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
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

The Soviet Military Stance Opposite Rumania




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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
21 October 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Soviet Military Stance Opposite Rumania

Summary

The Soviets probably feel that some 15 to 20 combat-ready divisions would be needed to assure the quick neutralization of the Rumanian Army and the sealing-off of the Yugoslav border. Extensive mobilization and movement of forces would be required to assemble a force of this size. Although some Soviet forces on the Rumanian border were mobilized during the Czech crisis, photographic evidence indicates that no buildup sufficient for intervention in Rumania had occurred by mid-September, and since then there have been no indications from other sources of such preparations.

Until the Soviets can stabilize the Czech situation and free most of their forces from that commitment, the assignment of additional large forces to a Rumanian intervention would take up nearly half the remaining forces available in the USSR which form the immediate backup to those opposite the NATO Central Region.

Note: This report was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Strategic Research.

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1. The USSR and its allies have not made the military preparations which would probably be necessary for intervention in Rumania. A successful military intervention would require not only the neutralization of the Rumanian armed forces, but also the sealing-off of the Yugoslav border to prevent assistance to the Rumanians from that quarter. Extensive mobilization and realignment of forces would be required before this kind of action could be taken.

2. Although some Soviet forces on the Rumanian border were mobilized during the Czech crisis, photographic evidence indicates that no buildup sufficient for intervention in Rumania had occurred by mid-September,

[REDACTED] A realignment for this purpose, moreover, would reduce by nearly half the remaining forces in the western USSR normally earmarked for use against the NATO Central Region.

Rumanian Forces

3. The Rumanian Army contains nine line divisions, five of which are believed to be combat ready. These divisions, which are somewhat smaller than Soviet divisions, are located generally around the perimeter of the country, with no concentration of force in any area (see map, appended foldout). [REDACTED]

4. The Rumanian Air Force's primary mission is air defense. It has less than 300 aircraft, many of them older models, and its effectiveness is limited by the low level of pilot training.

Forces Available in Western USSR

5. Soviet forces currently available for possible use against Rumania include 21 divisions, of which only 7 to 9 are presently estimated to be combat ready. Of these, 8 divisions are in the Carpathian, 4 in the Odessa, and 9 in the Kiev military districts (see map).

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Three are divisions of the 14th Army in the Odessa Military District which were mobilized during the Czech crisis.

6. It is noteworthy that two reduced-strength (Category II) divisions in the Carpathian Military District just north of the Rumanian borders did not appear to have been mobilized when observed in high-resolution photography in mid-September. Furthermore, no divisions in the Kiev Military District are believed to be combat ready or undergoing mobilization. The normal mission of the forces there is believed to be to form a strategic reserve. The Soviets would be expected to mobilize at least part of this reserve before undertaking an operation with consequences as unpredictable or unsettling as a Rumanian intervention.

Forces Available in Hungary and Bulgaria

7. Two of the four Soviet divisions normally stationed in Hungary are involved with the Czech occupation and are not now available for any action against Rumania. The remaining two are in their home garrisons in Hungary. In view of the general instability in Eastern Europe, it is unlikely that the Soviets would consider leaving Hungary entirely without Soviet military control--as demonstrated in the Czech crisis when one Soviet division remained in Hungary and another was quickly returned. Some reinforcement in Hungary by troops from the USSR, or the return of the other two Soviet divisions from Czechoslovakia, would therefore probably be necessary before an attack could be launched from Hungary. Any Soviet forces launched from Hungary would probably be reinforced by one or more of Hungary's three or four combat-ready divisions.

8. No Soviet troops are stationed in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Army contains 12 divisions, 6 of which are estimated to be combat ready. Mobilization would probably be necessary to enable the Bulgarian Army to play a substantial role in a Rumanian intervention. Even then, probably no more than 4 divisions would be available, as the protection of the southern borders with Greece and Turkey is normally the chief mission

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of the Bulgarian Army. Because of historic Bulgarian-Rumanian antipathies, the USSR would also have to consider the extreme provocation that the use of Bulgarian forces would present to Rumanians.

Soviet Air Strength Near Rumania

9. The redeployment of Soviet tactical air forces in connection with the Czech crisis has resulted in a net increase of nearly 150 Soviet combat aircraft in the general western USSR-Eastern Europe area, including those still in Czechoslovakia, raising the total to about 2,450. The number of aircraft in regions directly bordering Rumania declined slightly during this shift, to a total of about 700, but this force is considered sufficient to support an intervention.

Force Requirements for Intervention

10. The Soviets would probably consider using airborne units to assist in securing critical objectives in Rumania, as they did in Czechoslovakia. Any of three airborne divisions--at Vitebsk, Tula, or Kirovabad--would be available for use against Rumania. Only the Kirovabad division is known to have exercised in the Balkans. All are within nonstop flying range of Rumanian targets, but units and transport aircraft probably would be staged at intermediate airfields in the Odessa and Carpathian military districts.

11. Soviet military doctrine requires the attacking force to have at least a 2-to-1 advantage in troop strength over the enemy before starting an offensive. In the Czech invasion, the USSR had at its disposal some 30 divisions, against 8 Czech combat-ready divisions. At the time of the invasion 4 additional low-strength Czech divisions in Slovakia had already been effectively prevented from mobilizing by the presence of Soviet divisions which had moved in their area during the pre-intervention "maneuvers," creating an actual ratio of more than 3 to 1.

12. The high ratio observed in Czechoslovakia is probably attributable in part to the need for extra divisions to secure the western border against NATO forces in West Germany in place of the usual Czech

divisions. Although action against Rumania would have to take into account a requirement to seal the border with Yugoslavia, the number of troops required for this purpose would be substantially less than was the case in Czechoslovakia. Moreover, even if the Rumanians were able to mobilize, their 9 divisions would constitute a lesser threat than did the 8 combat-ready Czech divisions. These circumstances suggest that the Soviets would judge that they would need 15 to 20 combat-ready divisions, properly disposed, before moving into Rumania.

13. A quick, bloodless takeover would be considerably more difficult in Rumania than it was in Czechoslovakia. Most important areas of Czechoslovakia were within 75 miles of convenient starting points in East Germany, Hungary, Poland, or the Soviet Carpathian Military District. Two of these areas--East Germany and Carpathia--contained the only large concentrations of ready Soviet forces prior to mobilization.

14. Rumania, in contrast, is much less accessible. Rumania is roughly divided by the Carpathian Mountains into two regions, one accessible from Eastern Hungary and the other accessible from the Carpathian and Odessa military districts and from northern Bulgaria. The approach from Bulgaria would require the seizure of crossings over the Danube, which is bridged at only one point on the Rumanian border. The distances to some important objectives would be well over 200 miles.


15. Considerations of geography and available forces suggest that a Soviet invasion of Rumania would be carried out mainly by Soviet forces from Hungary and the southwestern USSR. Some forces--either Bulgarian or Soviet, or both--would probably be launched from Bulgaria. The size of the force from Bulgaria would be limited by several considerations: the primary mission of the Bulgarian Army, which is against Greece and Turkey; the barrier formed by the Danube River; and the fact that any Soviet troops committed from Bulgaria would first have to be transported there by sea or air.

16. To launch an invasion of Rumania, the Soviets would probably assemble a force of four or five armies and 15 to 20 divisions. These might include one or two Soviet armies in Hungary--probably with one or more Hungarian divisions--and two in the Carpathian and Odessa military districts. In addition a Bulgarian army might be used, possibly reinforced by a division or so from the USSR. As an alternative to committing these particular forces the Soviets could build up an intervention force from other resources. However, this course of action would take considerably more time.

17. The Soviets will need to maintain substantial forces in Czechoslovakia for some time to come. Because of this requirement, the redeployment needed for a move into Rumania would commit virtually all the remaining divisions of the Carpathian Military District, and would leave about 10 divisions deployed far to the south of their primary contingency areas in central and northern Europe.

Current Disposition of Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Near Rumania

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