


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

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DIRECTORATE OF  
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# Intelligence Report

*Line Divisions of the Polish Army: Size and Capabilities*



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September 1970

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
September 1970

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Line Divisions of the Polish Army:  
Size and Capabilities

Introduction

What is known about the plans the Soviets have made for the contingency of a war in Europe indicates that they intend to employ the main Warsaw Pact theater forces in a broad, rapid advance through West Germany and on to the English Channel. This mission would be executed by a force of five fronts in two echelons. The primary offensive missions would fall to the first echelon, comprised of the Soviet and East European forces presently deployed in Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia.

A Polish front--composed of one combined arms, one mechanized, and one tank army and a tactical air army, plus front combat and service support units--would constitute the northern flank of the thrust through central Europe. It probably has an offensive zone of responsibility about 100 miles wide, extending as far west as the English Channel at Ostende.

Good quality, high resolution satellite photography of the facilities occupied by Polish divisions has been acquired. This photography, along with reliable information from [REDACTED] a variety of other sources, has made possible a comprehensive assessment of the size, capabilities, and status of the Polish mechanized and tank divisions which would form the Polish front.

*Note: This report was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Strategic Research.*

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This report discusses the present state of information and analysis of these forces and presents the findings and conclusions to date. It describes the current dispositions and peacetime combat preparedness-- as measured by manning and equipment status--of the Polish line divisions. It also evaluates the wartime capabilities of Polish mechanized and tank divisions, and projects the future course of Polish ground force development. It does not treat army and front combat and service support or Polish tactical aviation.

The conclusions of this report begin on page 24. An explanation of the methodology employed and a detailed examination of major Polish units are at Annex A, starting on page 28. Annex B, on page 43, compares first-line Polish and Soviet divisions and their nearest Western counterparts, West German brigades.

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Disposition of Polish Divisions



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Assessing Polish Divisions

General

The ground forces potentially available to constitute the Polish front consist of 15 ground divisions--8 mechanized and 5 tank divisions organized in three armies, an assault landing division, and an airborne division--plus front and army level combat and service support units. (See map, facing.) The assault landing and airborne divisions are not part of an army organization, but would be assigned directly to the front and used for special operations in support of the Warsaw Pact's first echelon.\*

This report assesses the capabilities of the 15 Polish divisions to determine the degree to which they could fulfill their role. Three factors were considered as significantly affecting unit performance. First, the level and quality of equipment of each division

*\* The "front" is the highest Warsaw Pact field headquarters for the joint operational control of general purpose forces in wartime. A front would consist of about three field armies and a tactical air army, plus combat and service support. The rear services of the front are responsible for most of the administrative support of the combat units, including supply, medical service, construction, and maintenance. Fronts do not exist as such in peacetime.*

*"Echelon" has a special meaning in the Soviet--and Warsaw Pact--view of military operations. The first echelon forces are those which are located in the forward area and which would initially engage the enemy. Behind the first echelon units would be large groupings of troops not initially engaged in combat. This second echelon would be committed only after the first echelon forces had been substantially engaged by the enemy. To some extent the second echelon can be viewed as a reserve, but it is primarily a maneuvering force, often with predetermined objectives. The Soviet concept of echelons is applicable at all levels, including army, front, and theater.*

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

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


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were compared with those found in the highest strength Polish divisions. The second factor was the degree to which each division is manned in peacetime. The third was mobilization--how quickly divisions which were short equipment and men could be brought up to strength and made ready for deployment and combat. The fuel stocks of the divisions were also assessed.

The Evidence

[redacted]

These data permit confident estimates of the authorized wartime strengths of tank and mechanized divisions, of the total number of major equipment items actually in Polish tank and mechanized divisions, of the size of the airborne and amphibious assault divisions, and of the discrepancies between Polish tank and APC requirements and actual division holdings.

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Tank and Mechanized Divisions

Equipment Levels

[REDACTED] analysis of satellite photography indicate that two divisions in the Pomeranian Military District-- the 20th Tank Division and the 12th Mechanized Division-- have received as much new equipment as any divisions in Poland and are manned at high levels (for analysis of manning levels see page 12).

Intensive analysis of repetitive, good quality satellite photography has provided the basis for a high-confidence estimate of the equipment holdings of these two divisions. Analysis of elements of other Polish divisions using overhead photography [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] supports the judgment that the two divisions examined are typical of Polish divisions which are maintained at high strength and which the Poles feel are capable of being deployed without mobilization--in short, first-line divisions.

This analysis indicates that a first-line Polish mechanized division has about 1,700 major equipment items and that a first-line tank division has about 1,500 major items of equipment. The tables at Annex B beginning on page 43 show the number of tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, and other equipment found in first-line Polish divisions.

Using high resolution satellite photography [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 10 divisions were assessed against the estimated holdings of the two first-line divisions in Pomerania. (The 11th Tank Division in Silesia was not assessed

[REDACTED] but it was one of the Polish units which went into Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and is probably a first-line division. The airborne and assault landing divisions were assessed separately.)

A first-line Polish division reduced to essentials has about 800 major items of equipment--such as tanks and artillery--which cannot be supplied from the

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civilian sector. A Polish division probably also requires at least 200 trucks to be able to conduct limited training activity and routine housekeeping in peacetime and would require about the same number of trucks to move from its garrison to its alert area in an emergency. Thus, approximately 1,000 major items of equipment are required by a viable tank or mechanized division--one which is able to mobilize rapidly and deploy. Such a division--if augmented with civilian transport vehicles--could probably perform most of the combat roles assigned to Polish divisions.

Of the 5 Polish tank divisions, 2 had enough equipment to be considered first-line divisions, and the tank division not assessed is also considered to be in this category. The other 2 were below first-line strength by 100 to 200 vehicles. Of the 8 mechanized divisions, 2 had enough equipment to be considered first-line divisions and a third was below first-line strength by only about 100 vehicles. Another 3 were below first-line strength by about 500 to 600 vehicles. Equipment levels in the remaining 2 mechanized divisions were so far below first-line strength--about 900 vehicles, probably including some combat equipment--that these are probably not viable divisions.

Detailed data on estimated equipment levels of the 12 tank and mechanized divisions for which data were obtained are included in Annex A, beginning on page 28.

#### POL Requirements and Stocks

Polish divisions are organized with a limited amount of essential supplies on hand. Reliable information indicates that the supply of POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants) carried with a division will last approximately three to five days, after which the division would require major logistical support from the army level to maintain its combat effectiveness.

Those Polish divisions which had their motor transport units well covered by satellite photography were examined to determine their level of mobile stocks of POL. Using as a norm fuel consumption rates and

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planned rates of advance for conventional and nuclear war derived from Warsaw Pact tactical writings, analysis indicates that the POL supply organic to a Polish division does approximate three to five days. Given the rates of advance for various situations, three to five days equates to about 110 to 140 nautical miles.

#### Airborne Division

Poland has one airborne division. Analysis of high resolution photography [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] indicates that it has about 3,600 men and approximately 600 major items of equipment. (See Annex A, page 41). The Poles consider this division ready for immediate deployment.

[REDACTED] the airborne division is directly subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense and would be assigned to the front for special operations during wartime. This division would probably require service support from the front--especially motor transport--to stage for an airborne operation. In addition, Poland does not possess sufficient airlift capability to carry this unit on an assault and would have to rely on the Soviets, who have supplied the airlift for the Polish airborne division in joint exercises.

#### Assault Landing Division

Poland has one assault landing division for amphibious operations. Analysis of good satellite photography [REDACTED] indicates that this unit has a personnel strength of about 3,700 and approximately 1,000 major items of equipment. (See Annex A, page 42). The Poles consider this division ready for immediate deployment.

Although there is no direct evidence, this division's mission [REDACTED] indicates that--as with the airborne division--it would be subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense in Warsaw during wartime. It would probably be assigned to the front for operations along the Baltic coast. The assault landing division probably would require assistance from the front in the form of motor transport

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to stage for an operation, and assistance would also have to come from the Soviets because the Poles do not possess enough landing craft to lift the entire division.

#### Manning Levels

Good evidence indicates that in peacetime Polish units are maintained at four readiness levels, which are directly related to the quantity of equipment and personnel permanently maintained in the division. The evidence also indicates that equipment holdings and manning levels are related in Polish units.

At full strength a first-line Polish tank division has about 6,300 men and a first-line Polish mechanized division has about 8,700. The small amount of direct evidence on actual manning levels makes necessary a range of uncertainty in estimating peacetime personnel strengths.

The evidence indicates that the peacetime personnel levels probably range between 80 and 100 percent of full strength in first-line tank and mechanized divisions, 50 to 75 percent is the probable range of manning for divisions which are 100 to 200 vehicles below first-line strength, and those divisions which are 500 to 600 vehicles below first-line strength are probably manned at about 25 to 50 percent. The two divisions which are around 900 vehicles below first-line strength are probably manned by small caretaker detachments--20 percent or less of full strength. Analysis indicates that these caretaker detachments form a nucleus which, upon mobilization, would expand to form two mechanized divisions.

Poland's other two divisions are designed for specialized operations and are much smaller than the tank and mechanized divisions--the airborne division has about 3,600 men and the assault landing division has about 3,700 men. Both are probably at or near full strength.

#### Polish Mobilization

The Polish military system depends upon the mobilization of men and vehicles from the civilian economy

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to augment understrength units. The capability of units to carry out this mobilization effectively is essential to their availability for combat, and the extent to which units depend upon reservists and civilian vehicles affects their capabilities for combat itself.

#### Vehicles

[REDACTED]

Poland's mobilization procedure for vehicles. Basically, it involves the designation of civilian motor transport units in areas less than about 50 nautical miles from the military unit to be augmented. These motor transport units usually do not exceed 200 trucks each. They are subjected to periodic inspections and tests.

Problems in the mobilization process arise because of the unequal distribution of motor transport resources in relation to the mobilization requirement. Military units are not always garrisoned within 50 nm of their assigned vehicles. Moreover, certain industries have such a large and rapid turnover in personnel and equipment that it is virtually impossible to maintain a permanent mobilization stock.

#### Personnel

The manpower reserves consist of trained personnel up to 35 years of age (40 years of age if possessing a critical military specialty) and of personnel with civilian specialties useful in the armed forces. As a general rule, reservists are apparently given mobilization assignments in those units and duties in which they have completed their conscript term of service or in which they have participated during military exercises. In addition, every attempt is made to satisfy the mobilization requirements with reserve personnel who live within the county (powiat) where the unit being augmented is stationed.

Reserve training is conducted continuously on a year-round basis for periods lasting from three days to a maximum of three months. Training of individuals is not conducted regularly, however, and as many as

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13 years may pass between the reservist's active duty and his first reserve call-up. The Polish approach to reserve training tends to nullify any advantage which placing him in his former active duty job may have afforded.

[REDACTED] Polish reserve training tends to follow the Soviet approach, which restricts the firing of live ammunition, lacks imagination, and in general does not provide the reservist with a realistic atmosphere in which to learn and practice his job.

#### Capabilities

The majority of Polish divisions--all 5 tank divisions and 3 of the mechanized divisions--are at most only slightly below first-line equipment strengths and have at least half their personnel. These divisions can probably be made ready for deployment within hours, with any shortages made up by the mobilization of vehicles and reserve personnel.

The other 5 divisions--the 4 mechanized divisions in the Warsaw Military District and one mechanized division in Silesia--constitute the Polish divisional reinforcement force and depend in large part on an effective mobilization procedure for their rapid deployment. Of these divisions, 3 are substantially below first-line equipment and personnel strengths and would require about 3 days for the mobilization of sufficient vehicles and reserve personnel to be at first-line strength.

The remaining 2 mechanized divisions are sufficiently below first-line strength that even though they might mobilize, conduct limited training, and even deploy in about a week, they are unlikely to contribute any significant combat potential for about three weeks after mobilization begins because of the amount of training required by their large--about 80 percent--reserve component.

#### Modernization of Polish Divisions

About mid-1967 Poland set out on a five-year military modernization plan which ostensibly was to provide

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
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for the complete mechanization of Polish divisions. Analysis of satellite photography indicates that beginning about that time divisions in the Pomeranian and Silesian military districts began receiving large numbers of Polish-built OT-64 armored personnel carriers. (See photograph, below.)

The timing and the extent of the introduction of modern equipment into units since then, however, indicates that the four mechanized divisions in the Warsaw Military District and one of the mechanized divisions in Silesia were not included in the modernization plan.

[REDACTED] the divisions in the Warsaw Military District have consistently been equipped at a lower level and with older equipment than those in Pomerania and Silesia. The four mechanized divisions in the Warsaw Military District are equipped with World War II era T-34 tanks, have no APCs, and do not have sufficient trucks to transport their infantry without the mobilization of civilian resources.

This situation will probably continue, with the Warsaw Military District divisions being supplied with secondhand equipment from Pomerania and Silesia as those districts receive new equipment. This exchange will probably take place sometime after 1980, when most of the secondhand equipment going to the Warsaw Military District will be over ten years old.



The OT-64 is an amphibious eight-wheeled armored vehicle which can carry 14 riflemen and 2 crewmen to a range of approximately 340 nm. It is the result of a joint Polish-Czechoslovak project and is similar in design to the Soviet BTR-60.

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Thus, in addition to variations among divisions in the number of major equipment items, Polish tank and mechanized units vary substantially in the models, types, and vintages of combat equipment which they possess.

And even the first-line Pomeranian and Silesian divisions have been supplied with fewer tanks and APCs than previously estimated. Analysis of satellite photography indicates that first-line Polish tank divisions have about 60 tanks and about 120 APCs fewer than their estimated requirement and the three first-line mechanized divisions which have received new equipment are still short of their estimated requirement by approximately 20 tanks and about 50 APCs each.

The discrepancies in the availability and modernity of equipment among Polish divisions indicate that in the context of tight economic constraints the requirement for many divisions outweighs the requirement for uniform high quality.

Analysis of evidence on equipment production indicates that the Polish economy and industrial base have not been geared to establish and maintain the relatively large Polish Army at a uniform level of high quality and that this situation will probably continue for the foreseeable future.

In short, of the 13 tank and mechanized divisions making up the Polish Army, only 8--all in Pomerania and Silesia--are being maintained as modern divisions. These have been equipped with modern combat vehicles and are manned at levels which would permit them to participate immediately with at least part of their forces in the event of hostilities with NATO. But even these divisions do not have the complement of tanks and APCs to meet their requirements.

#### Capabilities of Polish Forces

Owing to their position behind the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the East German Army, Polish divisions need not maintain themselves at a consistently high readiness because they are not vulnerable to surprise attack by massed ground units.

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Good evidence and analysis of equipment and manning levels and mobilization procedures indicate that Polish divisions are maintained at four general levels of readiness: first-line, reduced strength, cadre, and Class D (see page 18 for criteria used to classify Polish divisions).

The first-line units are maintained at high personnel strength levels and are sufficiently equipped to be capable of immediate deployment; reduced strength units require substantial mobilization of reservists and civilian vehicles but could be ready for deployment within hours; and cadre divisions are manned and equipped at such a level that it would probably take up to 3 days to bring them up to first-line strength. Class D divisions are probably manned by caretaker contingents, and although they could be brought up to first-line strength in about a week, they would be unlikely to make a significant contribution to Poland's combat capability without extensive training of their large proportion of reservists (and the provision of additional military equipment). This training would probably require about two more weeks.

The army formed by the Pomeranian Military District is composed of two first-line (Class A) and two reduced strength (Class B) divisions which are outfitted with modern tanks and armored personnel carriers. (The table on page 19 gives the class into which each Polish division falls.) Pomerania could deploy a combined arms army of two tank and two mechanized divisions fully manned and with modern equipment within hours of the beginning of mobilization.

The Silesian Military District is composed of three first-line, one reduced strength, and one cadre (Class C) division. In the event of mobilization, Silesia could initially form its four class A and B divisions, which are equipped with modern combat equipment, into a tank army capable of deployment within hours.

The Silesian cadre division probably would take about 3 days to mobilize and deploy. The division's large proportion of poorly trained reservists, T-34 tanks, and unarmored troop transport would greatly lower its combat capabilities.

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### Classification of Polish Divisions

Polish divisions are maintained at four levels of readiness. These levels are directly related to the quantity of equipment and personnel permanently maintained in the division.

First-line (Class A) divisions are those ready for deployment without mobilization. A first-line tank division has about 1,500 major equipment items and 80 to 100 percent of its estimated 6,300 personnel. A first-line mechanized division has about 1,700 major equipment items and 80 to 100 percent of its estimated 8,700 personnel.

Reduced Strength (Class B) divisions are below first line strength by 100 to 200 major items of equipment and are manned at 50 to 75 percent of full strength. They could be augmented with civilian motor transport and filled up with reservists and be at first-line strength within hours.

Cadre (Class C) divisions are below first-line strength by between 500 and 600 major items of equipment and are manned at 25 to 50 percent. Many of their tanks are World War II era T-34s and they possess no armored troop transport but would have to rely on mobilized civilian trucks for this purpose. These divisions could be filled up with reservists augmented with civilian vehicles and deployed in about 3 days. Even after complete mobilization, however, the large number of reservists, T-34 tanks, and unarmored troop transport would greatly lower combat performance.

Class D divisions are below first-line strength by about 900 major items of equipment--probably including some combat equipment--and probably are manned at 20 percent or less by a small contingent of officers and enlisted men in the form of caretaker contingents. These divisions have no modern tanks--only T-34s--and no armored troop transport. These divisions could not be formed into first-line divisions through short term mobilization. Although these divisions might be mobilized and deployed in about a week, they are unlikely to contribute any significant combat potential for about three weeks after mobilization begins because of the training required by their large reserve component.

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Classification of Polish Divisions

<u>Subordination</u>	<u>Division</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Class</u>
Pomeranian MD	8th Mechanized	Koszalin	B
	12th Mechanized	Szczecin	A
	16th Tank	Elblag	B
	20th Tank	Szczecinek	A
Silesian MD	2nd Mechanized	Nysa	C
	4th Mechanized	Krosno	A
		Odrzanskie	
	5th Tank	Gubinek	A
	10th Tank	Opole	B
	11th Tank	Zagan	A
Warsaw MD	1st Mechanized	Jablonna	C
		Legionowo	
	3rd Mechanized	Lublin	D
	9th Mechanized	Rzeszow	D
	15th Mechanized	Olsztyn	C
Ministry of National Defense	6th Airborne	Krakow	A
	7th Assault Landing	Gdansk	A

*Note: The 11th Tank Division was not assessed [redacted]  
[redacted] It is estimated to be a Class A division because of its  
participation in the intervention in Czechoslovakia.*

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The Warsaw Military District is composed of two cadre and two Class D mechanized divisions. The two cadre divisions could be brought up to first-line strength through mobilization and deployed--with some limitation on their effectiveness because of their large proportion of reservists, T-34 tanks, and unarmored troop transport--in about 3 days. The two Class D divisions could be brought up to first-line strength through mobilization (probably including some combat equipment) as rapidly as the cadre divisions--and with the same absence of modern tanks and armored transport--but the Class D divisions' large (about 80 percent) component of reservists would require about two more weeks to train before they could deploy as an effective combat unit.

Poland's main strength lies in its ability to assemble a large combat force in a short period of time--provided its mobilization plan is not interrupted by hostile action. Also, Poland's ground forces have a high ratio of tanks to personnel and a large number of tanks--about 2,000--overall. This composition would give the Poles good mobility, heavy direct firepower, and good protection against nuclear damage.

The major weaknesses of the Polish armies stem from their dependence on a complex and awkward mobilization procedure, notable deficiencies in equipment in some divisions, and from the necessity to deploy their forces westward into Germany before they could be committed in an offensive. The operations of the Polish forces depend on the mobilization and movement actions, and these actions are vulnerable to interruption if they are under way when hostilities begin.\*

*\* This study is limited to the line divisions, the combat element of Polish forces. A complete assessment of Poland's ground forces awaits a comprehensive analysis of army and front combat and service support. Combat support elements include artillery and tactical missiles. Service support elements provide maintenance and construction, medical services, and resupply of the divisions, whose own stocks are sufficient for only a few days of intensive combat. The detailed study of support and logistical capabilities requires different methodologies than does the study of the combat forces.*

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Comparison with Soviet Divisions and West German  
Brigades

Polish first-line divisions are smaller than their Soviet counterparts. (See the chart on the next page and Annex B). Polish mechanized divisions have about 90 percent of the personnel and 85 percent of the tanks found in a first-line Soviet motorized rifle division. Polish tank divisions have approximately 80 percent of the personnel and 75 percent of the tanks found in a first-line Soviet tank division.

The nearest Western counterparts of the Polish tank and mechanized divisions are probably the West German armored brigades and armored infantry brigades (three of which form a West German division) with their one-third share of the divisional combat and service support establishment. Except in numbers of tanks and artillery, however, the West German brigades are more nearly comparable to Soviet divisions and thus are substantially larger than Polish divisions. The West German brigades have significantly more APCs than Polish or Soviet divisions.

Soviet Forces in Poland

The Soviet Northern Group of Forces (NGF) in Poland consists of only two tank divisions, both of which are probably at combat strength, but has combat support units approximating those of a typical Soviet field army and 180 ground attack and reconnaissance aircraft.

There is no evidence to indicate the intended war-time role of the NGF, but its units could be used to reinforce either the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany or the Polish front, or they could form a part of a theater reserve.



Trends

Polish plans for maintaining eight of the nine divisions in the Pomeranian and Silesian military

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### Comparison of Equipment Levels of Polish and Soviet Divisions and West German Brigades

This chart compares the number of major equipment items in Polish and Soviet divisions and West German brigades plus their division support. Major equipment items include all self-propelled vehicles, except motorcycles, and all large towed items such as artillery and two-axle trailers. Two armored brigades and one armored infantry brigade are in a West German armored division and two armored infantry brigades and one armored brigade are in a West German armored infantry division. See Annex B, beginning on page 43, for a breakdown of the totals shown here, by type of equipment.



Assumed to be first-line because of participation in Czechoslovak intervention.



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districts at a predominantly high state of readiness will probably continue. One division in Silesia and those in the Warsaw Military District will probably be kept at cadre or Class D strength levels. The Warsaw divisions will probably receive equipment from Pomerania and Silesia as those areas receive new or replacement vehicles.

The Class D divisions may be brought up to a cadre level eventually, but various sources indicate that there are probably no plans for increasing any of the cadre or Class D divisions to Class A or B divisions.

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Summary

In the event of hostilities, Warsaw Pact planning calls for Poland to form a front of three armies--one from each of its military districts--composed of five tank divisions, eight mechanized divisions, one airborne division, one assault landing division, and a tactical air army plus front combat and service support units.

Intensive analysis of satellite photography of the installations occupied by the units of the Polish ground divisions [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has made possible a comprehensive assessment of the equipment holdings, status, requirements, and overall capabilities of these divisions. This assessment indicates that in peacetime Polish divisions are maintained at four major readiness levels--first-line (Class A), reduced strength (Class B), cadre (Class C), and Class D or caretaker.

A first-line Polish tank division contains about 1,500 major equipment items and a first-line Polish mechanized division contains about 1,700 major equipment items. Poland has 5 first-line divisions, 3 tank and 2 mechanized. There are 3 reduced strength divisions--2 tank and one mechanized, which are below first-line strength by about 100 to 200 major equipment items. These 8 divisions comprise the initial Polish combat force. The remaining 5 divisions--all mechanized--constitute the Polish divisional reserve. Of these, 3 are cadre divisions which are below first-line strength by approximately 500 to 600 major items of equipment. The other 2 are Class D divisions which are below first-line strength by about 900 vehicles each.

Evidence indicates that in Polish units equipment holdings and manning levels are related. A full strength first-line Polish tank division has about 6,300 men and a full strength first-line Polish mechanized division about 8,700 men. The small amount of direct evidence concerning manning levels makes necessary a range of uncertainty, however. This evidence indicates the peacetime personnel levels probably range between 80 and 100 percent of full strength in first-line

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divisions, 50 to 75 percent is the probable range of manning for reduced strength divisions, and cadre divisions are probably manned at about 25 to 50 percent. Class D divisions are probably manned at 20 percent or less by caretaker detachments. Evidence indicates that these caretaker detachments form a nucleus which, upon mobilization, would expand to form two mechanized divisions. The Class D divisions are maintained at such a low state of readiness that their deployment as effective combat units before about three weeks of training is questionable.

The Polish military system depends upon the mobilization of men and vehicles from the civilian economy to augment understrength units. Poland's vehicle mobilization procedure involves the designation of civilian motor transport units in areas about 50 nautical miles from the military unit to be augmented. Problems arise because of the unequal distribution of motor transport resources in relation to the mobilization requirement and because certain industries have such a large and rapid turnover in personnel and equipment that it is virtually impossible to maintain a permanent mobilization stock.

Polish manpower reserves consist of trained personnel up to 35 years old (40 years old if possessing a critical military specialty) and of personnel with civilian specialties useful in the armed forces. As a general rule, reservists are apparently given mobilization assignments in those units and duties in which they have completed their conscript term of service or in which they have participated during military exercises. The Poles attempt to satisfy the mobilization requirements with reserve personnel who live within the county (powiat) in which their unit is stationed.

Reserve training is conducted continuously on a year-round basis for periods lasting from three days to a maximum of three months. Training of individuals is not conducted regularly, however, and as many as 13 years may pass between the reservist's active duty and his first reserve call-up. Polish reserve training tends to follow the Soviet approach, which restricts the firing of live ammunition, lacks imagination, and

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in general does not provide the reservist with a realistic atmosphere in which to learn and practice his job.

With about 6,300 men and 1,500 major equipment items (including about 225 medium tanks) in a full strength first-line Polish tank division and about 8,700 men and 1,700 major equipment items (including about 155 medium tanks) in a mechanized division, Polish divisions are small even by Soviet standards.

Polish divisions are even smaller by Western standards. For example, a Polish mechanized division has about 85 percent of the men and 80 percent of the equipment of a West German armored infantry brigade and its divisional support. A Polish tank division has about 75 percent of the men and equipment of a West German armored brigade and its divisional support. And three brigades form a West German division, which is--except in numbers of tanks and artillery--substantially larger than either a Polish or Soviet division.

The Polish Army is relatively large for a country of its size, and the equipment and personnel are not of uniform quality. The Polish divisions contain approximately 2,000 tanks overall, but about one-third of these are World War II era T-34s. The infantry strength of the Polish force includes a large proportion of reservists, and more than half the infantry force lacks the proper quantity of armored personnel carriers. In some divisions, trucks would have to be substituted for APCs. This inequality in equipment and training will probably continue because Poland does not have the manpower resources and equipment production to maintain all of its divisions at a consistently high level of readiness in peacetime.

The Polish assault landing and airborne divisions are specialized units smaller than the regular divisions. The assault landing division has about 3,700 men and approximately 1,000 major equipment items. The airborne division has about 3,600 men and about 600 major items. The Poles consider both units ready for immediate deployment. Lacking adequate air and sea transport, the Poles would need Soviet assistance in utilizing these two units.

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Poland's main strength lies in its ability to assemble a large combat force in a short period of time. But much of this force--men and vehicles--needs to be mobilized, and a potential weakness in the system used to mobilize the force is its vulnerability to disruption by the onset of hostilities. The training of individual reservists is infrequent and poorly conducted, and units with a high proportion of reservists would need training before they could achieve an acceptable level of combat effectiveness.

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Annex A

Equipment Holdings of Polish Divisions

This annex contains a detailed accounting of equipment holdings of 14 of the 15 Polish ground force divisions and their individual elements. Determination of unit type and estimates of strength were based on photography. [redacted]

The first step in arriving at equipment holdings was to identify each division element and to determine the amount and type of equipment in each identified element of each division. An additional allowance was made for the equipment strengths of known units not covered on satellite photography and for units which could not be identified or located but which probably exist.

The units not covered and those not identified or located are listed as a percentage of a full strength equivalent Soviet unit. The percentage used for each division was derived by comparing the strength of that division's tank and mechanized regiments with first-line Soviet tank and motorized rifle regiments. Strengths for the uncovered or unlocated units were added to equipment counts for identified elements to arrive at a division total.

One of the 15 Polish divisions--the 11th Tank Division in Silesia--could not be assessed [redacted]

[redacted] It was one of those which participated in the intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, however, and is probably a first-line unit with equipment holdings comparable to the two tank divisions assessed as being at first-line strength (the 5th and 20th).

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Estimated Equipment Levels of Polish Ground  
Force Divisions

8th Mechanized Division - Pomeranian Military District

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Equip- ment count</u>	<u>Location and installation</u>
Estimated division total	<u>1,582</u>	
Mechanized regiment	208	Trzebiatow [redacted]
Mechanized regiment	181	Kolobrzeg [redacted]
Mechanized regiment	242	Kolobrzeg [redacted]
Tank regiment	134	Slupsk [redacted]
AAA regiment	89	Trzebiatow [redacted]
Artillery regiment	146	Kolobrzeg [redacted]
Chemical defense	27	Koszalin [redacted]
Signal battalion	19	Koszalin [redacted]
Engineer battalion	101	Gryfice [redacted]
Motor transport battalion	230	Koszalin [redacted]
<i>Unlocated units*</i>		
Headquarters element	16	
Reconnaissance company	27	
Antitank regiment	42	
Frog battalion	17	
Rocket launcher battalion	59	
Medical battalion	6	
Maintenance battalion	38	

\* Includes unidentified units at Kolobrzeg [redacted] which are probably subordinate to this division. These units have 80 to 94 items of equipment, which are considered to be included in the division total as part of the allowance for unlocated units.

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Estimated Equipment Levels of Polish Ground  
Force Divisions

12th Mechanized Division - Pomeranian Military District

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Equip- ment count</u>	<u>Location and installation</u>
Estimated division total	<u>1,723</u>	
Mechanized regiment	204	Szczecin [redacted]
Mechanized regiment	215	Stargard [redacted]
Mechanized regiment	247	Szczecin [redacted]
Tank regiment	210	Szczecin [redacted]
Artillery regiment	154	Szczecin [redacted]
Rocket launcher battalion	74	Szczecin [redacted]
Signal battalion	19	Szczecin [redacted]
Engineer battalion	98	Szczecin [redacted]
Motor transport battalion (elements)	113	Szczecin [redacted]
<i>Unlocated units*</i>		
Headquarters element	20	
Reconnaissance company	34	
AAA regiment	84	
Antitank regiment	51	
Chemical defense	22	
Frog battalion	20	
Medical battalion	8	
Motor transport battalion (elements)	100	
Maintenance battalion	50	

\* Includes unidentified units at Szczecin [redacted] with 157 items of equipment and Stargard [redacted] with 61 items of equipment which are probably subordinate to this division. These 218 items of equipment are considered to be included in the division total as part of the allowance for unlocated units.

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Estimated Equipment Levels of Polish Ground  
Force Divisions

20th Tank Division - Pomeranian Military District

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Equip- ment count</u>	<u>Location and installation</u>
Estimated division total	<u>1,540</u>	
Tank regiment	175	Walcz [redacted]
Tank regiment	156	Zlocieniec [redacted]
Tank regiment	200	Czarne [redacted]
Mechanized regiment	182	Stargard Szczecinski [redacted]
Artillery regiment	86	Walcz [redacted]
	80	Zlocieniec [redacted]
AAA regiment	99	Stargard Szczecinski [redacted]
Frog battalion	25	Stargard Szczecinski [redacted]
Rocket launcher battalion	82	Szczecinek [redacted]
Engineer battalion	80	Czarne [redacted]
Motor transport battalion	222	Szczecinek [redacted]
<i>Unlocated units*</i>		
Headquarters element	17	
Reconnaissance company	29	
Antitank regiment	23	
Chemical defense	20	
Signal battalion	16	
Medical battalion	7	
Maintenance battalion	41	

\* Includes unidentified units at Szczecinek [redacted] with 45 items of equipment and Zlocieniec [redacted] with 30 items of equipment which are probably subordinate to this division. These 75 items of equipment are considered to be included in the division total as part of the allowance for unlocated units.

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Estimated Equipment Levels of Polish Ground  
Force Divisions

16th Tank Division - Pomeranian Military District

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Equip- ment count</u>	<u>Location and installation</u>
Estimated division total	<u>1,399</u>	
Tank regiment	190	Braniewo [redacted]
Tank regiment	160	Elblag [redacted]
Tank regiment	172	Elblag [redacted]
Mechanized regiment	181	Braniewo [redacted]
AAA regiment	97	Elblag [redacted]
Antitank regiment	22	Braniewo [redacted]
Engineer battalion	80	Elblag [redacted]
Motor transport battalion	176	Elblag [redacted]
<i>Unlocated units*</i>		
Headquarters element	16	
Reconnaissance company	27	
Artillery regiment	126	
Chemical defense	18	
Frog battalion	17	
Rocket launcher battalion	59	
Signal battalion	14	
Medical battalion	6	
Maintenance battalion	38	

\* Includes unidentified units at Elblag [redacted] with 74 items of equipment and Malbork [redacted] with 140 items of equipment which are probably subordinate to this division. These 214 items of equipment are considered to be included in the division total as part of the allowance for unlocated units.

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Estimated Equipment Levels of Polish Ground  
Force Divisions

2nd Mechanized Division - Silesian Military District

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Equip- ment count</u>	<u>Location and installation</u>
Estimated division total	1,138	
Mechanized regiment	173	Czestochowa [redacted]
Mechanized regiment	216	Klodzko [redacted]
Mechanized regiment	104	Nysa [redacted]
Tank regiment	101	Nysa [redacted]
Artillery regiment	84	Kozle [redacted]
<i>Unlocated units*</i>		
Headquarters element	13	
Reconnaissance company	22	
AAA regiment	57	
Antitank regiment	34	
Chemical defense	15	
Engineer battalion	66	
Frog battalion	12	
Rocket launcher battalion	43	
Signal battalion	12	
Medical battalion	5	
Motor transport battalion	144	
Maintenance battalion	37	

\* Includes unidentified units at Zabkowice Slaskie [redacted] with 68 items of equipment, Nysa [redacted] with 68 items of equipment, Czestochowa [redacted] with 57 items of equipment, and Nysa 005 with 163 items of equipment which are probably subordinate to this division. These 356 items of equipment are considered to be included in the division total as part of the allowance for unlocated units.

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Estimated Equipment Levels of Polish Ground  
Force Divisions

4th Mechanized Division - Silesian Military District

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Equip- ment count</u>	<u>Location and installation</u>
Estimated division total	<u>1,659</u>	
Mechanized regiment	236	Gorzow Wielkopolski [redacted]
Mechanized regiment	225	Miedzyszcz [redacted]
Mechanized regiment	228	Krosno Odrzanskie [redacted]
Artillery regiment	106	Sulechow [redacted]
Engineer battalion	91	Krosno Odrzanskie [redacted]
Motor transport battalion	184	Krosno Odrzanskie [redacted]
<i>Unlocated units*</i>		
Headquarters element	18	
Reconnaissance company	32	
AAA regiment	81	
Antitank regiment	49	
Chemical defense	21	
Frog battalion	20	
Rocket launcher battalion	88	
Signal battalion	18	
Tank regiment	192	
Medical battalion	17	
Maintenance battalion	53	

\* Includes unidentified units at Sulechow [redacted] with 79 items of equipment and Miedzyszcz [redacted] with 40 items of equipment which are probably subordinate to this division. These 119 items of equipment are considered to be included in the division total as part of the allowance for unlocated units.

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Estimated Equipment Levels of Polish Ground  
Force Divisions

5th Tank Division - Silesian Military District

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Equip- ment count</u>	<u>Location and installation</u>
Estimated division total	<u>1,524</u>	
Tank regiment	183	Gubinek [redacted]
Tank regiment	156	Gubinek [redacted]
Tank regiment	191	Slubice [redacted]
Mechanized regiment	232	Kozuchow [redacted]
AAA regiment	69	Gubinek [redacted]
Artillery regiment	167	Kostrzyn [redacted]
Engineer battalion	69	Kostrzyn [redacted]
<i>Unlocated units*</i>		
Headquarters element	14	
Reconnaissance company	27	
Antitank regiment	18	
Chemical defense	19	
Frog battalion	17	
Rocket launcher battalion	76	
Signal battalion	15	
Medical battalion	7	
Motor transport battalion	214	
Maintenance battalion	50	

\* Includes unidentified units at Gubinek [redacted] with 50 items of equipment, Gubinek [redacted] with 233 items of equipment, and Kostrzyn [redacted] with 28 items of equipment which are probably subordinate to this division. These 311 items of equipment are considered to be included in the division total as part of the allowance for unlocated units.

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Estimated Equipment Levels of Polish Ground  
Force Divisions

10th Tank Division - Silesian Military District

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Equip- ment count</u>	<u>Location and installation</u>
Estimated division total	<u>1,351</u>	
Tank regiment	132	Opole [redacted]
Tank regiment	144	Opole [redacted]
Tank regiment	124	Opole [redacted]
Mechanized regiment	211	Opole [redacted]
AAA regiment	107	Lubliniec [redacted]
<i>Unlocated units*</i>		
Headquarters element	15	
Reconnaissance company	30	
Antitank regiment	20	
Artillery regiment	136	
Chemical defense	15	
Engineer battalion	80	
Frog battalion	20	
Rocket launcher battalion	65	
Signal battalion	20	
Medical battalion	7	
Motor transport battalion	180	
Maintenance battalion	45	

\* Includes unidentified units at Opole [redacted] with 46 items of equipment and Tarnowskie Gory [redacted] with 362 items of equipment, which are probably subordinate to this division. These 408 items of equipment are considered to be included in the division total as part of the allowance for unlocated units.

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Estimated Equipment Levels of Polish Ground  
Force Divisions

1st Mechanized Division - Warsaw Military District

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Equip- ment count</u>	<u>Location and installation</u>
Estimated division total	<u>1,083</u>	
Mechanized regiment	108	Rembertow [redacted]
Mechanized regiment	148	Skierniewice [redacted]
Mechanized regiment	160	Ciechanow [redacted]
Tank regiment (NCO training regiment)	121	Gizycko [redacted]
Artillery regiment	109	Bartoszyce [redacted]
Engineer battalion	70	Jablonna Legionowo [redacted]
Maintenance battalion	53	Gizycko [redacted]
<i>Unlocated units*</i>		
Headquarters element	12	
Reconnaissance company	15	
AAA regiment	30	
Antitank regiment	32	
Chemical defense	14	
Frog battalion	20	
Rocket launcher battalion	45	
Signal battalion	11	
Medical battalion	5	
Motor transport battalion	130	

\* Includes unidentified units at Ciechanow [redacted] with 63 items of equipment, Jablonna Legionowo [redacted] with 124 items of equipment, and Jablonna Legionowo [redacted] with 109 items of equipment which are probably subordinate to this division. These 296 items of equipment are considered to be included in the division total as part of the allowance for unlocated units.

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Estimated Equipment Levels of Polish Ground  
Force Divisions

3rd Mechanized Division - Warsaw Military District

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Equip- ment count</u>	<u>Location and installation</u>
Estimated division total	<u>752</u>	
Mechanized training unit	96	Hrubieszow [redacted]
Motor transport unit	136	Lublin [redacted]
<i>Unlocated units*</i>		
Headquarters unit	40	
Signal unit	50	
Tank unit	130	
Training unit	130	
Maintenance unit	170	

\* Includes unidentified units at Lublin [redacted] with 170 items of equipment and Lublin [redacted] with 60 items of equipment which are probably subordinate to this division. These 230 items of equipment are considered to be included in the division total as part of the allowance for unlocated units.

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Estimated Equipment Levels of Polish Ground  
Force Divisions

9th Mechanized Division - Warsaw Military District

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Equip- ment count</u>	<u>Location and installation</u>
Estimated division total	<u>755</u>	
Mechanized training unit	110	Tarnow [redacted]
Training unit	116	Kielce [redacted]
Tank unit	133	Sanok [redacted]
Motor transport unit	136	Rzeszow [redacted]
<i>Unlocated units*</i>		
Headquarters unit	40	
Signal unit	50	
Maintenance unit	170	

\* Includes one unidentified unit at Rzeszow [redacted] which is probably subordinate to this division. This unit has 139 items of equipment, which are considered to be included in the division total as part of the allowance for unlocated units.

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Estimated Equipment Levels of Polish Ground  
Force Divisions

15th Mechanized Division - Warsaw Military District

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Equip- ment count</u>	<u>Location and installation</u>
Estimated division total	1,237	
Mechanized regiment	171	Lidzmark Warminski [redacted]
Mechanized regiment	156	Morag [redacted]
Mechanized regiment (training regiment)	104	Bartoszyce [redacted]
Tank regiment	142	Ostroda [redacted]
AAA regiment	79	Olsztyn [redacted]
Artillery regiment	139	Morag [redacted]
Engineer battalion	75	Olsztyn [redacted]
Maintenance battalion	47	Ostroda [redacted]
<i>Unlocated units*</i>		
Headquarters element	15	
Reconnaissance company	15	
Antitank regiment	36	
Chemical defense	15	
Frog battalion	25	
Rocket launcher battalion	50	
Signal battalion	12	
Medical battalion	6	
Motor transport battalion	150	

\* Includes unidentified units at Lidzmark Warminski [redacted] with 59 items of equipment, Olsztyn [redacted] with 144 items of equipment, and Olsztyn [redacted] with 117 items of equipment which are probably subordinate to this division. These 320 items of equipment are considered to be included in the division total as part of the allowance for unlocated units.

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Estimated Equipment Levels of Polish Ground  
Force Divisions

6th Airborne Division - Ministry of National Defense

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Equip- ment count</u>	<u>Location and installation</u>
Estimated division total	644	
Airborne battalion	84	Bielsko Biala [redacted]
Airborne battalion	82	Krakow [redacted]
Assault gun battalion	45	Krakow [redacted]
AAA battalion	49	Krakow [redacted]
<i>Unlocated units*</i>		
Airborne battalion	84	
Airborne battalion	84	
Airborne battalion	84	
Mixed artillery battalion	70	
Engineer battalion	36	
Reconnaissance company	12	
Signal battalion	6	
Chemical defense	8	

\* Includes one unidentified unit at Krakow [redacted] which is probably subordinate to the airborne division. This unit has 60 items of equipment, which are considered to be included in the division total as part of the allowance for unlocated units.

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Estimated Equipment Levels of Polish Ground  
Force Divisions

7th Assault Landing Division - Ministry of National Defense

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Equip- ment count</u>	<u>Location and installation</u>
Estimated division total	<u>969</u>	
Amphibious regiment	151	Lebork [redacted]
Amphibious regiment	176	Gdansk
AAA regiment	54	Gdansk
Artillery regiment	82	Gdansk
Medium tank battalion	96	Slupsk
Training battalion	102	Slupsk
Motor transport battalion	133	Gdansk
Unidentified	175	Gdansk

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Annex B

Manning and Equipment Levels of Polish and Soviet  
Divisions and West German Brigades

This annex compares the equipment holdings of first-line (Class A) Polish divisions and first-line Soviet divisions with their nearest Western counterparts-- West German brigades. Three brigades form a West German division, and the brigades are shown with a one-third share of the personnel and equipment of the divisional combat and service support establishment to make them comparable to the Polish and Soviet divisions.

Table 1 compares Polish and Soviet tank divisions and a West German armored brigade. Table 2 compares a Polish mechanized division, a Soviet motorized rifle division, and a West German armored infantry brigade. (See also the chart on page 22.)

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Table 1

Estimated Manning and Equipment Levels of  
First-line Polish and Soviet Tank Divisions and  
West German Armored Brigade

	Polish tank division	Soviet tank division	West German units <sup>a</sup>	
			Armored brigade	Armored division
Personnel	6,300	8,000	8,600	28,300
<u>Total major equipment items <sup>b</sup></u>	<u>1,500</u>	<u>2,300</u>	<u>2,000</u>	<u>6,500</u>
Medium tanks and tank destroyers	225	310	131	360
Light or recon tanks	13	19	14	40
Armored personnel carriers <sup>c</sup>	105	121	201	727
Antitank guns	10	0	0	0
AA guns (towed)	24	24	5	15
AA guns (self-propelled)	6	12	12	36
Frogs or Honest Johns	3	4	2	6
120mm mortars <sup>d</sup>	9	18	8	40
155mm or 122mm howitzers <sup>e</sup>	42	60	12	36
8-inch (203mm) or 152mm howitzers <sup>e</sup>	0	0	2	6
175mm guns	0	0	4	12
Multiple rocket launchrs	12	18	8	24
Other	1,060	1,700	1,600	5,170

a. [redacted]

*The data for the armored brigade include the wartime complement of 5,500 men and their equipment and the brigade's one-third share of the personnel and equipment of the divisional combat and service support establishment. The West German armored division has two armored brigades and one armored infantry brigade.*

- b. *Major equipment items include all self-propelled vehicles except motorcycles and all large towed items such as artillery and two-axle trailers. Totals are rounded to two significant digits.*
- c. *Includes reconnaissance vehicles as well as APCs. Many Polish and Soviet divisions do not yet have either vehicle in these numbers, and some divisions have none.*
- d. *All West German field artillery and heavy mortars are self-propelled. All Polish and Soviet field artillery and heavy mortars are towed.*
- e. *West German calibers are listed first.*

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Table 2

Estimated Manning and Equipment Levels of  
First-line Polish Mechanized Division,  
Soviet Motorized Rifle Division, and  
West German Armored Infantry Brigade

	Polish mechanized division	Soviet motorized rifle division	West German units <sup>a</sup>	
			Armored infantry brigade	Armored infantry division
Personnel	8,700	10,000	10,200	29,900
<u>Total major equipment items <sup>b</sup></u>	<u>1,700</u>	<u>2,400</u>	<u>2,200</u>	<u>6,700</u>
Medium tanks and tank destroyers	160	186	98	327
Light or recon tanks	13	19	14	40
Armored personnel carriers <sup>c</sup>	235	266	325	851
Antitank guns	30	18	0	0
AA guns (towed)	24	24	5	15
AA guns (self-propelled)	4	4	12	36
Frogs or Honest Johns	3	4	2	6
120mm mortars <sup>d</sup>	27	54	24	56
155mm or 122mm howitzers <sup>e</sup>	54	54	12	36
8-inch (203mm) or 152mm howitzers <sup>e</sup>	12	18	2	6
175mm guns	0	0	4	12
Multiple rocket launchers	12	18	8	24
Other	1,130	1,740	1,730	5,300

The data for an armored infantry brigade include the wartime complement of 7,000 men and their equipment and the brigade's one-third share of the personnel and equipment of the divisional combat and service support establishment. The West German armored infantry division has two armored infantry brigades and one armored brigade.

- b. Major equipment items include all self-propelled vehicles except motorcycles and all large towed items such as artillery and two-axle trailers. Totals are rounded to two significant digits.
- c. Includes reconnaissance vehicles as well as APCs. Many Polish and Soviet divisions do not yet have either vehicle in these numbers, and some divisions have none.
- d. All West German field artillery and heavy mortars are self-propelled. All Polish and Soviet field artillery and heavy mortars are towed.
- e. West German calibers are listed first.

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