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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

SUBJECT: Comments of a Senior Soviet General Officer
on Soviet Plans Regarding Berlin

1. Enclosed are comments on Soviet planning with regard to Berlin made by a senior Soviet general officer concerned with military preparations for Berlin during the course of a confidential discussion with our source, a well-placed Soviet official in whom we place considerable confidence.

2. In view of the possible significance of this information and the sensitivity of our source, it is requested that this report be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within your office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

CDSB-3/647,498

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

1/16/2006

HR 70-14

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1. Soon after the end of the work of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, the peace treaty with Germany will be signed. This is the final decision of Khrushchev and his government. The signature will no longer be put off. Firmness is required in politics, particularly on the German question, and the West will retreat before this firmness. The German government knows that to sign this treaty involves certain risk and danger, but it is not afraid because it knows that the Federal Republic of Germany is not yet ready for war and needs an additional two or three years, and that the United States, Britain, and France, will not begin a major war on this issue, but will retreat.

2. We, too, do not want a major war, but we do want to force the West to begin to negotiate with the DDM about procedures for movement along the access routes, and about entry and exit to and from Berlin and so on. These first dealings with the DDM will really be the first recognition of the DDM, and this is important for history. Firmness is needed to force the West to recognize the DDM at least partially, and to restrict the West in Berlin.

CONFIDENTIAL
 A reliable and well-placed Soviet official (B), from a confidential discussion with a senior Soviet general officer who is concerned with Soviet military preparations for Berlin.
 2 (for reportorial accuracy)

CONFIDENTIAL
 COMBINT
 LATE JUNE 1961
 Plans Regarding Berlin
 Comments of a Senior Soviet General Officer on Soviet

CSDB-3/647, 498

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CSDB-3/647,4.

3. "Immediately after the signature of the treaty, a state of combat alert will be declared, the troops of the DDR will cut off a block the highway (Helmstedt) and other dangerous roads with their tanks, and air patrolling will be increased. A state of combat alert will also be declared for the Soviet troops in the DDR, and in Czechoslovakia as well. We are ready to support the DDR with our multitude of tanks, and if necessary with other weapons. We would want any clash to be brief and limited in scope if the West moves up tanks and other weapons to seize and consolidate communications with Berlin.

4. "After the signing of the treaty, the DDR will introduce a new scheme for movement and the use by the West of the railways leading to Berlin and other means of communication with Berlin. We do not intend to forbid the West access to Berlin, but there will be certain restrictions: the West will have to negotiate with the DDR, and that is very important. While recognizing the risk, we believe that there will not be a major war, although there may be a local clash only on the territory of Germany, and limited to a small area."

Source Comment: After relating the above remarks of the senior general officer, source added the following as his personal comment:

"The treaty will be signed. The firmness of Khrushchev must be met with firmness. Khrushchev might also retreat on the period of signing of the treaty, if he feels that the West is not confused and if the West prepares significant strength for the defense and reinforcement of communications with Berlin. He is not prepared for a major war, and is only playing on the nerves. It would be advantageous to the West to announce widely a major redeployment of NATO troops, the bringing of the troops to combat readiness, the great strength and power of West Germany, the deployment in Europe of several thousand tanks and airplanes, and to simulate the movement of troops, etc. It is necessary that all this be exaggerated, but it is also necessary to increase Western strength in this theater for a quick, sharp blow at the Soviets."

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