

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

HR70-14

No. Pages 113

21 August 1963

Copy No. 3


APPROVED FOR RELEASE -  
HISTORICAL COLLECTION  
DIVISION HR70-14 DATE:  
07-18-2012

A STUDY OF THE SOVIET GROUND FORCES


AN INTERIM REPORT  
OF THE  
CIA/DIA PANEL FOR A SPECIAL  
STUDY OF THE SOVIET GROUND FORCES  
FOR  
SECRETARY McNAMARA

~~TOP SECRET~~

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification



~~TOP SECRET~~




**IRONBARK**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A Study of the Soviet Ground Forces: An Interim Report

	<u>Page</u>
The Problem . . . . .	1
The Scope of This Report . . . . .	2
Summary and Conclusions . . . . .	3
Discussion . . . . .	6
I. Background . . . . .	6
A. The Evolution of the Soviet Ground Forces through the mid-1950's . . . . .	6
B. Current Military Doctrine . . . . .	8
C. The Structure of the Soviet Ground Force Establishment . . . . .	10
II. The Number of Soviet Divisions and Division Cadres (D/CDs) . . . . .	14
A. The Nature of the Evidence . . . . .	14



**IRONBARK**

Page

<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 500px; height: 15px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>	
B. Bases of Assessment . . . . .	24
C. The Findings . . . . .	27
1. The Aggregate View . . . . .	27
a. The Detailed Assessment Approach . . . . .	27
b. The Field Army/Corps Approach . . . . .	28
c. The Probability Approach . . . . .	28
d. Summary . . . . .	29
2. Geographical Distribution . . . . .	30
Notes to the CIA/DIA Panel's Findings on the Number of Major Line Elements . . . . .	33
I. Eastern Europe and Western USSR . . . . .	33
A. Eastern Europe . . . . .	33
B. Western USSR . . . . .	36
II. Southern USSR . . . . .	38
III. Southwestern USSR . . . . .	42
IV. Northwestern USSR . . . . .	43
V. Far Eastern USSR . . . . .	46
VI. Central USSR . . . . .	49
III. The Manpower Available to the Soviet Ground Force . . . . .	52
A. The Soviet Manning Process . . . . .	52
B. The Nature of the Evidence . . . . .	52
C. The Assessment . . . . .	55
1. The Aggregate Assessment . . . . .	57
2. The Assessment of the Distribution of Personnel . . . . .	59

Appendix

Following Page

Summary Presentation of the Evidence for Each Major Soviet Line Element . . . . .	63
--	----

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## IRONBARK

### A STUDY OF THE SOVIET GROUND FORCES: AN INTERIM REPORT

#### The Problem:

To study the size and quality of Soviet ground forces as requested by the Secretary of Defense. This request required a thorough re-examination of the evidence and an assessment of the levels of confidence or ranges of uncertainty which apply to the following questions:

- 1) What is the present number of major line elements in the Soviet ground force?
- 2) What are the gross capabilities and mobilization potential of this force in terms of available military manpower?
- 3) What are the gross capabilities of this force in terms of land combat equipment?
- 4) What are the Soviets spending annually to equip this force with land combat equipment and how does this compare with US expenditures?
- 5) What are the procedures in the Soviet ground force for acquiring, storing, and handling land combat equipment insofar as these procedures have bearing on requirements or maintenance personnel?
- 6) What is the quality of the Soviet ground force in terms of such aspects as firepower, mobility, readiness, manning levels and logistics?
- 7) Is the assumption that US and Soviet divisions of like type have comparable capabilities valid?

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## IRONBARK

### The Scope of This Report

There are three aspects to the interim nature of this report of the CIA/DIA Panel for a special study of the Soviet ground forces. First, the report attempts to answer only the first two of the above questions relating to the present number of major line elements in the Soviet ground force, and their gross capabilities and mobilization potential in terms of available manpower. The four questions, relating to land combat equipment, storage procedures, and the various qualitative aspects, will be covered in the final report.

Second, although the conclusions reached in this interim report are based on exhaustive research and analysis, they must be considered tentative until the final report is completed early in 1964.

Third, the matter of the seventh question relating to the comparable capabilities of US and USSR line divisions will ultimately require a net evaluation which, at the minimum, will involve the military operations staffs.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## IRONBARK

### Summary and Conclusions

The Panel has examined the evidence from all sources on the Soviet ground force\* in terms of its organization, number of major line elements and manpower. We find that the quality of the evidence varies widely and does not permit high-confidence, single-valued assessments of most of the quantitative aspects of the force which have been examined. However, there is abundant evidence on the general nature of the force as to its organization, mission, magnitude, and system for acquiring manpower.

As to organization, it is clear that the Soviet ground force is administered from headquarters in Moscow through fifteen military districts in the USSR and three groups of forces stationed in the European Satellites. At the next level there probably are 22 or 23 field armies and five to seven corps, each of which has a number of "line divisions" and various combat and service support units; in addition there are some "line divisions" which do not appear to be subordinated to field armies or corps.

The Panel has exhausted the evidence on the number of "line divisions" in the Soviet ground force. The direct evidence is not adequate for determining the actual manning level of any of the Soviet "line divisions" with the possible exception of those in the groups of forces. For this reason we have been forced to assess the number of "line divisions" in the Soviet ground force without regard to manning levels. In order to emphasize this fact and to highlight the basic differences between US and Soviet "line divisions" even at at TOE strength the Panel created the term D/CD (division/cadre division).

Current Soviet military literature indicates that these D/CDs are of three types which the Panel has designated as at combat, reduced and cadre personnel strengths. The Panel considers the "combat" to be manned at or near authorized wartime personnel

\* Very generally, the Soviet ground force is defined to include those Soviet military personnel performing functions similar to most of those performed by the US Army with the principal exception of continental air defense.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

**IRONBARK**

strength and designed to participate in the very earliest stage of a war; and the "reduced" to be manned at about 70 percent of the "combat" and supposed to be brought up to authorized wartime strength very quickly after hostilities begin. Because of the Soviet mobilization system, the distinction between the personnel strengths of "combat" and "reduced" D/CDs might be eliminated quickly in an emergency. Finally, the "cadre" have most of their officer and NCO complement but only a few other troops; they are scheduled to be fleshed out with reservists in order to participate in a subsequent stage of the war.

On the basis of its detailed re-examination of the evidence, the Panel concludes with a high degree of confidence that between 115 and 135 D/CDs existed in the Soviet ground force in the first half of 1963. However, the Panel cannot rule out the possibility that the number may have been as low as 100 or as high as 150.

The examination of the evidence on total military manpower implied by the Soviet system for military conscription and the requirements for the remainder of the armed forces leads to the tentative conclusion that there were between 1.8 and 2.1 million men in the Soviet ground force in early 1963. Most of these, about three-quarters, were conscripts with an average of a year and a half of service; the remainder are professional NCOs and officers. However, the conscript system provides the USSR with a very large body of reservists with about three years of military experience for fleshing out the reduced strength and cadre D/CDs.

Because the evidence the Panel has reviewed is insufficient to determine the number of D/CDs in each of the three categories of personnel strength, the Panel examined several possible alternatives and evaluated their consistency with what is known about Soviet doctrine and the over-all personnel strength of the ground force. On this basis, the Panel tentatively believes that the following alternative allocations of the 115-135 D/CDs together with their implied total manpower levels for the Soviet ground force are consistent with all available evidence:

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

**IRONBARK**

Alternative	Number of D/CDs			Total Ground Force Manpower (Million)
	Combat	Reduced	Cadre	
A	58	35	22-42	1.5-2.1
B	65	25	25-45	1.6-2.1
C	75	25	15-35	1.7-2.3

The Panel believes that alternatives A and C bound the region of other reasonable alternatives which can be postulated. Soviet writings indicate that the major portion of the "ready" force is in Eastern Europe and Western USSR; the alternatives presented above assume a range of about 45 to 55 D/CDs at combat personnel strength in these areas.

It must be emphasized that the assessments presented above are tentative and are not meant to imply anything about the actual state of readiness of these units nor their equipment because the Panel has not yet completed its examination of these factors.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## IRONBARK

### Discussion

The discussion which follows includes: a background section on the evolution, doctrine and structure of the Soviet ground force; three sections assessing the number of major line elements\* in the force; and a section assessing the manpower available to the Soviet ground force.

#### I. Background

Because the Soviet and US ground forces differ in a variety of important ways, it is the purpose of this section of the discussion to highlight in a general way the evolution, current doctrine and the basic organizational structure of the Soviet forces and thus to provide an orientation and framework for the more specialized and detailed section of this interim report.

##### A. The Evolution of the Soviet Ground Force Through the Mid-1950's

Marxian metaphysics notwithstanding, the Soviet ground force as an institution is uniquely a product of its heredity and its environment. In both the czarist and communist eras the Russian/Soviet ground force has served an autocracy obsessed with concern for its preservation and protection from a relatively large, heterogeneous, and frequently oppressed and hostile population. It has faced potential and actual foes across many hundreds of miles of boundary little of which is naturally advantageous for defensive operations. It has had to operate with long lines of communication which, though internal, even today must be characterized as technically, geographically and climatically difficult. Clearly, political factors have united with geographical factors to explain the historical dominance of the ground force among the military organizations in Russia and in the Soviet Union just as they explain the historical dominance of the army in Germany and the navy in Britain.

Except during the period in which the revolution was fought and consolidated, the continental system of conscription by age-group under a system of universal military service has been used for nine-tenths or more of the enlisted strength of the standing force and of the call-up

\* Major line elements refers to field armies, corps, or line divisions.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## IRONBARK

in the event of mobilization. For materiel support, the ground force (as well as the other military forces) has found itself competing in a very real way with the rest of the economy for relatively scarce resources: in the earlier periods because of the absolutely tight supply, in more recent times because of the forced pace of industrialization.

Beginning with the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, the Soviet ground force has shifted its orientation several times in terms of its organization and doctrine. The focus of the first of these phases was upon winning, consolidating and protecting the revolution. The organization was based on a mixed regular-territorial militia system; manning was dependent upon a rather curious and changing mixture of Bolshevik activists, Russian patriots, former czarist officers, and peasants and proletarians; materiel support was haphazard and largely dependent on pre-revolutionary stocks, exaction, foraging, pillaging and rummaging.

After the revolution became consolidated and industrialization programs began, the second of these phases started to emerge. Its focus was upon "active defense" of the homeland from external enemies. The standing army was to halt incursions or, at the minimum, conduct delaying actions in depth while and until trained reservists could be mobilized (presumably, quickly) and counter-offensive operations begun. The mixed regular-territorial militia organization was abandoned; the structure of the forces was regularized in the traditional sense; rank was re-established in the officer cadres; manning returned to a straightforward reliance on full time conscripts within the context of the system of universal military service; materiel support was organized. A significant military equipment industry was established; modernization and motorization became the watchword; explicit efforts to design and develop equipment were re-established. By 1940, the production targets of the People's Commissariats which comprised the military equipment industry represented 20 percent of total planned industrial production; the T-34 medium tank had been introduced into series production; the ground force had an extensive albeit limited indigenous materiel support base in terms of both design and production.

The level of development achieved during the thirties is attested to by the wartime experience of the early forties. Although debilitated and demoralized by the Stalinist purges of the late thirties, the ground force demonstrated its capabilities for assembling large numbers of men and forming them into rifle (infantry) divisions of

- 7 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## IRONBARK

admittedly mediocre initial combat-worthiness. As a result of the winter war with the Finns and clashes with Japanese in Manchuria a considerable amount of mobilization preceded the German attack in 1941. Within three months after the German invasion started the mobilization system facilitated further expansion from about 250 to 400 line divisions. Ultimately, the ground force numbered in excess of 10 million and included nearly 600 divisions.

Concurrently with the initial military reverses, considerable military production capacity was evacuated to the east, reconstituted and expanded. As a result of this program, war production in just the eastern and central regions of the USSR was reportedly two and one-half times greater during World War II than the level of production in the whole territory of the USSR in 1940. Soviet statistics, largely corroborated by other sources, claim that during the last three years of the war, annual production averaged 120,000 artillery pieces, 100,000 mortars, and 30,000 tanks and assault guns.

Developments in Soviet ground force organization and doctrine between World War II and the death of Stalin defy generalization. Substantial forces remained on the ground to support the consolidation of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and threaten Western Europe. Events which occurred in Berlin, Iran, Greece, and (possibly) Korea suggest aggression rather than defense and delaying action. Mr. Khrushchev claims there was build-up of forces following the postwar demobilization. However, he is obviously propagandizing, placing the responsibility on "western provocations," and, most significantly, does not indicate when the build-up began but tends to suggest that it occurred later rather than earlier in the period. A broad spectrum of development, production, and procurement programs for new substantially improved models of land combat equipment were initiated. The wartime experience was studied and unit organizations modified to improve firepower and mobility; the pay and pension schedules were overhauled; but no clear shift in doctrine emerged.

### B. Current Military Doctrine

From the vantage point of today it is quite evident that Soviet military doctrine has been undergoing discussion, study, modification and change for at least the last five to seven years, and perhaps a decade. This discussion was impelled by developments in nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. It would also seem that publication of the collection of articles on Soviet military strategy under the editorship of Marshal

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## IRONBARK

of the Soviet Union Sokolovskysignals that a compromise may have been reached, at least temporarily.

Present Soviet military doctrine conceives of the nature of war in three basic categories:

- 1) world war - between east and west,
- 2) small imperialist wars - local limited wars between "imperialists" or between an "imperialist" and a colony, or
- 3) national liberation, civil, or other popular wars - for freedom, independence, or repelling imperialistic aggression.

World war, in the present Soviet view, will involve massive use of all types of armed forces, including strategic strikes with nuclear-armed guided missiles on the enemy's military, political and economic potential. While a premeditated war of this sort is thought unlikely at the present time, it may arise as the result of a miscalculation. Such a war will begin with a strategic nuclear attack and come as a surprise. Therefore, certain forces should be in being and in a constant state of immediate readiness for combat. It will be a highly destructive war to each side and, therefore, victory should be sought within the shortest possible time.

On the other hand, the Soviets conceive of the necessity for preparing for a long war, and, therefore, must either maintain the requisite wartime forces in peacetime "which is economically impossible for even the strongest country" or must provide for the rapid mobilization of manpower and military production.

As these concepts apply to the ground force, the following doctrinal trends emerge:

- 1) A ground force must be provided which is sufficiently strong to withstand the initial attack, and to go on to occupy strategically important areas before a definitive victory can be obtained.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## IRONBARK

2) This force must include strong combat-ready formations which are capable of immediate employment in offensive operations at the very outset of the war to seize the strategic initiative during the very first hours. The defensive, delaying-action-in-depth doctrine is expressly repudiated.

3) This force must have a mobilization base, capable of expansion by inducting trained reservists into existing units (some of which are organized to be filled out in short order) and by forming new units.

4) This force must have increased firepower (principally by means of tactical missiles and rockets with both conventional and nuclear capability), maneuverability and mobility (on or off roads and by air).

### C. The Current Structure of the Soviet Ground Force Establishment

Because this interim report is partial in the sense that it will deal only with the major line elements of the Soviet ground force, the purpose of this section is to orient the reader by showing the place of these major line elements in the structure of the establishment and to assist the reader in gaining an appreciation of the relationship of these line elements to other combat elements and to service support elements and higher command echelons.


Functionally, the Soviet military establishment can be divided into the following forces: Navy; Home Air Defense; Long-Range Aviation; Strategic Rocket; and Theater. The organization of the ground force elements of the theater forces for operational and logistical command and control is shown in Figure 1.\* For purposes of this interim report these Soviet ground force elements, include all land combat elements of the theater forces plus their service support and higher command elements and in addition, the common support which the Soviet Army provides to its other forces and to the forces of the Soviet Navy. This definition excludes from the ground force all missile forces except those surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missile forces which are part of theater forces and virtually all aviation except for the few light utility aircraft organic to major line elements.

\* Figure 1 follows page 10.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Figure 1.

ORGANIZATION OF THE SOVIET ARMY FOR OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~  
IRONBARK

D/CD Division/Cadre Division

(a) For purposes of simplification only 2 of the 15 Military Districts are depicted

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic downgrading and  
declassification

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## IRONBARK

The headquarters in Moscow maintains fairly detailed policy direction and control, provides for technical and logistic support from scientific institutions, production enterprises, and certain reserved stockpiles. Control of the ground forces is delegated to military district commanders in the USSR and commanders of Groups of Forces in Eastern Europe. The commander of a district has responsibility for operations, logistics, training, conscription, and mobilization in his district and is also charged with assisting local authorities in maintaining order. In the border regions the military district is designed to be converted quickly to a field command in the event of hostilities. Within a district (or group of forces) the forces are either organized into field armies or corps or remain directly subordinate (as separate units) to the district or group commander. There are two kinds of Soviet field armies, the combined arms army and the tank army. The type\* combined arms army consists of four motorized rifle divisions and one tank division; the type tank army consists of four tank divisions. The Soviet corps does not operate as a part of an army; it is essentially a smaller compressed version of the field army and operates as a separate organization. Soviet divisions are designated as motorized rifle units, tank units, or airborne units and in this respect correspond to the US designations of mechanized, armored or airborne.

At least in terms of personnel strength there are no echelons in the US Army which can be compared directly with the Soviet field army or with the Soviet corps. The Soviet line division has similarities as well as differences when compared to the US line division. The Panel has not, in this interim report, examined the evidential basis for Soviet division TOEs. Nevertheless, in order to demonstrate the similarities and differences Tables 1 and 2 compare selected aspects of the TOEs of currently accepted Soviet motorized rifle and tank divisions and US draft ROAD mechanized and armored divisions. In terms of manpower Soviet divisions are very much (30-40 percent) smaller than US divisions. The maneuver units (Soviet tank and rifle regiments; US brigades) are reasonably comparable as to function (but not as to size). The rest of the Soviet divisions, however, is lighter in artillery, engineer, signal, and reconnaissance (including light aviation) and particularly in

\* Field armies and corps do not have fixed TOEs; they are highly flexible organizations tailored to specific missions. The term type indicates a representative wartime organization used for planning and instructional purposes.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## IRONBARK

Table 1

Comparison of Selected Aspects of TOEs  
of a Soviet Motorized Rifle Division and a  
US Draft ROAD Mechanized Division

	<u>Soviet Motorized Rifle Division</u>	<u>US Draft ROAD Mechanized Division</u>
Total Personnel Strength	11,013	15,891
Personnel in maneuver elements (US - brigades; Soviet - rifle and tank regiments)	6,547	8,280
Armored personnel carriers	383	662
Personnel in artillery and rocket units	1,617	2,437
Personnel in other divisional combat and combat support units (reconnais- sance, signal, engineer, AT and AA)	1,762	2,300
Personnel in divisional headquarters and service support units	1,087	2,874
Tanks and assault guns	224	205
Howitzers	36 (Towed)	76 (SP)
Mortars	63	122
Multiple rocket launchers	20	0
AT guns	54	0
AA guns	34	0
Fixed wing aircraft and helicopters	5	103

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## IRONBARK

Table 2

Comparison of Selected Aspects of TOEs  
of a Soviet Tank Division and a  
US Draft ROAD Armored Division

	<u>Soviet Tank Division</u>	<u>US Draft ROAD Armored Division</u>
Total Personnel Strength	8,936	15,899
Personnel in maneuver elements (US - brigades; Soviet - rifle and tank regiments)	4,867	8,256
Armored personnel carriers	352	580
Personnel in artillery and rocket units	1,547	2,437
Personnel in other divisional combat and combat support units (reconnais- sance, signal, engineer, and AA)	1,424	2,300
Personnel in divisional headquarters and service support units	1,098	2,906
Tanks and assault guns	399	359
Howitzers	36 (Towed)	76 (SP)
Mortars	15	109
Multiple rocket launchers	14	0
AT guns	12	0
AA guns	44	0
Fixed wing aircraft and helicopters	5	103

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## IRONBARK

maintenance and other logistic support. It would appear that Soviet major line elements are not designed to conduct sustained independent operations whereas the US units are.

### II. The Number of Soviet Divisions/Cadre Divisions (D/CDs)

One of the principal dimensions of the Soviet ground force is the existing number of divisions at various levels of personnel strength because these units constitute not only the force in being but also the mobilization base. Marshal Sokolovsky's work distinguishes three categories of units: the combat-strength units intended to carry out initial operations in the event of the outbreak of hostilities; reduced strength units having a mobilization period sufficiently short to insure their participation in early (in contrast to initial) operations; and those units maintained in peacetime at low strength to be built-up at the outset of war. The Panel has adopted the term, Soviet line division/cadre division (D/CD), to describe those Soviet units which are under consideration in this section of this discussion to avoid the possibly misleading connotation of the word, division, alone. Therefore, in the remainder of this report, as appropriate, the Panel will use the term or its abbreviation (D/CD) to refer to organized and active Soviet line divisions irrespective of their level of personnel strength and degree of combat-readiness.

This portion of the interim report represents the CIA/DIA Panel's review and re-evaluation of the evidence as to the number of Soviet D/CDs currently in existence and an assessment of the range of uncertainty which apply to these numbers. It must be noted that this section of the discussion makes no attempt to assess the present strength of these units either in terms of manpower or equipment.

#### A. The Nature of the Evidence

There is no single source of evidence as to the existence of D/CDs. Many bits and pieces from many types of sources must be weighed in the final determination.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

**IRONBARK**

[Redacted]

[Redacted]


[Redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

IRONBARK




~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

IRONBARK




~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

IRONBARK




~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

IRONBARK



- 19 -


~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

IRONBARK




- 20 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

**IRONBARK**




~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

**IRONBARK**




~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

IRONBARK




~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED] TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

## IRONBARK



### B. Bases of Assessment

The preceding discussion on the nature of the evidence makes it quite clear that the sources and types of evidence, used singly or in combination, are not sufficient to determine with complete confidence the number, location, or identity of all the D/CDs in the Soviet ground force. The evidence obtainable through each of the sources presently available exhibits strengths and weaknesses which vary with respect to opportunity, currency, geographic coverage, reliability, definitiveness, and acceptability.

It must be assumed that Western reliance [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is known to the Soviets. However, the practice of deception on a large scale over a long period of time would be administratively complex and costly. [REDACTED]

- 24 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

**IRONBARK**

No new or unexploited source of information or any failure to exploit such information consistent with assigned priorities was revealed in the course of the Panel's review. KEYHOLE photography offers an increasing potential for further analysis, but its contribution has had and will continue to have only a gradual impact because of the sheer mass of the material which must be evaluated and the very limited resources allocated to its exploitation. Lack of timely information is the principal frustration in arriving at a current and definitive assessment of the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the Soviet ground force.

The Panel examined a variety of criteria and rules for determining the confidence rating which might be assigned to a judgment as to the existence of a unit and decided that not even quasi-objective rules or criteria could be devised to satisfy its requirements. There were many types of evidence but each was available in varying amounts or was restricted in coverage either in terms of time or geography. Therefore, for purposes of this study, the greatest flexibility consistent with the evidence has been allowed. Although certain bodies of direct evidence have been selected as primary bases for determining the present existence of individual units, no supplementary source available has been ignored. Of particular importance, however, is the degree of emphasis and reliance placed on the general background knowledge of Soviet procedures, organizations, and customs possessed by experienced analysts who have studied the Soviet ground force for a long period of time and who are familiar with the characteristics and patterns of the evidence. In this re-examination and reappraisal of the evidence, these analysts were instructed to ignore previous conclusions and to examine and assess the information relating to each major line element with only one objective in mind: the probability of the existence of that unit in the first half of 1963.

Because the approach is limited to examining available evidence, the results include only those units on which there is some evidence, and the possibility exists that the Soviet ground force contains some major line elements about which nothing is known. The Panel judges that there is no significant number of units that has been missed on this account. On the other hand, because conclusive evidence about the abolition of units is seldom received or seldom can be inferred except after a considerable

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

## IRONBARK

period of time, some fragmentary evidence may suggest the possible continued existence of a unit well after it may actually have been abolished.

For this reason, and because the direct information does not warrant a uniform and high confidence level concerning the existence of all D/CDs which may be in the Soviet ground force, each of these D/CDs has been assigned one of four ratings describing the probability of its existence. It should be noted that even though several units may be assigned the same rating, the assessment for those in a given category may be based on different types of evidence and judgment factors. Nevertheless, the four descriptive ratings are intended to express the following degrees of confidence that a unit existed in the first half of 1963:

1) Firm indicates that there is little doubt that the unit is currently (1963) in existence - chances are assessed as (90) percent or better. [REDACTED]

2) Highly probable indicates high confidence in the likelihood of the unit's current existence. [REDACTED]

Chances that the unit exists in 1963 are perhaps about three out of four. In most respects, evidence for units in this category is similar to that in the first category, but some basis exists for reservation in assigning a firm rating.

3) Probable indicates that there are fairly good reasons to believe the unit exists [REDACTED] chances are somewhat better than even that the unit exists in 1963. [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

**IRONBARK**

4) Possible indicates that there is a sufficient body of evidence to conclude that chances are no better than even and on the average are about one out of four that the unit exists currently.

[Redacted]

This category contains the most divergent group of units as to the type and date of evidence and as to the Panel's confidence that they exist currently.

C. The Findings

With respect to its findings the Panel takes both an aggregate view and a geographical distribution view.

1. The Aggregate View

The Panel utilized several approaches to come to a judgment as to the aggregate number of D/CDs in existence in the first half of 1963 in the Soviet ground force. The objective was to come to a conclusion in which high confidence might be placed. A description of the various approaches follows.

a. The Detailed Assessment Approach

The detailed assessment of the evidence leads the Panel to recognize 174 individual D/CDs in the Soviet ground force any of which may possibly have existed in the first half of 1963.

The distribution of these units by confidence rating is, as follows:

<u>Rating</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Cumulative</u>
Highly Probable	76	76
Probable	37	113
Possible	26	139
	35	174



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## IRONBARK

This tabulation might lead to the conclusion that there are at least 76 and at most 174 D/CDs in the Soviet ground force. However, the Panel believes that the probabilities are such that the range 113-139 (between those rated highly probable or better and those rated probable) is a more reasonable representation of the number of D/CDs in the Soviet ground force. Nevertheless, the Panel must concede it is prudent to assume that at least some of the D/CDs rated as probable, highly probable, and firm do not exist and that at least some small number of those rated as possible do exist.

### b. The Field Army/Corps Approach

The Panel, by reason of its detailed assessment of the evidence also recognizes the possible existence of 23 field armies and eight corps in the Soviet ground force in the first half of 1963, distributed by confidence rating, as follows:

<u>Rating</u>	<u>Numbers</u>		<u>Cumulative</u>	
	<u>Field Armies</u>	<u>Corps</u>	<u>Field Armies</u>	<u>Corps</u>
Firm	21	1	21	1
Highly Probable	1	4	22	5
Probable	1	2	23	7
Possible	0	1	23	8

Because each field army may be expected to contain three-four D/CDs on the average and each corps may be expected to contain two-three D/CDs on the average, it is possible to infer 83-113 D/CDs from the 23 field armies and seven corps which have been rated probable or better. However, this inference implicitly assumes that there are no D/CDs directly subordinate to the military district, whereas in fact such D/CDs are known to exist. To give some weight to these D/CDs, therefore, D/CDs rated firm or highly probable which are in excess of the number needed for the armies or corps rated probable or better were determined district by district and added to the 83-113 D/CDs derived above. The resulting range was 120-135 D/CDs.

### c. The Probability Approach

This approach recognizes the fact that it is quite likely that a few of the highly probable, some of the probable and most

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## IRONBARK

of the possible D/CDs did not actually exist in the first half of 1963. Various sets of alternative "probability" coefficients were assigned to each of the rating categories to arrive at alternative appreciation of the number of D/CDs. The coefficients used and resulting values are, as follows:

	Sets				
	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>	<u>V</u>
Firm	0.90	0.92	0.95	0.97	1.00
Highly Probable	.65	.70	.75	.80	.85
Probable	.45	.50	.60	.70	.75
Possible	.05	.10	.25	.40	.45
Value	106	112	124	136	143

The probability coefficients in Sets I and V may be too extreme, but were chosen to test the sensitivity of the resulting values. However, they do appear to set limits within which the true number of D/CDs is most likely to fall. The Panel considers the range of coefficients used for Sets II and IV reasonable representations of the limits established by the subjective judgments made in the assignment of the confidence ratings and concludes on this basis that a range of 112-136 D/CDs were in the Soviet ground force in the first half of 1963.

d. Summary

A summary of the determination of the number of D/CDs by the various approaches follows:

<u>Approach</u>	<u>High Confidence Range</u>
Detailed Assessment	113-139 D/CDs
Field Army/Corps	120-135 D/CDs
Probability Approach	112-136 D/CDs

Tentatively, the Panel concludes with a high degree of confidence that between 115 and 135 D/CDs existed in the Soviet ground force in the first half of 1963. However, the Panel cannot rule out the possibility that the number may have been as low as 100 or as high as 150.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## IRONBARK

### 2. Geographical Distribution

The breakdown of the Soviet ground forces by broad geographical region and by assigned confidence rating is shown in Table 3 for field armies and corps and in Table 4 for D/CDs. The geographical distribution and confidence ratings of the total number of D/CDs that the Panel has recognized as being possibly in existence are shown in Figure 2. These presentations show that about 40 percent of the total Soviet D/CDs which are recognized by the Panel as having some possibility of existing, and about 60 percent of those units to which the confidence rating, firm, has been assigned by the Panel, are deployed adjacent to central Western Europe. Incidentally, it may be observed that the varying relationship between the "total" and the "firm" numbers in the tables reflects the regional variations in the intelligence collection capabilities.

While the table and the figure do not illustrate the point, the structure within which the D/CDs are organized also varies regionally. The structure of the forces in East Germany differs from those in the border areas of the USSR, and the structure in the border areas differs from that in the interior of the USSR. In East Germany all of the D/CDs are firm and are organized into field armies. In the border districts, a substantial proportion of the D/CDs are organized into armies and corps. In the interior, all D/CDs seem to exist as separate units.

The disposition of the field armies appear to be related generally to their potential missions. Of the 23 field armies and eight corps that the CIA/DIA Panel has recognized as possibly existing 13 armies and two corps are deployed adjacent to central western Europe. The remaining 10 armies and two corps are deployed in the other border regions. No army or corps seems to exist in the central region of the USSR.

The "Notes" to this section of the Panel's findings (which follow on page 33) discuss the disposition and the mission of these forces within each of the broad regions and the nature of the relevant intelligence information upon which the judgment as to the existence of the unit was based. In these notes units have been grouped by region not only because such grouping shows the geographic disposition of Soviet ground force strength, but also because a correlation exists between geographic area and the quantity and quality of the evidence pertaining to the existence of units.

~~TOP SECRET~~



**IRONBARK**

Table 3

Soviet Field Armies and Corps in 1963,  
By Location and Assigned Confidence Rating

Location	Assigned Confidence Rating				Number of Units	
	Firm	Highly			Armies	Corps
		Probable	Probable	Possible		
Eastern Europe & Western USSR	13A		1C	1C	13	2
Southern USSR	2A	1A 4C	1C		3	5
Southwestern USSR	4A				4	0
Northwestern USSR	1A				1	0
Far Eastern USSR	1A 1C		1A		2	1
Central USSR					0	0
Total Field Armies	21	1	1	0	23	
Cumulative		22	23	23		
Total Corps	1	4	2	1		8
Cumulative		5	7	8		

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

# IRONBARK

Table 4

Soviet D/CDs in 1963  
By Location and Assigned Confidence Rating

Location	Assigned Confidence Rating				Total
	Number of Units				
	Firm	Highly Probable	Probable	Possible	
Eastern Europe & Western USSR	47	13	4	8	72
Southern USSR	8	10	6	7	31
Southwestern USSR	5	6	2	4	17
Northwestern USSR	7	1	-	2	10
Far Eastern USSR	6	3	6	6	21
Central USSR	3	4	8	8	23
Total	76	37	26	35	174
Cumulative		113	139	174	

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## IRONBARK

NOTES TO THE CIA/DIA PANEL'S FINDINGS  
ON THE NUMBER OF MAJOR SOVIET LINE ELEMENTS

### FOREWORD

The purpose of these notes is to provide a survey of each of the broad regions which have been referred to earlier in this report. The order of presentation of the regions in these notes is the same as the order in which they were presented in Table 3 and 4 of the previous portion of the discussion on the findings of the Panel. For each region these notes indicate the confidence ratings which the Panel has assigned to the D/CDs in each military district, and discuss the disposition and mission of the force and the nature of the intelligence information upon which the existence of the force was based and rated. A summary presentation of the evidence for each D/CD can be found in Appendix A to this interim report.

#### I. Eastern Europe and Western USSR

The breakdown of the field armies, corps and D/CDs by military district, or group of forces and by assigned confidence rating is shown in Tables 5 and 6. The existence of all 13 of the field armies in this region has been recognized as firm; one corps has been recognized as probable and one corps as possible. With one exception, the existence of the 26 D/CDs in Eastern Europe has been recognized as firm by the Panel; in the Western USSR almost half of the units have been so recognized.

##### A. Eastern Europe

All Soviet units stationed in Eastern Europe are organized into three Groups of Forces: Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG), Northern Group of Forces (NGF) in Poland, and Southern Group of Forces (SGF) in Hungary. While each of these are called Groups of Forces by the Soviets, they differ in size, composition and mission. The GSFG, by far the largest, approximates a front - the largest and highest echelon Soviet wartime field command. It contributes largely to the security of Bloc territory and would undoubtedly make up a large part of the striking force in a Soviet attack against NATO. NGF, with only

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

**IRONBARK**

Table 5

Soviet Field Armies and Corps  
in Eastern Europe and Western USSR in 1963  
By Location and Assigned Confidence Rating

Location	Assigned Confidence Rating				Number of Units	
	Firm	Highly	Probable	Possible	Armies	Corps
		Probable				
GSEF	6A				6	0
SGF					0	0
NGF					0	0
Baltic MD	1A			1C	1	1
Belorussian MD	3A				3	0
Carpathian MD	3A			1C	3	1
Total Field Armies Cumulative	13	0	0	0	13	
Total Corps Cumulative	0	0	1	1		2

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

**IRONBARK**

Table 6


Soviet D/CDs  
In Eastern Europe and Western USSR in 1963  
By Location and Assigned Confidence Rating

Location	Assigned Confidence Rating				Total
	Firm	Highly	Probable	Possible	
		Probable			
GSFG	20	-	-	-	20
SGF	4	-	-	-	4
NGF	1	1	-	-	2
Baltic MD	4	7	1	4	16
Belorussian MD	10	3	1	1	15
Carpathian MD	8	2	2	3	15
Total	47	13	4	8	72
Cumulative		60	64	72	

~~TOP SECRET~~

**IRONBARK**

two divisions and minimal support troops, has a less obvious role. It appears likely that its divisions would reinforce GSFG in any war in Germany. The group headquarters itself might become the nucleus for a front, but our knowledge is not sufficient to make this judgment with any certainty. SGF, with four divisions, approximates an army in size but appears to lack certain of the support elements of the typical Soviet army. Since the Hungarian uprising SGF's principal mission has been considered to be the maintenance of internal stability and the support of the Hungarian regime. However, if only by reason of its present location, this force constitutes a Soviet military asset which could be employed against central or southern Europe.



B. Western USSR

This region includes the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Districts (MD).\* It is recognized by the Panel as containing about one-fourth of the D/CDs rated possible or better. The bulk of the D/CDs in the region are organized into field armies or corps which sit astride

\* This grouping adopted by the Panel excludes the Moscow MD which has been customarily considered part of the Western USSR.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

**IRONBARK**

the direct routes between that region and central Europe. [redacted]

[redacted] Soviet military writings, suggest quite clearly that these armies are slated to take an early active role in any conflict in central Europe, or to form the primary defense against any attack against the USSR from central western Europe. However, in the Baltic MD there may be as many as eight separate D/CDs not organized into armies nor situated so as to participate in the first stage of a conflict in central Europe. Beyond the missions of local defense and internal security, the probable initial wartime role of these separate units is obscure.

[redacted]

As indicated in Table 5, in the Western USSR the existence of seven field armies has been recognized as firm; one corps as probable and another corps as possible. [redacted]


[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

**IRONBARK**



II. Southern USSR

The breakdown of the field armies, corps, and D/CDs in this region by military district and by assigned confidence limits is shown in Tables 7 and 8. Two of the three armies and about one-quarter of the D/CDs which the Panel has recognized as possibly existing in this region have been rated firm. This region includes three military districts: North Caucasus, Transcaucasus and Turkestan. These forces are oriented toward the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean area. It is the only place, other than the tip of Norway, where Soviet territory abuts on that of US Allies - Turkey and Iran. Also, the great Soviet missile test range complexes are found within the borders of these districts. The principal purpose of the ground forces in the region probably is to preserve the security of the southern borders, including that which meets China's Sinkiang Province. They are also capable of rapid intervention

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

# IRONBARK

Table 7

Soviet Field Armies and Corps  
in Southern USSR in 1963  
By Location and Assigned Confidence Rating

Location	Assigned Confidence Rating				Number of Units	
	Highly				Total	
	Firm	Probable	Probable	Possible	Armies	Corps
North Caucasus MD		2C			0	2
Transcaucasus MD	2A	1A			3	0
Turkestan MD			2C	1C	0	3
Total Field Armies Cumulative	2	1 3	0 3	0 3	3	
Total Corps Cumulative	0	2	2 4	1 5		5

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

# IRONBARK

Table 8

Soviet D/CDs  
In Southern USSR in 1963  
By Location and Assigned Confidence Rating

<u>Location</u>	<u>Assigned Confidence Rating</u>				<u>Total</u>
	<u>Firm</u>	<u>Highly</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Possible</u>	
		<u>Probable</u>			
North Caucasus MD	1	3	2	2	8
Transcaucasus MD	2	4	3	3	12
Turkestan MD	5	3	1	2	11
Total	8	10	6	7	31
Cumulative		18	24	31	

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## IRONBARK

if a favorable political situation should develop in the Middle East or Central Asia, a possibility which was emphasized when two airborne divisions were moved in 1960 from the Western USSR to this region where they remain today.

The Panel has recognized the possible existence of three field armies and five corps in this region and, as shown in Table 7, has rated two armies as firm and one army and four corps as highly probable. The continued existence of the two armies rated as firm has been corroborated.


As indicated in Table 8, the Panel recognizes the possible existence of 31 D/CDs in this region. supports 27 currently active division-level stations: seven in North Caucasus MD, 11 in Transcaucasus MD, and nine in Turkestan MD. All seven active stations in the North Caucasus MD are tentatively located and tentatively related to division areas indicated by other source material. In the Transcaucasus MD six of the eleven active stations are located and firmly related with division areas. Two others are tentatively located and tentatively related. The remaining three active division-level stations are unlocated and therefore cannot be related.

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]  
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

## IRONBARK



### III. Southwestern USSR

The breakdown of the field armies, corps and D/CDs in this region by military district and by assigned confidence rating is shown in Table 9. All four of the armies and four of the 17 D/CDs which the Panel has recognized as possibly existing in this region, have been rated as firm.

This region includes two military districts: the Kiev MD, and the Odessa MD. From the standpoint of prospective military operations the Southwestern region occupies a pivotal position. In their present location, the ground forces are oriented toward the Balkans and southern Europe. Study of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Soviet military writings, indicates that the field army now located west of the Dneestr River in the Odessa MD would probably be employed on the routes between the Southwestern USSR and Greece or Turkish Thrace. Those forces in the eastern part of the Odessa MD, including the field army in the Crimea, are not situated to facilitate early deployment westward, and may have a local defense role at least initially. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In the Kiev MD, the army in the Chernigov area [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] would probably become part of the first strategic echelon of any Soviet force engaged in that area. The other army in Kiev MD, now located at Dnepropetrovsk, is oriented toward the Balkans but could equally well deploy toward central Europe, or even toward the Caucasus.

For this region there is less depth and continuity in the evidence than is the case for the Western USSR. Furthermore, there has been considerable reorganization and relocation of units which has generated conflicts or obscurities in the information. [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~



[REDACTED]  
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

## IRONBARK

The possible existence of four field armies (but of no corps) has been recognized (see Table 9) for this region. [REDACTED] has firmly established the existence of two army-level stations in the Odessa MD and two in the Kiev MD. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The continued existence of the two field armies in the Odessa MD has been corroborated [REDACTED]

Also, as indicated in Table 9, the Panel has recognized the possible existence of 17 D/CDs in this region. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The continued existence of twelve divisions, six in each military district, has been corroborated since the beginning of 1961 [REDACTED]

#### IV. Northwestern USSR

The breakdown of the field armies, corps and D/CDs in this region by assigned confidence limits is shown in Table 10. The existence of the one field army and of seven of the ten D/CDs in this region has been recognized as firm by the Panel.

The entire Northwestern USSR is made up of the Leningrad MD. Most of the ground forces in the region are concentrated along the border with Finland and Norway, or in the vicinity of the cities of Leningrad and Pskov. There appears to be only one field army in the region located north of Lake Ladoga along the Finnish border. The remaining D/CDs in the Leningrad/Pskov area, appear to be directly subordinate to the military district headquarters. The implication

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

# IRONBARK

Table 9

Soviet Field Armies, Corps and D/CDs  
in Southwestern USSR in 1963  
By Location and Assigned Confidence Rating

Location	Assigned Confidence Rating				Number of Units
	Firm	Highly		Possible	
		Probable	Probable		
Kiev					
Armies	2				2A
Corps					0C
D/CDs	2	3	2	2	9D/CDs
Odessa MD					
Armies	2				2A
Corps					0C
D/CDs	3	3	0	2	8D/CDs
Total Field Armies	4	0	0	0	4A
Cumulative		4	4	4	
Total D/CDs	5	6	2	4	17D/CDs
Cumulative		11	13	17	

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

# IRONBARK

Table 10

Soviet Field Armies, Corps and D/CDs  
In Northwestern USSR in 1963  
By Location and Assigned Confidence Rating

<u>Location</u>	<u>Assigned Confidence Rating</u>				<u>Total</u>
	<u>Highly</u>				
	<u>Firm</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Possible</u>	
Leningrad MD					
Field Armies	1A				1A
Corps					OC
D/CDs	7	1	0	2	10D/CDs
Cumulative D/CDs		8	8	10	

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## IRONBARK

here is that the field army, located near the best routes into the Scandinavian Peninsula is available for use in early offensive action into Scandinavia. The forces near Leningrad and Pskov, on the other hand, are possibly intended for local defense of that area initially.

The seven D/CDs which the Panel has rated as firm

had been previously identified and their continuous existence has been corroborated by other sources since the beginning of 1962.

However, three locations have been observed since 1962 and each of the three appeared to be an active garrison of a size consistent with the requirements of a D/CD

### V. Far Eastern USSR

The Panel has recognized the possible existence of two field armies and one corps in the Far Eastern USSR. One army and one corps has been rated as firm, the remaining corps is rated as probable. The breakdown of the D/CDs in this region by military district and by assigned confidence limits is shown in Table 11. Six of the 21 D/CDs whose possible existence in this region has been recognized are rated as firm.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

**IRONBARK**

Table 11

Soviet Field Armies, Corps and D/CDs  
In Far Eastern USSR in 1963  
By Location and Assigned Confidence Rating

<u>Location</u>	<u>Assigned Confidence Rating</u>				<u>Total</u>
	<u>Highly</u>				
	<u>Firm</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Possible</u>	
Far East MD					
Field Armies	1A				1A
Corps	1C				1C
D/CDs	5	3	2	5	15D/CDs
Transbaykal MD					
Field Armies			1A		1A
Corps					OC
D/CDs	1		4	1	6D/CDs
Total D/CDs	6	3	6	6	21D/CDs
Cumulative D/CDs		9	15	21	

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

## IRONBARK

This region consists of the Far East and Transbaykal Military Districts. Historically, the Soviet Far East has been a semi-autonomous military region. Separated from Moscow by vast distances, with only the tenuous connections the Trans-Siberian Railway and the seasonal Northern Sea Route, the ground forces cannot depend on early reinforcement or logistical support from the Western USSR.

The ground forces in the Far East appear to have primarily a defensive role at the present time. However, it is interesting to note that the principal ground forces on the mainland are all located on the main routes between this region and Manchuria. There has been a decline in numbers of D/CDs since 1955, and several army and corps headquarters have disappeared. A corps formerly located on the Kamchatka Peninsula and in the Kuriles was reduced to a single division; the field army on Sakhalin Island was reduced to, or replaced by, a corps; in the mainland forces an army and an airborne corps seem to have been disbanded.

A considerable amount of [REDACTED] information was formerly available and this made it possible to identify most of the D/CDs in the region. [REDACTED] information has dwindled to the point where almost no useful information [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is received. Thus, the problem of maintaining continuity and detecting changes has become more difficult [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In the Transbaykal MD [REDACTED]

The Panel recognizes the possible existence of two field armies and one corps in this region. The army and the corps in the Far East MD are rated as firm. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Both army and the corps have been recently reidentified [REDACTED] and the continued existence of both has been corroborated [REDACTED]

The army in the Transbaykal MD has been rated as probable. Its existence has not been detected [REDACTED] in recent years and its existence has not been corroborated [REDACTED] since 1956.

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

## IRONBARK

However, several factors make its continued existence probable. Among these are: (1) the probable current existence of the tank divisions formerly known to be subordinate to this army; (2) the fact that in every other case where several tank divisions are grouped together a tank army is known to exist; and (3) the strategic importance of the locations, and its remoteness from other important ground forces, which suggests a requirement for a force which could be readily placed in the field.

As Table 11 indicates, the Panel recognizes the possible existence of 21 D/CDs in this region.

[REDACTED]

Since the beginning of 1961, the continued existence of seven previously identified divisions has been corroborated [REDACTED] (six in the Far East MD and one in the Transbaykal MD). Also since the beginning of 1961, [REDACTED] troops and equipment consistent with the existence of one D/CD in four division areas in the Far East MD and three in the Transbaykal MD. [REDACTED] interpretations currently available indicate the existence of housing capacity for 8,000 or more troops and recent use of garrison or adjacent training areas in each of six locations in the Far East MD and four locations in the Transbaykal MD.

### VI. Central USSR

The breakdown of the D/CDs by military district and by assigned confidence rating is shown in Table 12. Three of the 23 D/CDs, whose possible existence the Panel has recognized, are rated as firm. No field armies or corps are known to exist in this region.

The Central USSR consists of four military districts: the Moscow MD, the Volga MD, the Ural MD, and the Siberian MD. While its strategic importance is enhanced by the great industrial centers of its western half, and by the ICBM launching sites which it harbors, it does not figure largely in Soviet ground force capabilities in the short term. With the possible exception of the airborne division near Moscow, these forces do not appear to be organized or intended for early deployment. Rather, they seem to form part of a strategic reserve and mobilization base which would come to bear only in the later stages of

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

## IRONBARK

a war. Currently their functions are principally the training of conscripts and reservists and, perhaps internal security.

The usual type of difficulty in obtaining information on Soviet ground force units is compounded by the vast extent and inaccessibility of this region. The flow of information from it has never been great and the amount has tended to decline since the early fifties. The three Moscow parade divisions are seen regularly, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Panel recognizes no field armies or corps in the Central USSR because there has been no evidence of their existence since the early postwar period. [REDACTED]

As Table 12 indicates, the Panel has recognized the possible existence of 23 D/CDs. The three parade units in Moscow are the only D/CDs rated as firm. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The continuing existence of three D/CDs, over and above the three Moscow parade divisions, has been corroborated since the beginning of 1961. [REDACTED] interpretations currently available indicate the existence of housing capacity for 8,000 or more troops and recent use of the garrison or adjacent training areas at each of eight division areas which were indicated by other source material; five in the Moscow MD, two in the Volga MD, and one in the Ural MD. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] recently confirmed military occupancy of seven division areas: five in Moscow MD, one in Ural MD, and one in Siberian MD.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

**IRONBARK**

Table 12

Soviet D/CDs  
In Central USSR in 1963  
By Location and Assigned Confidence Rating

Number of Units

Location	Assigned Confidence Rating				Total
	Firm	Highly Probable	Probable	Possible	
Moscow MD	3	1	2	3	9
Volga MD		1	2	2	5
Ural MD		1	2	2	5
Siberian MD		1	2	1	4
Total	3	4	8	8	23
Cumulative		7	15	23	

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

**IRONBARK**

III. The Manpower Available to the Soviet Ground Force

A second principal dimension of the Soviet ground force is the manpower available to it both as a force in being and as a base for mobilization in periods of international tension or hostility. This section of the interim report represents the CIA/DIA Panel's preliminary review and re-evaluation of the evidence, and an assessment of the uncertainties as they apply to the military personnel strength of the Soviet ground force in the aggregate and as they might be distributed among the various echelons and D/CDs. It must be noted that this section of the discussion makes no attempt to assess the type or strength of these forces in terms of equipment.

A. The Soviet Manning Process

While it is possible that the Soviets are reviewing their policies for manning their military establishment, present policy has two simultaneous objectives. Ready forces in being must be maintained at levels which the government regards as sufficient under given circumstances, and substantial numbers of trained reserves must be provided for against a possible emergency. In general terms the Soviet military establishment may be conceived of as comprising two groups of personnel: the career and the conscript. The career group consists primarily of regular officers with some career non-commissioned officers.

The officer corps is made up primarily of graduates from officer candidate schools which provide three-year courses of instruction leading to a commission. The career non-commissioned officers (NCOs) are former conscripts who have been permitted to fill a comparatively small number of designated key positions. The conscripts are inducted for a three-year period of compulsory service by age group under a system of universal military service. Thus, at any given time the Soviet establishment is manned by a combination of a large group of career officers and a few career NCOs, and a group of conscripts which normally includes three classes or draft contingents.

At the present time, there are approximately three classes of conscripts in service. These classes are designated according to the year of birth; during the first half of 1963, the classes of 1941, 1942, and 1943 constitute the bulk of the conscripts in active

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## IRONBARK

service. If the establishment were to be expanded, larger numbers of men from given age groups would be inducted and/or reservists would be returned to active duty until the appropriate number of conscript classes (those of 1940, 1939, 1938 and so on) and reserve officers had been recalled. If the establishment were to be reduced, smaller numbers in each group would be called and appropriate numbers of officers and conscripts released to the reserves.

The system of conscription and reservist training is administered by a network of offices known as VOENKOMATS (military commissariats). In accordance with central plans each VOENKOMAT is required to work out all the details for servicing the normal annual conscription and reserve training and to be prepared to carry out a detailed plan for limited or large scale mobilization of reserves in the event of emergency.

A high proportion of the conscripts are assigned to the ground force by reason of its size and nature. Within the ground force conscripts are assigned directly to organized units rather than to special training centers. For example, the D/CD serves as a training unit for conscripts and reservists and (in event of emergency) a mobilization base for the ground force. The portion of the ground force which is career is almost one-quarter of total ground force manpower. In the remaining three-quarters, one group of conscripts is in its first year of service, one group is in its second year, and one group in its third year. This procedure results in the Soviet D/CD having a variety of characteristics which differ from present US divisions. Typically in the fall of each year about one-third of the enlisted strength (including all but the few NCOs who are permitted to re-enlist) turns over; men with three years of service are replaced by recruits with a resultant sharp but temporary drop in effectiveness. Typically also, Soviet D/CDs on the average are at substantially less than full strength and are in a position to implement one degree or another of mobilization. A further result of this procedure is that in recent years the Soviet military establishment generally has had a large portion of officers in the active forces (about one out of four) as compared with the US (about one out of eight).

Put another way, over and above the career officers and NCOs, the manpower available to the military establishments consists of the bulk of the males in the country. The present male population of the USSR, ages 18-29, by age group class (estimated by the US Bureau of Census) is as follows:

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

# IRONBARK

<u>Class</u>	<u>Age in 1963</u>	<u>Total Men (000)</u>
'45	18	1400
'44	19	900
'43	20	800
'42	21	1200
'41	22	1900
'40	23	2000
'39	24	2200
'38	25	2400
'37	26	2300
'36	27	2000
'35	28	1700
'34	29	1700

These one year age group statistics are derived from Soviet official statistics. At any given time some substantial proportion of all males aged 19, 20, and 21 are in active service as conscripts. Most of the remainder of these age groups are assigned directly to the reserves. Each summer, some of these reservists, along with many of their conscripted contemporaries after they have been discharged, are called up for two-three months of training. The present worth to the military establishment of the conscripts (serving in the first half of 1963 or recently released) aged 20-29 is possibly suggested by the nominal schedule of conscription and discharge which follows:

<u>Age in 1963</u>	<u>Year Conscripted</u>	<u>Year Discharged</u>
20	1962	-
21	1961	-
22	1960	(To be discharged in 1963)
23	1959	1962
24	1958	1961
25	1957	1960
26	1956	1959
27	1955	1958
28	1954	1957
29	1953	1956

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]  
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

## IRONBARK

The above schedule is rather oversimplified and somewhat idealized; in part, because some conscripts do not fulfill their obligation in accordance with the normal schedule, and, in part, because in some assignments a conscript may be obliged to serve for a longer period, e.g., four years in the navy. The Panel, as indicated in the statement on the scope of this interim report, will assess the qualitative aspects of this training in a later report. The remainder of this section of the discussion will deal with the question of the personnel strength of the Soviet ground force in the first half of 1963.

### B. The Nature of Evidence

For the assessment of the personnel strength of the Soviet ground force by unit or in the aggregate there is no unique type of intelligence source that has as yet become available. The process is one of gathering fragmentary bits of information in point or from which inferences can be drawn with various degrees of confidence.

In general, the statements that have been made as to the amount and quality of each source of information in Section II, A (above) are applicable to questions of Soviet personnel strengths. Attaches and missions can gain general appreciations of manning levels at various installations they observe, but the presence of reservists in training or the co-location of units obscures the meaningfulness of such appreciations. In East Germany approximate head counts can be made for small units when such units are enroute as units. Similarly, defectors and repatriates, and covert sources and informants can provide reasonably trustworthy indications with respect to the small units in which they may have served. However, more broadly knowledgeable sources have been rare.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

**IRONBARK**

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

C. The Assessment

[Redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## IRONBARK

[redacted] This assessment of the manpower available to and its distribution within the Soviet ground force in the first half of 1963 is made in two stages. First, a judgment is made as to aggregate manpower based on an evaluation of Soviet announcements of total personnel strength, studies of Soviet population and education, and the recent history of conscription patterns. Then, a range of distribution patterns is postulated by combining this aggregate with our judgments as to the number of major line elements (Section II, above) and considerations of general geographic and strategic factors which it is reasonable for the Soviets to have taken into account.

### 1. The Aggregate Assessment

In 1959-60 when the Soviets announced a military force of 3.6 million men, a figure which the Panel believes to be generally accurate, the manpower system of the military establishment appeared to be functioning normally. Some initial evidential traces were received on the reorganization which was to become widespread during 1960, but no serious effect on manpower levels was noted. Conscripts were serving their regular terms of service. The establishment consisted of approximately three age-group classes of conscripts and the career cadre. Studies of Soviet population and educational statistics, and evidence on the current history of conscription and military requirements for manpower, are generally consistent with the Soviet announcement.

In January 1960 Khrushchev announced a reduction of these forces to 2.4 million men, to be completed by 1962. Evidence [redacted] confirms that the reduction was begun, and further, indicates that it was halted early in 1961 when probably about half complete, or at about 3 million men. In the autumn of 1961, during the Berlin crisis, the Soviets held in service most of a class of conscripts due for release, while calling into service a new conscript class. The class held in service was released gradually during 1962, but it is unlikely that the force level was returned to the 3.0 million men probably in service in mid-1961 before the Berlin crisis. Thus it is the judgment of the Panel that the manpower of the Soviet armed forces is currently within the range of 3.0-3.6 million men with the most likely level to be about 3.3 million men.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## IRONBARK

Some substantiation for a total force level higher than 3.0 million appears to be furnished by the measures being taken to procure conscripts in 1963. Provision to conscript men from age groups over and above the group normally eligible has been made, and women are being encouraged to enlist. Demographic data suggests that such measures would not be necessary if the total force level were at 3.0 million men or less.

Also the statements by Marshal Malinovsky and others in both classified and open material support the inference that a compromise level exists between the 3.6 million man total announced in 1960 and the 2.4 million man goal of the reduction begun in 1960. (As indicated above, no figures are given by the authors of the statements nor are they specific as to the distribution of the forces.)

Current intelligence holdings for the number of men in forces other than the ground force (as defined in this report) total about 1.2-1.5 million men. The ranges of uncertainty for manpower forces other than the ground force are felt to be within reasonable limits because of the range of reliable evidence relating to the numbers of ships, aircraft, and missiles and the manpower suggested by these forces. By deducting these 1.2-1.5 million men from the 3.0-3.6 million men judged to be currently in the entire military establishment, the Panel arrives at the judgment that the resultant figure of 1.5-2.4 million men encompasses most of the range of uncertainty as to the personnel strength of the ground force and that a reasonably high degree of confidence can be attributed to the range of 1.8-2.1 million men.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## IRONBARK

### 2. The Assessment of the Distribution of Personnel

A detailed review of the evidence on the number and character of non-D/CD units and on TOE's where applicable throughout the force, has not been made in this interim report. The Panel has however, satisfied itself on the basis of a general survey

The purpose of this section is to illustrate the personnel strength implications of certain postulated force structures involving:

- a) within the limits of a 115-135 total, varying the number of D/CDs manned at differing levels, and
- b) reasonable variants as to the aggregate non-D/CD portion of the force.

Although there is a wide spectrum of possible options, we have selected six postulated force structures, each of which was based upon a different number and mix of combat, reduced, and cadre strength D/CDs, influenced strongly by the Panel's judgment regarding:

- a) the possible effects on the real force induced by the nature of mobilization base, and
- b) the geographical considerations likely to influence Soviet readiness postures.

The average strengths for the D/CDs assumed in each case are as follows:

<u>Personnel Level</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Assumed Actual Strength</u>
Combat	Motorized Rifle	10,000
Combat	Tank	8,000
Combat	Airborne	6,000
Reduced	Motorized Rifle	7,000
Reduced	Tank	6,000
Cadre	Motorized Rifle and Tank	2,500

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## IRONBARK

The personnel strength assumed for a "combat" motorized rifle or tank D/CD is strongly suggested by actual practice in GSFG where the Panel believes the manning level of these units represents combat personnel strength. Also, it should be noted, that the assumed combat level is over 70% of the 1956 TOE and, obviously, an even higher percentage of the apparently smaller, new TOE. These percentages appear to the Panel to be reasonable compromises between the Soviets' conception of a need for combat readiness and a base for further mobilization. The airborne D/CDs have been assumed to be organized and manned as "light" motorized rifle units. Reduced and cadre strengths are simple assumptions derived from those of the combat D/CDs.

Evidence from Soviet documentary material indicates that the field army in the USSR may have two or three of its four or five D/CDs at combat strength with the other(s) at reduced or cadre strength. On this basis, the Panel assumed that the Soviet corps has one or two of its three D/CDs at combat strength.

Evidence on the NGF (Poland) and SGF (Hungary) indicates that, like the GSFG, their units are at combat personnel strength. Therefore, for all postulations shown in Table 13, the 26 divisions recognized by the panel as being in the Groups of Forces are taken as being at combat personnel strength. Additionally, seven airborne divisions rated by the Panel as highly probable or better have been assumed to be at combat personnel strength. In no case is the postulated force structure a violation of the evidence which led to the Panel's earlier judgment regarding the geographical distribution of D/CDs rated probable or higher.

For each case two variant ratios of personnel in the combat support and the command and service support are used, consistent with both the range of uncertainty about this group and with the information available relative to its size. The first variant assumes that for each man in the D/CDs, there is one man in this group (combat support and command and service support); the second assumes one and one half men.\* Table 13 sets out the various postulated force

\* It is recognized that these assumptions imply that this group of units is manned, in aggregate, at the same general level of "authorized" strength as the D/CDs.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Table 13

Postulated Distribution of D/CDs  
By Personnel Strength Level and Region

Case	Personnel Strength	D/CDs at Combat or Reduced Strength Per Army or Corps Inside USSR				Number of D/CDs							
		Western Region		Other Regions		Groups of Forces and Airborne	Western Region	Other Regions	Total				
I	Combat	2/A	1/C	-	-	33	16	-	49				
	Reduced	1/A	1/C	2/A	1/C					-	9	26	35
	Cadre	-	-	-	-					-	-	-	31-51
II	Combat	3/A	2/C	-	-	33	25	-	58				
	Reduced	1/A	1/C	2/A	1/C					-	9	26	35
	Cadre	-	-	-	-					-	-	-	22-42
III	Combat	2/A	1/C	1/A	1/C	33	16	16	65				
	Reduced	1/A	1/C	1/A	1/C					-	9	16	25
	Cadre	-	-	-	-					-	-	-	25-45
IV	Combat	3/A	2/C	1/A	1/C	33	25	16	74				
	Reduced	1/A	1/C	1/A	1/C					-	9	16	25
	Cadre	-	-	-	-					-	-	-	16-36
V	Combat	2/A	1/C	2/A	1/C	33	16	26	75				
	Reduced	1/A	1/C	1/A	1/C					-	9	16	25
	Cadre	-	-	-	-					-	-	-	15-35
VI	Combat	3/A	1/C	2/A	1/C	33	25	26	84				
	Reduced	1/A	1/C	1/A	1/C					-	9	16	25
	Cadre	-	-	-	-					-	-	-	6-26

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~  
IRONBARK

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## IRONBARK

structures, with the assumptions leading to them.

The Panel prefers the examples toward the center of the set of cases shown in Table 13 as being more consistent with readiness, mobilization, and geographic concepts which are believed to be critical factors to the Soviets in the manning and distribution of D/CDs. The outermost Cases, I and VI, are extremes which, though conceivable, would seem to exceed the limitations set by the critical factors. Case I, with only 16 combat strength divisions in the Western region, and very high proportions of reduced and cadre D/CDs would not appear to qualify as the ready force discussed in Soviet military literature. In Case VI, on the other hand, the number of reduced and cadre strength D/CDs would not seem to provide an adequate mobilization base for the size force ultimately suggested by the number of combat strength divisions. In Cases II heavy emphasis in the ready force is on the Western region and in Case V equal emphasis is placed on all regions. Both cases probably exceed parameters for the distribution of forces set by geographic factors and the likely areas of conflict as viewed by the Soviets. Cases III and IV represent more balanced forces which might satisfy most of the critical factors of readiness, mobilization, and geography.

The manpower distribution in Table 14 shows the implications of each of the postulated force structures. The Panel believes that the two variants used in reckoning personnel in combat support and command and service support probably set the outer limits of numbers of personnel in these elements and that the actual figure lies somewhere between these limits. It should be noted that in each case, the 20 D/CDs in the range between 115 and 135 add some 50,000 men at the assumed strength levels for cadre divisions. It shows the added mobilization base which the Soviet system can provide relatively cheaply in terms of manpower.

As in the distribution of forces shown in Table 13, Cases I and VI also probe the outer extremes of the range of uncertainty in terms of manpower. Cases II through V are more likely if the actual manpower of the postulated distribution of D/CDs lies between the cases used for approximating the numbers of support personnel. Cases III and IV perhaps would be most likely to satisfy the limits of the range of aggregate manpower (1.8-2.1 million men). Thus, within the limits of the 115-135 D/CD base and assumptions made as to personnel strength, Cases III and IV are preferable both with respect to indicated aggregate manpower and to readiness, mobilization and geographic factors.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Table 14

Personnel Implications of  
Postulated Force Structures

Case	D/CDs	Personnel In Thousands	
		Total Ground Force*	
I	700-750	1400	- 1900
II	775-825	1550	- 2050
III	800-850	1600	- 2125
IV	850-900	1700	- 2275
V	875-925	1750	- 2300
VI	925-975	1850	- 2450

\* The lower end of this range includes personnel in D/CDs plus an equal number for combat support and command and service support. The upper end of this range includes personnel in D/CDs plus a factor of 1.5 for combat support and command and service support.

~~TOP SECRET~~

IRONBARK

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

**IRONBARK**

APPENDIX A

SUMMARY PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE  
FOR EACH SOVIET LINE ELEMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

**IRONBARK**

This appendix is designed to present a detailed summary for the nature of the evidence upon which a judgment was formed as to the existence of each Soviet line element (division, in Soviet terms) with particular emphasis on the basis for establishing the confidence limits of that judgment. The summary tables are arranged alphabetically, first, by group of forces in Eastern Europe, and second, by military district in the USSR.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

# IRONBARK

Group of Soviet Forces Germany

D/CD	Confidence Rating				Latest Date of Identification
	Firm	Highly Probable	Probable	Possible	
6 Gds Tk Div	X				60
9 Tk Div	X				62
11 Gds Tk Div	X				61
9 Gds Tk Div	X				62
12 Gds Tk Div	X				62
25 Tk Div	X				61
26 Gds Tk Div	X				61
32 Mtz R Div	X				62
94 Gds Mtz R Div	X				62
207 Mtz R Div	X				61
20 Gds Tk Div	X				60
21 Gds Mtz R Div	X				63
39 Gds Mtz R Div	X				62
57 Gds Mtz R Div	X				62
7 Gds Tk Div	X				63
14 Gds Mtz R Div	X				62
20 Gds Mtz R Div	X				63
6 Gds Mtz R Div	X				63
10 Gds Tk Div	X				62
19 Mtz R Div	X				63

~~TOP SECRET~~




~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

**IRONBARK**

Remarks to Summary for Group of Soviet Forces Germany



~~TOP SECRET~~


~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

# IRONBARK

Northern Group of Forces and Southern Group of Forces

	Probability of Existence				Latest Date of Identification
	Firm	Highly Probable	Probable	Possible	
Northern Group of Forces					
D/CD					
20 TK Div	X				60
u/i Div (ex 26 Gds Mecz)		X			60
Southern Group of Forces					
D/CD					
2 Gds Tk Div	X				61
35 Gds Mtz R Div	X				62
u/i Mtz R Div (ex 27 Mecz)	X				62
u/i TK Div (ex 13 Gds Mecz)	X				59



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

# IRONBARK

Baltic Military District

D/CD	Probability of Existence				Latest Date of Identification
	Firm	Highly Probable	Probable	Possible	
8 Gds Mtz R Div				X	60
23 Gds Mtz R Div		X			60
u/1 Div (ex 29 Gds Mecz)		X			58
29 Gds Mtz R Div		X			61
1 Tk Div	X				62
1 Gds Mtz R Div		X			61
5 Gds Mtz R Div			X		60
16 Gds Mtz R Div		X			60
26 Gds Mtz R Div	X				61
u/1 Div (ex 28 Gds Mecz)	X				62
u/1 Div (ex 30 Gds Mecz)	X				62
31 Gds Abn R Div		X			59
51 Gds Mtz R Div				X	60
u/1 Div (?), Dobeles		X			
u/1 Div (?), Riga				X	
u/1 Div (?), Bagrationovsk				X	

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED] ~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

**IRONBARK**

Remarks to Summary for Baltic Military District

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

# IRONBARK

Belorussian Military District

D/CD	Probability of Existence				Latest date of Identification
	Firm	Highly Probable	Probable	Possible	
69 Gds Mtz R Div		X			62
103 Gds Abn R Div	X				61
120 Gds Mtz R Div		X			61
8 Gds Tk Div	X				62
22 Tk Div		X			62
29 Gds Tk Div	X				61
3 Gds Tk Div	X				62
27 Gds Tk Div	X				62
47 Gds Tk Div	X				61
8 Tk Div	X				62
u/1 Div (ex 12 Gds Mecz)	X				62
50 Gds Mtz R Div	X				61
55 Gds Mtz R Div	X				62
48 Gds Mtz R Div				X	59
u/1 Div, Osipovichi			X		


~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

IRONBARK

Remarks to Summary for Belorussian Military District



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

# IRONBARK

Carpathian Military District

D/CD	Probability of Existence				Latest Date of Identification
	Firm	Highly Probable	Probable	Possible	
24 Mtz R Div	X				62
23 Tk Div	X				63
31 Tk Div	X				61
u/1 Tk Div (ex 117 Gds R Div)	X				62
u/1 Tk Div (ex 13 Gds Cav Div)	X				63
u/1 Div (ex 10 Gds Mecz Div)				X	60
15 Gds Mtz R Div	X				61
161 Mtz R Div		X			61
u/1 Div (ex 17 Gds Mecz)				X	63
66 Gds Mtz R Div	X				63
70 Gds Mtz R Div		X			63
128 Gds Mtz R Div	X				63
97 Gds Mtz R Div				X	59
183 Mtz R Div				X	60
318 Mtz R Div				X	56

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

IRONBARK

Remarks to Summary for Carpathian Military District


~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

# IRONBARK

North Caucasus Military District

D/CD	Probability of Existence			Latest Date of Identification
	Firm	Highly Probable	Probable	
9 Mtz R Div		X		63
u/1 Mtz R Div (ex 19 R Div)		X		63
24 Gds Mtz R Div			X	60
73 Mtz R Div		X		61
266 Mtz R Div			X	62
u/1 Tk Div (ex 5 Gds Cav)	X			61
18 Gds Tk Div				X 60
372 Mtz R Div				X 61

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

**IRONBARK**

Remarks to Summary for North Caucasus Military District

[Redacted content]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

# IRONBARK

Transcaucasus Military District

D/CD	Probability of Existence			Largest Date of Identification	
	Firm	Highly Probable	Probable		Possible
6 Mtz R Div		X			62
u/i Div (ex 31 Gds Mecz)			X		60
75 Mtz R Div	X				63
216 Mtz R Div				X	56
u/i Div (ex 26 Macz)		X			63
164 Mtz R Div			X		61
u/i Div (ex 1 Gds Mecz)			X		60
10 Gds Mtz R Div		X			56
414 Mtz R Div		X			54
104 Gds Abn R Div	X				63
118 Mtz R Div				X	60
261 Mtz R Div				X	55

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

**IRONBARK**

Remarks to Summary for Transcaucasus Military District

[Redacted content]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

# IRONBARK

Turkestan Military District

D/CD	Probability of Existence			Latest Date of Identification
	Firm	Highly Probable	Probable	
u/1 Div (ex 5 Gds Mecz)	X			63
15 Tk Div	X			62
54 Gds Mtz R Div	X			62
u/1 Div (ex 16 Gds Mecz)	X			62
203 Mtz R Div		X		63
357 Mtz R Div		X		62
u/1 Div (ex 376 R Div)		X		63
360 Mtz R Div			X	62
105 Gds Abn R Div	X			62
201 Mtz R Div				X 55
u/1 Div, Tashkent				X

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

**IRONBARK**

Remarks to Summary for Turkestan Military District

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

# IRONBARK

Odessa Military District

D/CD	Probability of Existence				Latest Date of Identification
	Firm	Highly Probable	Probable	Possible	
u/1 Div (ex 33 Gds Mecz)		X			63
48 Mtz R Div	X				63
59 Gds Mtz R Div		X			63
u/1 Div (ex 28 Mecz)	X				63
315 Mtz R Div	X				63
u/1 Div (ex 28 Gds R Div)				X	59
u/1 Div (ex 34 Gds Mecz)		X			63
u/1 Div, Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy				X	

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

**IRONBARK**

Remarks to Summary for Odessa Military District

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

# IRONBARK

Kiev Military District

D/CD	Probability of Existence				Latest Date of Identification
	Firm	Highly Probable	Probable	Possible	
u/1 Div (ex 4 Gds Mecz )			X		59
u/1 Div (ex 25 Gds Mecz)	X				62
42 Gds Tk Div		X			61
75 Gds Mtz R Div	X				62
u/1 Div (ex 18 Gds Mecz )				X	60
112 Mtz R Div		X			61
72 Gds Mtz R Div			X		61
25 Gds Mtz R Div		X			61
u/1 Div, Artemovsk/Donetsk				X	

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

IRONBARK

Remarks to Summary for Kiev Military District

[Redacted content]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

# IRONBARK

Leningrad Military District

D/CD	Probability of Existence			Latest Date of Identification
	Firm	Highly Probable	Probable	
45 Mtz R Div	X			62
341 Mtz R Div	X			62
367 Mtz R Div	X			62
2 Gds Tk Div	X			62
37 Gds Mtz R Div	X			62
45 Gds Mtz R Div	X			62
64 Gds Mtz R Div		X		62
76 Gds Abn R Div	X			63
67 Mtz R Div				X 59
u/1 Div (Poss 69 M <del>██████████</del> )				X 62

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED] ~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

**IRONBARK**

Remarks to Summary for Leningrad Military District

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

# IRONBARK

Far East Military District

D/CD	Probability of Existence			Latest Date of Identification
	Firm	Highly Probable	Probable	
u/1 Div (ex 3 Gds Mecz)		X		58
u/1 Div (ex 7 Gds Mecz)		X		61
17 Gds Mtz R Div	X			62
40 Mtz R Div	X			62
63 Mtz R Div				X 60
79 Mtz R Div		X		61
264 Mtz R Div				X 58
342 Mtz R Div	X			62
12 Mtz R Div			X	58
22 Mtz R Div	X			62
98 Gds Abn R Div	X			62
99 Gds Abn R Div				X 56
u/1 Div, Pokrovka			X	
u/1 Div, Spassk-Dalniy				X
u/1 Div, Khabarovsk				X

~~TOP SECRET~~


[REDACTED] ~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

# IRONBARK

Remarks to Summary for Far East Military District

[REDACTED]



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

# IRONBARK

Transbykal Military District

D/CD	Probability of Existence			Latest Date of Identification
	Firm	Highly Probable	Probable	
5 Gds Tk Div	X			63
u/1 Div (ex 9 Gds Mecz)			X	58
110 Gds Mtz R Div			X	57
111 Tk Div			X	57
61 Tk Div			X	55
u/1 Div, Domna				X

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED] ~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

# IRONBARK

Remarks to Summary for Transbykal Military District

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

# IRONBARK

Moscow Military District

D/CD	Firm	Highly Probable	Probable	Possible	Latest Date of Identification
2 Gds Mtz R Div	X				63
4 Gds Tk Div	X				63
11 Gds Mtz R Div				X	59
32 Gds Mtz R Div			X		59
38 Gds Mtz R Div				X	59
106 Gds Abn R Div	X				62
265 Mtz R Div		X			59
53 Gds Mtz R Div			X		59
87 Gds Mtz R Div				X	57

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

**IRONBARK**

Remarks to Summary for Moscow Military District

[Redacted content]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

# IRONBARK

Volga Military District

D/CD	Probability of Existence				Latest Date of Identification
	Firm	Highly Probable	Probable	Possible	
29 Mtz R Div			X		60
43 Mtz R Div			X		55
96 Mtz R Div		X			62
194 Mtz R Div				X	55
270 Mtz R Div				X	56

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]  
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

# IRONBARK

Remarks to Summary for Volga Military District

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

**IRONBARK**

Ural Military District

D/CD	Probability of Existence				Latest Date of Identification
	Firm	Highly Probable	Probable	Possible	
13 Mtz R Div				X	57
91 Mtz R Div			X		57
126 Mtz R Div		X			61
279 Mtz R Div			X		59
417 Mtz R Div				X	60

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

IRONBARK

Remarks to Summary for Ural Military District

[Redacted content]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

# IRONBARK

Siberian Military District

D/CD	Probability of Existence				Latest Date of Identification
	Firm	Highly Probable	Probable	Possible	
23 Mtz R Div				X	59
56 Mtz R Div		X			61
74 Mtz R Div			X		60
109 Gds Mtz R Div			X		57


~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

IRONBARK

Remarks to Summary for Siberian Military District



~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~