


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
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE


Intelligence Memorandum

*Military Aspects of Rumania's Independent
Policy Within the Warsaw Pact*



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
SR IM 67-4
25 August 1967





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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
25 August 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Military Aspects of Rumania's Independent
Policy Within the Warsaw Pact

This spring, a group of military attachés posted in Moscow were wondering who would replace Marshal Grechko as commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact forces. "If it were up to Rumania," remarked the Rumanian to a colleague, "there would be no one."

Summary

During the past three years, Rumania has so sharply reduced its participation in the Warsaw Pact that it cannot now be considered an active member. Bucharest has challenged Moscow's authority to direct the activities of Rumanian troops. The present regime would not willingly commit these troops to a European war begun by Moscow.

Despite its objections to the Pact, the Ceausescu government is unlikely to repudiate membership, as the Albanians have done. The regime has publicly committed itself to uphold its Pact obligations so long as NATO exists and to participate in Pact exercises. It intends to see that critical decisions affecting Rumania's armed forces are made in Bucharest, however, rather than in Moscow. In this respect, Rumania's policy now resembles that of Yugoslavia.

Note: This memorandum was produced by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Strategic Research and coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence and the Office of National Estimates.

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East European Warsaw Pact Military Forces



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An important factor influencing the regime's course is the pressure--economic, political, and military--that Moscow might apply if Rumania should leave the Pact. Bucharest realizes it can do much to lighten the burden of membership without making a formal break. Withdrawal would adversely affect relations with some "Socialist" countries, but membership does not unduly hamper the development of closer relations with non-Communist governments.

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Background of the Military Differences

1. Important milestones in Rumania's search for political and economic independence from Moscow were achieved in 1954, when the Soviet-Rumanian joint economic enterprises began to be disbanded, and in 1958, when Soviet troops were withdrawn from the country. Between 1958 and 1964 Rumania greatly expanded its economic and political contacts in non-Communist countries. In April 1964 Bucharest announced its "declaration of independence," which unequivocally asserted Rumania's right to national autonomy and equality in the Communist world.

2. Rumania's military policy toward the USSR has reflected the economic and political relations between the countries. The Rumanian military establishment did not break with the Soviet military on its own initiative. Rather, the high command has remained loyal to the government and has carried out the policy toward the Warsaw Pact laid down by the regime. Those few senior officers who evidently were unwilling to accept this policy either have been demoted or were released from service in 1965 and 1966.

3. The first change in the Soviet-Rumanian military relationship was detected in 1962-63, when the Dej regime persuaded Moscow to recall the Soviet KGB advisers monitoring the activities of the Rumanian intelligence community. Among the organizations from which the Soviets were removed were the military counterintelligence section of the General Directorate of State Security and the Armed Forces Intelligence Directorate. The withdrawal of the Soviets probably led to a decline in intelligence exchange between Rumania and the USSR.

4. A more serious disruption occurred in September 1966, when the Armed Forces Intelligence

Directorate refused to send a representative to an important Pact intelligence conference in Prague. As a result, [redacted] the Rumanians were not invited to a similar meeting in February 1967. The purpose of the Prague conferences was to evaluate recent NATO exercises, to discuss procedures for improving radio communications among intelligence organizations, and to improve the exchange of information during international crises.

[redacted]

5. The Armed Forces Intelligence Directorate's present activities probably reflect its discovery, sometime prior to the fall of 1966, of a combined Soviet, Czechoslovak and Hungarian intelligence net directed against Rumania. [redacted]

[redacted] Bucharest has initiated its own operations against "Soviet Bloc countries." In June of this year the Rumanian military attaché in Moscow asked the [redacted] for information on Soviet naval operations in the Mediterranean--a further indication that the Rumanians are collecting intelligence on Warsaw Pact forces.

Training and Equipment Problems

6. Rumanian officials continue to endorse "collaboration and joint battle training with the fraternal armies." Many have complained privately, however, that during some Pact maneuvers the Soviets invented absurd and unrealistic situations involving the simulated use of weapons not even in the inventories of the participating countries.

7. Only a few selected ground force battalions from Rumania took part in the Pact exercises held in Bulgaria in 1964 and 1967. During the past three years Rumanian naval and air defense units also have conducted a few minor exercises with the Soviets and Bulgarians.

The Rumanians are likely to contribute only token forces at most to future Pact exercises, and then only under direct pressure from Moscow.

8. The types of training emphasized during the past three years suggest greater concern for Rumania's national defense than for potential Pact operations. Bucharest has concentrated on developing the combat effectiveness and esprit of its mountain troops, although these troops would not be useful in the initial stages of Pact offensive or defensive operations. They most likely would be employed against an aggressor who intended to occupy Rumania for an extended period.

9. The performance of the Rumanian Navy, which could augment Pact forces in the Black Sea, remains conspicuously poor. [redacted] claimed recently that the navy is to become primarily a training facility for the merchant marine.

10. The Rumanians are taking steps to make themselves less dependent upon the USSR for military equipment. Both party leader Ceausescu and armed forces minister Ionita stated this year that Rumania will devote greater attention to the domestic production of armaments.

[redacted] the party presidium has formulated an ambitious plan for the production of rockets, high-performance aircraft, artillery, armor, transport vehicles, and sophisticated communications equipment.

[redacted] the program is intended to give Rumania its political and military independence from the USSR.



Colonel General ION IONITA
Rumanian Minister of Armed Forces

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military officers are pressing the regime to provide new military equipment. One purpose of the production plan, the funding of which appears to be beyond Rumania's present capabilities, may be to solidify military support for the government with a long-term promise of improvement.

11. The USSR may have sparked Rumania's decision to reduce its dependence on the Soviets for military equipment. In 1965 both Pact commander Grechko and party secretary Brezhnev annoyed the Rumanians by urging them to step up equipment purchases from the USSR. The Soviets also are reported to have assigned Rumania the task of manufacturing spare parts for obsolescent military hardware. To fulfill the assignment, Rumania would have had to purchase machinery that could not be used to manufacture anything else.

Evasion of Moscow's Authority

12. Some Rumanian officials have voiced fears of a violent Soviet reaction if Rumania were formally to renounce its Pact membership. Ceausescu himself



Rumanian Party General Secretary **NICOLAE CEAUSESCU**
and his Soviet counterpart **LEONID BREZHNEV**

(November 1966)

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reportedly warned Rumanian foreign office personnel in 1964 that "the Russians would crush us if they were given the opportunity." One possible plan, involving the withdrawal of Rumania from the Pact in conjunction with the withdrawal of Greece and Turkey from NATO and the signing of a Balkan non-aggression agreement, allegedly was considered in 1964 but dropped as being impractical.

14. Both Ceausescu and Ionita told the Rumanian National Assembly in July that Bucharest will remain in the Pact as long as NATO exists. Even while retaining their membership the Rumanians have been able gradually to erode Moscow's control over the Rumanian military establishment. When Grechko complained in 1965 that the Rumanian representatives in Pact headquarters had been insubordinate, the Rumanian armed forces minister replied that Bucharest was the proper judge of what Pact orders would be obeyed by the Rumanian armed forces. This response was tantamount to rejection of the Pact chain of command established in 1955, under which the East European defense ministers are deputy commanders of the Pact armed forces and thus subject to direct orders of the commander. The Rumanians are believed to have objected strongly to Soviet efforts made in 1965 and 1966 to expand the number of Rumanian units formally committed to the Pact's Combined Command. It is highly unlikely that Bucharest now considers any of its armed forces so committed.

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15. In early 1966 Rumania reportedly circulated a proposal calling for Moscow to consult the other Pact members before making decisions on critical issues. Bucharest also is reported to have asked that the top Pact command positions be rotated among the East European members, that the East Europeans be charged less for the Soviet troops stationed on their soil, and that the numbers of these troops be reduced. Rumania already had taken steps in 1964 to cut its own military force mainly by reducing the obligation of conscripts from 24 to 16 months. The Soviets are reported to have been particularly displeased.

16. This year, Rumania's intransigence apparently delayed for several months the formal appointment of Soviet Marshal Yakubovskiy to succeed Grechko as Pact commander. Ceausescu's declaration on 17 June that each Pact partner "must possess its own supreme command" was a clear warning that the new commander could expect no more cooperation than his predecessor.

17. The Rumanians believe there is a degree of sympathy for their anti-Soviet stand in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and perhaps even in Hungary and Bulgaria. Only in East Germany is there no warmth for the Rumanian position and no opposition to Moscow. Bucharest apparently recognizes, however, that its East European colleagues are not questioning the usefulness of the Pact, as Rumania does, but only the mechanics of its operation.

The Rumanians in Wartime

18. Since embarking on its independent policy, Rumania has revised the legal procedure necessary for it to declare war. The 1965 constitution, though upholding Rumania's commitment to the Warsaw Pact, contains an addendum to the 1952 version that appears designed to eliminate an obligation to become involved in an "undesirable" war. Whereas the earlier constitution stated that "obligations of

mutual defense deriving from international treaties" represented a basis for the declaration of war, the new document states that the Rumanian parliament can declare war

"...only in the case of armed aggression directed against the Socialist Republic of Rumania or against another state toward which the Socialist Republic of Rumania has mutual defense obligations arising from international treaties, if such a situation has come about, for which the obligation of declaring a state of war has been laid down."

19. Rumania's behavior prior to or at the outbreak of general war in Europe in all likelihood would be based primarily on a calculation of its own interests rather than those of the Pact. Its "socialist" outlook might make it initially sympathetic to Moscow, particularly if the causes of the conflict were obscure, but this outlook would not be an overriding factor in the final decision to commit Rumanian armed forces. Rumania probably would try to prevent any attempt by Soviet troops to cross Rumanian territory covertly prior to hostilities and would be tempted to give the West valuable, perhaps critical, early warning. After the outbreak of hostilities, Rumania probably would not permit its troops to be committed outside its borders and might be unwilling to make its oil available to Pact armor. Any sign of NATO military success would stir memories of Rumania's dubious military tradition and its deep distaste for the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact alliance.