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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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22 JUN 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (SECRET): "The Massed Use of Missile Troops in Operations", by Lieutenant-Colonel Ye. Pavlov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article from the SECRET Collection of the Journal "Military Thought" published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of division commander.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: DEC 2004

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The Director for Intelligence,
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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (SECRET): "The Massed Use of Missile Troops in Operations", by Lieutenant-Colonel Ye. Pavlov

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "The Massed Use of Missile Troops in Operations", by Lieutenant-Colonel Ye. Pavlov. This article appeared in Issue 6(61) of 1961 of a special version of the Soviet journal Military Thought which is classified SECRET by the Soviets and is published irregularly.

Issue 6(61) was sent to press on 7 December 1961.

Comment: "Military Thought" is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version is issued monthly and has existed since 1937. The SECRET version is issued irregularly. By the end of 1961, 61 issues had been published, 6 of them during 1961. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in early 1960 and is also issued irregularly.

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COMMENT ON A PREVIOUS ARTICLE

The Massed Use of Missile Troops in Operations

by

Lieutenant-Colonel Ye. Pavlov

In an article under this title, Colonels B. Samarin and I. Korotkov[1] attempted, on the basis of the experience of exercises and military games, to investigate the problems of the massed use of nuclear weapons and the control of missile troops in operations. At the very beginning of the article it is maintained that in exercises and military games held before 1959, the use of nuclear weapons, with some exceptions (the fire preparation for the offensive) did not have a massed nature. It seems to us that there is not sufficient basis for such a statement. The massing of forces and weapons is one of the most important principles of Soviet military art. From the very first days that the Soviet Army received nuclear weapons, this principle was made the basis of their combat use.

The experience of exercises held in Belorussia in 1957 and in the Moscow Military District in 1958 give evidence that even with an extremely limited number of nuclear warheads allocated for an operation, they were used in a massed way: in the period of the fire preparation for the offensive, a massed nuclear strike was delivered in coordination with conventional means of destruction, and in the period of fire support of the offensive, several successive single and group nuclear strikes were delivered on the main axis. There were also

1. Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", No. 1 (56), 1961.

individual instances of dispersing nuclear warheads along the entire zone at these exercises, but on the whole they were used in a massed way on the decisive axes, with the purpose of destroying the most important enemy installations.

It seems to us that the authors of the article in their statements had in mind not the "massed use of nuclear weapons" but a "massed nuclear strike", and this is not the same thing. The massing of nuclear weapons in operations is the use of the basic mass of nuclear warheads on decisive axes against the most important installations and against the whole depth of enemy troop formation with the purpose of destroying them decisively. A massed nuclear strike and successive single and group nuclear strikes are methods of using nuclear weapons by means of which massing is achieved.

The experience of exercises shows that the methods of massing nuclear weapons changed as their numbers increased and the quality of nuclear warheads allotted for an operation was improved, and as the means for delivering them to targets were improved. With a small number of nuclear weapons, the basic methods for their use in an operation were single and group nuclear strikes on the main axis. Massed nuclear strikes were usually delivered only at the beginning of the operation and with limited goals. As the authors correctly note, an increase in the number of nuclear warheads allotted to an operation, and the widespread introduction of missiles into formations and large units have resulted in a growth of the proportion of massed nuclear strikes. It is now possible to deliver massed strikes by a considerable number of nuclear warheads against the entire depth of the enemy troop formation in extremely short periods of time, and with more decisive goals both at the beginning as well as during an operation.

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Thus, the massing of nuclear weapons in an operation is achieved by delivering not only massed but also successive single and group nuclear strikes against the enemy.

A single nuclear strike is the action of one nuclear warhead against a single enemy objective with the purpose of destroying or neutralizing it. These strikes are used to destroy individual important enemy objectives as soon as they are detected, or according to a plan. The delivery of single nuclear strikes is carried out by single launchings of missiles by individual launch batteries (mounts). Depending on the degree of readiness of a launch battery, 15 to 40 minutes are needed to prepare and carry out an unplanned single strike.

A group nuclear strike is the simultaneous strike of two or more nuclear warheads against a single objective or group of objectives located in a limited area, with the purpose of destroying or neutralizing them. The concentrated fire of several launch batteries is used to carry this out. From 35 to 60 minutes will be needed to prepare and deliver an unplanned group nuclear strike. A single tactical or operational-tactical task is accomplished by a group nuclear strike. The experience of exercises gives evidence that it is advisable to deliver a group strike against a group of objectives which must be destroyed simultaneously, when it is not advantageous to prolong the strike or when it is impossible to use a single nuclear charge because of the conditions of the situation.

While agreeing basically with the definition of a massed strike given by the authors of the article, we consider it necessary to note that the most important distinctive feature of such a strike is the simultaneous delivery of single and group

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nuclear strikes according to the commander's unified plan against the most important objectives of the main enemy grouping on the decisive axis. The sum total of the single and group nuclear strikes simultaneously carried out according to the unified plan gives new qualities to the nuclear strike, results in the decisive destruction of the enemy in short periods of time, sharply changes the correlation of forces and weapons on a given axis, destroys the stability of the enemy grouping throughout its entire depth, creates gaps in his defense, and allows our troops to penetrate quickly into the depth of the enemy disposition and smash him on the flank and in the rear with swift strikes. Massed nuclear strikes are the best way for guaranteeing the success of the struggle for fire superiority in operations, and offer a strong psychological effect on the enemy.

At exercises in 1960 and 1961, usually during one day of the operation, one or two massed nuclear strikes were prepared and delivered with the simultaneous use of from 10 to 40 or 45 nuclear warheads. Massed nuclear strikes were carried out in extremely short periods of time, counted in minutes, and up to one hour and thirty minutes to one hour and forty-five minutes were spent preparing them. Single or group nuclear strikes were delivered successively in the intervals between the massed strikes.

The number of simultaneously destroyed installations in a massed nuclear strike may be quite varied and will depend on the existence of enemy installations reliably detected by intelligence, the plan of the operation, the commander's decision, and the quantity and quality of missiles with nuclear charges which can be used in the strike.

The authors' statement that as a result of a massed nuclear strike, the enemy troops become incapable of carrying on further combat operations, is without foundation. The experience of exercises

in 1959 to 1961 gives evidence that, although as a result of a massed nuclear strike, the combat and psychological capabilities of the enemy on a selected axis show a marked decrease, even after this strike his troops can show a high degree of activity. And considerable efforts will still be needed to complete their destruction. To accept the authors' viewpoint means to agree that after the massed nuclear strike, our troops will not have to conduct combat operations, but will only have to execute a march to occupy the area against which the massed nuclear strike was delivered. It is impossible to perform all the tasks in a battle and operation by fire alone. To complete the destruction of an enemy neutralized by fire, to seize equipment which has survived, and to seize territory -- this is the task of the troops who deliver strikes after the massed nuclear strikes, and they must be prepared for this.

The massing of missile troops who play the primary role in delivering nuclear strikes is achieved by concentrating and deploying that grouping of missile troops which would be able to guarantee the most effective use of the combat capabilities of missile units on the decisive axes, the sudden delivery of massed, group, and single nuclear/missile strikes against the entire depth of the enemy troop formation, the execution of a maneuver by fire from certain axes to others, and the antinuclear protection of missile units.

The limited number of missile units of operational-tactical designation in an army necessitates a creative approach in selecting siting areas for them, in organizing their combat orders, and in creating a grouping of missile troops as a whole, because not every disposition and shift of missile units and subunits makes it possible to use their combat capabilities effectively and to guarantee their constant readiness to deliver nuclear/missile strikes.

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The degree of dispersal of missile units for the purpose of antinuclear protection has definite limits which are caused by the need to concentrate fire efforts of the larger part of the missile troops for the decisive destruction of the enemy on the selected axes and by the requirement to organize continuous control of them in operations.

The most advantageous siting areas for missile units may be determined by the chief of missile troops and artillery of an army after the army commander has adopted the decision on the forthcoming operation. The shift of battalions of operational-tactical missiles to new siting areas must be carried out with consideration that in critical moments of the situation, it would be possible to deliver nuclear/missile strikes against the enemy by using the larger part of the launch batteries.

The massed use of the army missile troops (including battalions of tactical missiles) can guarantee the effective massing of nuclear weapons on one or two axes on a front of 120 to 150 km and to a depth of 100 to 140 km. By reinforcing the army with a separate missile battalion with a range of fire of up to 300 km, the army's capabilities in massing nuclear weapons increase considerably.

To guarantee the massed use of missile troops, there must be a sharp increase in the effectiveness of controlling their fire and maneuver. In addition to what was said on this problem in the article being discussed, let us examine one more way of increasing effectiveness in controlling the missile troops of an army.

On the basis of the experience of exercises in 1960, an important fundamental conclusion was made that the chief of missile troops and artillery of an army (front) is to provide direct control of the fire of missile units subordinate to an army (front).

The practice of subsequent exercises confirmed the correctness of this conclusion, and the staff of missile troops and artillery of an army was transformed into an organ of direct control of the fire and maneuver of missile units of operational-tactical designation and, when necessary, of tactical missile subunits, too.

To control the fire and maneuver of the missile units successfully the headquarters of the missile troops and artillery of an army must have continuous knowledge of the position and condition of each launch battery of the missile brigade, and in preparing a nuclear/missile strike, for each battery, it must determine the coordinates of the targets, the type, yield, and height of the burst, and the time for readiness for launching and must prepare and transmit the commands. The direct executors of the commands are the commanding officers of the launch batteries who prepare and carry out the launching of the missiles. The tasks and all the commands for controlling fire are sent from the headquarters of missile troops and artillery of an army to the executors according to the system - brigade - battalion - launch battery, and all reports from subordinate elements are sent to the headquarters in the reverse order. At each level the command (report) is decoded, the information contained in it is taken into consideration, if necessary it is made more accurate, then it is coded and sent to the next level. With such a plan, each command (report) is broadcast three times and coded and decoded three times.

At the exercises in 1960 and 1961, other systems for passing commands were also tried: the headquarters of missile troops and artillery - the commanding officer of the battalion from which was assigned the duty launch battery; the headquarters of missile troops and artillery - the duty launch battery. In both instances the

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headquarters of the missile brigade, however, only informed them about the task which had been set. The time saved in preparing the nuclear strike was 12 to 15 minutes.

Thus, a tendency began to be seen to reduce the transmitting levels in controlling the fire and maneuver of missile troops of an army. Obviously, the most advisable system for setting tasks and for commands (reports) should be considered the system: the headquarters of missile troops and artillery of an army - battalion - launch battery; and for the duty launch batteries: the headquarters of missile troops and artillery - duty battery. These systems not only accelerate the transmission of commands, but also facilitate the introduction of the means of automation down to the battery inclusively and make it possible to have more stable communications with missile subunits.

At the present time the headquarters of the missile brigade is an intervening level. It issues tasks to battalions, carries out their deployment in combat formation, supervises the preparation and launching of missiles, and organizes communications, meteorological, engineer, and rear services support, and the guarding and defense of the siting areas. A large part of these measures is carried out directly by the forces and means of the battalions on the basis of instructions of the headquarters of missile troops and artillery of an army. It is true that, with the existing organization, in resolving several problems the latter depend on the commanding officer and staff of the brigade and require means of reinforcement.

In our opinion, in an army it is more advisable to have separate missile units (battalions or regiments) which are directly subordinate to the chief of missile troops and artillery of an army without a brigade level of command. The separate

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missile units must be independent, highly maneuverable fire and tactical organisms, consisting of the command and staff of the unit, 3 or 4 launch batteries of operational-tactical missiles, and subunits of combat support.

The elimination of the brigade level will make it possible, without additional expenditures, to reinforce the staffs of the missile units, expand the capabilities of the meteorological service, and include in the complement of missile units the necessary subunits of engineer and chemical troops, means of signal and code communications, and subunits to guard and defend the siting areas.

It is advisable to include the technical battery of a missile brigade in the complement of an army missile-transport (raketno-parkovyy) battalion, assigning it full responsibility for supplying ready missiles to army missile units.

After receiving reliable modern means of control, the chief of missile troops and artillery of an army and his staff will be able to control directly and specifically the activity of 2 or 3 army missile units, both in peacetime as well as in wartime.

The proposed system of control of missile troops (without the brigade level) comes closer to meeting modern requirements and has more long-range possibilities, but it requires thorough investigation and careful checking in exercises with troops.