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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

# Intelligence Memorandum

## *Soviet Military Policy in 1967: The Challenges and the Issues*



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# FOREWORD

This memorandum seeks to provide an overall view of the principal political factors bearing on Soviet military policy in 1967. For analytical convenience, these factors are grouped under the headings of "challenges" and "issues." The challenges refer to the objective conditions of the strategic situation that frame the choices open to Soviet policy. The issues refer to the choices themselves, to the problems that are now being posed for the Soviet policy maker, both by the requirements of the objective situation and by internal political influences, primarily pressures from the Soviet military establishment. It traces the recent development of these issues, mainly as they have been reflected in the writings of Soviet military theorists.

This is one of a series of memoranda on Soviet military policy and strategy which the Office of Research and Reports has issued since the advent of the new Soviet regime. Previous memoranda in this series have included: CIA/RR MM 66-1, The Military Issue in Soviet Policy During 1965, February 1966, SECRET, and CIA/RR MM 66-6, Soviet Military Theorists Reappraise Nuclear War, September 1966, SECRET.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

# Soviet Military Policy in 1967: The Challenges and the Issues

## Summary

Changes in the Soviet Union's strategic situation over the past year -- brought about in part by the growth of the country's offensive and defensive strategic forces -- are raising new questions for Soviet military policy and placing old questions in a new context. In a sense, it may be said that the Soviet Union is approaching maturity in the nuclear-missile age, the point at which it must ask itself not merely how much and what kinds of additional military power it needs, but how it can improve the efficiency of its management of military power, and how it can translate this power into effective political influence in world affairs.

Much evidence has accumulated over the past year to indicate that issues related to questions of this kind have been under active debate in the Soviet

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Union and that opinions are being formed, and actions taken, that may affect Soviet military policy for some years to come.

In particular, it may be inferred that:

A political disturbance was provoked in the Soviet government by the US invitation in January 1967 to discuss measures for controlling the deployment of offensive and defensive strategic systems and also that elements within the Soviet military establishment have been pressing strongly for a vigorous ABM deployment policy.

Some elements within the Soviet military are dissatisfied with arrangements which presently exist for exercising supreme authority over the Soviet Armed Forces in emergency situations, and a body of opinion is forming behind the idea of establishing a formal, permanent command authority to exercise these functions.

There is sharp dissatisfaction within the Soviet Union regarding the quality and organization of Soviet planning and military operational research, and pressure is being generated within both military and political quarters for improvements in these activities.

These issues have not yet seriously disturbed the functioning of the politicc-military leadership in the formulation of military policy or in the day-to-day management of military affairs in the Soviet Union.

The new leaders seem to have found common ground with the military on the basis of a program that is strongly committed to the buildup of strategic forces but is attentive also to the improvement of the sub-strategic capabilities that might be needed for emergencies short of general war.

But as decisions on military matters come to depend more on expert technical knowledge, the influence of those who command this knowledge -- that is, the technically trained officers -- is bound to grow. How to utilize this knowledge without becoming captive to it and how to insure the continued dominance of political considerations in matters of vital significance to the nation have now become critical and topical questions for the Soviet leaders. This memorandum examines the evidence bearing on Soviet attitudes toward these questions in the context of a broad assessment of the strategic situation facing the Soviet Union today.

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## The Challenges

1. There has been a marked change in the Soviet Union's strategic situation over the past year as the continuing growth of the country's offensive and defensive strategic forces has bolstered Soviet assured destruction capabilities and cut somewhat into the lead that the United States has enjoyed in the military power relationship. While the significance of this development still lies mainly in the implications it carries for the future, there seems little doubt that these implications are raising new questions for Soviet policy and placing old questions in a new context. In a sense it may be said that the Soviet Union is approaching maturity in the nuclear-missile age, the point at which it must ask itself not merely how much and what kinds of additional military power it needs, but rather how it can use to political advantage the power it already has.

2. The issues of military policy that face the Soviet Union today -- and, above all, the issue whether Soviet policy is to be oriented toward a continuation of high levels of military development and deployment effort, or whether this effort may be eased -- hinge on the answers that will be given to these questions. These answers are not likely to be given all at once, or in any formal or deliberate way, or under the influence of any single strategic or political criterion. They are more likely to emerge indirectly from the many separate decisions in the many different fields of policy that the Soviet Union must make during the years ahead. Some of the factors that may affect these decisions can already be gauged.

## The Strategic Setting

3. The principal concerns of Soviet military policy remain centered, as they have been for many years, on problems relating to the Soviet Union's military relationship with the United States. The military power and

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policies of the United States constitute, in the Soviet view, the major threat to Soviet security, the principal obstacle to the exercise of Soviet political influence in world affairs, and the major factor affecting the country's capacity to fulfill the goals of its domestic policy without distraction. In assessing US military power and policies in 1967, the Soviet Union is likely to find little grounds for complacency, although it may find some reasons to believe that its strategic situation can be improved by a careful management of its military policy.

4. From the purely military standpoint, that is, from the standpoint of the capabilities of the two sides to wage war, the power relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States must still appear unsatisfactory to the Soviet leaders. US power includes a largely invulnerable strategic retaliatory force, consisting of land-based and sea-based ICBM's and strategic bombers in the aggregate in far greater numbers than the corresponding forces possessed by the Soviet Union. These forces are designed to guarantee, at a minimum, that a massive counterblow will strike the Soviet Union if it launches a nuclear attack on the United States. Below the strategic nuclear level, the United States has a range of military capabilities, including both tactical nuclear and conventional capabilities, permitting it to adopt a "flexible response" in the event of limited and local military challenges.

5. The Soviet leaders are undoubtedly aware that the main directions of development in US forces are aimed at qualitative improvements of various kinds, including the provision of multiple warheads. Programs have been announced for converting the US missile submarines to carry an advanced Polaris and the new Poseidon missiles and for replacing part of the ICBM deployment with the new Minuteman-3 -- programs designed largely to promote accuracy and penetration success. On the level of limited, conventional capabilities, the invaluable experience being

acquired by the US forces in Vietnam represents another kind of qualitative growth. The Soviet leaders must be aware that current US programming calls for a leveling off of strategic missile deployment within the next year or so; they may see this as offering them the opportunity to catch up with or surpass the US in numbers of ICBM launchers. On the other hand, the prospect of continuing improvements in the US forces will necessitate constant reevaluation by the Soviet leaders of the numbers and types of weapons and forces they need.

6. From the political point of view, current developments in the intermediate world between the Soviet Union and the United States carry mixed implications for Soviet military policy for the future. The trends in Europe point toward a further accentuation of the pluralistic tendencies that have characterized the policies of states on both sides of the Iron Curtain for some time, and, consequently, toward a further relaxation of the tensions that have long governed the arrangements of power in this part of the world. The trends in Asia point in the opposite direction, toward increasing tensions with Communist China, toward the possibility of military emergencies provoked by China, and toward the possibility of a broader war arising out of the Vietnam conflict.

7. The new mobility in European political relations offers opportunities as well as problems to the Soviet military planners. The Soviet leaders undoubtedly believe that they can exert influence on the policies of Western states, including the United States, by the policy they adopt toward the Warsaw Pact. No axiom has been more firmly established by the history of international relations over the past generation than that any assertion of militancy from the East evokes a corresponding reaction in the West, and conversely, that any peaceful signals from the East evoke divisive echoes in the West. Given the conditions that are likely to exist in Europe over the next few years, there seems little doubt that Soviet policy toward the Warsaw Pact will reflect the lessons drawn from this experience.

8. The situation in Asia presents a darker picture for the Soviet leaders. Even before the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, China's hostility had seemed sufficiently menacing to cause the Soviet Union to begin measures to improve its defenses along various sectors of the common border. These measures have been underway for several years and are continuing. Further incentives for caution are now being supplied by the revolution in China which is being fed in part by anti-Soviet motives and which has already led to violent demonstrations against Soviet representatives. In a situation so inherently unpredictable, Soviet planners must prepare for the worst, including the possibility that the Chinese leaders, or some aspiring Chinese leader, might seek to provoke a military emergency, including a clash with the Soviet Union, to divert public attention from troubles at home and create an artificial rationale for the imposition of authority.

9. The war in Vietnam adds further elements of uncertainty to the Soviet outlook in Asia. As long as it continues, the Soviet Union is exposed to the danger that some action by the US side, or some provocation by the Chinese, will place it in the position of having to choose between a deeper involvement in the war or humiliation. The war points up also one of the major deficiencies in the Soviet Union's military posture -- its inability to apply its conventional power effectively in areas beyond its own periphery.

10. In summing up these various considerations bearing on Soviet military policy in 1967, it may be said that the USSR faces a strategic situation in which the United States continues to enjoy superiority in overall military power but in which the Soviet Union retains possibilities to improve its position, either by direct military development and deployment efforts, or by indirect actions aimed at world political attitudes and relationships. As the Soviet Union improves its nuclear

deterrent posture relative to the United States, the objectives governing Soviet military policy may change somewhat. The Soviet Union may become less concerned with the question of what additional military power it needs and more concerned with the question of how to use to political advantage the power that it has already acquired.

The Influence of Current Military Programs

11. The strategic weapons programs that the Soviet Union is now carrying forward will have an important bearing on Soviet policy in the future. They are helping to create the strategic environment in which Soviet policy will have to operate, and, as such, they tell something about Soviet expectations and intentions in this regard.

12. The force goals that the Soviet Union sets itself in the buildup of its ICBM forces is clearly one of the major factors that will affect Soviet policy in the years ahead. Some 900 launchers, including both those that have been completed and those that are in various stages of construction, are now estimated to be in the Soviet Union.

13. Whatever the ultimate size may be, it is now clear that the Soviet Union has undertaken strategic offensive programs of sufficient scope to affect the existing military relationship with the United States and that it has thus invited the risk that the United States may take compensatory actions. This means that it is acting to bring about a situation in the years immediately ahead in which pressures for high levels of military development and deployment effort are almost certain to be intensified. Moreover, in view of the time dimensions that apply to modern military planning, it must be assumed that this possibility has already been reckoned by Soviet planners and that it is serving as one of the coordinates around which overall Soviet policy is being planned.

14. Evidence of developmental activity indicates that programs are planned which will be follow-ons to those now being deployed in the strategic offensive field. The nature and timing of developmental activity would be consistent with a further cycle of ICBM deployment to follow the programs that are currently under way. However, it is unclear at this time as to whether quantitative or qualitative changes are signaled. Evidence also has become available over the past year that the Soviet Union is constructing a new class of ballistic missile submarine with capabilities more nearly comparable to the Polaris than has been the case with existing submarine classes.

15. Soviet activities in the ABM field are also exerting pressures for an upward turn in the competition for military power, although the evidence of Soviet intentions in this field is still ambiguous. The issue that concerns the United States, and hence bears on the question of the conditions that may face Soviet policy in the future, is whether the system that is now being installed in the Moscow defense zone will be extended to other areas of the Soviet Union. The incentives for such an extension are strong. They include the technical consideration that a single-city defense system is inherently defective in the conditions that would prevail in a general nuclear war with the United States. They include also the practical consideration that an enormous investment stands to be wasted unless the system is developed to its full potential. They undoubtedly also include the pressures that are generated by the men and institutions with a vested interest in a strong ABM policy. Against these considerations, the Soviet Union must balance the knowledge that an extension of the Moscow ABM system would provoke the United States to take actions designed to offset the advantages that such an extension might offer.

16. In summing up these various considerations, it can be said that the Soviet Union has reached a point in its military development programs at which further progress

along the lines that are now being followed is likely to lead to consequences it might wish to avoid. Seldom, if ever, in the brief history of the nuclear-missile age have the issues of military policy in the Soviet Union and the United States been more delicately interrelated than they are at present. This should serve as an important qualifier to the implications about Soviet expectations and intentions drawn from the considerations discussed above, for it underscores the fact that the Soviet Union has strong incentives to avoid these implications, to brake the momentum of its current programs. A first step in this direction may have been registered by the Soviet Union's recent acceptance of the invitation offered by the United States to discuss measures to prevent a further escalation of the arms race.

The Issues

17. How the Soviet Union deals with the problems that the current strategic situation poses will be affected in some measure by factors that relate less to the objective features of this situation than to the subjective features of the Soviet reaction to it -- to the Soviet policymaking process itself and to the political influences that play on it. The character of the national leadership, the quality of its relationships with the High Command, the capacity of the political and military leaders to control the tensions and conflicts chronic to the political-military relationship, their ability to cope with the problems of administering the sprawling military establishment, and their ability, as well, to solve the peculiar missile age problems of strategy, force planning, and command and control, are obviously vital factors affecting the development of Soviet policy in the future.

18. It is a mark of the vitality of these issues, of their relevance to problems that are currently facing the Soviet Union, that they are being publicly discussed in the Soviet Union today. Indeed, the salient feature of

Soviet writings on military affairs over the past year is the testimony they have given that issues of this kind have now moved to the forefront of Soviet military attention.

Political-Military Relations

19. Problems relating to political-military relations have always been at or near the center of leadership concern in the Soviet Union. Basically, these problems arise from a clash between two impulses -- the totalitarian impulses of the Communist Party, which cause it to view with suspicion any independent agency of power within the boundaries of its own authority, and the professional impulses of the military establishment, which cause it to resist any restrictions of the autonomy required to develop its own functional efficiency. For many years in the Soviet Union, these problems centered on disciplinary matters, questions of loyalty, party indoctrination, and the like. Now they concern mainly policy matters: the intricately complicated questions of what the advisory role of the military should be in an age in which military issues have become the major preoccupation of national leaders, and the question of where advice leaves off and influence begins.

20. The major factors bearing on these matters concern the character of the national leadership, the quality of its authority in general, and the extent of its ability to impose its authority effectively on the military establishment. Political-military relations have tipped one way or the other during the history of the Soviet Union, depending in large measure upon the strength of the leaders who represented either side. Under Trotsky, Stalin, and, to some extent, Khrushchev, the military was kept under strict political discipline. On the other hand, strong leaders on the military side, such as Tukhachevskiy and Zhukov, and at times, Malinovskiy, have been able, for brief periods, to assert military interests effectively. At the present time it appears that strong leaders are lacking on both sides.

21. The political leadership today can be described as an arrangement of convenience that has worked reasonably well to keep Khrushchev's heirs in harness but has discouraged the emergence of any one decisive hand in the formulation of policy. Brezhnev and Kosygin seem to have been fairly successful in dividing their responsibilities along party-government lines, although Brezhnev has shown some signs of jealousy regarding the boundaries of his own prerogatives. Podgornyy, the other member of the formal triumvirate, may also share authority at the top echelon, perhaps serving as a makeweight on Brezhnev's behalf, or possibly as a broker of policy differences. In any event, the situation at the top of the Soviet hierarchy of power seems complex and unstable.

22. The situation in the High Command appears to reflect the continued dominance of the older generation of military leaders, although a new fluidity in the command structure is suggested by some of the rearrangements that have followed Malinovskiy's death. The major appointment, that of Marshal Grechko to succeed Marshal Malinovskiy as Minister of Defense, is a significant indicator of continuity, since it was almost certainly motivated in part by the political leadership's desire to avoid ruffling military opinion. Other appointments, however, have not fitted this pattern of smooth transition. Marshal Yakubovskiy, for example, was raised to the rank of "first" deputy minister of defense, apparently in anticipation of his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact forces, yet no confirmation of his appointment has yet been published. Army General Sokolov was also raised to the rank of "first" deputy minister, seemingly indicating that he would be appointed chief of the General Staff, yet the incumbent, Marshal Zakharov, continues to be identified in that post. Whatever the explanation of these puzzling features of the command transition may be, it is worthy of note that the top levels of the Soviet High Command have now been reached by members of the below-60 age bracket.

23. Marshal Grechko is the natural heir to the military patrimony, and he is likely to carry on in the traditions of his predecessor. What is known of his attitudes suggests that he is practical, discreet, and generally conservative -- qualities that would seem to recommend him both to his political superiors and to his professional colleagues. On issues that have seemed to divide the military leadership in the past, Grechko has cultivated a public image of unequivocally supporting official policy decisions. This has sometimes seemed to place him in the advanced wing of military thinking, but he has also revealed conservative tendencies, as in his recent adjuration to military theorists to study the experience of the past to avoid "wool-gathering in clouds of theoretical abstractions." On the whole, it seems that the job rather than the man will be the important factor in determining how the military establishment will be run. Whatever his personal inclinations may be, Grechko is likely to find not only that he must explain and defend government policies to his colleagues, but also that he must defend the institutional interests that he represents and at the same time resist changes that might threaten military prerogatives or that might upset the smooth functioning of the military establishment.

24. A reasonably peaceful coexistence now seems to prevail between the political and military leaders on matters of defense policy. The political leaders have generally refrained from public discussions of military matters -- although some of Brezhnev's actions and remarks seem to mark him as an advocate of strong military policies, while Kosygin's interests and responsibilities suggest that he favors restraints on military spending. The military leaders, for their part, have found few burning issues to dispute. The new leaders seem to have found common ground with the military on the basis of a program that is strongly committed to the buildup of strategic forces but is attentive, also, to the improvement of all the sub-strategic capabilities that

might be needed for emergencies short of general war. It is a program that could hardly better be calculated to keep the political-military relationship on an even keel if it were expressly cut to that specification.

The Military Lobby and Current Policies

25. There has been considerable evidence, however, of continuing turbulence beneath the surface calm that now prevails in Soviet political-military relations. Two issues in particular seem to have aroused controversy over the past six months. One concerns the question of the general level of effort that the Soviet Union should devote to defense -- the old resource allocation issue. The other concerns the ABM issue -- whether the Soviet Union should seek arrangements with the United States that would result in curbing a further deployment of the ABM system now being installed in the Moscow defense zone or whether the Soviet Union should extend this system to other cities, regardless of possible United States reactions.

26. The first issue came to the surface in the military press last year under the guise of a theoretical discussion of the concept of military superiority. The discussion developed in the context of a renewed attempt by Soviet military theorists to explain how the Soviet Union might prepare itself to conduct a nuclear war. In addressing this problem, the Soviet theorists faced the need to reconcile the long-held tenet of Soviet doctrine that force superiority is a prerequisite of victory with the manifest fact that the Soviet Union was inferior to the United States in existing strategic attack forces. One line of thought that developed from this discussion centered on the notion that superiority is a temporary condition and that it could be achieved at a given place and time even though it might not be achievable in an overall sense. Another line of thought was much more direct -- it simply asserted that a real, practical superiority should be the goal of Soviet military policy.

27. This view was presented by only one spokesman, but the directness of his argument and the circumstances that existed at the time his article appeared suggest that he was speaking for a broad sector of military opinion and that he was addressing an issue of current concern. The spokesman was Lieutenant Colonel Bondarenko, and his article appeared in Communist of the Armed Forces in September 1966. Bondarenko defined the goal of military policy as the achievement of superiority in the "quantity and quality of weapons and combat equipment." And, disputing the views of his colleagues described above, he asserted that modern weapons "make it difficult" to alter the balance of forces during the course of a war and that superiority must be achieved before war, "in peacetime."

28. There is some reason to believe that this article was timed to coincide with a period when critical decisions affecting the economy were being faced by the Soviet leadership. This was a period when the plan for the forthcoming year would have been going through its final firming-up process, and hence a time at which lobbying efforts might be expected to have maximum effect on unresolved issues. That pressures were being exerted in the other direction -- that is, toward economizing on military expenditures -- seems likely because there were a number of symptoms of trouble in the Soviet economy at the time, including the shortfall in the plan for capital investment revealed by official information published at the half-year point. Moreover, there had been public arguments against the desirability of tying Soviet military policy to the goal of superiority. An article in International Affairs in May 1966 had attacked the notion that superiority represented a realistic goal of military policy and had questioned whether the concept itself was meaningful under present conditions. Decrying the use of "hackneyed phrases" about the need to preserve military superiority, the article argued that "nuclear forces have a quantitative limit which it is useless from the military viewpoint to exceed."

29. Whatever the precise conditions that existed in the leadership at the time, there seems little doubt that this article was written on the assumption that a strong assertion of military needs was called for and that this assertion might have some effect on Soviet military policy. The fact that the argument has not been carried forward in subsequent articles suggests that military spokesmen no longer feel the need to press the point, that they are generally satisfied that the allocations that have in fact been made to defense are adequate.

30. Another issue that has broken the surface calm of Soviet political-military relations in recent months concerns ABM policy. The evidence is still unclear as to precisely how the issue is being posed in the Soviet Union and how the various political and military interests line up around the issue. What seems clear, however, is that some sort of partisan in-fighting was provoked in the Soviet Union by the United States' invitation in January 1967 to discuss measures for controlling the deployment of offensive and defensive strategic systems, that this flap was preceded by a long controversy within the military establishment concerning the value of strategic defense in modern war, and that elements within the Soviet military establishment are now pressing strongly for a continuation of the present ABM deployment.

31. In the regime's first public response to the US invitation, Kosygin at his press conference in London on 9 February claimed that the Soviet Union regarded the development of an ABM system to be justifiable on the gounds that such a system was "defensive" in nature. While acknowledging the costliness of an ABM program, Kosygin implied that the question of economy was not central to the issue. Despite the negative tone of his remarks, Kosygin took pains to insist that he was not closing the door to negotiations on the issue.

32. Whatever the relationship between the Kosygin statement and the leadership consensus prior to his trip, shortly after Kosygin's return to the Soviet Union an article in Pravda on 15 February by commentator Burlatskiy suggested that elements within the regime wished to put a more positive face on the Soviet Union's attitude toward negotiations on the issue. The Pravda article attributed to Kosygin at the London press conference a statement supporting an ABM moratorium that Kosygin did not in fact make. Kosygin was quoted as saying that the Soviet government was willing to discuss questions related to both "offensive" and "defensive" weapons in the interest of averting a "further arms race."

33. This was followed by reports -- carried by Western news agencies on 17 February -- that reliable Soviet sources had expressed embarrassment over the "mistaken" impression conveyed by the Burlatskiy article and reaffirmed the regime's opposition to a negotiated settlement of the ABM issue with the United States "at present." The same officials also reportedly maintained that a "new article" laying down the regime's negative position regarding the proposed ABM moratorium would be forthcoming. In fact, this new statement was never issued, and Burlatskiy's article remains the most authoritative public exposition of the Soviet Union's position on the moratorium negotiations.

34. Nevertheless, a very strong statement in favor of continuing a vigorous ABM policy has now been published in the Soviet military press. This article, which was authored by Lieutenant General I. Zavyalov, appeared in Red Star in two installments on March 30 and 31, the second of which was concerned directly with the question of the role of antimissile defense in Soviet military doctrine. Acknowledging the "decisive" importance of offensive operations in modern war, Zavyalov at the same time emphasized the "very great national" and "strategic" role of defensive actions based on "antiair" and "antimissile" weapons.

35. The importance of this article derives not only from the vigor of its advocacy of a strong ABM policy but also from its relationship to a long-standing controversy within the Soviet military concerning the role of "active defense" in modern war as well as from Zavyalov's previous involvement in this controversy. The most recent phase of this controversy took place in the pages of Military Thought during 1965. This phase was initiated by Zavyalov himself in the January 1965 issue in an article published under the same title as the second installment of his current article -- "Types and Forms of Military Operations." According to the comments of one participant in the debate, Zavyalov's article provoked the "sharpest of all polemics" in which "entirely contradictory" viewpoints were expressed.

36. One supporter of Zavyalov's views, Colonel General N. Tsyganov, writing in the August 1965 issue of Military Thought, cited Soviet historical experience as evidence of the correctness of the doctrinal concept of "strategic defense" based on antimissile weapons. As if to underscore the critical importance of the defense of the major Soviet administrative, industrial, and political centers, he pointed to the strenuous efforts of the Nazi command during World War II in attempting to demoralize and destroy Moscow and Leningrad by air attack. In repulsing the advance, according to Tsyganov, the anti-aircraft defenses of those cities played an "unconditionally" strategic role. He also emphasized the import of this experience for current policy: the need to establish "complexes" of antimissile and anticosmic defense and to allocate "serious capital investments" for this undertaking.

37. Another supporter of Zavyalov, Colonel I. Grudinin, writing in the same issue of Military Thought, claimed that rejection of the strategic importance of antimissile defense was fraught with the "most serious of consequences." Grudinin specifically related the present controversy to the "incorrect conclusions" and "insufficient

considerations" contained in the book Military Strategy, edited by Sokolovskiy. Grudinin argued that the rejection of the concept "strategic defense" in Military Strategy was a result of an underestimation of the possibilities of anti-missile defense. A similar criticism had previously been registered in the military press following the publication of the first (1962) edition of the book. Criticizing the Sokolovskiy authors for ignoring the significance of the concept of "strategic defense," a review published in Military Historical Journal, No. 5, in 1963 asserted that it is "impossible" to win victory in modern war without "modern antiair and antirocket defense."

38. The reactions to Zavyalov's arguments were far from universally favorable. In March 1966, Marshal Sokolovskiy himself authored another strong argument for the primacy of strategic attack forces. But there were a number of indications that Zavyalov's views were supported at high levels. It may be relevant, in this connection, to note Brezhnev's speech to the military graduates in July 1965 -- a political benchmark which suggests that some real change in strategic defense policy was taking place at the time. He pointed to Soviet achievements in developing antimissile weapons, and referred to "recent" but unspecified developments which he said would enhance the capabilities of the antimissile forces.

39. The republication of Zavyalov's views now at a time when the question of ABM policy is obviously at the top of the leadership's agenda seems a highly significant indicator of military attitudes toward the ABM issue. It suggests that the military leaders -- or, at least, important members -- are concerned that the current moratorium negotiations might lead the Soviet government to postpone or discontinue measures for ABM defense which they regard as essential to the country's security.

The Command and Control Problem

40. In addition to these current issues, there are other shadows on the picture of Soviet political-military relations that point to problems that may become more

serious in the future. One problem that is receiving attention in the current writings concerns command and control -- that is, the arrangements by which a government insures its ability to control its military forces in all the contingencies that the hazards of the nuclear-missile world may pose. Although the Soviet writers discuss the question only in general terms, it seems clear that they are reflecting concern that Soviet arrangements for all these contingencies are less than satisfactory. It is possible that the prolonged illness that preceded Malinovskiy's death may have brought this concern to a head. While it seems highly unlikely that Malinovskiy held the authority to initiate strategic retaliatory action in the event of hostile attack, the knowledge that Malinovskiy would soon pass from the scene may have prompted new thinking about how this authority should be exercised. The concern probably also stems from more general considerations, including the increased attention that Soviet military theorists have recently been giving to the problems of nuclear war and the impression of untidiness that must be conveyed to military thinkers by the political arrangements that now prevail at the top of the Soviet hierarchy, and between the political and military authorities.

41. One of the problems treated in the Soviet doctrinal writings over the past year has been the question of the responsibility of the political leadership for the direction of military affairs both in war and in peacetime. Some of these writings have also gone beyond this general question into a discussion of the institutional channels through which the political leadership should exercise these functions.

42. The import of these discussions seems to be that, as a result of the "revolution in military affairs" that is now going on, the top command channels have become far more critical to successful operation than ever before. One article went so far as to say that the present moment in Soviet military development marks the beginning of a

new stage in this revolution -- a stage that will be characterized mainly by the effort to master the problems of command and control.

43. This article, which was written by a Colonel Tyushkevich, was published in the fall of 1966 and gives particular prominence to the technical aspects of the problem of command and control. It is on this basis that the new stage -- the stage that is just beginning -- is distinguished from those that went before, the first of which was devoted to the mastery of the technology of nuclear-missile weapons and the second of which was devoted to the adaptation of the armed forces to their use.

44. That these changes implied by this periodization of history have amplified the prerogatives of the political leadership in military affairs is fully recognized in the military writings. A Colonel Prusanov, writing in January 1966, for example, said that rocket and nuclear weapons increase "the ability of politics to direct combat operations and to influence the course and outcome of armed struggle." And a Colonel Grudinin wrote in July 1966 that there is no question that the emergence of the new weapons has raised the role of policy and political leadership to "unprecedented heights."

45. Some of the writers have taken pains to adduce support for their observations by broad historical generalizations. Major General Zemskov, for example, whose article in January 1967 presented the freshest and most comprehensive discussion of this problem, tacitly aligned himself with a famous French expert on the subject, when he wrote that both World War I and World War II proved that war leadership could "not be left in the hands of the military alone." He added that there was even more reason today to insist on the political dominance of military affairs because "modern weapons are such that the political leadership cannot let them escape its control."

46. Some of the writers have obviously been concerned to reconcile their observations on the need for political control with another principle of equal importance to the military -- that is, that professional military opinion should be an essential ingredient of all decisions affecting military matters. General Lomov, for example, asserted that the political leadership must not "ignore the recommendations of the military."

47. A number of the writers speak of the need for a combination of political and military authority in one command element. They have noted that the USSR has in fact operated through such an arrangement in wartime, citing the example of the State Defense Committee headed by Stalin in World War II. But the recent military articles have shown a special concern for effective supreme leadership not just in war conditions but in peacetime. Marshal Grechko, in the Military Historical Journal of June 1966, for example, related this concern to the increased importance of the factor of surprise in strategic operations with nuclear weapons: "To the degree that the importance of surprise has increased, the role of correct and timely evaluation of the situation prior to a war, and the reaching of initial decisions by the supreme command, have increased."

48. Not enough is known about the arrangements that actually exist at the top command level in the Soviet Union for conclusive evaluation of the significance of these writings. The evidence has been ambiguous as to whether the post of "Supreme Commander-in-Chief" with all the powers it was assumed to embody under Khrushchev survived his political demise. It is also unclear whether the post of Chairman of the "Defense Council," which Brezhnev is reported to hold, includes the powers that Khrushchev exercised as Chairman of the Supreme Military Council. Supreme authority over the armed forces today, including the authority to initiate retaliatory action in the event of hostile attack, is apparently shared

by the Politburo as a whole, or at least a committee of the Politburo. The Soviet penchant for vesting authority in committees and the character of the relations that now exist at the top of the system seemingly work to inhibit a greater centralization of these responsibilities at this time.

49. What seems clear from the writings described above is that the present command and control institutions and procedures appear inadequate to at least some elements of military opinion and that a body of opinion is forming behind the idea of establishing a formal, permanent command authority to exercise these functions. General Lomov came closest to expressing all the desiderata mentioned in these writings when he wrote in Military Thought that "the experience of the past convincingly shows the necessity for political and strategic war direction unified in a single supreme military-political organ," and that "this applies to peacetime as well."

The Strategy and Force Planning Problem

50. Another problem that has been identified in recent military writings as a factor relevant to future Soviet military policy concerns the organization of Soviet military planning and theoretical research. This is an old problem for the Soviet Union, and allusions to it have cropped up from time to time for many years. Indeed, the best and fullest analysis of the problem was given some years ago by Rear Admiral Bogolepov, writing in the Soviet General Staff journal Military Thought. Even though it must be assumed that many of the shortcomings that he criticized have since been corrected, a brief summary of his findings may be useful as a backdrop for assessing the complaints and recommendations that are now being made.

51. Bogolepov complained, first, of parochialism in the research and planning process, resulting from the dispersal of the analysis effort among the different

branches of the armed forces, each of which held "biased views" regarding the operational capabilities of the other branches. A further penalty of this fragmentation of effort, he said, was that the various organizations involved had failed to develop a common methodology. Because of these deficiencies, according to Bogolepov, Soviet techniques of cost-effectiveness study were poor. He lamented the fact that existing conditions prevented the "selection of the best systems in complete freedom" and caused friction and "impulsive decisions."

52. Bogolepov argued that the solution of these problems would require the organization of a centralized activity to include both military theorists and engineering scientists. In order to assure overall competence, coordination, and security, this activity should be subordinated to the General Staff, possibly within the Chief Operations Directorate. Its purpose would be to investigate, on a long-range basis, the most promising alternatives for accomplishing main strategic tasks and to determine the best all-round weapons mix and the sequence of procurement to be followed.

53. It may be relevant to note that a new department of the General Staff, called the Military Science Directorate, made its appearance at about the time Bogolepov was writing. This directorate was first identified by Red Star in January 1962 and has since been mentioned only occasionally. In January 1963, Red Star indicated that the Military Science Directorate was the parent organization of the Military History Section which had been a known component of the General Staff for some years. It seems possible that this new department of the General Staff represented a first attempt to meet the objections that Bogolepov was raising by centralizing the functions of broad theoretical research and doctrine formulation. It seems questionable, however, whether the more technical functions, such as the drawing up of contingency plans and force structure requirements, would have been lodged in this component.

54. Recent indications suggest that there continues to be dissatisfaction regarding the organization and quality of Soviet planning and military operational research activities. An article in the March 1966 issue of the journal Military Thought, for example, reported that an investigation of the state of research in military theory at institutes and academies had revealed poor direction and support. The article editorialized: "The most desirable form of centralized management and coordination of military research has not yet been found." A number of other articles have noted that advanced methods of analysis are not exploited sufficiently. A Lieutenant Colonel Kazakov, for example, wrote in Red Star in September 1966 that "certain theorists and practitioners" mistakenly assume that mathematical methods can be applied only to "concrete calculations." While the objects of the Colonel's criticism in this case seemed to concern studies conducted at a rather low level and on quite narrow problems, such criticisms at least raise suspicions about the standards applied at higher levels.

55. Some writers have expressed dissatisfaction by drawing favorable attention to the level of effort devoted to military research in the West, no doubt implying an invidious comparison with the Soviet Union. For example, Marshal Sokolovskiy, in March 1966, coupled the strongest possible appeal for an organized attack on current theoretical problems with a description of Western research and planning facilities. (The RAND Corporation, the Hudson Institute, and the Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom were specifically cited.) Calling for an expansion of the Soviet "strategic research front" to include scholars of many fields and varying points of view, Sokolovskiy observed that the US effort involved an "enormous army of scholars and military and political figures." He found Soviet military strategy lacking in scientific approach, specifically noting that mathematical methods of problem solving should be introduced.

56. Sokolovskiy's views were echoed in an article in the July 1966 issue of Military Thought, by Lieutenant General Zavyalov, who said that practical requirements urgently demand the development of a scientific methodology for military research, a field in which, he observed, the Soviet authorities "have still done little." Zavyalov echoed Sokolovskiy also in calling for the enlistment of various specialists to study force structuring principles, including philosophers, economists, mathematicians, and specialists in weapons systems analysis, operations research, organization, and control. The purpose in broadening the effort in this manner would be to prevent subjective errors in judgment. Here Zavyalov seemed to touch upon a point of contention; he remarked that in deciding questions of armed forces structuring the intuitive solutions of individuals, no matter how rich their experience, cannot be relied on. "Past experience," he said, "is completely inadequate for understanding nuclear war."

57. Again, as with the command and control problem, it is difficult to assess the significance of these writings because little is known about the actual state of affairs in Soviet planning for war and force structure development. According to Western experts, this has been a chronic weakness in Soviet General Staff functions, and there is much evidence from the recent history of Soviet weapons systems developments and force structure decisions to suggest that this weakness has persisted. The storms that have raged among Soviet military historians around the question of the respective roles of Stavka (whose planning element was the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff) and the Front commands in various World War II victories and defeats may also be read as an indirect reflection of this weakness, since the writing and interpretation of history in the Soviet Union is always done with an eye for its implications for the present. The most successful chief of the Main Operations Directorate during World War II was Shtemenko. He has now been

reappointed to head this Directorate. This seems to reflect an effort to give new direction and vigor to this sensitive element of the General Staff.

58. A more important question relating to military planning for the future concerns the relationships between the military and political authorities in this process. As decisions on military matters come to depend more on expert technical knowledge, the influence of those who command this knowledge -- that is, the technically trained officers -- is bound to grow. How to utilize this knowledge without becoming captive to it -- how to insure the continued dominance of political considerations in matters of vital significance to the nation -- has now become a critical and topical question for the Soviet leadership. It may be that this question was faced and then postponed when it was decided to appoint Marshal Grechko to succeed Marshal Malinovskiy as Minister of Defense. It will inevitably be faced again, not only when it comes time to appoint a successor to Marshal Grechko but also on the many occasions before that event occurs when decisions on major military matters have to be made.

Trends in Doctrine

59. One of the questions relevant to the respective roles of the political and military leaderships in defense policy concerns military doctrine. In the Soviet view, military doctrine embodies the broad, guiding concepts according to which specific policy decisions are made, it is developed under the guidance of the Party on the basis of military and scientific advice, and it is modified from time to time as circumstances seem to warrant. Historically, tensions affecting political-military relations have sometimes been registered in Soviet public writings by the ways in which the respective roles of the political and military authorities in the formulation of doctrine are treated. During periods of

military assertiveness, as, for example, following the Berlin crisis of 1961, military writers have tended to stress the importance of the military role in the formulation of doctrine and to diminish the Party role correspondingly. That these word changes are regarded as important in the Soviet Union is attested by the fact that the Party has been vigilant in correcting them and that military writers have been expressly criticized for overstating the military case in this regard.

60. It seems of some importance, therefore, to note in recent writings some symptoms of a renewal of this subtle pulling and hauling over political and military prerogatives regarding the formulation of doctrine. A recently published book on military doctrine, representing in some sense an interim report on military doctrine pending the forthcoming publication of the third Sokolovskiy edition, treated the subject in a way seemingly calculated to emphasize the military role in this process. The book, entitled Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice, said that military doctrine is elaborated by the political "and military" leadership of the state and that it is based on the postulates of "military science." Other recent writings, including the important article by Colonel Zavyalov, in Red Star of March, have echoed these words closely.

61. The Party side of the case, on the other hand, has also been reasserted, most notably by a recent article in Red Star authored by a Colonel Babin. This article was devoted almost exclusively to an assertion of the dominant role of the Party in resolving all questions of military affairs. It takes on added significance by the fact that it was published after Malinovskiy's death and during the period when the question of his successor was apparently being debated.

62. As for the substance of doctrine, there have been no significant changes over the past year, but merely a reiteration and further development of trends that have

been apparent for some time. What may be called the "flexible response" doctrine -- that is, the increasing tendency of Soviet military theory to accept the postulate that Soviet military policy should include preparations for all kinds of war, including various forms of limited war -- has been further emphasized.

63. The book Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice cuts through some of the ambiguities that have attended Soviet views on limited war. It denies the Khrushchev view that any limited war must "inevitably" escalate into general war. It admits that even a nuclear war may be limited by the number and yield of the weapons employed or by the geographical boundaries within which the war is waged. And it stresses the need for conventional warfare capabilities.

64. Other recent articles have given further testimony that Soviet doctrine now recognizes the possibility of postponing, limiting, or avoiding the introduction of nuclear weapons in modern war. A Colonel Kozlov, for example, writing in Communist of the Armed Forces, in February 1967, stated that the Soviet armed forces must be prepared to conduct both a "world as well as a limited war, both with and without the use of nuclear weapons." The more recent Red Star article, by General Zavyalov, asserted that the armed forces must be capable of conducting general nuclear war and "any other wars."

65. Although these articles are couched in terms of theory, and specifically in terms of theoretical "possibilities," they obviously carry practical implications for Soviet force structure and contingency planning. In asserting the possibility of limited war, Soviet military theorists are, in effect, arguing that the Soviet Union should be prepared to meet all kinds of emergencies. This is, in the first place, a counsel of prudence. In addition, it reflects the lessons of the nuclear-missile age -- notably the lesson at Cuba -- which have taught that the key to success in modern strategy is the ability

to impose on the other side the onus of choosing whether to raise the stakes when a confrontation occurs. To do this, one must have adequate power at all the scales of the escalation ladder. Read in this light, the new statements do not reflect a lessened concern on the part of the Soviet military over the danger that a clash between the nuclear powers may escalate. Rather, they reflect a recognition of the importance of the ability to meet Western moves affirmatively -- and a growing confidence that the Soviet Union is acquiring such an ability.

66. In summarizing all this very briefly, it may be said that Soviet military spokesmen have been taking strong stands over the past year on a number of issues bearing on the future course of Soviet military policy and on the administration of military affairs generally. In this, they have been carrying forward a practice of mixing in policy questions that began some years ago. Under Khrushchev, military spokesmen were encouraged to bring their talents and experience to bear on the problems of doctrine and force structure that were raised by the advent of nuclear-missile weapons; they also reacted publicly to policies imposed by Khrushchev which they regarded as unwise or unfavorable to their interests. The present discussions may be regarded as an extension of this earlier dialogue, in the sense that it also reflects the need of the leadership for military advice, as well as the need of the military establishment to make its voice heard at the policy level. Perhaps the most significant feature of the new discussions is that, in contrast to those of some years ago, the military is not simply reacting to political initiatives, but is itself taking the lead in posing the questions and offering the answers.