


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DIRECTORATE OF
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Intelligence Memorandum

Rumania Adjusts Its Independent Course


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
30 October 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Rumania Adjusts Its Independent Course

Summary

Rumania has again taken up the ideological cudgels against the Warsaw Five. This renewed assertiveness, ending the conciliatory silence which began soon after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, probably reflects Bucharest's confidence that it is safe for the moment from any massive Soviet pressure. Having reached this judgment, the regime is now speaking out in order to make sure that neither Rumania's Communist neighbors nor its population conclude that it is no longer willing to defend its independence.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Office of National Estimates.

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1. Party leader Ceausescu's speeches on 16 October in Iasi, near the Soviet border, reasserted Rumania's pretensions to an independent position. Ceausescu reaffirmed his country's determination to defend its independence, and rejected the concept of suprasovereignty advanced in Pravda on 26 September. Once again he set forth the formula that independence and equality should be recognized under socialism, even more than under capitalism, and classed departures from the principles of sovereignty and equality--implicitly by Moscow--as not in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism but rather as "deviations."

Initial Reaction to the Czechoslovak Invasion

2. Ceausescu's remarks are the most strident since those issued during 21-25 August, when the Rumanian leader condemned the Warsaw Five's invasion of Czechoslovakia. Having gotten its views on record, Bucharest had refrained from further public criticism of the Five. A period of "watchful waiting" regarding Soviet intentions ensued for the Rumanians. During this period, Bucharest carefully balanced its military posture toward its neighbors. It placed on full alert some of its border security forces but did not move large bodies of its forces or mobilize low-strength divisions.

Apprehensions for the Future

3. Even as he tells Moscow in his latest speeches that Rumania will not concede on its major principles, Ceausescu remains uncertain about longer term Soviet intentions. The Rumanians are acutely aware of the "new realities" stemming from the Warsaw Five's invasion of Czechoslovakia. Hence Rumanian officials are in part intent on keeping alive a sense of crisis in an effort to gain new benefits from the West and to keep the country in the limelight. There is a genuine concern over Rumania's exposed position in Eastern Europe.

4. Rumanian diplomats stationed abroad continue to emphasize that tensions in Rumanian Government circles over the possibility of Soviet intervention

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are still high. At home, however, Rumanian officials generally stress that the country is returning to normal and that the threat of Soviet interference is diminishing each day.

5. The Rumanians have not lost sight of their vulnerability to psychological, if not other, forms of pressure. Ceausescu's over-all tactics since 21 August, for example, reveal his awareness that the kind of pressure Moscow applies against Czechoslovakia might one day also be applied to Rumania. (Rumania has borders with friendly Yugoslavia, and with the USSR, Bulgaria, and Hungary, three of the invaders of Czechoslovakia.) Accordingly, the Rumanian leadership has committed the Rumanian people to armed resistance should Rumania be invaded, and is closing off every channel by which the Soviet Union might seek to infiltrate and impose its will upon Rumania.

Attitudes of Rumania's Neighbors

6. At the present time, Bucharest's neighbors, even the USSR, seem content with confining their pressures to occasional news articles and broadcasts depicting the evils of nationalism and revisionism. There also is no hard evidence suggesting major differences during the recent visit to Rumania of Pact commander and Soviet marshal Yakubovsky. If the Rumanians overplay their assertiveness, however, they could themselves be subject to economic sanctions or added political isolation.

7. Judged on the basis of the forces required to occupy Czechoslovakia, the USSR and its hard-core allies have not undertaken the military preparations at any time since 21 August that would be necessary for a comparable intervention in Rumania. Nor has there been so far any confirmation of rumors that the Warsaw Pact asked Rumania to accept Soviet troops or to allow Pact maneuvers to be held on Rumanian territory. Sometime next year, however, when tensions over the invasion of Czechoslovakia presumably will have somewhat abated, Rumania reportedly is agreeable to the holding of some form of Pact maneuvers in Rumania or to sending some forces to participate in exercises in another country.

8. A successful military intervention in Rumania would require not only the neutralization of the traditionally Russophobic Rumanian military forces, but also the sealing off of the Yugoslav border to prevent

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assistance to the Rumanians from that quarter. Ceausescu has stressed that all Rumanians would resist any foreign intervention. More importantly, Moscow would have to take the likelihood of such resistance into account in planning any possible invasion. Extensive mobilization and realignment of forces would be required before intervention could be conducted. Such mobilization will be more difficult as the harsh cold and heavy snows of winter get under way in the Carpathian Mountains.

Bucharest's Aspirations Abroad

9. Given the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the always politically realistic Rumanians can be expected to seek a revised modus vivendi with Moscow for so long as the Russians and their hard-core allies remain tough-minded. Bucharest probably hopes for an accommodation in which it will retain freedom of maneuver in exchange for accentuating the positive in its ties with the Warsaw Pact and with the bloc economic organization CEMA. Ceausescu's skill at manipulating the situation is likely in the long run to increase his influence in international Communist conferences. The Rumanians will continue to tailor their contacts with the West by temporarily playing down, for example, their close relations with West Germany and by engaging in less obvious contacts with Washington. At the same time, however, Bucharest seems intent on establishing a relationship with the US that would generate greater US concern over Rumania's exposed position in Eastern Europe.

10. At a time when overly close relations with some of the NATO countries raise objections in Moscow, Rumania probably will expand further the political relations and new markets it has developed with a variety of other non-Communist countries in recent years. Foreign Minister Manescu's current tour of six South American countries exemplifies this new thrust, and this trip closely follows one to Latin America by Deputy Premier Radulescu, who also is Rumania's permanent representative to CEMA. The Rumanians are making similar initiatives in various Afro-Asian countries.

11. Manescu's position as president of the 22nd session of the UN General Assembly greatly contributed

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to these increased contacts. Rumania's policies toward the non-NATO free world countries have paid dividends at the UN, where Rumania's prestige has sharply increased in recent years. These policies also have, as Ceausescu recently said, enabled Rumania to win "many friends on all continents." These relations also collectively serve to provide Rumania greater freedom of maneuver and trading opportunities.

The Party Leader's Image in Rumania

12. Ceausescu has adroitly used the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the threat of an invasion of Rumania to enhance his political standing at home. Not only has he developed far greater rapport with the people, but the invasion has popularized and united even more closely his "second generation" Communist leadership.

13. Even though Ceausescu seemingly has handled his regime wisely, he can be expected to read the prevailing political winds carefully before undertaking any dramatic foreign policy initiatives. To the Rumanians what is at stake is the fundamental principle that all national parties are coequal and therefore cannot be subjected arbitrarily to general policy lines. It is precisely on this principle that Bucharest has erected its edifice of independence.

New Moves at Home

14. The Ceausescu regime will focus new attention on the domestic front. Ceausescu has repeatedly emphasized the theme of "socialist democracy" since the first of this year and particularly since 21 August. Already making some conservative economic changes, the leadership now seems poised to introduce a cautious liberalization affecting citizens' rights and freedom of creative expression. Ceausescu already appears to be moving in this direction through the recent creation of such new bodies as the Front for Socialist Unity and the Councils for Coinhabiting Nationalities.

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15. Such cautious measures are consonant with the character of the Rumanian leadership and are calculated to avoid the effect rampant liberalization might have both domestically and on Rumania's relations with Moscow. By cautiously introducing liberal measures, however, the internally conservative Ceausescu regime at once acts to maintain its new-found popularity at home, "modernize" its image, and provide a safety valve for any popular pressures for change. In so doing, Ceausescu neither will have given up any critical control over the internal scene, nor will his regime have introduced any important irritant to Moscow.

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