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# INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

## THE SOVIET POLITICAL SCENE


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Office of Current Intelligence

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Office of Current Intelligence  
31 December 1964

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Soviet Political Scene

1. This memorandum reviews some of the analytical problems that have arisen since Khrushchev's removal two months ago. In particular, we have undertaken a new review of the evidence pertaining to the reasons for the ouster; we have looked at some of the problems facing a collective leadership and have put forth our views on the current status of the military and the KGB, and the prospects for the creative intellectuals. No attempt has been made here, however, to review the indications of an economic nature. While realizing that it is still much too early to be able to draw a clear picture of the new leadership's intentions, we believe nonetheless that the signs so far point to a policy orientation in domestic affairs certainly no less liberal, and perhaps more liberal, than Khrushchev's.

A New Look At The Coup

2. The reasons why Khrushchev's lieutenants revolted against him are still far from clear even though events in the two months following his ouster have cast some light on the circumstances and given a number of clues to the intentions of the regime. Each conspirator undoubtedly had his own set of irritations, policy differences, fears, and ambitions, but it must have taken a powerful force to overcome their ingrained caution against voicing thoughts of political disloyalty to the extent necessary to organize and carry out the coup.

3. The myriad of reports of "fact" and rumor cover a wide range of "reasons"--some plausible, some questionable or even absurd. Among the reports

purporting to give the reasons that precipitated the move, however, none can be singled out as a clearly authentic account. Even reports of what the central committee was told were the presidium's charges against Khrushchev are either fragmentary or probable hearsay. The reasons for the ouster given to various foreign Communists seem to have centered on the roots of dissatisfaction--which extended well into the past--but there are only slight hints that the Soviet officials singled out any as the precipitating reasons.

4. The report of the briefing to the Austrian party delegation given by Soviet Party Secretary Ponomarev in late October still seems, as far as it goes, to be one of the most plausible lists of charges that we have seen, although there is no reason to believe that Ponomarev was telling the full story. He made three essential points against Khrushchev. First, that he had debased the Sino-Soviet dispute into an exchange of personal invective with Mao, making it impossible to deal with Peiping either on a party or even on a governmental level. Second, that despite Khrushchev's personal hold over agricultural policy for ten years, the Soviet Union in 1963 still had to make the largest foreign grain purchases in its history. The fault here was attributed to Khrushchev's erratic policies and his disregard for scientific advice when it contradicted his personal views. The third point was that Khrushchev had fostered nepotism and his own personality cult. Ponomarev stressed the harm done by Adzhubey's unauthorized loose talk, noted Khrushchev's disregard for the presidium's decision, and his tendency to work out policy on an ad hoc basis with selective associates but not with a majority. In this regard, Ponomarev cited the case of Khrushchev's giving Nasir the Hero of the Soviet Union award in the face of a disapproving vote by the party presidium.

5. With the exception of Khrushchev's personal mishandling of the Chinese problem, the same general set of reasons for the decision to remove him was put forth by Soviet central committee member Emelyanov in discussions with Westerners immediately after the October party plenum, which he attended. In neither case is an immediate precipitating issue mentioned.

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6. These reports along with numerous others, as well as the list of official charges against Khrushchev appearing in Soviet propaganda media, make it clear that the style of rule was one of the foremost underlying reasons for the coup. As Sergo Mikoyan said recently, Khrushchev had become a dictator and the many problems, particularly economic problems, facing the Soviet Union could not be solved by dictatorial methods.

7. The situation would probably have been different if Khrushchev's policies had been more successful but there were major shortcomings, if not failures, in a number of policy fields. Thus the bill of particulars against him apparently came to reflect not only the grievances over how he was doing the job but also the more deep-seated grievances over what he was doing. We already have seen two policies of the Khrushchev era reversed by the new leadership: the restrictions placed on the private plots in the rural areas, and the bifurcation of the party which was ordered in late 1962. It is now quite clear that Khrushchev railroaded the latter policy through despite considerable high-level opposition. The repressive line on the plots may have been set down in a similar manner. The policies that have been explicitly reversed, however, had been on the books for some time and were obviously not the issues which would have triggered a coup.

8. A hint of more recent trouble has come from the Italian Communist delegation after it returned in early November from its briefings in Moscow. In its published statement, the delegation made the following remarks: "The motives may above all be found in the criticism of Khrushchev's activity, especially during the last period, his methods of governing and a series of decisions which he had made or proposed to make." The statement went on to say that "...Khrushchev made decisions...from his head and announced them in public discussions, thus placing before the government an accomplished fact." These negative consequences "are to be felt, above all, in the orientation and organization of agricultural production."

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9. The Italian commentary points to a problem surrounding the central committee plenum which Khrushchev had called for November. There had been some indication that Khrushchev's plans for this plenum on agriculture had not been accepted by the party presidium but that Khrushchev nevertheless disclosed the new policies to local officials in an effort to force the presidium's hand. The policies themselves did not appear to be particularly far-reaching or revolutionary. As far as we know, they were intended merely to implement the scheme for organizing parts of agriculture along industrial lines and this meant a further proliferation of specialized agricultural committees and departments. We doubt, however, that this in itself was much of a policy issue in the leadership. Rather, it was a prime example of Khrushchev's personal handling of policy and of his "hare-brained" organizational schemes. We are left with the rather good possibility, therefore, that the idea of a November plenum served as a catalyst in that it raised issues which represented "a last straw" to those who were critical of Khrushchev's methods of operation.

10. We speculated in the very early period after the ouster on the possibility that Khrushchev also intended to take advantage of a central committee plenum in November to make shifts in personnel at the highest levels. The Italian statement quoted above might be interpreted to suggest that this kind of action was anticipated, but it is more likely that the Italians were referring only to Khrushchev's proposed changes in agriculture. A better indication that important personnel actions were expected has been passed

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This line has not been reflected in other reports and has not been suggested in speeches or other pronouncements from the new leaders. Personnel changes seemed overdue, however, and the nagging concern which this question inevitably produced is likely to have become one of the contributing factors behind the ouster.

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11. While the allegation that Khrushchev was planning a wholesale party reorganization is confined solely to the Yepishev report, there have been numerous claims, both before Khrushchev's removal and afterward, that his son-in-law Adzhubey had been slated for an important promotion; several recent reports have mentioned the party secretariat. Adzhubey was obviously a special target of the conspirators. There was abundant evidence that his influence with Khrushchev had been steadily growing, with signs that in some fields he was virtually bypassing some members of the presidium and other legally constituted officials such as Foreign Minister Gromyko. If, in fact, Khrushchev had become so reckless in his methods of operation that he planned to formalize Adzhubey's special status by promotion to the upper reaches of the party, it unquestionably would have been met by the strongest kind of negative reaction. We feel certain that nearly every member of the presidium would be personally alarmed at the thought of an ascendant Adzhubey in the secretariat. In this situation, a unanimous decision to oust Khrushchev would have been relatively easy to obtain.

12. It is still unclear to what extent the question of resource allocations entered into the final decision against Khrushchev. This question certainly had been one of the more hotly contested issues over the years and it must have weighed heavily in the minds of most of the conspirators although they may have recognized a lack of common viewpoint on it. However, the great majority of reports on the ouster have failed to mention this problem as an immediate factor.

13. One of the very few recent references to the allocation question has come from the French party delegation which went to Moscow for clarification of the reasons for the ouster. Undoubtedly referring to Khrushchev's speech in late September on long-range planning and the further development of consumer production, the French noted that "very recently, Comrade Khrushchev made an unexpected speech on economic problems without any previous discussion." This wording suggests that the French were reflecting more concern over Khrushchev's highhandedness in expounding uncoordinated policy than in the policy itself. This, of course, does

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not negate the possibility that Khrushchev came up with a plan in September for a shift in resource allocations considerably beyond that which the present leaders have agreed on. However, considering the large attendance at the September meeting where Khrushchev presented his plan, and the universal interest in the subject matter, it is somewhat surprising that the word would not have leaked out.

14. Our best guess at this point then is that the September meeting and the planning of the November plenum were the developments which served to solidify the opposition. The clearest issue seems to have been the one of personal power. Khrushchev's opponents probably realized that doing away with his increasingly willful brand of dictatorship was becoming a now-or-never proposition.

#### Current Political Problems

15. We continue to have no reason to believe that the current crop of Soviet leaders will be any more successful at collective rule than were their predecessors. While there have been only a few signs to suggest that an earnest struggle for power may already be under way, we would expect the indications to blossom forth at any time.

16. Policy differences will probably be no easier to settle than differences over the question of ultimate authority. Despite the fact that some high-level personnel changes have already been made, the current Kremlin lineup still contains most of the old faces representing the same old vested interests and conflicting points of activities of the leaders disclose very little as to the present division of authority and responsibility. However, the status of one of the senior leaders-- Party Secretary Podgorny--has been clarified somewhat during the past month. Because Podgorny had been such a favorite of Khrushchev and was played off against Brezhnev by Khrushchev, there was considerable speculation immediately after the ouster that Podgorny would also go. It is quite evident now, however, that Podgorny was an active member of the cabal; otherwise, it is doubtful that he would have shared so prominently in the division



of the spoils. Indeed, the fact that he gave the report to the November plenum on the reunification of the party structure suggests that he is acting as the senior secretary immediately below Brezhnev. Some commentators, however, have gone beyond this interpretation--citing Podgorny's role at the plenum as evidence that, in effect, he controls party organizational and personnel matters. We think that there is insufficient evidence for this conclusion. It would seem more likely that the powerful position of cadres secretary would be filled only well after the first secretary had solidified his hold. Until that time, the first secretary, himself, would probably attempt to administer this function or, more likely, it would come under some kind of collective control. If Podgorny does emerge rather quickly as the full-fledged cadres secretary, and positing a Brezhnev-Podgorny rivalry, we would probably conclude that Brezhnev's chances for securing a permanent foothold were very much in doubt.

17. Our attention, therefore, is focusing closely on the relationship that will develop between these two particular leaders, and it is because the contest for ultimate authority now seems likely to be waged inside the party machine that we tend to minimize the significance of recent rumors that the leaders, in order to preserve collegiality, have decreed that the premiership and the post of party first secretary will henceforth not be held by the same person. As of now, putting both jobs under one hat is probably not a prerequisite to the achievement of the number one position. If Brezhnev, for instance, could dominate the party apparatus and then bully the party presidium, in all likelihood he would win the day. In this event, the rumored new decree could be thrown out the window.

18. Until this question of ultimate authority is decided, administration by collective leadership is bound to be cumbersome and inefficient but by no means totally unworkable. Many of the important problems can be handled by a group; some, however, are totally unsuited to such an arrangement. The hot line, for example, symbolizes one of these problems: who speaks for the Soviet Union on foreign affairs? According to a Soviet magazine

article last year, the Moscow terminal for the hot line is in the Kremlin, not far from the office of the premier. Since this is an intergovernmental communication system it should be expected that the Soviet side would be under the domain of Kosygin as chairman of the Council of Ministers, but Brezhnev in any major confrontation with the US would likely try to put words in Kosygin's mouth as Khrushchev used to do with Bulganin. This kind of situation not only exacerbates relations between the two Soviet principals involved, but has an unsettling effect on all the leaders as they observe the first secretary continually working to extend his authority. Yet there is a real need to clarify the chain of command. Gromyko was taken very much aback and could not answer Ambassador Kohler's recent question as to who manned the Soviet end of the line. Soviet functionaries involved in domestic affairs are undoubtedly asking the same kind of questions in an effort to piece together the chain of command. Officials in the upper reaches must know precisely to whom they should refer their problems. Pressures to clarify this situation can only help to undermine the collectivity of the present leadership.

19. A similar problem arises in connection with clarifying the chain of command from the political leadership into the military hierarchy. This chain was well defined during the later years of Khrushchev's rule when he set himself up as supreme commander in chief and established a special military council to advise him personally on problems of a military nature. With this arrangement, he undoubtedly had final authority over the commitment of Soviet forces. While a somewhat less direct and efficient channel was probably used in the earlier post-Stalin period, the establishment of well defined lines of authority in recent years would probably promote pressures at this point for a resumption of such a system. Certainly the military would be pressing for a precise definition and would gladly offer to take on this authority. The politicians, however, undoubtedly would elect to work out a decision among themselves rather than to trust the military with this kind of power. But the necessity for a decision inevitably brings fears and rivalries to the fore and also enhances the prestige, if not the authority over the military, of the person selected.

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The KGB and the Soviet High Command

20. There is very little evidence concerning the exact nature or degree of secret police (KGB) involvement in the coup. Until the moment Khrushchev fell, all outward signs showed his personal control of the security apparatus to be as strong as ever, and any moves against him seemed foredoomed to discovery.

21. Thus the success of the plot itself indicates KGB complicity. At the least, secret police chief Vladimir Semichastny and his principal deputies knew about it. They were probably sounded out by Shelepin and may have been briefed by Brezhnev himself. Because they too had begun to chafe under Khrushchev's increasingly arbitrary and dictatorial rule, or because they saw an opportunity to reap rewards for themselves, the KGB leaders agreed with the conspirators that Khrushchev had to go.

22. From the time they were told of the plot, they were chiefly concerned with its security. The precise nature of their action remains unknown, but it must have been designed to prevent any hint of the impending coup from reaching Khrushchev or anyone else outside the conspiratorial circle. In all likelihood, this was accomplished primarily by doing nothing to disturb the business-as-usual atmosphere which prevailed until the last moment.

23. Upon Khrushchev's return to Moscow, however, the KGB apparently took a much more direct hand. The evidence suggests that the secret police were alerted to head off possible countermoves by Khrushchev. Thus, the plotters informed Semichastny of their progress at least twice, and on 14 October--before the central committee convened--he replaced the KGB agents normally assigned to Khrushchev's offices. As a further security precaution, he evidently placed the responsibility for guarding Khrushchev directly upon the KGB first deputy chairman late that same afternoon.

24. The status of the KGB was clearly enhanced by the promotions awarded to Shelepin and Semichastny a month after the coup, and, through Shelepin, secret police interests now appear to be more strongly and directly represented at the policy level than at

any time since the purge of Beria in 1953. It is, however, less certain that these promotions should be interpreted solely as rewards to the KGB for its role against Khrushchev. Shelepin, for example, probably owes his full presidium membership to Brezhnev's patronage. He may indeed have been rewarded but, at least over the short run, the significance of his presence on the party's ruling body should be judged in terms of the political balance of forces. He has joined Polyansky and Kirilenko in what appears to be the core of support around Brezhnev.

25. The elevation of Semichastny from candidate to full membership on the central committee is much closer to an outright reward, but it too has some mitigating aspects. Both his predecessors--Serov and Shelepin--had been full central committee members during their tours as KGB chief, but Semichastny held the job for three years before receiving the party rank which normally accompanies it. Furthermore, he was promoted with seven other men in a move ostensibly designed to bring the central committee up to the prescribed 175 full members. Thus, his promotion would seem little more than belated recognition of his satisfactory performance as secret police chief. Since KGB participation in the coup may have been vital to its success, Semichastny might feel that he got less reward than he deserved. The debt may not yet have been fully paid, however.

26. In any case, the secret police are riding higher than they have for many years. Their chairman has finally been accorded his rightful seat on the central committee, and through Shelepin--who is evidently a close friend of Semichastny--they have a direct pipeline into the presidium itself. Furthermore, the KGB continues to enjoy unusually good publicity coupled with some operational successes. The most notable examples are the Schwirkmann and Khabarovsk incidents, and concurrently, the wave of press attention to Richard Sorge.

27. Neither the Schwirkmann case nor the Khabarovsk incident has any discernible connection with Khrushchev's fall. They were counterintelligence operations which succeeded. Although Schwirkmann did not drop into the laps of the KGB--as

evidently had been planned--his counteraudio operations were effectively stopped and the KGB later used the incident to intimidate other Western technicians. As for the Khabarovsk incident, our attachés were caught with their hands in the cookie jar. When the matter leaked to the press, the Soviets predictably lodged espionage charges, replete with photographs of the confiscated gear. The publicity was, of course, intended to convince the Soviet reader of the vigilance and efficiency of the KGB.

28. On the face of it, the decision last September to permit publication of the Sorge story was similarly motivated, since his activities had also been directed against the external enemy. Thus, the propaganda which the three cases have received would seem to be part of the continuing attempt to refurbish the secret police image. The portrayal of the KGB as operating only against foreign intelligence services naturally tends to de-emphasize the role it played under Stalin, and Sorge's story makes it clear that the "Chekist" was a dedicated patriot even then.

29. The most recent development in the affair has a slightly political overtone. After Khrushchev fell, the new leaders awarded Sorge the posthumous title "Hero of the Soviet Union" and named a Moscow street for him. Why these honors were so long in coming was not fully explained--although they were conferred on the 20th anniversary of his execution--and the decision to make him a hero may have been taken while Khrushchev was still in power. Nevertheless, it is the new leadership which gets the credit for decorating Sorge and for promoting Shelepin and Semichastny. The implications are that there is an improved relationship between the Kremlin and the KGB and that the secret police will continue to enjoy an enhanced status so long as they do the bidding of their new masters. This does not mean, however, that they have been granted any actual increase in power, nor is there any suggestion of more pervasive KGB activity against the Soviet populace.

30. The state of affairs between the new leaders and the Soviet military establishment must

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be treated with considerably less certainty. To begin with, there is an almost total lack of evidence that the military had an active hand in the machinations against Khrushchev, and events subsequent to his downfall have been particularly unrevealing.

31. Such evidence as is available contains few suggestions that the army would have been disposed to go to Khrushchev's rescue. If there is any truth whatever to allegations of an on-going debate over defense allocations and balance of forces, quite the opposite would be expected. The military establishment in general would naturally come to regard Khrushchev as the ultimate source of their frustrations. Certainly his initiatives in creating the strategic rocket forces as a separate command, cutting military budgets, reducing the size of the ground forces, gambling on the Cuban missile venture, or negotiating the nuclear test ban cannot have been much to their liking, and thus his departure from the scene would be welcome indeed.

32. Yet the high command is made up of Khrushchev creatures. Men like Malinovsky, Grechko, and Chuykov were directly indebted to him for their positions of authority and, unless they saw the promise of better things under a new leadership, they might have been expected to protect their patron.

33. There are, however, no indications that the army did anything at all during the coup. At most, the conspirators probably took the precaution of soliciting Malinovsky's views in advance. One Soviet source heard that such an approach was made and that Malinovsky gave his assurance that the army would not rally to Khrushchev's support. Marshal Grechko might also have known what was afoot.

[REDACTED] In any event, it now seems clear that the marshals became involved only to the extent of agreeing that Khrushchev had to go and that the army would therefore remain passive.

34. Subsequent developments have cast no further light on the picture, and things so far do

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not seem to be any better for the military than they were under Khrushchev. The high command will find little comfort in the 500-million-ruble reduction in the 1965 military budget or in the new regime's avowed intent to narrow the rates of increase between the production of consumer and capital goods. It is further unlikely to greet the promotion of Yepishev--the chief of the main political directorate--with any real enthusiasm. He, like Semichastny, was one of the eight central committee candidates raised to full membership at the November plenum, and his promotion also has the aspects of a routine move. His predecessor--Marshal Golikov--was a full central committee member and won his marshal's star while in office. But Yepishev is a party careerist, a purely political general, whereas Golikov was a professional officer who, despite the nature of the job, presumably had the basic interests of the military at heart.

35. Perhaps the only post-Khrushchev development in favor of the military's vested interests was the appointment of Matvey Zakharov to head the General Staff. He is a brilliant and popular professional soldier, and by some accounts an advocate of traditionalism. But he is 66, [REDACTED] and was recalled to a post vacated by Biryuzov's death. Thus he may be slated to serve only until the regime convinces itself that it must staff key military slots with younger men. Nevertheless, the officer corps may view his appointment as at least a temporary gain for military professionalism.

36. The picture is further beclouded by recurrent rumors in Moscow that the defense minister himself is in trouble and may be removed. If Malinovsky is in ill grace, the cause very likely has nothing to do with his part in the Khrushchev ouster. Had Malinovsky actively opposed the plotters, he would probably have been sacked on the spot. On the other hand, his full cooperation would seem to have merited at least some token of appreciation. Certainly he would be retained in his job--as indeed he may yet be. We do not know precisely why he is said to be in trouble, but suspect that he has rather overstepped his authority on several recent occasions. For example, his surprisingly bellicose remarks on 6 November may not have sat well with the new leaders. Neither can they have been much pleased with his reported

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suggestion to Chou En-lai that the army had a key role in ousting Khrushchev. Furthermore, he expressed his doubts--and to a foreign diplomat--about the Presidium's decision to aid the Congo rebels, and may also have argued against the reduction in the military budget. If Malinovsky is to be removed, his actions since Khrushchev's ouster would seem the most probable cause.

37. On balance, then, all the signs indicate that the military establishment did not have an active role in getting rid of the erstwhile commander in chief, and there is no evidence that it has reaped rewards or concessions of any kind. The best guess is that the army's leaders did precisely as they were told--nothing.

#### The Intellectual Community

38. There has been no clear enunciation of cultural policy from the new leaders. In this fluid atmosphere, the liberal intellectuals are probing to determine the leadership's tolerance for nonconformity in culture and, in the process, are attempting to unseat several long-established petty tyrants in science and the arts.

39. Officials of the Writer's Union in conversations with American Embassy officers in late October were described as uncertain about the future, reiterating only that there could be no return to the Stalinist past. They commented, however, that the new leaders had been helpful to them on routine administrative matters in the recent past and that one of their first acts had been to abandon an unpopular proposal by Khrushchev for consolidation of the cultural news media.

40. On 27 October the liberal journal, Novy Mir, announced that its publication plans for 1965 included works by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Yevtushenko, Viktor Nekrasov, Vladimir Dudintsev and General Aleksandr Gorbatov. Solzhenitsyn is the author of One Day In The Life of Ivan Denisovich as well as of several even more harshly criticized stories. Nekrasov's relatively balanced description of his trip to the United States, combined with his public defiance of Podgorny's demand that he apologize for



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it, led Khrushchev to demand his expulsion from the party. Dudintsev's 1956 novel, Not By Bread Alone, is still cited by conservatives as a horrid example of nonconformity. Gorbатов's memoirs in Novy Mir this spring presented a nonfiction counterpart to Solzhenitsyn's semifictional revelations of prison camp life in One Day. On 31 October, Literary Gazette carried excerpts from a highly experimental new poem by Andrey Voznesensky which combines prose passages with verse. The poem was also published in full in the October issue of the magazine Young Guard.

41. The reported release from prison camp of Boris Pasternak's amanuensis, Olga Ivinskaya, and of the young Leningrad poet Iosif Brodsky, cannot apparently be attributed to the new leadership team.

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21 September--well before Khrushchev's ouster in mid-October. Brodsky may once again have been released briefly but, according to the embassy's latest information, is now back in prison camp. A Moscow rumor has it, however, that his sentence is to be reviewed "soon" with a view to commutation.

42. A Pravda editorial on 1 November restated a conservative line in culture and called for a struggle against the "reactionary ideology" of the West. There were recurring rumors, however, that Pravda's chief editor, Pavel Satyukov, was to be replaced, and the editorial had no visible impact on the intelligentsia.

43. In mid-November, Literary Gazette carried a slashing attack on a conservative novel depicting the struggle between conservative painters and young experimentalists. Abandoning all pretense of literary criticism, the reviewer charged that conservative painters--whom Soviet readers could readily identify--were defending not the interests of the party as they claimed, but their own personal power positions which were based on esthetic standards long since discredited as sterile and primitive.

44. The conservatives have been represented in two articles by drama critic Yury Zubkov. In the

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conservative weekly, Literary Russia, Zubkov attacked liberal Soviet playwrights for alien "bourgeois humanism" and in the conservative journal, Oktyabr, he praised highly a new play by conservative Anatoly Sofronov for its "socialist humanism."

45. On 13 November, the appointment of Aleksey Rumyantsev as chief editor of Pravda was announced. Two days later Pravda carried a terse unsigned note reprimanding all concerned for the Oktyabr article-- Sofronov for a hastily written and poorly thought out work, Zubkov for praising it, and Oktyabr's chief editor, conservative Vsevolod Kochetov, for printing that praise. The play itself, which reportedly portrays the defeat of the antiparty group, has not yet been staged and it is not clear wherein its error lies. Nonetheless, Pravda's reproof of conservatives, even for an unknown error, is a gain for the liberals.

46. In the same issue Pravda carried a signed and therefore slightly less authoritative article praising such western writers as Ray Bradbury, Harper Lee, C.P. Snow, and Heinrich Buehl for their "critical realism" and "humanism" and concluding that Soviet "socialist realism" and western "critical realism" have a "mutually enriching effect." Zubkov's distinction between socialist and western humanism was ignored.

47. On 22 November Pravda carried another editorial on cultural policy. Like its 1 November predecessor it called for high ideological content and "socialist humanism." However, it omitted the earlier demand for hostility to "reactionary ideology" and it added a new and ambiguous criticism of "groupism"--overpraising the work of a "comrade." Oktyabr's praise of the Sofronov play was clearly an example of this, but the charge might equally well be leveled against the liberal group surrounding Novy Mir.

48. Trofim Lysenko's long reign in biology and agriculture has been under sustained attack in the central press since a week after Khrushchev's ouster. One of the earliest of these attacks, in Komsomolskaya Pravda on 23 October, was of particular interest since it marked a rare appearance in

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print by Vladimir Dudintsev, and--like his harshly criticized 1956 novel Not By Bread Alone--described a clash between true science and bureaucracy. In this 1964 case, bureaucracy was described as backing Lysenko's theories.

49. Another monopoly, established like Lysenko's under Stalin's aegis, has also come under public attack--that of sculptor Yevgeny Vuchetich. A colleague writing in Komsomolskaya Pravda hinted strongly that Vuchetich's latest project is merely a copy of an earlier work, and implied that the older man exploits the young sculptors who work in anonymity under his direction.

#### Problems Ahead

50. Ambassador Kohler remarked recently that the new Soviet leadership should be thought of as a negative coalition in that it came together essentially to get rid of a particular individual but was not united behind a set policy program of its own. In many areas, therefore, new policies are bound to emerge slowly, and will be subject to continuing modification as the compromises of the coalition give way under the firmer direction of a new leader. In two areas, particularly in the organization of the party but also in agriculture, there apparently was quick agreement that Khrushchev had been wrong. However, even here the decisions taken were to undo Khrushchev's schemes, and there has been a definite slowness in revealing the new organizational pattern. The continuing silence on the question of party leadership in the Russian Republic (RSFSR) is perhaps the most obvious example of procrastination. This issue may be the most contentious facing the leadership. The question specifically is whether the party bureau for the RSFSR, which Khrushchev created and dominated, is to remain and if so, who shall head it. Brezhnev is undoubtedly making every effort to take it over; other leaders may be bent on doing away with the bureau entirely in order to help preserve the collective leadership. Similarly, moves are now being made to remove some of the leading personnel associated with Khrushchev's agricultural practices. We still have no good clues, however, as to who will have responsibility for agricultural administration, and more importantly, who will become the leading policy initiator in this field.

51. We are also waiting to see how the new leaders will decide to treat the Khrushchev era, and how far they will proceed in blaming past errors on Khrushchev personally. There have been signs that this is a sensitive issue. Then there is the problem of scheduling a party congress--technically set for next year--with all the issues it raises in terms of formulating a definitive policy statement beforehand and agreeing on the composition of a new central committee. Finally there is probably a problem of restructuring the upper reaches of the Council of Ministers; Kosygin, for instance, may want to fill the two first deputy premier posts that have become vacant as the result of promotions. The recently concluded Supreme Soviet session did not address itself to this question--perhaps for lack of high-level agreement or perhaps because extensive organizational changes throughout the governmental structure are under consideration.

52. At lower levels of administration, however, the leaders have apparently agreed on a few organizational and personnel changes which they are beginning to announce piecemeal without either propaganda buildup or reference to Khrushchev. This procedure is undoubtedly intended to minimize any disrupting efforts on the party and governmental bureaucracies, and may well become standard in the months to come. The new leadership will continue to readjust its policies and personnel, but a collective works slowly and, in addition, this one is attempting to show continuity with the past.

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