


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The problem of a uniform understanding of military terms has frequently been brought up in Voyennaya Mysl', since in the postwar years a great many new words and concepts have been added to military language. A main characteristic of military language, as of any other professional language, is the rapid addition to it of new terms, produced by the revolution in science and engineering. New words, upon becoming professional terms, acquire an unambiguous meaning necessary for them and distinguish a certain concept from bordering ones. Terms, especially military ones, should not permit of more than one interpretation, especially within the bounds of current military doctrine.

The existence of specialized terms makes possible great brevity in military speech, since it makes it possible to convey briefly complicated concepts, the explanation of which would otherwise require many words and much elucidation. People who know the meanings of the terms easily grasp the meaning of regulations and manuals, and of military theoretical literature, and as a consequence uniformity of understanding is developed and the process of thinking is expedited. In the conditions of today, when military operations have become rapid-moving, and abrupt changes in the situation require of command personnel firm, resourceful and continuous direction of the troops under them, a common, uniform understanding of military terms is becoming all the more important.

Unfortunately, not all our terms are understood in the same way by everybody. Such a situation is intolerable. Now, as never before, there is required absolute uniformity in this, for which there is also necessary a single dictionary of military terms.

The first postwar publication of such a dictionary was undertaken in 1958<sup>2</sup>. Unfortunately, for all its virtues, the dictionary expressed the point of view of its compilers, which could not be shared by all. We need a dictionary which has codified ["legalized"] the principle persisting military terms and made them uniform and obligatory for all. Such a dictionary, in our opinion, should be small, and should include primarily those terms needed for the command of troops.

1. Slovar' osnovnykh voyennykh terminov (Dictionary of Basic Military Terms. Voenizdat, 1965, 248 pp.
2. Kratkiy slovar' operativno-takticheskikh i obshchevyennykh slov (terminov) (Brief Dictionary of Operational-Tactical and General Military Words (Terms) ). Voenizdat, 1958, 324 pp.

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The recently published Slovar' osnovnykh voyennykh terminov (Dictionary of Basic Military Terms), despite defects in it, with which we will deal below, undoubtedly will be of positive value and will help to attain a uniform understanding of many terms. The dictionary will be a valuable training aid for the training of young military cadres, and to a certain extent it can be used by scholars and military editors, although both the latter would undoubtedly be better served by a military encyclopedia, in the publication of which a wide range of Soviet readers is now interested.

In the main, the dictionary being reviewed reflects the changes which have taken place since the publication of its predecessor. Operational terminology is widely represented in it. However, along with the obvious virtues of this book, it is not lacking in defects which should be taken into account in subsequent editions of books of this kind.

First, it should be noted that the authors in many items draw a parallel between operational art and tactics, thinking that those characteristic traits inherent in a battle are to an equal degree inherent in an operation. They do not even try to find the difference between them -- those characteristic features which are typical of each of these phenomena taken separately.

The dictionary is guilty of inexact and, in places, not entirely correct definitions.

Thus, for example, "artillery instrumental reconnaissance" (AIR) is treated in the dictionary as "a constituent part of ground artillery reconnaissance" (p. 15). One asks, why only ground? It is well known that not only in the conditions of today, but also in wars it has been a part also of air artillery reconnaissance.

On the next page "artillery observation" is explained as "a means of reconnaissance of the enemy consisting of observation of the enemy from ground artillery observation points." Again the question arises: why only from ground points? Has not artillery observation been conducted, and is it not conducted, from the air? For this there exists special spotting planes, and besides these, during a number of past wars balloons were sent up for artillery observation. Incidentally, it should also be pointed out that the term "observation," one of the most important methods of reconnaissance, is not in the dictionary.

The dictionary states that a "ballistic rocket (raket) (p. 22) is a means of destruction. That is true. It may carry a nuclear, chemical, or conventional warhead. But the raket is primarily a means of delivery. Therefore it would be more correct to consider it just as a means of delivery.

The compilers have confused the concept of "blocking" (blokirovaniye) with "encirclement." The former only preceded the latter; it is not identical with it. Besides, "blocking" is of briefer duration than "encirclement,"

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and is carried out with fewer forces with the aim of temporarily depriving the enemy of the possibility of maneuver in outer directions.

"Combat training" (boievaya podgotovka) is defined as "teaching to various categories of service personnel, podrazdeleniya, chasty, soyedineniya, and staffs the carrying out of combat operations, and to rear agencies ---their rear support." The question arises: to whom does "their" refer? To the rear agencies themselves? Here, obviously, striving for brevity has not been justified. It would have been better to have said "the rear support of troops," but that definition, too, would be somewhat too narrow, since rear personnel also engage in their own protection and defense, and to a certain extent also must be taught to carry out combat activities, especially repulsing surprise attacks of the enemy and protection against his means of destruction.

We cannot understand on what basis the authors say that a "military umpire" (voyskovoy posrednik) is designed only for troop or command-and-staff exercises involving two sides (p. 54). Military umpires are also designated for exercises involving only one side.

A "second echelon," in the opinion of the authors, is: "a part of the operational formation or combat order of troops not participating directly, at a given moment, in the engagement (battle)" (p. 56). In the circumstances of today such a definition cannot be considered correct. The second echelon, even before entry into the engagement, may often wage battle, carrying out such missions as fighting against enemy forces which have broken through, and against his landing assaults, carrying out encirclement and destruction of forces remaining in our rear, etc.

Combat aviation never has been attached to soyedineniya, especially not under the conditions of today. Its great speeds do not permit it to be used in the zone of operations of a soyedineniye, and the compilers of the dictionary should have remembered this; under "combined-arms battle" they treat this subject incorrectly (p. 145).

In the opinion of the compilers, a "march security detachment" (pokhodnaya zastava) can only be an advance party or a flank party (p. 176). This is not entirely accurate. A rear party (tyl'naya pokhodnaya zastava) also has every right to exist.

A "reconnaissance patrol" is sent out not only from a reconnaissance detachment, as is asserted in the dictionary (p. 194), but also from a reconnaissance group. Besides, in considering the term "reconnaissance patrol" one cannot ignore the existence also of the term, "combat reconnaissance patrol," and fail to tell, at least in general outlines, for what purpose and when it is sent out.

There are many such definitions in the dictionary which are mainly correct but are not complete. And this does not permit the meaning content of the

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terms to be clarified. For example, in explaining the term, "artillery group," the authors state that it is created for the accomplishment of missions in a battle (p. 15). They should have added: also in an operation, since these groups in the past war were created not only in an army, but even in a front. This is all the more important since a reader often encounters the term "artillery group" in military historical literature.

In considering "surprise" (vnezapnost') as one of the principles of the art of war (p. 39), it should have been stated that it operates in the course of a certain period of time, i.e., it has a beginning and an end.

Under "military reconnaissance" it would have been appropriate to add that, depending on the sphere in which it operates, it is subdivided into land, air, space, and sea reconnaissance.

In explaining the meaning of "further (subsequent) mission" (dal'-neyshaya [posledushchaya] zadacha), it should have been pointed out that in order to accomplish it, changes are necessary in the combat disposition (operational formation) and in the organization of cooperation (for example, entry into battle of the second echelon).

GHT Unjustifiably narrow is the treatment of the term "operations research" (p. 99). The process of studying operations cannot consist only of mathematical methods. Many methods of scientific research are applicable here, including historical, logical, statistical, etc.

Under "defense of the sea coast" (p. 143) it is not indicated by whom this is carried out, and this is something that is most basic.

In explaining the meaning of "defensive operation" (p. 143), the authors say nothing about holding occupied lines. This mission under modern conditions is not taken away from defending forces.

In defining the term "operational coordination" an important feature was overlooked -- the operations of troops, as distinguished from tactical coordination, outside of coordination of fire (ognevaya svyaz). On the same page, under "operational ob'yedineniye" they might have mentioned that its composition is not permanent.

The term "reconnaissance group" (p. 194), in our opinion, should have been defined more broadly. Reconnaissance groups may be formed also for searches and ambushes. When necessary reconnaissance groups may carry out their own combat missions.

There are also explanations in the dictionary which, because they are too general and in places not definite enough, cannot satisfy the reader. For example, in defining "advance guard" (p. 5), they should have said for what kind of march it is detailed. You see, in addition to an advance

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guard assigned for a march in the direction of the front, in a flank march there is also detailed a flank advance guard. It is important also to answer the questions: is an advance guard always designated in carrying out a march, and who has the responsibility of guarding the troops if an advance guard is not detailed? What organizations detail from their own forces an advance guard, and for what purpose? It would have been good to state the composition of an advance guard, and by what principles one should be guided in designating it.

There should have been fuller explanation also of the designation of a "rear guard." It is detailed not only for a march from the front to the rear, but also in a withdrawal. Troops withdrawing from battle move back following the line of the rear guard. When necessary the rear guard engages in battle on intermediate lines of defense, in order to delay the enemy long enough for disengagement of the main forces. It is also important to tell which organizations of the defense detail a rear guard from their own forces, and who covers those columns from which one is not detailed.

A very general explanation is given of the term "immediate mission" (blizhayskaya zadacha): "Depending on the situation, an immediate mission is destruction of means of nuclear attack, defeat of a main force of the enemy, and taking of targets, regions and lines, the seizure of which assures successful accomplishment of the further (subsequent) mission" (p 25). In our opinion, definition of this mission should not be given apart from its relation to the general combat mission. Besides, there should have been a statement of the principles which underlie the breakdown of the general combat mission into a number of ones to be accomplished in sequence. Considering that the meaning of "immediate mission" in podrazdeleniya, chasty, and soyedineniya (not to mention ob'yedineniya) is very different, it seems inappropriate to us to put under this term one version of an immediate mission, since it may mislead some officers, who will take what is recommended as an obligatory standard.

In speaking of "kinds of battle" (p. 39), they might have named them, and indicated the basic principles of classification. On the same page, under "kinds of armed forces," they should have stressed that the distinguishing feature of any kind of armed forces is its capability of carrying on independent operations. The foreign term, "zone of combat operations" (p. 87), is not thoroughly explained. First, this zone can also include coastal regions, and consequently there can develop in it not only combat operations of ground forces, but of naval forces as well. The latter, as a rule, support the ground forces, of which the conduct of war by the US army is convincing evidence.

Second, the compilers are of the opinion that a zone of combat operations is occupied only by field armies and army corps. But it can also be occupied by groups of armies. It all depends on the scale of combat operations and the operational size of the theater itself.

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In fact, if the compilers include the term "zone of combat operations," why do they not give the term "zone of communications," which is the second constituent part of a theater of military operations?

Under "objective laws of war" (p. 145) there should have been stated the particulars of their application in war. They are manifested in the form of principles, and it would have been appropriate to point this out under "principles of the art of war" (p. 179).

There is too brief exposition of the term, "alerting of troops" (opoveshcheniye voysk). The most important thing will not be clear to the reader: how and when it is done, and what means are used for this.

In the preface it is stated that the compilers made use of Kratkiy slovar' operativno-takticheskikh obshchevoynnykh slov (terminov) (Brief Dictionary of Operational and Tactical and General Military Words (Terms)). So they did. But it is too bad that they did not listen to the voice of criticism. A study of the reviews of the 1958 dictionary would have enabled them to avoid some defects. For example, in one of the reviews of the 1958 dictionary the absence of the term "voyennoye delo" [military affairs: the military field] is pointed out. It often occurs in our literature, but is not understood by everybody in the same way. And the authors of the new dictionary should have included it.

On the whole, the book we are reviewing will be useful to our generals and officers and is a necessary one for their libraries.

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