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WWR: ✓6

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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September 5, 1961

I think this is excellent + we should press w/ Kohl et c

MEMORANDUM TO MR. BUNDY

FROM: *WWR*

Owen can help

If you agree, this is a matter you may wish to call to the attention of the President.

EO 12958 3A(b)(1)-25Yrs (C)

I was approached today by [redacted] officers [redacted] who have been much concerned with the morale problem in West Berlin. They have drafted a proposal* for the expansion of the activities of the University there with respect to the training of Afro-Asian students. They took kindly to my suggestion that the massive and sophisticated electrical industry in West Berlin gear itself to the training of men from the underdeveloped areas; the manufacture of equipment especially designed for the underdeveloped areas; and for the supply of technical assistance in this important field. The question to be raised is this: Should it not be one of General Clay's major functions to help lead the way in Berlin in generating enterprises which would give Berlin a sense of greater mission and connection with the world outside? If so, this role -- among others -- should be explored in the next days; and we should make sure that he will be staffed-up to handle this kind of problem.

[redacted]

EO 12958
3A(b)(1)-25Yr
S
(C)

The President should be aware that one virtue of this proposal is that it would give General Clay a continuing special task -- in addition to his other roles -- and it might lessen the possibility that he will tangle with the existing chain of command. There is considerable anxiety in the town on the latter score.

** going forward via Dick Davis' committee; Max Taylor has a copy and may raise it at Thursday meeting 5/12.*

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Proposed additional questions for directive to SecState re military preparations:

1. What are the chances that the call-up and despatch of additional divisions will reduce Khrushchev's negotiating flexibility, by engaging his prestige still more directly in an apparent test of US and Soviet will- as the previous SNIE on military preparations suggested was a possibility?

2. Are programs planned or underway to create units of our regular armed forces which can substitute for the reserve units at some time in the foreseeable future- thus permitting the reserve units to be demobilized, if the Berling crisis proves to be highly protracted, without degrading our combat capability during this crisis?