


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

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TO: BUNDY FOR THE PRESIDENT



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/// S E C R E T ///

THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS APPROVED BY THE U.S.
INTELLIGENCE BOARD ON THE BERLIN SITUATION MAY BE HELPFUL:

"THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD HAS APPROVED THE FOLLOWING
CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY ITS SPECCIAL BERLIN SUBCOMMITTEE
WHICH REVIEWED THE SITUATION FOR THE PERIOD 9 THROUGH 29
MAY 1961:

1. KHRUSHCHEV STATED TO AMBASSADOR THOMPSON ON 23
MAY THAT HE CONSIDERS BERLIN THE MAIN TOPIC FOR DISCUSSION
AT VIENNA. WE DO NOT FEEL, HOWEVER, THAT HE IS SITTING THE
STAGE FOR A SHOWDOWN WITH THE PRESIDENT. KHRUSHCHEV'S

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INTEREST IN NEGOTIATING A SETTLEMENT IS STILL EVIDENT. NEVERTHELESS, IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR THOMPSON AND IN A SIMILAR TALK WITH THE WEST GERMAN AMBASSADOR LAST MONTH KHRUSHCHEV IMPLIED A DEADLINE OF LATE 1961 OR EARLY 1962 FOR A FINAL SOVIET DECISION WHETHER TO GO AHEAD WITH A SEPARATE TREATY. HOWEVER, HE HAS BEEN CAREFUL TO AVOID COMMITTING SOVIET PRESTIGE TO AN EXACT SCHEDULE IN PUBLIC.

2. KHRUSHCHEV MAINTAINED HIS POSITION THAT THE USSR WILL SIGN A PEACE TREATY WITH EAST GERMANY AND TRANSFER CONTROL OVER ALLIED MILITARY ACCESS IF NO AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED. KHRUSHCHEV REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED HIS PREVIOUS CONTENTION THAT AS A CONSEQUENCE OF A SEPARATE TREATY, THE WEST WILL NOT HAVE FREE ACCESS WITHOUT COMING TO TERMS WITH THE EAST GERMAN REGIME.

3. THE TIMING OF THE 23 MAY CONVERSATION WAS INTENDED TO MAKE EARLY NEGOTIATIONS AN ATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO THE THREATENED CONCLUSION OF A SEPARATE PEACE TREATY. KHRUSHCHEV'S STATEMENTS TO AMBASSADOR THOMPSON PROVIDE FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT MOSCOW INTENDS TO CONCENTRATE ON OBTAINING WESTERN

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AGREEMENT TO AN INTERIM SOLUTION FOR BERLIN,
THE IDEAS OF A NEW SUMMIT MEETING AND FURTHER HIGH-LEVEL
NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEGUN TO APPEAR IN THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA
BUILD-UP FOR THE VIENNA TALKS, AND WE EXPECT THAT THESE
THEMES WILL BECOME MORE PROMINENT.

4. WHILE KHRUSHCHEV'S REMARKS UNDOUBTEDLY SERVE THE
SOVIET PREMIER'S TACTICAL PURPOSES IN PREPARING FOR HIS
TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT, THEY ALSO POINT UP HIS BASIC
DILEMMA. ON THE ONE HAND, KHRUSHCHEV'S LONG-STANDING
AND REPEATED COMMITMENTS TO SIGN A SEPARATE TREATY IF HE
FAILS TO OBTAIN SATISFACTION FROM THE WEST PROBABLY ACT
AS A FORM OF PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET LEADER. ON THE OTHER
HAND, DESPITE KHRUSHCHEV'S REPEATED EXPRESSIONS OF SKEPTICISM
REGARDING THE WEST'S WILLINGNESS TO RESORT TO WAR OVER
BERLIN, HIS ACTIONS DURING THE PAST TWO AND ONE-HALF YEARS
SUGGEST THAT HE IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY CERTAIN WHT THE WESTERN
RESPONSE IN A CRISIS WOULD BE AND THAT HE STILL PREFERS A
NEGOTIATED SOLUTION.

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