APPROVED FOR RELEASE - Historical Collection Division -HR70-14 DATE: 04-26-2012

This document comb Number __ la_ of __ 70 copies, Series __ A

H5

TOP SECRET

TU

The Secretary

FRUM

INA -- Roger Hilsman

THRUUGH :

5/5

SUBJECT: CIA Report Concerning Soviet Intentions on Germany, Iran

I refer to the attached CLA report delivered to you by Allen Dulles. The source is a Soviet official.

The two significant points of the report are:

(1) A separate treaty will be signed with the GDA, and even if a conference takes place, Khrushchev will insist on negetiations on his terms or also will leave the conference; and

(2) The USSR will deliver an ultimatum to Iran and Turkey in September-October demanding the removal of foreign troops and and bases, and will occupy Iran if the ultimatum is not met.

We do not believe we can completely dismiss the warnings contained in this report; in particular, the USSR might (as indicated in Al above) reverse its previously indicated approach to Berlin by signing a separate treaty without any serious prior effort to reach a negotiated settlement and then seek to force the West to an accommodation.

however, there are reasons for caution in accepting the information in the report as fact. Two of these reasons are cited by CIA. In addition, there are some seeming inconsistencies in the report. If the Soviets want to avoid nuclear war over the Berlin issue, as we believe they do, it would not be logical for them to risk an all-out encounter by bringing the Berlin crisis to a razor's edge and then engaging the West at thet particular moment through an armed attack on Iran. And if the USSR were contemplating a preemptive strike primarily against the United States and England, as the report further suggests is on Khrushchev's mind, an attack on a peripheral area such as Iran would hardly promote this objective but on the contrary serve as gratuitous notice that they were pressing for a show down. Finally, the possibility cannot be excluded that the source has unwittingly been fed information by the Soviets designed to convince us of Soviet firmness.

INR: RSB/BP: JShaw: aw: 9/1/61

TUE SECLET