


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
THE WARSAW PACT UNDER INTERNAL STRAINS

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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THE WARSAW PACT UNDER INTERNAL STRAINS

Ten years after its formation in May 1955, the Warsaw Pact is one of the few remaining instruments of effective Soviet control over Eastern Europe. It is however, subject to increasingly visible strains. Rumania desires to loosen its ties with the pact. Some Bulgarian officers also may have objected to Bulgaria's close association with the pact. High-level Polish officials are complaining about economic aspects of the pact, and the Hungarians are professing disinterest with regard to pact objectives. These sentiments contrast with the subservient attitudes of East German and Czech leaders, but even they are unsure of Soviet commitment to their security in a crisis. None of the East European regimes is likely to challenge openly in the near future Moscow's domination of the forces of the pact. However, the resentments now evident, whether directed by the East European regimes against the USSR or against each other, undermine the effectiveness of the pact. Moscow is undoubtedly concerned about this trend and may be taking steps to counter it.

More Than a Military Alliance?

Originally a propaganda instrument designed to counter West Germany's admission to NATO, the Warsaw Pact has gradually become a framework within which the armed forces of the USSR and the six active East European members have conducted combined training exercises using relatively modern standardized equipment for the past five years.

The Soviets have recently taken pains to emphasize that the pact consists of more than a military alliance. On the occasion of the pact's tenth anniversary, Soviet Defense Minister Malinovskiy asserted that the January 1965 meeting of its Political Consultative Committee in Warsaw "convincingly proved" that "the friendship of the

peoples, born in the joint struggle for freedom and happiness and sealed in the bloodshed in battles against the common enemy, continues to grow, cemented by the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism." He stated that contacts between personnel of the "friendly armies" increased every year, and called for the further development of these contacts, in order to make "our unity and strength more monolithic."

Possibly in order to heighten the impression of unshakable unity, the Soviets have recently taken to revealing to Western observers the identity of the national representatives serving at pact headquarters in Moscow. At a Moscow reception on 23 August, Soviet Marshal Rotmistrov took the unprecedented step of

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WARSAW PAC, COMBINED ARMED FORCES COMMAND



Marshal of Soviet Union
ANDREY GRECHKO
Commander in Chief



Army General
PAVEL BATOV
Chief of Staff



Marshal of Soviet Union
VLADIMIR SUDETS
Commander in Chief
of
Air Defense Forces

East European Representatives

POLAND General of Division **JAN SLIWINSKI**

HUNGARY An unidentified Colonel

Other representatives unidentified

Warsaw Pact Deputy Commanders — The East European Defense Ministers



Marshal of Poland
MARIAN SPYCHALSKI

POLAND



Army General
LEONTIN SALAJAN

RUMANIA



Army General
BOHUMIR LOMSKY

CZECHOSLOVAKIA



Army General
DOBRI DZHUROV

BULGARIA



Army General
HEINZ HOFFMAN

EAST GERMANY



Colonel General
LAJOS CZINEGE

HUNGARY

Warsaw Pact Representatives to East European Ministries of Defense

Colonel General
D. S. ZHEREBIN

POLAND

Lieutenant General
YE. T. MARCHENKO

RUMANIA

Colonel General
A. M. KUSHCHEV

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Colonel General
A. I. BAKSOV

BULGARIA

Army General
V. V. KURASOV

EAST GERMANY

Colonel General
P. G. SHAFRANOV

HUNGARY



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identifying [redacted] the senior Polish representative. In the presence of the Pole, General of Division Jan Sliwinski, Rotmistrov pointedly stated that although Poles and Soviets, may have their "nuances," they are all Slavs who would close ranks in the face of any US attempt to play on these minor differences. Two days later the Hungarian military attaché in Moscow told [redacted] that the senior Hungarian officer assigned to Warsaw Pact Headquarters was a full colonel.

Until now, the presence of these representatives has never been publicized by the Soviets, although a reliable Soviet clandestine source reported some time ago that representatives of each East European member of the pact--including "many major generals"--worked continuously under the Warsaw Pact chief of staff (now Soviet Army General Batov) in the Soviet General Staff Headquarters building on Arbat Square in Moscow.

Despite Moscow's efforts to make a convincing show of unity, there is increasing evidence that the pact has become less rather than more "monolithic" than formerly, that its ideological ties are weaker, and that relations between members are more often tense than "fraternal." The divisive tendencies in the pact are especially evident in the behavior of Rumania.

Rumania and the Chain of Command

According to the formal text of the Warsaw Pact, basic

policy decisions, political as well as military, are supposed to be made in the Political Consultative Committee, in which each member technically has one vote. However, the actual center of military policy making is the Combined Armed Forces Command, which remains under the firm control of Soviet Marshal Grechko, who is also second in command in the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Grechko's deputies are the East European defense ministers. He often appears to bypass some or all of them in issuing orders through the Warsaw Pact representatives to the field. This is particularly easy for Grechko in air defense matters, where Soviet Marshal Sudets, the Warsaw Pact air defense chief, takes orders from Grechko, but in turn outranks every East European defense minister except Marshal Spychalski of Poland. Grechko probably rationalizes these shortcuts as imperative to ensure timely compliance with his directives. Rumanian Armed Forces Minister Salajan, however, is reported to have told Grechko personally that the practice would have to cease.

Salajan and the new Rumanian leader, Nicolae Ceausescu have also asserted their prerogatives within the pact in other ways. Perhaps against Soviet wishes, the Rumanians willfully displayed their Scud surface-to-surface missiles in August 1963, almost a year before any other East European country. At the same time, they apparently

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refused to make any serious effort to improve their lackluster air defense, which would have been more constructive from the standpoint of the USSR. An apparently unilateral decision by Bucharest last October slashed the basic conscription term to 16 months, which has undoubtedly decreased the size of the Rumanian ground forces--and in all likelihood the morale of the two-year Bulgarian, Rumanian, Czech, and Polish conscripts as well.

In due course, the Rumanians will also probably seek greater contacts with the military establishments of countries outside the Warsaw Pact, particularly the Yugoslavs, Austrians, and French. Salajan may be promoted by Bucharest to the newly created rank of Marshal of Rumania, which would place him at the same level of rank as Defense Minister Spychalski of Poland--or even the USSR's Malinovskiy and Grechko.

The Bulgarian Coup

The situation of Bulgaria is also unsatisfactory. Inasmuch as the unsuccessful coup attempt against the Zhivkov regime last April was basically anti-Soviet, the coup also may have been directed against Bulgaria's close association with the Warsaw Pact. The group of Bulgarian political and military officials included the commander of the Sofia Garrison, General Anev, and two former high of-

ficials in the Armed Forces Main Political Administration. Soviet presidium member Suslov, the party's leading Bulgarian expert, was dispatched to Sofia in May, apparently to advise on tightening party discipline over the armed forces. Subsequently measures were taken to accomplish this, including a vigorous propaganda campaign to arouse the loyalties of the services.

The Main Political Administration, in the pages of the army journal, Narodna Armiya, continues to admonish officers to develop "high ideological awareness" and the realization that the summation of all Bulgarian military virtues is "loyalty to the party." A "military" department has been established in the central committee, the first such institution in any pact country. Bulgarian officers with World War II partisan backgrounds--and therefore potentially nationalistic proclivities--have been passed over in recent general officer promotions.

"Bourgeois Technicism" In Hungary

Information on the current political motivations of the Hungarian military establishment is sparse, but

reports detailing the drabness of life in a Hungarian unit, suggest that neither the Kadar regime nor Moscow can have complete confidence in its loyalty.

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Hungarian vs. Hungarian on Modern War

"For the imperialist states such a war would be unprogressive and unjust, and for the socialist countries --- possibly including nonsocialist but anti-imperialist and peace-loving countries --- it would be profoundly just." -- Lt. Colonel Jozsef Forizs, Miklos Zrinyi Military Academy, "Concerning Several Theoretical Questions of Modern War," Valosag (Budapest), No. 5, 1965.

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In any case, Budapest appears to mistrust the temper of the times. "Nationalism," said the chief of the agitation and propaganda group at a Hungarian army-party conference in June, "is the binding material for all hostile views."

Although the Kadar regime has failed to indicate the extent of its dissatisfaction with the pact, it has long permitted some writers to state a revisionist position regarding international affairs. One of them, Gyorgy Konrad, labeled a "bourgeois technician" by his most recent critic, Lt. Col. Forizs of the Miklos Zrinyi Military Academy, has argued that no purpose, least of all an ideological one, justifies the risk of a major war in the nuclear age, and insisted that the leaders of the capitalist states realize this fully as well as their socialist counterparts.

Konrad also believes that until the mutual suspicions preventing world disarmament recede, the present balance of deterrents,

"In general there is no international right or unwritten prohibition which might be valid in this mutual wildness... What will follow after the first day no strategist can calculate." ---- Gyorgy Konrad, "The Anachronism of Modern War," Valosag (Budapest), No. 6, 1963 and No. 1, 1964.

and not attempts by the socialist countries to achieve military superiority, lessen the threat of direct military catastrophe.

The publication of such views has not been permitted elsewhere within the pact. However, there has not been any indication on the official level of any open Hungarian dissidence within the pact in recent years.

Polish Problems

Frictions and difficulties of various kinds and degrees have also developed in plenty in the northern tier of the Warsaw Pact.

In May

feared increasing pro-Soviet and anti-Semitic trends in the Polish political and military leadership. Whatever dissension these trends may have caused among the Polish military, it does not at present seem likely to become sufficiently

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grave to cause the Poles to default on their current pact commitments. The main current Polish grievances appear to be focused on the quality of military materiel furnished by the Soviets, the types of equipment allocated to each member's production capacity--i.e., defense contracts--and the financial contribution made by each member to the pact's maintenance.

[redacted] blames the Soviets for maintaining the pre-pact pattern of bilateral agreements between themselves and each East European country, rather than opening defense matters to general pact discussions. As a result, the East Europeans, particularly Poles and Czechs, often accuse each other of failing to share equally in the economic responsibilities of the pact.

[redacted] senior logistics officers from the several defense ministries have the opportunity to meet within the framework of the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA), but [redacted] that these exchanges are either too infrequent or too brief to be fruitful from a non-Soviet point of view.

In view of continuing Soviet shipments to Eastern Europe of surface-to-surface missiles, supersonic jet fighters, and other modern hardware, Polish charges that the Soviets furnish inferior equipment appear to be losing much of their validity.

[redacted] (with some application to all East European pact members) that Polish officers occasionally translate the Polish initials for CEMA--RWPG--as "Rusjanom Wszystko Polakom Gowno" --"Everything for the Russians, dung for the Poles."

The significance of these disputes over equipment is difficult to assess. They are perhaps an inevitable accompaniment to the operation of an organization such as the pact. There seems to be little doubt, however, that in some cases the grievances are deep seated, and that some officers have concluded that Moscow wishes only to adorn Polish forces enough to invite NATO counterstrikes in the event of hostilities, thereby relieving the pressure on Soviet forces.

East German Uncertainty

Mistrust of Soviet purposes is also evident in the situation of East Germany with respect to the pact, to which the East German Army (excluding Border Guards) was subordinated in May 1958.

The Soviets have directed a continual stream of equipment to the East German forces and have consistently sought to impress the West with its presence.

[redacted] the East German 4th Motorized Rifle Division has stated that in June 1964 his unit opposed a Soviet division in an exercise in which each side simulated the delivery of its own

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East German Troops in East Berlin Parade, 8 May 1965



"Military service in a partitioned country confronts our young soldiers with difficult political problems and demands a class attitude on such fundamental questions as the problem of war and peace, the national question, the question of the fatherland, and 'who is your friend and who is your enemy'." -- Heinz Hoffman, East German Defense Minister, in V Yedinom Stroyu (In a Single Formation), 1965.

nuclear weapons. This supports other indications that the Soviets have encouraged East German, as well as Polish and Czech, commanders to expect to receive nuclear warheads in an all-out war with NATO. The Soviets thus appear to have at least some confidence in the East Germans.

Yet the East German leaders do not always appear certain of the nature of the Soviet commitment to them. East German Deputy Foreign Minister Georg Stibi told a group of East and West German journalists on 30 August in effect that there is no guarantee by the Soviet Union to defend East Germany with nuclear weapons--a remark censored from the East German press.

[redacted] came to doubt that even conventional Soviet forces are formally committed to the pact or any member thereof, including East Germany. He believes that the Soviets at one time considered making such a commitment, but desisted for fear both of prejudicing future negotiations with the West on the basis of rights dating from World War II, and of possible complications within the pact itself.

The odds are against the Soviets' having made a covert agreement with the East European defense ministers on this matter, and published documents tend to support [redacted]. For example, the Warsaw Pact is nowhere mentioned in the Soviet status-of-forces agreements contracted with Poland on 17 December 1956, East Germany on 12 March

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1957, Rumania on 15 April 1957 (nullified by the withdrawal of Soviet forces in May 1958), and Hungary on 27 May 1957. This contrasts with the NATO Status-of-Forces Agreement of June 1951 (supplemented in August 1959) which regulates the positioning of Western troops in Europe.

Moreover, information received from a reliable Soviet source some time ago, to the effect that the defense ministry of each East European country was in possession of only an extract of the general deployment plan, and not the general plan itself, has never been impeached. It thus remains highly likely that neither the East Germans nor any other pact members are privy to the basic Soviet strategic plan for Europe.

Czechoslovakia: A Minority View

If the Novotny regime in Prague, Defense Minister Lomsky, or any high-ranking Czechoslovak officers have complaints against the Warsaw Pact, they have expressed them most discreetly. An article by Lomsky in V Yedinom Stroyu (In a Single Formation), a book published in Moscow on the occasion of the pact's tenth anniversary, heaps fulsome praise on the pact, the Soviet Army, and the Soviet party. The adoption last year of a new uniform more in keeping with Czechoslovak national traditions has not been accompanied

by any public hint from Prague that the country's national interests diverge from those of the pact.

Meanwhile the combination of Soviet missile and aircraft shipments and their own impressive armor and artillery production has given the Czechoslovaks the best equipped East European ground and tactical air force.

The Balance Sheet

The Czechoslovak exception notwithstanding, there can be little doubt that the prevailing disharmony in Warsaw Pact affairs, and the limitation this imposes on the utility of the pact forces, are a matter of concern to the Soviet Union. On 13 September, party leader Brezhnev referred to the need for "improving" the pact, suggesting that Moscow may have in mind some remedial changes in its organization.

The nature of these changes is not clear, but the Polish

opinion that the Soviets are aiming at closer integration, under their control, of the military and security forces of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. The Soviets may promote the symbolic exchange of small contingents among the three, although the Poles, in particular, would have reservations about having East German troops as permanent guests.

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The Soviets can also expect the enhancement of the net capabilities of the pact when the support pipeline presently under development--similar to the NATO pipeline--comes into operation. Over time, the constructive effect of combined exercises, which the Soviets probably will hold more frequently than in the past, and which will employ improved coordination at command and staff levels, will also be felt.

On balance, the Soviets probably hope that measures such as these will tend to keep the wayward tendencies of the pact members within bounds. Moscow probably has noted with

satisfaction the steadiness of Czechoslovakia, where high-level complaints and expressions of dissatisfaction have been conspicuously absent. The Soviets, moreover, may reason, probably with justification, that a majority of the top East European military still find most Soviet objectives compatible with their personal and national interests. For these reasons, the USSR's policy toward the pact will probably remain the realistic one of making haste slowly, in the recognition that at least some friction is inevitable in the life of any formal military alliance.

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