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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

APPROVED FOR RELEASE -
Historical Collection Division -
HR70-14
DATE: 04-26-2012

18 MAY 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: USSR Reinforcement Capability (U)

I am concerned that our estimates of the USSR's ability to reinforce Central and Southern Europe with forces from the USSR do not take enough account of operational problems in large-scale deployments. Experience and studies of our own deployment ability show that non-transportation time is a large part of total deployment time.

A detailed study of USSR ability to reinforce, taking account of relevant U.S. data, would be very helpful. I think it would be most useful if done jointly by DIA and CIA.

The enclosed paper outlines some important considerations which I think such a study should include. The point of contact on my staff for this study is the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), and I would appreciate it if you would keep him informed of progress and discuss with him any problems which might arise.

If necessary, the study can be written at the SI/SAO level.

I suggest a completion date for the study of November 1, 1967.

Robert S. McNamee

Enclosure

cc: CIA

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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Sec Def Cont Nr. X-3019

Revised
ASD (SA)
DC/L

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MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS IN STUDY OF USSR REINFORCEMENT

STUDY OBJECTIVE

The overall objective is to determine a realistic deployment schedule of divisions from the USSR to East Germany and Thrace, using realistic factors for non-transportation time.

PRINCIPAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. U.S. analogs from JCS and U.S. Army studies should be the main guidance as to what is "realistic". The study should document any assumptions that the USSR can do tasks faster than the U.S. does.
2. The study should specifically consider non-divisional logistic and other support troops. This should include estimates of specific troop lists of non-divisional units required for deployment of divisions; these requirements should then be compared with actual available units. If men or equipment must be mobilized to fill these units, realistic times should be assigned to doing this. The study should support these estimates with the best available information on the Soviet's mobilization plans and programs.
3. The study should include a specific estimate of individual and unit training time for units requiring substantial increases in personnel to reach wartime strength. If training time is assumed to be less than comparable time for a U.S. unit, the study should document why this is possible.
4. The study should make a realistic estimate of the proportion of transportation capacity that can be diverted to military use. It would be useful to discuss the effect on the East European civilian economy and the willingness of these governments to support the Soviet Union. It should consider any possible fear of retaliation if they collaborated in massive military movements.
5. The study should consider how the assembly of a massive strike force in East Germany would be affected by precautions against a possible NATO tactical nuclear strike.
6. The requirement for concurrent movement of ammunition, POL and other material should be examined.

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Honorable Richard Helms
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Nick:

I am concerned that our estimates of the USSR's ability to reinforce Central and Southern Europe with forces from the USSR do not take enough account of operational problems in large-scale deployments. Experience and studies of our own deployment ability show that non-transportation time is a large part of total deployment time.

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If necessary, the study can be written at the SI/SAO level.

I understand that work now in progress on MIL-11-14 will bear on this study. To take advantage of this work, I suggest a completion date for the study of January 1968.

Enclosure

OASD(SA)RBA/CORossotti/et/12May67
Re 2A530/200883

Copy to: Director, DIA
LBA:RHH:NG:KSH

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ASD(SA)CHRONO

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17 MAY 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Study of USSR Reinforcement Capability (U)

The attached memoranda to the Directors of CIA and DIA request the study of USSR reinforcement capability mentioned in the DPM on RUCO.

Recommend signature.

Alain Enthoven
Assistant Secretary of Defense

Enclosure

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

18 MAY 1967

Honorable Richard Helms
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

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If necessary, the study can be written at the SI/SAO level.

I suggest a completion date for the study of November 1, 1967.

Sincerely,

Enclosure

cc: DIA

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