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Hillenkoetter, R. H. Second Interview December 2, 1952

IX/276
IX/14(2)
IX/14(2)
IX/14
IX/17
IX/24
IX/24
IX/33
IX/35

We followed his written answers of October 24. The references are to pages in that paper.

Page 2. He said that rank did not bother him. If it did, it was a very minor consideration at the time he received instructions to return and become Director of Central Intelligence. He did not wish to leave his post in Paris. It was certain. Mrs. Hillenkoetter and he had just moved into very pleasant quarters. He was in close touch with officials whom he had helped to escape from the Germans. While at Vichy he had been very active with the underground in getting prominent Frenchmen across to Africa. Some of these men, and he named them as personal friends, were now in high office. One in particular could give him information of the first importance and was perfectly willing to do so. Hillenkoetter was therefore in position to supply the State Department as he had in the days of Bullitt and Leahy. He enjoyed the situation; he did not wish to leave. As he put it, he was so close to sources of information. I remarked that he must have enjoyed collecting secret intelligence. His face registered instant response in the affirmative.

Wish to remain in Paris

Secret Collection

CIG was so uncertain at that time. It was a "civilian agency." He did feel his inferior rank when head of the Agency. While in the Navy he had sat as a junior officer on many boards with superior officers of the Army, and he had not felt "rank." But when head of a civilian agency, the military men made him feel often that he was their inferior.

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Page 3 - 4. He looked upon the position as DCI from a military point of view, and he still does. To him it was and is a "war" agency. Therefore a military man should head it. If we could look forward confidently to a period of peace rather than war or the imitation of it, cold war, Hillenkoetter would see no reason for having CIA. We came back to the subject later on when I made a suggestion with regard to a permanent central organization, even with departmental status.

An
Agency
for
War

While we were having lunch I asked him if it were inconceivable that there should be a new instrument of government, not necessarily CIA but something like a department or division, either associated with the Department of Defense or the Department of State or independent of both, with a head responsible directly to the Executive Office. This person might have even the rank of a Secretary in the President's Cabinet. Hillenkoetter replied at once: "No, not departmental status." But he did consider the possibilities in a permanent organization for the collection and preparation of intelligence. I gathered that he was thinking of President Truman's often repeated remark that he expected the DCI to give him personally information which he as President needed to have.

Departmental
Status

I suggested then that the officer, whatever his title or rank, might be considered comparable either to the Director of the Budget or the Comptroller General. Hillenkoetter said: "Not the Comptroller," because he is an officer of Congress, a legislative officer. We quickly agreed on that distinction but I persisted in

A
Military
Man

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Training
and
Tenure

following the line of the Comptroller's independence of other officers and departmental officials and of his having long tenure. Hillenkoetter focused his thought upon the Director of the Budget as the President's own officer. Taking that cue, I said: "Well, then, perhaps this director of intelligence would have some such permanent status." Before I got to the point that he might be a civilian, Hillenkoetter said that he should have long tenure but that he should have military training. Hillenkoetter is convinced that the DCI should be a military man, not a civilian. But he might hold office for a period of ten to fifteen years.

Representation
for the
Departments

In this connection I asked Hillenkoetter if he knew of that recommendation in Souers' report of June 7, 1946 with regard to "coordinated representation." This had to do with investigation of the needs of the departmental intelligence agencies and recommendations to Congress with regard to their budgets: Souers' conception was that the Director of Central Intelligence might use the powers of inspection for the benefit of the agencies. If the Central Intelligence Agency became fully established and accepted by the several departments, it could handle the whole problem of intelligence within the Government for the benefit of the departments as well as itself. At first Hillenkoetter did not understand what Souers' idea was. Hillenkoetter had never seen Souers' report. But as we talked, Hillenkoetter said that he could see how it might develop along those lines.

I spoke of the British system which seems to me much more compact and articulated. The reason of course is that the American

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departments are more rivals than friends, at least so it seems to me. We then talked of the possibility that some day this intelligence organization might be so entrenched that its director could control the supply of experts in intelligence and for all practical purposes assign them to the several intelligence agencies of the departments. This amused Hillenkoetter. I could see that he believed that it would take a long, long time. In fact, I think, he did not consider it practical.

Experts
for the
Departments

Page 5. His interview with Donovan in the spring of 1947 was

primarily to get advice on personnel, men who had worked in OSS and might be available for CIA. Hillenkoetter did not give me any names. I did not ask for them as it was hardly relevant to our discussion. But he also talked about functions. He did not remember much of the conversation with Donovan. He has since had many which often become strenuous arguments, he said, as they do not agree in regard to the mixture of guerrilla warfare and clandestine intelligence.

Interview
with
Donovan

This led us to talk about Donovan's principles and I showed

Donovan's
Principles

him the letter to the Director of the Budget in August 1945. One glance made Hillenkoetter quite familiar with them. He said that Donovan's principles were about 75% action, economic and physical subversion, guerrilla tactics and the rest collection of secret intelligence. But he himself felt and still does, that guerrilla tactics should be kept as far away from clandestine intelligence as possible. I asked if they should be "over in the Department of Defense." He replied that they certainly should not be in the Central Intelligence

Guerrilla
Tactics

[REDACTED]
SECRET

[REDACTED]

Agency. Apparently he is watching the present development with considerable interest and although he does not wish the present DCI any hard luck, he feels that his own reluctance to engage in psychological warfare and its related activities has been more than justified by subsequent events.

Page 6. President Truman said to him again and again: " I am looking to you to get information for me. I do not care what those other fellows think." This was of course a reference to the IAB, the chiefs of intelligence, who were annoying Hillenkoetter as they had Vandenberg. The answer to my question was decidedly no. The President had no expectation that he should wait upon the chiefs' concurrence. At this juncture I asked if he had even taken them into his counsel when considering budgetary matters. He said, "Never." If he had done so, it would have spoiled everything. Matters of finance were none of their business and were never considered to be so, evidently even by them. I remarked that this of course cut the ground from under their contention that they were to consider "all" recommendations to NIA or NSC before the DCI made them. Hillenkoetter replied that I was correct. The Advisory Board never had any right to discuss financial matters or similar affairs of the Director. I did not think to ask him in this connection if the same were true of his personnel. It does not seem to me that it was; the Agency like the Group was dependent upon the Departments for a considerable number of its staff, at least until after NSCID 1 was in full operation.

Truman
on the
Departmental
Chiefs

Advice
on the
Budget

"All
Recom-
mendations"

[REDACTED]



Page 7. I asked him how the Director's power was more limited

Limitation
by the
Act of
Congress

under the Security Act than under the President's Directive. He said that the President could change his directive anytime he wished, even in a verbal order, because he had the right of interpretation of his own statements. But I demurred somewhat and endeavored to develop the theme in the concept that the DCI was given by law the power to initiate; that is, he has the specific authorization by Congress to make recommendations to the National Security Council. But Hillenkoetter stood his ground. He was not willing to concede that there was any range of discretion comparable to the President's under the Constitution. Of course Hillenkoetter is correct in his view of the President's power. But I still think that he failed to see the potentiality in the initiative which Congress gave to the Director.

Power to
Initiate

Range of
Discretion

We went from this discussion to exchange of views with regard

to the nature of the National Security Council. To Hillenkoetter it is a political body. The Secretary of a Department, he said, is so busy that he simply cannot know everything there is to be known about the matter before the Council. He therefore is certain to call upon his "boy." In briefing the Secretary the expert under him has the opportunity accordingly to fix his opinion for all practical purposes. Thus you go from the chief of intelligence who disagrees with the DCI through the Secretary back to the chief of intelligence for advice to the DCI. I presented the view that the National Security Council as a policy-making board was supposed to be "quasi-judicial." Hillenkoetter agreed that it might be so designed but he stuck to his point that in

The Council
a
Political
Body

Influence
by the
Chiefs of
Intelligence



[REDACTED]

practice the Secretaries are too busy with other matters to be properly informed on a particular question. He insisted that they would call in their experts and, consciously or otherwise, be governed in their own thinking by those men. (I should have this in mind when we come to the McNarney Report.)

Page 8. We had already distinguished collecting from estimating with respect to the Advisory Committee. The point is that collecting and other functions are administrative functions for which the DCI is primarily and almost exclusively responsible. In the case of making budgets he is exclusively responsible. But estimating is something else, and in this function the IAC from the beginning has had a greater share. This is to be seen in the first directive of NIA. There is no question but that the representatives of the several departments purveying the materials of intelligence have a share in arriving at the final product. The problem is still unsolved. Hillenkoetter's position, as he presented it again in this interview, has remained unchanged regardless of what may seem to be possible interpretations of statements from time to time.

I refer here to a place in the "Comments" on the Dulles Report where it seemed as though Hillenkoetter agreed to joint preparation and implied equality in estimating. He himself made the "Comments" from reports of his various Assistant Directors and others whom he asked to express their views, and from his own ideas. He took these reports home with him and put them in their final form as the "Comments." This paper was the answer to the Dulles Report. He was

Estimating
by the
Advisory
Committee

Comments
of the
Agency
on the
Dulles Report

[REDACTED]



Hillenkoetter's Responsibility responsible for it, and still wishes to be considered as solely responsible for it. In it, page 16, he did not mean to imply equality in estimating. Joint preparation meant participation by the chiefs of intelligence but his was the final individual responsibility for the estimate issued by CIA. His view with respect to estimates, therefore, has always been that the DCI must take the ultimate responsibility, after of course considering the views, the evidence, the facts as presented by the several departments and agencies concerned.

Hillenkoetter gave an example from his own experience under Admiral Nimitz. It seems that he submitted a report on Japanese strength on Attu. The admiral in command of the task force however submitted an estimate which maintained the Japanese had about ten times more strength there. At Nimitz' order Hillenkoetter reexamined his facts, but "stood pat." Nimitz asked what he thought Nimitz should do. According to Hillenkoetter, he said: "Sir, yours is the decision. I am sure of my facts." The admiral in command, said Nimitz, was much closer to the scene. Hillenkoetter replied that to the best of his knowledge the strength of the Japanese was 2500 men, not 25,000. Nimitz made up his own mind, removed the officer from command of the task force, and ordered his successor to complete the operation on the basis of the facts presented by Hillenkoetter. This was told to me with entire modesty simply as an illustration of individual responsibility. Nimitz had to make the decision. The stress was on the "facts" as distinguished from the "views" of the participants in the decision.

Nimitz and Hillenkoetter
Decision from Fact



[REDACTED]

The application of this formula to the function of making national estimates out of departmental intelligence is that the estimating staffs working for the Director must synthesize all the materials on a factual, objective basis. In practice, however, they do not do so. The capricious, the irrelevant, the particular interest of the contributing agency is very likely to get into the process. In short, representatives of the armed services will be thinking of their own budgets and their need for more plans or guns or ships when they offer an opinion in concurrence or dissent. The merits hardly ever get proper consideration in complete detachment. That is why, I gathered, Hillenkoetter felt that the Director of Central Intelligence must take the ultimate responsibility. He did not confuse this fact-finding process with the function of the policy-maker. His story about Nimitz illustrates the statement. The Director must present a considered as well as concerted estimate. But he must never get over the line into policy making on the basis of that estimate.

National Estimates

Opinions from Bias

Particular Interest

The Fact-Finding Process

Common Concern

"Common Responsibility"

From this discussion we went to the memorandum I had before him with regard to services of common concern to the agencies. Hillenkoetter agreed that in this sense CIA is a servant. Then we discussed the next idea that the Agency is engaged in the services of common responsibility by the agencies. That is to say, the agencies together have a duty to perform for the benefit of the policy makers. Hillenkoetter liked the phrase "common responsibility." Its implication is of course that the agencies must work together for the benefit of the national interest. We did not discuss the possibility that in

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this circumstance the Director should defer to the common responsibility as "collective responsibility." Neither one of us had the answer. The practical matter is that the departmental agencies have had to think of CIA in that manner.

It was about at this point that he reached into his desk drawer and brought out President Truman's letter to him as he returned to sea duty October 10, 1950. Hillenkoetter was obviously pleased with the letter, particularly for its commendation of his service to "the national interest rather than that of any particular group." He is evidently fully aware that he was replaced. He took care to tell me that he had put in for sea duty six months before he left. But at no time in our conference has he attempted to conceal the fact that he was investigated and criticized.

Truman
and His
Replacement

Interference
with
Internal
Organization

The Intention
of
Congress

He is fully aware that both the Dulles and McNarney Reports went rather far in interfering with the internal organization of the Agency. After all, he was entitled to have "ICAPS" or not, as himself pleased. He agreed with my suggestion that such direction by the National Security Council verged on the "illegal." He did not wish to call it illegal, for the NSC had the power to direct him. I remarked that of course the Council could direct him with regard to policy; but that as I read the Act, Congress did not intend that the Council should have authorization to force him into changing the internal mechanism of his organization except as the Council assigned him "other functions and duties." (Section 102 d 5) I understood him to agree but he obviously did not wish to criticize.

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Armstrong
for the
State
Department

Page 10. He glanced at the Armstrong letter concerning national intelligence and the right of inspection. I remarked that it seemed to me that Armstrong must have changed his position by the summer of 1949 when he was presenting "State's Four Problems."

Hillenkoetter said that Armstrong had changed very shortly after he had taken charge in place of Eddy. He did not indict Armstrong. He simply said that Armstrong had changed his position, probably under instructions. Hillenkoetter was interested in Houston's theory that Armstrong was seeking to get the DCI to use his right of inspection to help Armstrong in the State Department against the heads of geographical desks who were opposing him as they had McCormack. Hillenkoetter thought it possible but said that it was not very long before Armstrong was doing as the State Department wished him. Webb told Hillenkoetter that they would never let him make inspections over there.

Revocation
of the
Right
of
Executive
Agent

With regard to his revocation of the right to be executive agent of the Secretaries, Hillenkoetter said that he found the chiefs of intelligence very angry with Vandenberg. Hillenkoetter talked with them and with the Secretaries and Admiral Leahy. Leahy in particular said that he himself did not wish to interfere but that if Hillenkoetter wanted to give up the provision Leahy would support him. Vandenberg had never used his power. We talked at some length of my statement in Chapter VI. I did not have it quite as Leahy spoke in the meeting. They were accustomed to converse informally and then have the secretary set down the conclusions. But they often put things quite differently in the course of their conversation. What Leahy really

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Leahy's
Position

said, according to Hillenkoetter's memory, was that it seemed all right to him; but if the other men agreed that they should revoke, he would go along with them. This is much softer than I had it. And yet, it is true that Leahy saw no reason for abandoning the position. He recalled in my interview on July 3, 1952 that it was a good idea to have the Director in a position of strong and individual responsibility.

I am right in saying that, as he gave up the provision, Hillenkoetter had no intention to reverse Vandenberg's policies. Hillenkoetter was trying to reduce temperatures and remove hard feelings. In the same spirit he let the Eleventh Directive of "NIA" go through. It may have been, he said, a "bit of chicanery" on his part; they were possibly giving "some candy" to the chiefs of intelligence, but he and his supporters certainly knew that the Directive did not bind them after the National Security Act's section 303 came into operation. Probably, he said, the other fellows knew it also. But at the time he probably hoped that they did not. I asked him why he did not withhold approval. His answer was that he wanted to smooth things over until they got the new directives and the new organization under the statute. He felt that the DCI was more limited but also more secure in his position. The President could expand or contract the DCI's authority as the President saw fit before Congress passed the statute. He could no longer do this.

The
Eleventh
Directive
of
"NIA"

Royall's
Letter
for the
"IAC"

Page 12. It was the Royall letter which set Hillenkoetter in motion. He called it the "trigger." He went to Forrestal upon receipt of the letter. It so happened that the Bush letter came along to add

[REDACTED]

weight and to give Hillenkoetter an even better argument when he met the chiefs of intelligence again on December 8, after the famous meeting with Forrestal sometime between November 26 and December 8. This whole affair had not come out of a "clear sky." There had been days of telephoning and conversation. He was in daily contact with Souers by telephone or in personal conference. It was inevitable therefore that he should be called in by Forrestal for the "briefing."

The Meeting

As Hillenkoetter reconstructed the scene for me, Forrestal sat at the head of a long table with the chiefs of intelligence along one side, Chamberlin, Inglis, and McDonald or Cabell. (It was McDonald according to Cabell. But he attended the meeting on December 8. [REDACTED])

Those Present

[REDACTED]

Hillenkoetter does not remember which one of them represented the Air Force. There were also present Royall, Sullivan, Symington and Souers. Someone was there from the State Department but Hillenkoetter does not remember that it was Armstrong. It could have been Webb though that seems doubtful. Armstrong or his representative was more likely to be there with the members of the TAC. Anyway, Hillenkoetter stood at the other end of the table before a chart and an eagle, and explained the organization which he had in mind under section 303. When he had finished Forrestal asked for no opinions but turned to the chiefs of intelligence and said, according to Hillenkoetter's memory: "You are not going to interfere with this thing. It is going to run as Hillenkoetter says. Do you both understand that now?" Hillenkoetter is quite sure of the last question. It was aimed at Inglis and Chamberlin. The

Forrestal to Inglis and Chamberlin

[REDACTED]




General from the Air Force was not in the line of fire. Afterwards, Inglis said to Hillenkoetter, according to his memory: "He talked to us like a couple of plebes. I guess that makes us your servants now." I asked Hillenkoetter if he remembered this well. He was quite sure that he did. He said: "It was a great moment in my life."

"ICAPS" and the Standing Committee

Page 13. Hillenkoetter agreed that the issue over "ICAPS" had been blurred. He understood that "ICAPS" was Vandenberg's own staff and had never been anything else until the departmental chiefs insisted upon treating "ICAPS" and their representatives associated with it as subject to their control. I asked Hillenkoetter what became of his recommendation of September 18, 1947 with regard to "ICAPS" and the "Standing Committee." He replied that nothing effective was done about that.

The Difficulties of Scientific Intelligence

Page 14. Then we came to scientific intelligence. I asked what it was that held up his development of OSI, and proper relationships with AEC on the one hand and RDB on the other. Hillenkoetter said that the chief problem was to get scientists, the people whom he wanted. First rate scientists do not wish to "take the veil." He had tried to get the man who at present heads Brookhaven but had been unable to do so. Another person whom he did not mention by name had a \$65,000 a year job with one of the big businesses and an unlimited expense account. He could not afford to come to CIA. But it is that type of person whom CIA really needs to handle its scientific intelligence. Others who worked during the war wished to leave the Government.



[REDACTED]

I asked if there could not perhaps be a scientific center comparable to the research center at MIT. Hillenkoetter's reply was that the scientist must be here, on the spot, in order to understand the meaning of the cryptographic messages. He does not have to be a genius in research; he does have to be an expert in analysis to catch the meaning of some message which no one else without his knowledge would comprehend. Hillenkoetter told me of an endeavor with AEC to arrange for decoding the cryptograms and transmitting the "gist" to CIA. But the security officers would not allow such a procedure, for the reason that the material was too sensitive. It was necessary for the person to be there himself and run the material through his own mind. I have not put this in the proper language but it is about as I understood Hillenkoetter to explain it.

He said that there was on the part of G-2 or any other group no specific opposition to the development of OSI in the Agency. I felt that I had not obtained the whole story, not because he was reluctant to tell me but because I did not comprehend the details. He said that he was in frequent touch with Vannevar Bush who had an office nearby. I spoke of the letter from Bush to him in the spring of 1948 saying that the relationship between the Agency and the RDB was inadequate. But Hillenkoetter did not have much more to say upon the matter. In closing he presumed that we are still having difficulty. I asked about Chadwell and Clark. He was noncommittal beyond saying that they had a difficult task. The inference is not to be drawn that he considered them more to blame than anybody else.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Page 15 - 16. I recalled the proposal from CIA in July and August, 1947 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to membership in the Joint Intelligence Committee. Hillenkoetter remembered the plan for the Deputy Director to attend in case the Director were a civilian. I said that I had written, and I read part of it to him, that this amounted to having two DCIs. It seemed absurd to me. Hillenkoetter agreed. But, he said, the military men would be willing to have another military man attend the meeting. Still, he could hardly report back to his civilian chief what he had learned. The net result would be nothing except his own increased information.

Membership
in the
Joint Chiefs
of Staff

This led us to Hillenkoetter's plan for General Todd's membership in IAC. I asked him if it were expected at the time he wrote the letter to General Gruenther that he himself would have a place in the Joint Intelligence Committee of JCS. He said that they were discussing it. I read the sections which I have written on that matter, particularly the part which speaks of his taking the place of OSS at the foot of the table. Hillenkoetter smiled. He knew very well that would be his location. His thought on the whole matter, however, quite apparently was that any arrangement which he could make for maintaining the contact would be wise to make. It was evident that he was willing to put himself in an inferior position, although as DCI he was entitled to equality with the Joint Chiefs themselves. I remarked that they were the military advisers to the President as he was the intelligence adviser to the President and the Council. He readily assented. But he did not make any argument against the Joint Chiefs.

The Foot
of the
Table
for the
Director

Equal
Status
in
Law

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

His thinking, I suppose, was similar to that with regard to the intelligence chiefs in the summer of 1947. He should take what he could get, and be patient.

kinds
of
Intelligence

"Staff"
Intelligence

Navy
and
Air Force

Page 16 - 17. We talked a while about OIC. I asked him if there was any great reason for distinguishing the kinds of intelligence according to basic, current, national, and so on. He replied that they were useful distinctions but that current intelligence of course could be national. Then I said that I thought the whole business about "staff" intelligence was just so much "hokum." He laughed and said yes; when you want to keep something to yourself you claim that it is "staff intelligence." This recalled to him the controversy between the Navy and the Air Force over the control of air intelligence. He said that so far as he knew, the issue had never been settled. I replied that Secretary Forrestal had written a letter in January 1948 to designate the Air Force as the one with "primary interest," but also said that the Navy might continue to provide itself with this "staff intelligence." Hillenkoetter said they were continuing to do so. In other words, Forrestal did not settle the issue. He simply sidestepped it. I remarked that NSCIDs 2 and 3 were adopted after his letter. Yes, said Hillenkoetter, but the Navy and the Air Force were still bickering over air intelligence. This means, of course, that neither one has exclusive control and so they are competing. It is unnecessary duplication.

Page 18. And then we came to NSC 4-A. I asked him if he had followed the work of SENCOC. Yes, he had, through the reports of

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Psychological Warfare

Halversen. Did he agree with Galloway against mixing "SI" and "MO"? He most decidedly opposed involving the collection of secret intelligence with operations. He could not recall his memorandum of September 24, 1947; but he believed that I have the right presentation. He was opposed, and he expressed his opinion when the paper known as "304/11" came to start proceedings at once with regard to a covert psychological organization. Hillenkoetter did not wish to have CIA take over the function. He was forced to do so by the action of the Council. He remembered something of the drafting of this directive under NSC 4-A but not in great detail. He agreed that possibly he had left the details to Wright at that time because he himself was absorbed with the NSCIDs and the IAC.

"NSC 4-A"

Special Procedures Group in "OSO"

I asked him what the organization was which he established in OSO under Galloway. He said that they set up a foreign information branch and looked for persons to staff it, although he was most reluctant to involve clandestine intelligence with guerrilla actions of any sort.

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1.30241

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Connection
with the
Dulles Survey

Somewhere in this exchange of questions and answers I

inserted the inquiry if there had been any connection between the activity of the Dulles Survey Group and the shift from NSC 4-A to NSC 10-2. Hillenkoetter replied that there was no connection. In other words, the evolution of NSC 10-2 out of NSC 4-A, as he saw it, was independent of the general investigation of CIA although Kennan was interested in both. The point is here, I take it, that the Department of State and Department of Defense were not satisfied with having a covert psychological organization so closely under the control of CIA. They wished to run it. But neither wanted the other to take charge. They had to find some arrangement in which they participated. CIA was caught between them and subjected to punishment by both.

The State
Department
and the
National
Military
Establishment

The record shows that there was lack of confidence in Hillenkoetter, Wright and Galloway. But there was also rivalry and contention between the State Department and the National Military

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Establishment. The State Department wished to have its own man in control. Mr. Wisner came over from the State Department in 1948 as Mr. Kennan's man. "Defense" accepted the appointment at that time. Forrestal was still in charge. He committed suicide May 22, 1949. The situation was different in the summer of 1949 when the reunion of covert operations and secret intelligence was directed by the Council. Hillenkoetter discussed this consolidation later.

Disagreement
with
Donovan

[REDACTED]

Page 19. From the previous discussion we turned again to the question whether or not, if given his choice, Hillenkoetter would ever involve intelligence with operations. He said that he had talked often with General Donovan and on this matter they were in perfect disagreement. From Hillenkoetter's point of view he would have "OSO" compact and so well organized that it might be lifted out of one agency and deposited in another. But Hillenkoetter himself would not move "SI" to the Pentagon. He would move "OPC". He had not been given his choice. He had been "overridden" by his bosses in the National

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

"OPC"
to the
Pentagon

Cover
and
Funds

Security Council. I asked him if Kennan were back of it. I understood him to say that Kennan was one of the primary instigators. I then asked why they insisted upon using CIA and nominal responsibility of Wisner to the DCI. Hillenkoetter replied that it was for cover. They did not want "OPC" in either State or Defense and so they put it in CIA. If it failed they could disown it. But they did want to control "OPC" and so they practically forced the DCI to accept direction from State and Defense with regard to "projects." There was an additional reason, said Hillenkoetter. CIA was popular with Congress at that time. It could get money from Congress more easily than the State Department.

Page 20-21. Hillenkoetter again declared that he made a

His
"mistake"
in the
Bogota Affair

"mistake" in the Bogota affair. He would not make it again of course, and that was that. We talked then about Brown's statement in the subcommittee with regard to the intention of Congress not to give any agency the right to censor CIA. This led Hillenkoetter to recall that after the meeting Brown took particular pains to say that he sorry that Hillenkoetter had been given such unfair publicity. In other words, someone had misrepresented the situation to Brown. Here Hillenkoetter became reticent. I asked him if he knew who had caused the unpleasant publicity. He quietly replied: "Yes, I do know." It was a person in the State Department who had connections with another unnamed person in G-2.

Brown's
Remark
on
Publicity

It seems that the year before, when Hillenkoetter was taking office and Vandenberg leaving, the two of them wrote a letter to someone in the War Department practically demanding that a certain

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One Source of Enmity

clandestine operation for collecting intelligence in G-2's jurisdiction be stopped. The unnamed person there had expended about \$750,000; neither Vandenberg nor Hillenkoetter thought that the Government had got its money's worth. Besides, the activity was an infringement upon clandestine intelligence supposed to be reserved to CIA. They said in their letter that if the activity did not cease, they would take the matter to the Secretary. The practice, I believe, was stopped; but the enmity resulting from the interference by Vandenberg and Hillenkoetter caused the publicity. The man in the State Department, on behalf of his associate in the Army, gave out a good deal of hostile material. I remarked that I thought I might know who it was in the State Department. Hillenkoetter looked steadily at me. "Was it Peter Vischer?" It was.

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Origin of the McNarney Report

I asked him if the McNarney report were intended to be an independent commentary. I had noted that McNarney took exceptions to some of the Dulles findings. Hillenkoetter said no; it was written because Secretary Johnson claimed that he did not have time to read either the Dulles Report or Hillenkoetter's "Comments." And so, he got General McNarney to do the reading for him. Mr. Humelsine, representing the State Department, therefore seems to have been merely a silent partner. As Hillenkoetter put it, "He barely said yes and he never said no." The McNarney report was originally intended for Johnson only; it became, as Johnson presented it to the Council, the basis for action by the Council. Hillenkoetter did not wish to criticize the procedure, but it was apparent to me that he was not pleased with Johnson's behavior.

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[REDACTED]

The Investigation by Eberstadt

As for the Eberstadt investigation of 1948 and report, Hillenkoetter had little to say. He did not recall that it had much influence on the changes in the Agency. Eberstadt did not make the same kind of investigation that the Dulles Group made. He took testimony and seemed to prefer to "pat them on the back" rather than to criticize. I gathered that Hillenkoetter had paid relatively little attention to the Eberstadt Report. This would have been natural in view of the furore which the Dulles Report caused.

The Failure of the Operations Division

Then we came to the delay in the summer of 1949 over consolidating OSO, OPC [REDACTED] It was not Defense but the State Department which stopped their consolidation in an Operations Division. The "FBI" had nothing to do with it. I asked why it was that State should object. The answer was that State and Defense could not agree with regard to the man who should head the new organization. State would not accept Schow, the head of OSO, and Defense would not accept Wisner of OPC. Neither nominated anyone else. Hillenkoetter thought that the feud between Johnson and Acheson had something to do with the situation. He had already expressed his conviction that there should not be any such consolidation. To him OPC should have been put in the Pentagon as essentially a military operation. I did not ask him why he agreed to the move for consolidation. He was under much the same pressure by the Council as in the fall of 1947 when he was compelled to undertake psychological warfare against his own judgment.

State's "Four Problems" (1949) and the "Webb Staff Study" (1950) grew out of the Dulles and McNarney reports. To Hillenkoetter

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The State
and
Defense
Departments
in
Collaboration

it was a struggle for power between State and Defense. Armstrong was simply operating for his chief in the State Department. He had shifted his ground long since with respect to estimates. The role played by "ICAPS" was relatively minor. It was a "whipping boy." Its ineptitude had really no determining force. I asked about General Magruder's part. Hillenkoetter was reticent. It was obvious that he did not wish to speak against General Magruder. He put me off with the remark that the General was a sick man; he had lost a son in Korea. It was my cue to ask about something else.

Estimating
under
Pressure
Regarding
Korea

Hillenkoetter felt and still does that the estimating which was being done in CIA was in many cases, perhaps most cases, well done. I said in the course of the discussion that one point of view held by men of experience here was that no national estimates were made in those days, meaning coordinated departmental intelligence. On the other hand, there was a group who held that if they were not national estimates they were certainly remarkably accurate forecasts of what eventually happened. Hillenkoetter said "yes," and he was "proud" of their work. It was very pleasing to have been so accurate particularly with regard to Korea.

Reaction
to the
"Webb Plan"

As for the Webb Staff Study itself, apart from Magruder's share in it, Hillenkoetter's explanation was that after his "spies" in Defense told him what was afoot, he and his associates in the Agency took an extreme a position as they could. He said: "We did this, you know, so that if we asked for ten we might be able to get eight of the things we wished." In other words, they were in a fight for power and

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they knew it. They had thrust at them the phrase "collective responsibility." They threw back "individual statutory responsibility" under the Act of Congress. I had not studied the "Webb Plan" enough to ask any further questions at the time. It was nearly three o'clock. He had been talking since ten. He had another appointment soon, and so I withdrew.

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interview

Source: Hillenkoetter, R.H. file
in the Historical Staff files.

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Hillenkoetter to Darling (Second Interview), 2 December 1952.

p. 24:

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