian treaty implicitly recognizes their special status in the alliance, because the treaty is less constrictive than any of the other bilateral treaties. They also cite as evidence the Soviet willingness to sign a treaty that predated the Soviet-led occupation of Czechoslovakia, without insisting on the insertion of limitations on national sovereignty. Moreover, they contend, the establishment of the CEMA investment bank in July without Romanian membership illustrated the willingness of the Soviet Union and its East European allies to pursue economic integration with less than full participation.

36. The Soviets have shown no inclination, however, to recognize Romania's independence in the military sphere. Romania is particularly anxious to have its allies accept its right to refuse to participate in Warsaw Pact maneuvers, but the perennial tug-of-war over Romania's obligation to host Warsaw Pact maneuvers is likely to continue. The new treaty is ambiguous on this point, but it certainly does not let the Romanians off the hook.

37. The signing of the treaty has removed one bone of contention and has temporarily induced a state of calm in Soviet-Romanian relations. But it has also raised potentially new discordant issues and fails to portend a substantial improvement in relations in the long run. Even if the Warsaw Pact were to be dissolved as the result of a general European security settlement involving the dismantling of NATO, Romania would still be legally bound to the Soviet sphere by the mutual defense clause in its

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20-year treaty. Moreover, the Romanians would lose the basis for their current argument that the implementation of Article 8 is tied only to the Warsaw Pact in a European theatre.

38. Despite all demonstrations of Romania's good will toward China, the defense clause has undeniably troublesome implications in the eventuality of a Sino-Soviet conflict. As it now stands, the dispute between the two Communist behemoths can be exploited by Romania's adroit diplomats, but should it ever disintegrate into open conflagration, Romania's sovereignty probably would be seriously endangered. In such a case, it seems highly unlikely that the Soviet Union would continue to tolerate Romania's independent maneuverings. The Romanians realize this; they do not want a shooting war between the Soviet Union and Communist China. Conversely, the Romanians would also stand to lose from a genuine rapprochement between Moscow and Peking. Despite their carefully nurtured image as peace-makers, the Romanians would prefer to continue exploiting the Sino-Soviet conflict for their own purposes.

39. In Europe, Romania's prospects for continuing its independent policy appear to be improving as a result of increasing East-West diplomatic initiatives. The signing of the Soviet - West German treaty has generated a general feeling in East European countries that relations with Western Europe can now improve both politically and economically. Romania, for several years an advocate of detente, sees this new spurt as vindication of its forward-looking policy.

40. In the final analysis, the new treaty is probably the best that could be obtained from Bucharest's point of view, but its significance pales beside the fact that Romania's fate as a small nation ultimately depends on the will of one of the two most powerful nations in the world. The treaty accurately reflects the Romanians' pragmatic acceptance of their position--inescapable for the time being--within the Soviet sphere of influence and their determination to make the best of it. The signing of the Soviet

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treaty nevertheless opens the way for Romania to conclude bilateral treaties with its other allies. After ~~several days of apparently stiff bargaining, the Poles~~ announced that they and the Romanians had initialed a draft treaty on 8 August. The Hungarians, Bulgarians, and East Germans will probably soon follow suit, and Romania will again be legally enmeshed in the Soviet sphere with a full complement of bilateral pacts.

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