
APPROVED FOR RELEASE Historical Collections Division HR 70-14 Date: 2 May 2012



Monday, 26 May 1952

PRESENT:	General	Smith,	Messrs.	Wisner,	Wolf,	Becker,	Earman	

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General Smith discussed the length of the O/PC reply to his memorandum concerning soap drops in China and stated that (1) a short paragraph or two reporting the facts and remedial action taken was all that was required; (2) a reprimand in this case was not necessary. Mr. Wisner stated that he felt that this instance was a good indication of the fact that "we had too many balls in the air" and that he hoped a paper now being worked on by Admiral Stevens' Group and NSC 114, when finally adopted, would give us sufficient broad over-all programming guidance and priorities, particularly in the field of psychological warfare. The Director concurred with Mr. Wisner and stated that NSC 114 would be welcome as a basic advisory paper; however, it must contain priorities in order to be of any real benefit to us. In connection with this paper, Mr. Wisner noted that we should study it very carefully since in its present form he did not believe it would fill our bill and stated that if at all possible NSC 114 should be coordinated with the above-mentioned paper now being worked on by the Stevens' Group. The Director approved and asked Mr. Becker to pass this along to the NSC Senior Staff. Mr. Becker noted that (1) he had already passed along to the Senior Staff the DCI's desire that NSC 114 take a positive stand; (2) he had discussed with DD/P the preparation of several paragraphs to be included in this paper.

Mr. Wisner noted that there had been a large turnout in the Italian elections and we would have the final results by tomorrow.

Mr. Becker referred to the intelligence being received Sigmund Rhee and his clique and stated that, in his opinion, there was a "bombshell" building up which would put the Koje incident to shame.

(1) it was not incumbent upon CIA to secure OB information in Korea since the Army was there and that was their job; (2) we were much more concerned with the collection of strategic intelligence in this area:

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