


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✓ 30 October 1964 <sup>B</sup>

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# SPECIAL REPORT

NEW LOOK IN THE SATELLITE ARMIES


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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30 October 1964

NEW LOOK IN THE SATELLITE ARMIES

Accumulated evidence on equipment and organizational developments in the satellite armed forces shows that a major upgrading of their capabilities for modern warfare is under way. Although some of the equipment involved is capable of delivering nuclear weapons, there is no evidence that the USSR is prepared to turn over nuclear weapons to its allies. However, the receipt of this equipment and the organizational streamlining under way suggest that the satellites are to play an increasingly important role in Warsaw Pact operational plans.

New Equipment

The most obvious development has been the acquisition of new equipment, particularly tactical missiles.


the presidium of the Soviet central committee, in consultation with political representatives of the Warsaw Pact, decided sometime prior to 1960 to begin equipping all the East European satellites (except Albania) with surface-to-air and surface-to-surface tactical missiles by the end of 1961. Under the supervision of Chief Marshal of Artillery Varentsov, East European officers were brought to the USSR for missile training, then sent back to train native cadres with the assistance of Soviet instructors who were assigned as consultants for a two- or three-year period.

The missiles were shipped by authority of a special directorate of the Soviet General Staff, with the East Germans as-

signed first priority among the satellites. Types of missiles specified in the report included the Guideline, a SAM (surface-to-air missile) capable of intercepting aircraft up to 80,000 feet; the FROG (free rocket over ground) system, capable of supporting a division with either a conventional or nuclear warhead for a range of five to twelve miles; the Scud A surface-to-surface missile, which has a range of up to 80 nautical miles with a nuclear warhead and up to 150 nautical miles with a chemical or conventional high-explosive warhead; and the Shaddock, a cruise missile first displayed in the November 1961 Moscow parade.

Since June 1960, when the first SAM site manned by satellite troops was observed, the confirmed total of these sites has risen to 121. The recent Czech press identification of Soviet Marshal Sudets as commander of the Warsaw Pact Air

# SATELLITE MILITARY EQUIPMENT




POLISH SCUD A SURFACE-TO-SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILES SHOWN IN  
WARSAW PARADE 22 JULY 1964



HUNGARIAN AMPHIBIOUS ARMORED  
SCOUT CAR BRDM



SU-7 FIGHTER NOW IN POLISH  
AND CZECH AIR FORCES



HUNGARIAN T-54 MEDIUM TANKS SHOWN IN  
4 APRIL 1964 PARADE



EAST GERMAN SNAPPER  
ANTITANK MISSILE

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Defense Forces suggests that the USSR maintains indirect control over these sites. Since July 1964 East German SAM battalions probably are phasing in the latest type of SA-2, which includes the C-band Fan Song E radar system and a modified Guideline missile. This improvement would put the East Germans on a par with Soviet SAM battalions in East Germany.

Reasonably credible reports of East German FROG and Scud missiles appeared in 1962. In August 1963 the Rumanians displayed six Scud A missiles, a normal complement for a Soviet field army. This year the Poles and Rumanians each showed 12 Scuds, and the East Germans four. Czechs, Bulgarians, and Hungarians have been training with the same missile this summer and are expected to show them by mid-1965 in parades. The FROG made its first public appearance in East European hands in Poland in July, and more recently was in the 7 October East Berlin parade. In addition, the satellites have received some Snapper wire-guided antitank missiles. The Shaddock, however, has never been confirmed in either Soviet or satellite forces in Eastern Europe.

The satellites also are significantly improving the quality of their armored elements. In both East German tank divisions the T-54 medium tank has replaced the obsolescent T-34, and Rumania has added at least 100 T-54/55s in


the last year. Three types of armored personnel carriers were far more widely seen this year than in previous years: the tracked BTR 50p seen in Poland, the eight-wheeled model given by the USSR to Bulgaria, and the East German armored scout car.

Over the past year the Polish, East German, and Czech air forces were equipped by the USSR for a more active role in air defense and ground support. Since August 1963 the Polish Air Force has received at least 20 Fishbed-D all-weather interceptors, and five SU-7s (Fitters) for ground support. During the same period, at least 22 Fishbed Ds were sent to the Czech Air Force and 15 to the East German Air Force. With at least 45 Fitters now on hand, the Czechs have the best tactical air support for ground forces among the satellites.

In the East European navies, the four Osa-class guided missile patrol boats displayed by the East German Navy in October constitute the only notable new equipment.

The new Soviet equipment has been supplemented by satellite production. Tanks from the Labedy plant in Poland have appeared in East German regiments and Polish Mazur prime movers are being used to haul Czech artillery. The Czech press has recently publicized the development of a general-purpose machine gun which may

**ELITE UNITS IN SATELLITE ARMED FORCES**



K-61 AMPHIBIANS TRANSPORT GDANSK DIVISION IN 22 JULY WARSAW PARADE

PARACHUTE TRAINING  
IN EAST GERMAN ARMY



POLISH AIRBORNE TROOPS PRACTICE DESTRUCTION OF TARGETS  
BEHIND POTENTIAL ENEMY LINES.



CAMOUFLAGED CHECHOSLOVAK  
SOLDIER CROSSING WATER BARRIER  
DURING TRAINING



POLISH FROGMEN



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even replace the Soviet 7.62 Goryunov as the standard machine gun in the Warsaw Pact forces. In mid-1963 bloc air forces, including the USSR, began to receive the Czech L-29, expected to become the standard jet trainer for the Warsaw Pact countries. The Poles produce small experimental rockets, and negotiations between Prague and the Soviet Chief Engineering Directorate during 1964 indicate that the Czechs may be preparing to produce a SAM or Scud.

Reorganization

The satellite ground forces have undergone reorganizations similar to those noted in Soviet forces and are now characterized by smaller, more mobile units. During 1964, airborne forces received special attention. In the 22 July parade in Warsaw the public for the first time saw the red-bereted 6th Airborne Division from Krakow. Members of this high-morale unit are selected for their aptitude in foreign languages, are given better food and more privileges than ordinary conscripts, serve three years instead of the normal two, and receive instruction similar to that given US airborne troops. In several exercises over the past two years they have appeared in an "aggressor" role to simulate US Special Forces attacks against Polish security troops and regular line units.

In April a Czech defector from the 7th Airborne Regiment reported that his unit had be-

gun training in unconventional warfare, on orders from Moscow in 1961, and even bore the designation "Special Forces" (Zvastniho Urceni). The East German press has hinted obliquely that the black-bereted EGA paratroopers who first appeared in the September 1963 Dresden parade will be expanded in number and upgraded in importance. The other satellites have only token airborne forces, but are giving wide publicity to parachute training, both military and civilian.

Blue-bereted troops seen in the Warsaw parade belonged to an amphibious division created during 1963 at Gdansk, paralleling to some extent the recently reactivated Soviet marines.

The number of satellite tank divisions has been expanded during the past twelve months. Poland now has five; three of the five divisions in the Silesian Military District--in southwest Poland--are tank divisions. A three-to-one tank to rifle division ratio appears to be emerging in the First Czech Army just across the border.

There is some indication that the Rumanians have converted an infantry division into a tank division. Armored forces personnel seen by Western attachés in the August 1964

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Rumanian parade seemed older and more carefully selected than the average Rumanian conscripts.

During 1964, the Czech, Polish, and East German press referred briefly to "rocket troops," indicating that such personnel have been receiving special training.

Several methods of improving the professional competency of troops are being tried in the newer, more complex types of units. The Rumanians raised military pay scales this year to encourage career enlistments; East German military authorities now hold out the opportunity for higher education as a reward for a three-year enlistment instead of the required 18 months; Poles and Czechs who choose certain military occupation specialties, such as the air force or the airborne troops, receive better pay and more benefits than members of the less favored units. Some of the satellites, particularly East Germany, have staggered the induction and discharge periods so that conscript classes are smaller and more manageable and the general combat level remains relatively even throughout the year. As a general appeal to the patriotic sentiments of conscripts and professionals, the Czech Ministry of Defense changed the uniforms this year from the Soviet to a more traditional style, and the East Germans now allow noncommissioned officers to wear the same uniforms as officers.

In another approach, the satellites may also be taking additional measures to eliminate from combat units men they consider politically unreliable. An East German conscript may elect, as a conscientious objector, to serve his obligated period in a construction unit, where he receives no combat training and no weapons. He is supervised by politically more reliable, armed troops. For the past two years young Poles have had the option of working in the mines as members of the army instead of learning to fight, and recent reports from Bulgarian and Rumanian defectors indicate that a similar, if less voluntary, system has been operative in both countries for at least four years. The unusual numbers of Hungarian and Czech soldier-laborers noticed during the past year may indicate a similar development. In this way, the satellite regimes probably hope to create combat units more likely to carry out their missions against NATO forces. This may mean that there will be fewer, but more effective divisions.

#### Economic Aspects

Increases in satellite military expenditures are imposing greater burdens on economies already experiencing considerable difficulties, but still constitute only a small part of both the national product and the state budget. Poland and Czechoslovakia both produce major military hardware and East

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Germany appears to be entering the field. All of the satellites have been receiving increasing quantities of Soviet equipment for which it is believed they must make payment. Accompanying increases in costs for personnel, training, and operation and maintenance result from the possession of equipment of greater complexity as well as quantity and from the changing role of satellite forces.

A firm basis for judging the magnitude of the increased economic burden cannot be found in available evidence, either on separate categories of expenditures or on over-all military budgets. Total quantities of material produced, purchased, or sold are uncertain, as are the allocations of costs for such operations as the bloc air defense network. Published satellite military budgets are known to be incomplete, and in addition may record some pur-

chases at less than full cost. However, the published military budgets for five of the satellites do provide some indication of the trend. The tabulation below shows the percentage changes from 1960 to 1964 in the military budgets for the five countries contrasted with the changes in the estimated numbers of personnel in their respective military forces.

These figures show that the military budgets increased substantially more than the numbers of military personnel, although the budgets are believed to be a better reflection of personnel and operating expenditures than of domestic procurement of hardware. In each of the countries, except Poland, the planned budget for 1964 was slightly lower than in 1963, indicating a possible leveling-off of those expenditures provided for in the budgets. It is not known whether purchases of military goods from abroad, which probably grew rapidly after 1960, are included in the published budgets. If not, these budgets understate the total increase in expenditures.

**SATELLITE MILITARY EXPENDITURES**


SECRET	PERCENTAGE CHANGE 1960-1964	
	MILITARY BUDGET *	MILITARY PERSONNEL
BULGARIA	+ 45	+ 13
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	+ 25	+ 10
HUNGARY	+ 99	No Change
POLAND	+ 49	+ 10
RUMANIA	+ 21	- 8

\* Calculated from actual expenditures for 1960 and planned expenditures for 1964, on the basis of current prices.

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Emerging Deployment Patterns

It appears that the better equipped and reorganized



**HEADQUARTERS  
OF KEY SATELLITE  
ARMY AREAS**

30 OCTOBER 1964

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STATUTE MILES

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satellite ground force divisions are intended to operate as elements of field armies containing only satellite divisions. Previously, satellite units were believed to be intended as fillers for Soviet divisions or armies. Most of the first-line satellite divisions have been assigned to nine field army areas. These are Military District V in East Germany, the Pomeranian and Silesian military districts in Poland, the 1st and 4th Czech Armies, the

2nd Bulgarian Army, two undetermined military districts in Rumania, and one in Hungary. The other areas appear to contain most of the reduced-strength, supply, general support, and administrative units. If the forces in each of the key areas are formed into an operational field army, as is likely, the satellites will have in a relatively combat-ready status two probable tank armies and seven combined-arms armies, about 35 divisions in all.

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