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THE MOST IMPORTANT LENINIST PRINCIPLES OF MANAGEMENT
AND METHODS OF WORKING WITH MILITARY CADRES

Maj - Gen V. Domnikov

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The Communist Party teaches that desirable results in any practical activity depend, to a considerable extent, upon the ability of our cadres to work in accordance with party interests, rejecting everything that is obsolete or out-of-date and relying on Leninist principles of management, the ability to develop forms and methods of working with cadres which have been tested by life and to propose new forms and methods. Testimony of this is provided by the decisions of the October and November (1964) and March and September (1965) Plenary Sessions of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

The revolutionary reforms which have occurred during recent years in military affairs led to a sharp increase in the demands made upon Soviet military cadres. The officer complement of the Soviet Armed Forces has been confronted with new tasks involved in the theoretical elaboration and practical utilization of new methods and forms of conducting military actions, of organizing troops, and training and educating the personnel. The carrying out of these tasks at the present-day stage of the construction of the armed forces depends, to a decisive extent, upon the ability of our military cadres to organize service activity correctly, and upon their ability to make creative application, in their day-by-day practice, of the vivifying Marxist-Leninist theory.

Leninist methods of managing military cadres and of working with them represent the dialectical aggregate of methods and means contributing to the most fruitful decision of all problems of military construction, taking into consideration past experience, the demands of the present-day situation, and the prospects for further development. Those methods are characterized by the following most important principles: party-mindedness; the combination of revolutionary scope with communist efficiency and concreteness in work; the consideration of political-morale and on-the-job qualities; reliance upon the creative activity and initiative of the masses; the correct combination of methods of conviction and coercion; trust in the cadres and the checking of execution of the tasks given to them; the education of the cadres in the spirits of the demands made by the moral code for a builder of communism; and their promotion in conformity with the level of their abilities and training. These very important principles are organically

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The principles of Leninist management were elaborated and formed during the process of the struggle of the working class for the victory of the socialist revolution and for the strengthening of the world's first socialist state. Their system is of a revolutionary nature, devoid of dogmatism, stagnation, and routine. The life and activity of Lenin represent the embodiment of the new methods in work, which combine within themselves on the one hand, the revolutionary scope inherent in the working class and its party, and, on the other hand, Bolshevik efficiency and the ability to solve posed tasks persistently, to carry out plans that have been set down, and to move step by step to the final goal.

Leninist methods characterize the entire activity of the Communist Party and its Central Committee with regard to the construction of communism in our country. Relying upon Leninist principles, the party is boldly revealing shortcomings in various fields of economic, state, and military construction, decisively tearing down obstacles that retard our further movement ahead, and opening up vistas for the broad creative initiative and revolutionary energy of the masses.

In the process of preparation for its 23rd Congress, the Communist Party and its Central Committee are acting as models of management and the application of Leninist methods in work, and devoting continuous attention to the introduction of those methods into the practical activity of party, state, and military cadres.

Great importance is attached to the principles of Leninist methods of management in the practical work of the military cadres, commanders, and chiefs at all echelons, who are entrusted with the responsible and honorable task of controlling the troops and of achieving a constant rise in the level of combat power and combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The Leninist principles of management assured the Communist Party of the mobilization of the masses for the decisive assault against autocracy and contributed to the successful completion of the socialist revolution. For the solution of that grandiose task it was necessary to have "the gigantically bold, historically great, and completely selfless and enthusiastic initiative and scope of a truly revolutionary class" (V. I. Lenin, Poln. sobr. soch. (Complete Collected Works), Vol 32, page 406). Revolutionary scope and efficiency became a remarkable tradition for our state, party, and military cadres.

In the successes of the heroic armed defense of the young Soviet republic during the years of the civil war and foreign intervention, a tremendous role was also played by the Leninist principles of management

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of the Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War also was an effective realization of Leninist principles of management of methods of working with cadres.

The successful carrying out of the grandiose tasks of communist construction in our country, as proclaimed by the Program of the CPSU, convincingly indicates that the combination of revolutionary scope and communist efficiency remains a very important factor in the solution of fundamental problems of economic, political, and military construction.

The successes achieved in the rearmament of the Soviet Army and Navy, the creation of new types of armed forces, and the fundamental changes in the organization of the troops and the methods of armed combat represent the direct consequence of the skillful application of that Leninist principle in the strengthening of the defense capacity of our Motherland. Revolutionary scope and communist efficiency are that vivifying force without which movement forward would be impossible, a force which stimulates the mind and gives one perspective.

The generals and officers of the Soviet Armed Forces have a thorough understanding of the prospects for modern military construction, and are ably and boldly reorganizing their work as applicable to the new conditions, mobilizing broad masses of the fighting men for the mastery, within the shortest time periods, of the most complex combat technology, armament, and methods of their combat use.

The communist efficiency of our military cadres represents the maximum state of organization, state of discipline, and responsibility. It is an antidote to a superficial approach to the job. Without this demand made upon the cadres, serious work would be unthinkable.

When contrasting to "revolutionary" idle talk the simple everyday affairs and communist efficiency, V. I. Lenin at that time decisively castigated the disease of unprincipled utilitarianism, which infrequently leads workers, even those full of will and practical decisiveness but devoid of perspective, to serious errors. "Narrow-minded practicalism" and "headless utilitarianism" are the terms given to that disease by Lenin.

The Leninist concept of efficiency lies in the concreteness of the management of organizational work, in the ability to bring it to its conclusion, to achieve real results by painstaking everyday work. At the same time the Leninist demand of efficiency denies philistine, mundane problems and the digging among petty details. On the contrary, it presupposes the complete consideration of the actual conditions, the ability to see the immediate and the long-range prospects, to combat routine and stagnation, to direct creative efforts to those areas "where,

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most of all, the new is being constructed" (V. I. Lenin, Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 37, page 91).

Herein lies the capability of our military cadres to combine revolutionary scope with efficiency in their official activity. At the present time it is especially necessary that our officers, generals, and admirals construct their entire activity upon a scientific basis, in a new way, with a consideration of the tasks of combat readiness for modern warfare. The success of that work depends not only upon ideological training, but also upon the level of the military knowledge and the on-the-job qualifications of our cadres. Life demands of them that they constantly master Marxism-Leninism, the theory of military affairs, the ability to effect the practical realization of the conclusions of military theory and to move ahead, to enrich it in practice.

Much has already been said about the fact that a sense of the new is a very valuable quality of our military cadres. The commanders or chiefs must systematically develop that quality within themselves and inculcate it in their subordinates, must support their intelligent initiative. "The matter lies in providing support to each and every outcropping of the new...." Soviet cadres were taught by V. I. Lenin (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 39, page 20). For the officer complement of our armed forces this Leninist instruction rings forth as an indispensable demand that they decisively support everything new, advanced, progressive, that they fight against obsolete views and conceptions, and that they mercilessly unmask those who hold those views and conceptions.

The complete revolution in military affairs, which has brought about the necessity of re-examining many fundamental problems of military construction, and the combat and operational training of the troops, has posed in a new way the question of the training of the military cadres themselves, the areas of their specialization, and has made increased demands upon their selection and education. There has arisen, for example, the necessity of sharply intensifying the attention devoted to the engineer-technical personnel, of defining in a new way their role and importance under conditions of the increased degree to which the army and navy are supplied with technical equipment. A military engineer must be viewed now not as a narrow specialist deciding only "purely technical" problems, but as a military specialist who has mastered military knowledge and who is capable not only of accepting and executing orders, but also, if necessary, of independently fulfilling responsible command functions.

These officers must be helped to develop their command habits and to acquire experience in working with people. It is known that anything new requires additional efforts, and certain directors attempt to brush the subject aside, because they are afraid of the difficulties and the certain amount of risk involved in assimilating that which is new.

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Marxism-Leninism teaches that it is necessary attentively to observe past experience, to analyze it promptly and deeply, and to strive to find internal changes in it, so as to determine faithfully the tendencies of development. "Let's have a bit less intellectual and bureaucratic conceit," V. I. Lenin demanded, "and a bit more study of what our practical experience is yielding in the center and in the outlying districts, and what science has already given to us" (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 42, page 347).

Leninist methods in work are characterized by the isolation, from the diversity of unresolved problems, of the principal, the decisive problems, by concentrating on which the director is able to move ahead to the designated goal most successfully. If a commander or chief insufficiently thinks out the over-all direction to be taken in his work, if he does not isolate the critical matters on which it is necessary at the particular moment to direct his principal attention, there arises the danger that he is dissipating his efforts. It is precisely under these conditions that one most frequently observes the striving to cope with a posed task "just any old way," and Bolshevik efficiency is replaced by utilitarianism.

The characteristic feature of the Leninist methods of work -- the ability to organize the job on a practical basis -- expresses the essence and directedness of the work done by cadres. The practical organization of any job requires that the commander or chief proceed not from stereotype schemes, or ready-made formulas, but that he direct his subordinates to the solution of the task by relying on profound knowledge, experience, and a party sense. These methods of our command cadres introduce a high stage of organization into their activity, and helps to inculcate conscientious discipline in the subordinates. The content of the organizer function of commanders is measured by the practical results, but the essence of that function is the conformity between the word and the deed, the high state of efficiency in work. This demand of Leninist methods pertains both to commanders and troops, and to chiefs of central institutions and organizations.

V. I. Lenin devoted much attention to efficiency in the organization of work. "At the present time the speakers," he wrote, "receive a summons to the session in general and they wait for hours. This is absolutely outrageous. It is necessary to strive for a situation in which the speakers are told to come at one definite hour,... and that the speakers do not wait more than 15 minutes" (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 53, page 262).

These Leninist instructions continue to be valid in our time. Unfortunately, among our administrative cadres in troop units and especially in the center one still encounters individual officers and chiefs who have not made any conclusions from the party instructions concerning

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Administrative methods. Of course, it is incorrect to assume that sessions and meetings should not be held. But it is necessary to overcome the adherence to discussion, at meetings, of all the current problems, which requires the expenditure of efforts by a mass of people and of a large amount of time. Because much can and should be decided without sessions.

From that point of view an extremely interesting letter is that which was written by F. E. Dzerzhinskiy on 3 June 1925 to the administrative workers of the VSNKh /Higher Council of the National Economy/, entitled "The Fight Against Excesses in the Holding of Sessions." He wrote, "The greatest calamity for us at the present time is the infinite abundance of all kinds of sessions which eat up an infinite amount of time without providing sufficient results and which do not in any way compensate for the hours lost.... It may be that we should make it mandatory to introduce the custom, at each session, of raising as the first point the question of whether that session is necessary, and who among those present can and should be excused from participating in it, and whether or not the question could be resolved without the session!..."

High efficiency in work, a profound knowledge of special questions pertaining to military affairs are needed by the entire officer complement of our armed forces. This is especially required by the practice of training and educating the troops under the new conditions caused by the revolution in military matters.

The problem of training, selecting, and placing cadres occupies a special place in Leninist methods of management. V. I. Lenin considered that problem to be the chief, absolutely fundamental one in the organizational work of any manager. "One must study people and look for skillful workers. That's the principal thing now," he wrote. "Otherwise, all the orders and decrees are just meaningless pieces of paper" (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 44, page 367).

The selection of cadres on the basis of their political and on-the-job qualities became the law of our party. They must have a thorough ideological grounding, must be devoted to the cause of communism, and capable of implementing the party policy, of mobilizing people to carry it out, and must possess other businesslike qualities. In a letter to Babushkin, Lenin wrote, "... To hell with all these conciliators, these people with 'subtle views,' and milksops!! A little fish is better than a big cockroach. It's better to have two or three energetic and completely devoted people than a dozen dawdlers" (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 46, page 256). That is Lenin's teaching concerning the approach to the selection of cadres on the basis of political and businesslike qualities. It is precisely that principle that makes it possible most correctly and most efficiently to utilize cadres, their knowledge, abilities, and experience.

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The day-by-day practice of the Party indicates that many of the shortcomings that we now have in work are explained primarily by reasons of a subjective nature: poor work with cadres, the lack of the necessary commander's demandingness, lack of initiative, lack of activity, and sometimes even the lack of responsibility on the part of individual commanders and chiefs when executing their official duties. Sometimes these errors are made regularly by people, and therefore the Ministry of Defense requires the decisive elimination of those personnel who have shown themselves to be incapable of correcting the errors and miscalculations in their activities.

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The level of management, the selection and placement of cadres are inseparably linked with check on proper execution. Lack of such check is a sign of weakness on the part of the manager and poor organization of work. It is completely obvious that without systematic control and checking of execution, even the most conscientious people begin to work more poorly. It is not by chance that V. I. Lenin regularly demanded that that important principle of management not be forgotten. Lack of checking in military life, he said, means absolute ruin (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 51, page 50).

Control and checking, in the Leninist sense, consists in the critical analysis of the work done by subordinates, in the rendering of timely assistance to them. When revealing shortcomings, the commander publicizes the desirable experience gained in the work done by subordinates, and takes all steps to strive to extend that experience. This activity of the commander is closely linked with disciplinary practice.

The absolute majority of our commanders and chiefs check and study the trends in the entire official activity and life of their subordinates, inculcating in them a spirit of high consciousness. Unfortunately, one frequently encounters instances in which individual commanders or chiefs assume that checking on execution means waiting for the established period of time indicated by the decree, directive, or instruction, and then ascertaining what was done and what was not done. This is nothing else but a passive, contemplative attitude which contradicts the principles of Leninist methods of management and the spirit of party-mindedness in work. The checking of execution and the organization of the work represent a single process. Therein lies the essence of the checking of execution and its concomitant organizer work.

A source of the high consciousness of our officer personnel is their profound knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, the clear understanding of the universal historical tasks which are being decided by the Soviet people under the guidance of the Communist Party. A broad political outlook and complete devotion to the ideals of communism are the chief and determining factor in the education and training of the personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy.

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a solicitous attitude to socialist property. The protection of state interests and the good of the people is absolutely first for the Soviet officer. That quality present in military cadres is inseparably linked with their high adherence to principle, with the unequivocal and consistent conducting of the party line in all matters of military construction.

It is known that an unprincipled manager is held captive by obsolete ideas and moods, loses his footing in work, tries to conceal the miscalculations made by his subordinates, and thus inflicts great harm on the over-all cause.

There have been instances when individual chiefs who have recommended a subordinate for promotion by the efficiency-report procedure, express a derogatory opinion concerning him when it comes down to a matter of his promotion by way of carrying out the conclusions of the efficiency report. When submitting the name of a general or officer for retirement into the reserve, such chiefs refrain from direct, frank conversation with him, and transfer the initiative concerning the retirement onto personnel workers.

In the armed forces the criticism of the orders and decisions of commanders and chiefs is absolutely inadmissible, and all the military personnel must thoroughly understand this. But some of our administrative cadres make insufficient utilization of criticism and self-criticism as an effective method of educating the cadres. Unfortunately, even now one encounters instances of an intolerable attitude on the part of individual commanders even to businesslike comments directed to them not only by their subordinates, but also by their chiefs. And yet healthy criticism, even under conditions of the army and navy, is completely not counterindicated, but rather is a most important means of forming personality. Criticism and self-criticism have become a revolutionary tradition in Soviet society, including the life and activity of the army and navy. That tradition evolves from the Leninist methods of work, and is constantly developing and constantly becoming enriched with new content. One must not underevaluate the danger and harm of the tendency to make less utilization, under army and navy conditions, of that very important revolutionary method of educating our military cadres. It is precisely criticism and self-criticism which contribute to increasing the extent to which our cadres have a personal interest in eliminating the errors and miscalculations in their work.

Without a doubt, the only criticism and self-criticism which are supported in our society are those which reinforce the positions of society itself. We decisively reject that criticism which is directed at undermining the foundations of that society. Criticism must be of a

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V. I. Lenin emphasized that a nihilistic denial of absolutely everything cannot bring anything but harm. "Whoever, because of the struggle against the perversion of the new order, forgets its content," he said, "whoever forgets that the working class created and is running a state of the Soviet type, is simply unable to think and is just talking idly" (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 44, page 106).

This instruction of Lenin is especially important under army and navy conditions. The fundamental basis of criticism is its objectivity. It is always necessary to remember that damage can be inflicted both by overexaggeration of undesirable phenomena and errors and by a striving to whitewash the actual state of affairs. Criticism and self-criticism must always reflect the truth of life. The chief purpose of criticism is the task of correcting a person, of helping him to get rid of his shortcomings. It must contribute to the development and strengthening of discipline, to the increasing of the combat readiness of the troops. The success of criticism, the effectiveness of that criticism, as Lenin emphasized, depend upon how the party organizations create the opportunities under which each Soviet citizen is assured that he will find support and that his correct critical comments will be implemented. This Leninist demand has a direct bearing upon the working methods of the political agencies and our army and navy party organizations.

Experience shows that criticism develops successfully when it is actively supported and, on the basis of businesslike critical comments and suggestions, effective steps are taken. Wherever lack of principle manifests itself and wherever concern is shown not so much for the interests of the job as for a "peaceful life," there will always be stagnation in work and only imaginary well-being.

Leninist principles of management demand of commanders and military chiefs that they persistently combat even the slightest manifestations of suppression of criticism, that they persistently combat mutual covering up of errors, toadyism, and the unjustified extolling of services and merits, all of which, unfortunately, still occur in practice. And even if they are individual, specific instances, they still are intolerable under army and navy conditions.

It is generally known that adherence to party principles in all instances must combine with high commander's demandingness toward oneself and toward one's subordinates, with the rigid personal responsibility of the administration "for the fulfillment of definite, clearly and unambiguously outlined, tasks and practical work" (V. I. Lenin, Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 37, page 365).

Of especial importance for the strengthening of the armed forces and the education of the cadres is scientific criticism in the field of

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military theory and modern military affairs. In this direction the decisive role is played by the principle of the party approach to scientific criticism. Questions of party-mindedness in military science and scientific criticism have, in our time, taken on still greater importance. This is explained by the increased role of science in the development of society and of military science in military construction, and consequently, in the training of military cadres and the formation of the new fighting man. This work now would be unthinkable with the planned and complete utilization of the achievements of military pedagogics and psychology and of other sciences which our educator-commanders must possess.

The intensification of the ideological struggle on the international arena demands that one pose sharply, and in complete adherence to party principles, the questions of the unmasking of the bourgeois military ideology. Unfortunately, in the practice of scientific criticism the principle of party-mindedness is not always carried out sufficiently consistently. Not infrequently, critical reviews in the periodical press pose questions in an objectivistic way, without linking them with the class elucidation of the problem. There still are very few sharp, fundamentally critical research works in the field of the unmasking of the ideological diversionary tactics of imperialism against the countries of the socialist camp. Little is being done to unmask the so-called "theories" of the "lack of class structure" in bourgeois armies, of the "lack of party affiliation" of bourgeois military science, and other "theories" which present the party, class interests of the monopolies as being "public" or "nation-wide." The task of raising military-scientific criticism to a higher level is a very important party task of our military-scientific cadres. A means to be used in this noble task is provided by Leninist work methods, and the high personal responsibility of each military-scientific worker.

The high personal responsibility and demandingness of the command cadres are defined by our military regulations. They are required everywhere: not only in scientific activity, but also in day-by-day educational work, and in the assuring of the proper military discipline among the troops and at headquarters.

Under present-day conditions the role and importance of discipline have increased still more. The complex combat technology which our military cadres and the entire personnel of the armed forces now have to deal with, as well as other factors linked with the nature of nuclear warfare, demand of military cadres the greatest cohesion and precision in the work done by the personnel, the exceptional execution of assignments, the strictest, unconditional fulfillment of the demands contained in instructions, manuals, and regulations, and the orders and decrees of commanders and chiefs.

Even in the past, without iron military discipline, achievements in training, and victories in combat or an operation, would have been unthinkable. And without that iron discipline, they are even more impossible in present-day warfare.

The most essential shortcoming in the work methods of reinforcing military discipline and order in certain units and on ships consists, in our opinion, in the fact that, instead of a scientific approach to the analysis and evaluation of shortcomings in disciplinary practice, individual commanders and political workers limit themselves to pointless criticism. Therefore, in their work with cadres to strengthen their military discipline, the chief step in analysis is lost -- the explanation of the concrete causes of the individual undesirable occurrences. A scientific, party-minded approach requires a profound, objective study of the reasons for the violations of military discipline and order in the units and elements. By correctly applying Leninist principles of management and methods of working with the cadres, our commanders and military chiefs are revealing the reasons for the occurrences of breaches of discipline and are finding scientifically substantiated measures for eliminating them.

When speaking of methods of managing people, V. I. Lenin attached great importance to the principle of one-man management. At the September 1965 Plenary Session of the Central Committee, our party re-emphasized the primary importance of that principle in the administration of industry. And one-man management and personal responsibility have still greater importance in the armed forces. Without the strict and consistent implementation of this most important principle of military construction, any successful work in the army and navy would be unthinkable. By realizing and firmly carrying out that principle, our commanders and chiefs also utilize collectiveness in their work. It is known that reliance upon the creativity and activity of the masses constitutes the party basis of one-man management. "The one and only way that the communist manager must prove his right to manage," V. I. Lenin explained, "is by finding himself many, more and more, assistants ... by knowing how to help them work, to promote them, to indicate their experience and take it into consideration" (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 42, page 325). This teaching of V. I. Lenin should always be remembered by our military cadres.

The strict regulation of the entire life and activity in the army and navy on the basis of regulations, manuals, and orders and instructions of commanders and chiefs does not eliminate the necessity of developing the creative opportunities for subordinates in their process of the execution of their duties. Inculcating the feeling of high responsibility in each officer for the job assigned to him is impossible with the manifestation of businesslike initiative by him. Creative, rather than unthinking, execution raises our military cadres to a

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higher level, reveals their capabilities, and inculcates a precious feeling of personal responsibility for the execution of military duty.

In our time a statement which is especially vital is that one which was made by V. I. Lenin, to the effect that a conscientious worker must feel that he is not only the boss in his own plant, but also the representative of the country, that he must feel personal responsibility. These words of Lenin pertain, to varying degrees, to each person in the armed forces. All this means that it is necessary to wage a constant struggle against the ignoring of the opinions of subordinates and their suggestions made in the army collective. Unfortunately, one often has to observe that a particular commander not only does not listen to the opinion of his subordinates, but also, putting it simply, cannot stand having equals alongside of him, much less anyone who surpasses him in a particular area. All this hinders the development and inculcation of the high responsibility of our cadres and hinders their growth. It is not by chance that here and there there has gradually begun to develop a type of executive deputy who, it would appear, is, according to his assignment, not supposed to think, create, or search.

It is completely obvious that this type of deputy cannot become a successor to the person for whom he is acting as the deputy. In certain instances the counteraction to this faulty practice on the part of senior commanders and chiefs is not always effective. It is understandable that it is precisely this practice which has a detrimental influence upon the development of young talented cadres and which fails to guarantee effective succession in management. There are no irreplaceable administrators, and, as is well known, assignments are not given in perpetuity. One generation of administrative cadres leaves and another arrives, adopts the traditions, absorbs the preceding experience, and continues to carry on the work. In this regard, relying on the requirements of the Leninist style of administration, I should like to discuss the great importance of the personal example of the administrative cadres.

Our officer cadres, in the overwhelming majority of instances, are well trained and know their job, and the senior educator-commander, checking the execution of his decision, always successfully strives to improve the work methods. Communicating with them locally, he also enriches himself with new knowledge and experience. The senior chief must remember that others will always listen attentively to his opinion with special attention, will take over his working style, and sometimes even his manner of speaking, will compare his words with his deeds, will learn from him the ability to be demanding and strict, but just and attentive, to people, the ability to have a self-critical attitude to one's own work. We often forget that this approach of a senior to his subordinates is the best application in practice of the principle of Leninist administrative methods -- communication with the masses.

Taking this into consideration, Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy, speaking to commanders and chiefs, said, "Strive for the situation in which each of you could be given this evaluation -- a demanding commander and a good comrade."

Such features as honesty and justice, modesty and simplicity, are organically inherent in Leninist work methods. Need one say that the authority of our administrative cadres, the confidence and acknowledgment of the masses are won by businesslike modesty and simplicity, attention to people, an honest attitude to the job, and the moral purity of the commander or chief? There is good reason why the common expression says that it is not the job that distinguishes the man, but it is the man who distinguishes the job. V. I. Lenin always displayed dissatisfaction when he noted that his working comrades extolled his services to the party and the working class. "You cannot imagine," he said, "the extent to which this constant promotion of my personality is unpleasant to me." Speaking to his working comrades, he stated, "It would be awkward for me myself to prohibit this type of thing. But you should gradually apply the brakes to this whole business." Being at the height of position in our time means displaying great demandingness to oneself, without giving oneself the slightest rebate. It is inadmissible when albeit a small number of our administrative cadres say, "I am an administrator and I can do what others are not authorized to do."

To our chagrin, one can still encounter that type of worker who loves to promise in words not only what it is possible and desirable to do, but also what it is unauthorized or impossible to do. That is how the lack of confidence in the chief's words is gradually reinforced. In the army and navy this is absolutely intolerable. The subordinate must believe every word of his chief, he must trust him the way he trusts himself. Only then can the chief be assured that his order will be executed by his subordinates conscientiously, unquestioningly, precisely, and at the proper time.

Our generals, admirals, and officers are marching shoulder to shoulder to the common goal, like true friends and comrades. The type of administrative workers about whom we spoke earlier by way of criticizing their working methods can be numbered on the fingers of our hands. But they do exist, and this is sometimes explained by errors made in the selection of cadres. Work with cadres is a difficult job, and a delicate and necessarily soul-searching one.

A worker in a personnel agency must have a good knowledge of the on-the-job and political aspects of the cadres of the sector assigned to him, he must know their personal qualities, strong and weak points, shortcomings which hinder them in specific work, their family status, their vocation, their moods and desires. This will make it possible for any commander to make the most objective and best-directed recommendations concerning the placement of the cadres. There will be less

subjectivism and fewer errors. In our opinion, it is desirable to assign workers in personnel agencies to definite sectors for a longer period of time. Experience shows that the frequent rotation of officers not only among the troops, but also in personnel agencies, is actually detrimental.

When speaking about the basic principles of administration and the Leninist methods of working with military cadres, it is necessary to emphasize that the Communist Party, when educating Soviet military cadres, requires that they actively combat backward glances, that they do not "flatter the masses," do not trail behind whiners and people of little faith, and that they boldly and firmly move forward against the current, if that is required by the interests of the cause, convincing the masses, mobilizing them for the active and conscious solution of the tasks confronting them.

Leninist work methods presuppose not only a good knowledge of our cadres, but also a careful attitude toward them, constant concern for their needs and demands. V. I. Lenin showed constant concern for people, had an attentive attitude to each question that disturbed the workers, he was strict and was absolutely intolerant of bureaucratism. He was interested in literally everything: the small and the big, the administrators and the ordinary people.

V. I. Lenin was absolutely implacable toward those who looked down on the people from on high, who had an indifferent attitude to the labor and experience of that people, and their thoughts and demands. "In the masses of the people," he said, "we are still just a drop in the ocean, and we can administer only when we correctly express that which the people is conscious of" (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 45, page 112).

Leninist concern for people must constantly serve as an example to be imitated by our commanders and chiefs. It is a characteristic feature of their methods of administering military cadres.

Leninist methods are especially necessary for our military-scientific and command cadres under present-day conditions, when large creative searches are underway for new forms of the organization of the troops and methods of combat actions which correspond to the increased level of the technical status of the army and navy.

Our party, confirming the Leninist principles of administration, adopted from Lenin the characteristic features of his methods of activity and always turns to them when it is confronted with new tasks.

At its plenary sessions in October and November 1964 and March and September 1965, the Central Committee of the party sharply censured